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- THE SECRET LIFE OF GENERAL SUDOPLATOV
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TRUTH AND FICTIONS ABOUT MY FATHER

SERIES "DOSIER"

Andrey Sudoplatov

THE SECRET LIFE OF GENERAL SUDOPLATOV

Truth and fiction about my
father Book

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(Series "Dossier"). 151SH 5-270-01281-2 (Book 1) Pavel

Anatolyevich Sudoplatov was already considered an ace of espionage during his lifetime, or rather, the grand master of Stalin's political intelligence. This personality is truly legendary, on whose account there are many high-profile cases: special operations, organization of combat work behind enemy lines, providing our nuclear scientists with the most valuable information. But fate decreed that the name of Sudoplatov, one of the most talented illegal intelligence agents, who later became a lieutenant general, the head of reconnaissance, sabotage and terrorist special services, was deleted from the history of the state security bodies of our fatherland for many years. In 1953, he was unjustly arrested as "the closest accomplice of Beria" and for fifteen years carried his heavy cross in the cell of the famous Vladimirka. The author of this book, Andrei Sudoplatov (Kaganov), the eldest son of Pavel Anatolyevich, significantly expanded the scope of what was already known about the fate and career of an outstanding intelligence officer. The reader will get acquainted with a number of new documents and testimonies of people who knew P. A. Sudoplatov closely, as well as with personal

impressions of the author, which he kept in his memory, talking with his father in different years on various topics.

This edition consists of two books, provided with a wide range of application and reference apparatus, richly illustrated.

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1LVM 5-224-00137-4 design, 1998 *For many years the name
of Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, General Lieutenant
of State Security of the USSR, head of
the reconnaissance, sabotage and terrorist special services of
our country, was practically unknown to anyone. However, in recent
years, in connection with the releases, first in the United States, then in
a number of other countries and, finally, in Russia, the book of his
memoirs, it is unlikely that there will be at least one more Chekist, after
Dzerzhinsky, Yezhov, Beria, about whom so much would be written,
filmed documentaries in our country and abroad. Hundreds of articles,
television and radio programs with the characteristic titles "The main
saboteur of the Land of Soviets", "Terminator No. 1", "Prisoner of the
XX Congress" filled newspapers and television screens. Gradually,
this man is turning, as it is fashionable to put it now, into a cult figure.
The author of this book, when asked how he perceives all this hype
around the name of his father, said: "It is*

*unpleasant for me to watch how before my eyes a person whom I
knew and loved well turns into the main superman of the 20th century,
then into a vulgar idiot, murderer and executioner, depending on the
fantasy or political predilections of the next author. In addition, his so-
called "memories" themselves aroused serious objections in me.
These, of course, are not memoirs in the sense that we are used to
thinking about it, but the fruit of the labor of several authors, and the
father was clearly not the main one among them. Getting acquainted
with the translations of a book published in the USA, the first thing that
comes to mind is that the goal of its foreign co-authors was not the
desire to understand historical truth, but*

the intention to create a stir around those problems that my father had to deal with in his time ... "A difficult

fate befell Sudoplatov. His name is a legend, and his whole life is a struggle. And the fight is not only against the enemies of the Soviet government, for which he began to fight from the age of twelve, not only a fight with the Gipperian fascists, but also for his own life.

General Sudoplatov carried out "especially important - special and secret" tasks of the political leadership of the country. His track record includes illegal intelligence work in a number of European countries, the liquidation, on the instructions of I.V. Stalin, of the leader of Ukrainian nationalists, one of the reliable satellites of Adolf Hitler E. Konovalov, the development of an assassination attempt on Leon Trotsky in Mexico, and active participation in the creation of a special forces detachment NKVD (OMSBON), partisan units and reconnaissance and sabotage groups that made a significant contribution to the defeat of the Nazi invaders. But not only combat work is on the account of P. A. Sudoplatov. It fell to his share - one of the leaders of Soviet political intelligence - to provide our atomic

scientists with the most valuable information. But the brilliant career of General Sudoplatov life was interrupted at a mature stage in his life - on August 21, 1953, he was arrested as "Beria's closest accomplice" and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Neither the change of those in power, nor the petitions of combat comrades-in-arms and relatives influenced the decision of the court - he carried his cross

"from bell to bell" and was released in 1968. The tragedy of P. A. Sudoplatov is the tragedy of almost all of our special services, which were used as a fail-safe mechanism in implementing the Kremlin's policy. P. A. Sudoplatov himself recalls such an episode. It was after Leon Trotsky had gone into oblivion. Presenting the order for the excellent operation, the Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, M. I. Kalinin, assured its participants that the party leadership would always be grateful for the opposing work, and promised everyone all kinds of help. However, when

hastened to turn its back on its loyal soldiers, moreover, it made them scapegoats.

This book, created by the son of P. A. Sudoplatov , Andrei Pavlovich Sudoplatov.m-Kaganov, with the active assistance of the historian Alexander Kolpakidi, significantly expands the scope of what we already know about the fate and career of the outstanding Soviet intelligence officer Lieutenant General Sudoplatov. In it, the reader will not only find many new documents and testimonies of people about the multifaceted activities of one of the last Mohicans of intelligence of the old Soviet school, but also get acquainted with the author's personal impressions, which he kept in his memory, talking with his father on various topics in different years of their life together , will supplement his knowledge of the people who surrounded his father. The names of many of them are covered with glory and have become legendary. The book quite frankly shows the family life of the Sudoplatovs, their interests and hobbies. There is also much unknown in the book about Andrei's mother , Emma Karlovna, the wife of Pavel Anatolyevich, who devoted many years to Soviet intelligence, rising to the rank of

senior state security officer. Of course, the book does not claim to be comprehensive. The problems that P. A. Sudoplatov had to deal with by the nature of his service, Andrey Sudoplatov could not know all this for obvious reasons, but he replenished his knowledge from archival sources of the special services of our country, as well as from memories of people

who knew it well. A. Sudoplatova. The book "The Secret Life of General Sudoplatov" is published in two volumes. Both volumes are supplied with an extensive appendix, a list of names and photographic illustrations

In one of the newspapers I happened to read, after the death of the main character of this book, the following words: "Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov lived a worthy life in peace with himself, in accordance with his ideals and principles, the loyalty to which he carried through all the trials."

This is what the book is about.

THE SECRET LIFE OF GENERAL SUDOPLATOV

BOOK ONE

Chapter 1 THE SON OF THE VCHEK

My father, Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, was born in 1907 in Ukraine, in the city of Melitopol. His father's mother was a Moldavian from Tiraspol, Feodosia Terentyevna Palyga, and his father was a Ukrainian. Apparently, the father did not know the exact day of his birth. At least, looking through the numerous questionnaires filled out by my father, I did not find one. And although, of course, our family celebrated his birthday on July 7, I think that this date was conditional. However, this was not uncommon in those days. Shortly before his death, my father told how he was baptized in the Russian Orthodox Church on the day of Peter and Paul. In all likelihood, his birthday is not far from the date of his baptism, hence the name Paul. I remember those birthday father days. They always gathered at the dacha, in a narrow circle of relatives of the father and mother. Close friends came: the Rybkin families

- Zoya Ivanovna, Boris Arkadyevich - and the Zubovs - Anna Vasilievna and Pyotr Yakovlevich. My parents' friendship with these people was truly sincere and strong, tested by time, until the end of their lives. I imagined that only courageous, courageous people, soldiers of the "invisible" front - scouts could be friends like that. But of course, I did not know about the nature of their occupation then. The festive table was always "provided" by Grandma Fanya (mother of my mother). She always did it skillfully. On the table were various cookies, sweets, fruit drinks. At the age of seven, my father went to the Melitopol city school, from which he graduated in 1919. My father's primary education, like that of many of his peers, included the study of the New and Old Testaments.

and the basics of the Russian language, since in tsarist times the teaching of Ukrainian in schools was prohibited. They were used only as a conversational. By the way, at home, my father sometimes spoke to us in Ukrainian, jokingly called us “Khokhlyat children”, learned Ukrainian songs with me and my brother, sometimes he sang in Ukrainian when he put me to bed.

The family in which my father grew up was very poor, but in general poor. They didn't even have their own housing, they rented a two-room apartment in a small one-story house owned by the landlord Khrolenko. My paternal grandfather, Anatoly Sudoplatov, often changed professions: he was a laborer, baker, baker, cook, waiter. He died in 1917 from tuberculosis. After his death, all the worries about the family fell on the shoulders of his mother and older sister. Thus, the year 1917 in my father's biography, as he himself spoke about it more than once, was marked by two dates at once: the death of my father and the collapse of the Russian monarchy. My paternal grandmother was a

housewife. After the death of her husband, she was engaged in laundry at home. Already at an advanced age, she lived with her daughter Nadezhda, but her father constantly supported them financially. In general, he was a person with very keen family feelings, he always tried to help his loved ones in any way he could.

In the family, besides my father, there were four more children, he was the fourth in age. His older sister, our aunt Nadya, worked as an accountant for the Ministry of Medical Industry in Moscow after the war. The elder brother Nikolai, who had the greatest influence on his father, joined the Red Army in 1918, two years later he became a fighter in the Cheka detachment, and then almost continuously participated in battles on different fronts. In 1922, he died in the line of duty on the Polish border. Another brother, Grigory, also served in the Red Army. After demobilization in January 1946, he was in economic work, was the director of the Kyiv canning factory. And finally, the last, younger brother Konstantin, following the example of his father, worked in the state security agencies, but did not make a big career. For many years he

worked as an ordinary employee in the apparatus of the MGB of the Moscow Region, from where he was fired in 1953.

My father was ten years old when the revolution took place and the Bolsheviks took power. At first, life in the city, he once said, changed little and everything flowed according to the usual order. However, as soon as food supplies ran out, chaos began, accompanied by gang terror. My father's perception of the events of that time can be considered typical of low-income families who had nothing to lose. Quite naturally, my father believed with all his heart, after reading Bukharin's ABC of Revolution, that "public property will mean building a just society, where everyone will be equal, and the country will be ruled by representatives of the peasantry and the working class in the interests of ordinary people, and not landowners and capitalists.

When the Civil War began, Ukrainian nationalists proclaimed an independent republic and officially declared war on Russia and the Ukrainian Bolshevik leadership in January 1919. This struggle actually ended only in January 1922, after the Ukrainian government in exile and the rest of the world recognized President Kravchuk as the legitimate head of the sovereign state of Ukraine. My father made his life choice once and for all on June 26, 1919. As it seems to me now, for the father this choice was correct. At least

what is happening in Ukraine now has fully confirmed this. On that day, my father ran away from home and joined the Red Army regiment, which was being formed in Melitopol, the backbone of which was the workers of the city, active

participants in the struggle for the establishment of Soviet power. Then the regiment, under the onslaught of the Whites, left Melitopol along with other units of the Red Army. The regiment was defeated by the Whites during the retreat, and only small groups of fighters managed to join the units of the 44th Infantry Division of the Red Army in the Kyiv region. Later, Pavel Sudoplatov took part in the battles near Kiev. I had to fight mainly not with the Whites, but with the troops

Ukrainian nationalists, led by Petliura and Konovalets, commander of the Sich Riflemen corps. By the way, in the 30s, and then again in the 40s, my father again took a direct part in the fight against Ukrainian nationalists.

Interestingly, my father joined the Bolsheviks not at the moment of their offensive successes, but at the moment of retreat and the tragic collapse of the Ukrainian Front in the summer-autumn of 1919. However, he had already run away from home twice before in order to join the Red Army, once he returned himself, another time he was returned. My father was barely twelve years old that year.

Thirty kilometers from Melitopol, in the village of Veseloe, the detachment commissar made an attempt to bring his father home, but nothing came of it. The father fled from the commissar to the detachment, the fighters of which left him with them. Together with the detachment, after a dramatic crossing of the Dnieper, my father reached the city of Nikopol, Zaporozhye region. In this city, the 1st Melitopol Workers' and Peasants' Regiment was formed from Melitopol, which later merged into the 5th Zadneprovskaya Division. Somewhat later, the regiment was renamed the 1st shock. As it turned out later, my father's brother Nikolai also served in the same division in the 1st and 2nd shock regiments.

A poorly armed, practically untrained regiment in the area of Karnaukhovsky farms was defeated by the troops of the 3rd Kuban Cossack Corps, commanded by Ataman Shkuro. With a group of fighters, my father was captured, in which he spent a couple of days. However, an opportunity soon presented itself to escape from captivity. Taking advantage of the more than liberal attitude of the skins to strong drinks, the Melitopol residents dug a tunnel and fled from the barn in which they were kept. However, at night, the father fought off the rest of the fighters and found himself alone. He went back in the direction of Nikopol, hoping to join the remnants of his regiment. Besides, he just didn't know any other roads.

He crossed the front line safely, especially since there was no front line as such. And few people paid

attention to a twelve-year-old boy. At that time, thousands of such homeless children wandered along the roads of Ukraine.

Soon my father managed to join one of the Red Army groups, which also made their way in the direction of Nikopol. Here they were poured into the 2nd shock regiment. Here in Nikopol, my father met his brother Nikolai. Soon the whites approached the city - and the regiment was evacuated to Kremenchug. On the

way, my father fell ill. By this time, the Ukrainian front had finally collapsed, some of the Red Army men managed to break through to the north to join the soldiers of the Red Army, the other part joined the detachments of Father Makhno, and the majority remained in the rear. The 2nd shock regiment was transferred to Nikolaev, and from there to Odessa. Here, the father again lost his brother, after he, as part of one of the detachments, was thrown by the command of the Odessa garrison to liquidate the white landing force that had landed at the 16th station near Odessa.

On August 25, Denikin's troops occupied Odessa. Father still remained in it until the liberation of the city by the Red Army in January-February 1920. While in Odessa, my father was homeless, for some time he sailed on a sailboat along the Odessa-Kherson line, worked part-time in the port and in the market. In February 1920, after the liberation of Odessa by the Red Army, my father again joined the Red Army, this time in the signal company of the 123rd rifle brigade of the 41st division of the 14th army. Together with the brigade, my father was sent to the front and remained there until the end of the Soviet-Polish war.

During this period, the 41st division participated in the defeat of Denikin's troops in the lower reaches of the Dniester River, then in the defense of the Black Sea coast and the Dniester. Then the division was transferred to the Polish front, in April-June 1920, it participated in battles with the White Poles in the region of the middle reaches of the Dniester River, as well as in battles against detachments of Ukrainian nationalists led by Tyunnik; in June-July - in the offensive in the area of Vo-lochesk - Kremenets - Kamenets Podolsky; in July-August - in crossing the rivers Zbruch, Seret, Golden and Rotten Linden, the liberation of the cities of Terebovl, Chertkov, Galich, Rohatyn. However, after the defeat of the Soviet

troops near Warsaw, the division withdrew to the area of Kamenets Podolsky. In

November 1920, the 41st division took part in the liquidation of the Petliura partisan detachments and the liberation of the cities of Mogilev-Podolsky and Kamenetz-Podolsky. On December 21 of the same year, the division was reduced to a brigade and merged into the 44th division

of the 12th Army, and from January 1921 became part of the Kyiv Military District. At this time, the fighters of the division had to wage a fierce struggle with the detachments of Ukrainian nationalists, as well as with the Makhnovist gangs, carrying out raids on the Right-Bank Ukra

In the division where he served, Poles, Austrians, Germans, Serbs and even Chinese fought together. The latter, as my father recalled, were very disciplined and fought to the last drop of blood. The struggle was fierce, and it happened that entire villages were destroyed by Ukrainian nationalists and gangs: in total, over a million people died during the Civil War in Ukraine. My father once said that his generation was used to the brutality of that war, losses and hardships. The country has been in a state of war since 1914, and the tragedy of Russia was that until the very end of the Civil War, that is, until 1922, it was not possible to create a stable society based on normal, humane values. Employees of the political department of the division tried to send my father to study in Kyiv, but unforeseen circumstances confused these plans.

The fact is that the soldiers of the Special Division of the division were ambushed by Ukrainian nationalists. Most of them died. In the Special Department, in connection with the losses incurred, a telephone operator and a cryptographer were urgently needed. Since by that time my father had already graduated from elementary school, he could read and write, he was assigned to the Special Department. Thus, at the age of fourteen, my father was sent to work in the security agencies. This, obviously, was the beginning of his service in the state security agencies. In May 1921, my father became an employee of the Special Department of the 44th division,

stationed at that time in the city of Zhytomyr,

the main center of the Volyn region. In the bodies of the Cheka, my father was engaged in various technical work. At that time, he had the posts of a clerk, a registrar, a machinist, a systematizer, first in the Special Department, and then in the Gubernia Department of the GPU in Volhynia.

The experience gained by the father while performing the duties of a telephone operator, and then a cryptographer, turned out to be very useful to him in the future. He printed secret documents sent to the command, and deciphered telegrams that the Special Department received directly from the head of the Cheka, Felix Dzerzhinsky from Moscow. Father

recalled how 1921 was a turning point in his life. The division in which he served was transferred to Zhytomyr. The main task of its Special Department was to help the local Cheka in infiltrating the underground of Ukrainian nationalists led by Petliura and Konovalts. Their armed gangs staged acts of sabotage against local Soviet authorities. Potazhevich and Savin, who headed the Cheka, managed to establish a dialogue with the leaders of the gangs and hold informal negotiations with them. The leadership of the Special Department then met with them in Zhytomyr at a safe house. My father, as a junior assistant, was supposed to live in the house where the safe house was located and serve the negotiations. The experience of communicating with the leaders of the formations of Ukrainian nationalists, who were, in fact, the real masters in their district, helped my father in the future, when he became an operational worker of state security. He later said that he experienced in his own skin what it was like to deal with conspiracies in the underground.

Chapter 2

CIVIL WAR IN UKRAINE

The main enemies of the Chekists of Ukraine at that time were local Ukrainian nationalists. Almost all 30 years of his father's service in the state security agencies, he somehow had to deal with this public. To understand

the essence of this struggle, it is necessary to make a small historical digression into the history of Ukrainian nationalism, which in the current era of democratization is flourishing in full bloom on the territory of now independent Ukraine.

The war with the Ukrainian nationalists lasted almost two years and ended in 1922 with a compromise: their leaders accepted an amnesty given to them by the government of Soviet Ukraine. This happened only after the cavalry detachment of two thousand sabers, sent by Konovalets to Zhitomir, was surrounded by units of the Red Army and surrendered. The Konovalets gang suffered a crushing defeat. My uncle, my father's older brother Nikolai, who served in the border troops on the Polish border, died in these battles. After the capture of Ukraine by Denikin in 1919, the activities

of Ukrainian state security agencies were temporarily interrupted. However, as the territory of Ukraine was liberated, they again began to recover, mainly in the form of front-line Chekas. Investigative commissions and territorial judicial investigative bodies were created in some areas.

Only on March 17, 1920, after the complete liberation of the republic, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee adopted a decree on the formation of the Tsupchrezkom (Central Directorate of Extraordinary Commissions for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Offenses).

Unlike the former All-Ukrainian Cheka, which was only a department of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Tsupchrezkom was established directly under the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and was subordinate only to him. A little later, the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars of the republic explained that the Tsupchrezkom should work in close contact with the People's Commissariats of Justice and Internal Affairs. The local bodies of the Tsupchrezkom were departments of the executive committees of the Soviets, and the heads of the provincial departments of justice and internal affairs were part of the collegium of the provincial Cheka, which, in turn, delegated its representative to the collegium of the provincial r

Instead, district politburos were formed as part of the militia, which were in charge of the fight against counter-revolution and banditry.

The striking force of the Tsupchrezkom was the Special Department. His tasks were to protect the borders, conduct counterintelligence, combat espionage and the aforementioned banditry. To combat large gangs, internal security troops (VOHR) and special forces (CHON) were used. The latter were formed by local party committees and were subordinate to them. It is clear that the Russian-

speaking security officers who arrived from the RSFSR played the main role in the Tsupchrezkom. There were not enough local personnel, and those that were, the overwhelming majority were not Ukrainians by nationality. So, V.N. Mantsev, who was also a member of the collegium of the Cheka and the head of the Special Department of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts, became the head of the Tsupchrezkom. He was already an experienced security officer - before that he headed the Moscow Cheka. In the summer of 1920, the activities of the Tsupchrezkom were actually directed by the chairman of the Cheka, Dzerzhinsky, who was formally appointed concurrently as head of the logistics of the Southwestern Front. The headquarters of the rear of the front, created on the Right Bank of Ukraine, was headed by the deputy chairman of the Cheka, Yakov Peters.

The situation in Ukraine during this period was so difficult that the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee decided not to even apply here the January 1920 decree of the All-Russian Central Executive

Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on the abolition of the death penalty. The nationalist gangs expelled back in 1919, it was simply impossible to call them detachments at that time, found shelter in the border areas with Poland in the rear near Denikin, forming there the so-called "government of the Ukrainian People's Republic" (UNR). During the period of the triumphant victories of the Red Army, which ended in February 1920 with the liberation of Ukraine from Denikin's troops, the nationalists decided to take advantage of the situation and sent troops led by Omelyanovich-Pavlenko to strike at the rear of Denikin and at the same time launched a guerrilla war in the rear of the retreating Denikin.

The "independents" formed the so-called Tsupk (Central Ukrainian Insurgent Committee) in Kamenetz-Podolsky, headed by Nazar Petrenko (aka Stodolia), a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries. Tsupkom called for the creation of partisan detachments in the rear of the retreating Denikinists. At the same time, the troops of Omelyanovich-Pavlenko and Tsupkom were tasked with seizing power at the moment the White Guards retreated and the Red Army detachments

approached. This, of course, was a completely unrealistic, simply ridiculous adventure. Talking about these events, my father always emphasized that this adventurism, bordering on farce, has always been a distinctive feature of the supporters of "independent Ukraine" - people from its central and eastern regions, in contrast to the "Westerners", whose adventurism has always been heavily implicated in pathological cruelty and fanaticism. As expected, the performance

of Tsupkom ended in complete failure. His troops were completely insignificant in number; with the advent of the Red Army, most ordinary partisans joined its ranks, and employees of the Special Departments dealt with the leaders. The army of Omelyanovich Pavlenko was utterly defeated.

Having suffered yet another shameful fiasco, the government of the UNR entered into a dastardly collusion with the rulers of Poland. On the night of April 22, 1920, on the eve of the Poles' attack on the RSFSR, a secret treaty was signed in Warsaw, according to which the Petliurists, in exchange for recognition of the independence of Ukraine and help in the fratricidal war against the Russian people, transferred to the Poles a fifth of the Ukrainian land with a population of 10 million people (Eastern Galicia, Kholmshchina, part of Volhynia). At the same time, they transferred their "armed forces" to the Polish command for the war with the RSFSR.

Immediately after the start of the war, the leaders of the Petliura gangs operating in Ukraine became sharply active. They had the task of raising a general uprising in the rear of the Red Army. They did not succeed in doing this to the full extent, but they caused considerable harm.

In this regard, we can recall from history the treacherous role of the Galician units (by the way, in connection with their betrayal, my father was captured a second time), as well as the activities of numerous partisan detachments, the largest of which were: in the Kiev region - the gangs of Goly, Gryzl, Tsvetkovsky, Mordalevich, Dorosh, Yaremenko, Bogatyrenko, Tserbaryuk, Struk; in the Kremenchug region - the gangs of Kikt, Levchenko, Derkach, Khmara, Klepach, Yabluchka, Mamai, Zaliznyak, Zavgorodny, Stepovoy, Kaliberda, Bondar; in the Poltava region - the gangs of Gonta, Hristov, Matvienko,

Warriors, Shtapy; on Podolyina - gangs of Shepel, Folding, Zabolotny, Morgul, Granovoy, Saltis.

The leaders of the gangs, such as Tyutyunnik, Struk, Mazurenko, Sokolovsky, by their social origin were former teachers, wartime officers. Mordalevich acted in the Radomysl-Koro-

styshev region of the Kyiv province, Koshevoy and Zabolotny - in the Balsko-Olgopol region.

The activity of the Petliura bandits reached its greatest extent in the Alexandria, Chigirinsky and Cherkasy districts of the Kremenchug province, where the so-called Alexandria rebel division operated, numbering up to twenty thousand fighters in August-September 1920. It was headed first by Oko, and then by Ataman Khmara, who had transferred from the Poltava region. The political leadership of the division was carried out by the Elisavet-grad-Alexandria rebel committee headed by Nesterenko. The stronghold of the division was the famous Kholodny Yar, a dense forest with bogs, hills and rivers located in the Chigirinsky district. In this convenient place, the leaders of the underground and partisans found a safe haven. And although already in October 1920, units of the First Cavalry Army of Budyonny, together with the infantry units of the Red Army, surrounded the Alexandria Insurgent Division and defeated it in the area of the villages of Verblyuzhka and Novo-Starodub, for another four years separate partisan detachments operated in Kholodny Yar.

In addition to the gangs, the great danger in Ukraine was the Petliura underground. According to documents, the Tsupchrezkom, created only in March 1920, conducted an effective fight against the underground. One of the first to be liquidated was the so-called Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine, which arose in May 1920 in Poltava. It included, along with representatives of the Poltava intelligentsia, headed by Professor Priy-moy, leaders of the parties of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries (Chubukov, Doroshenko) and "Square" (Denisenko and Levchenko). The Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine was subordinated to its peripheral organization - the Poltava provincial insurgent committee and the partisan detachment of Ataman Vovk (200 people). Counting on the imminent collapse of Soviet power in Ukraine, the leaders of the committee decided to consider themselves the government of Ukraine, and Priyma was instructed to leave for Poland and coordinate with Petliura (who, by the way, was born in Poltava) the work plan of the "government". Here, however, the Chekists intervened and arrested the entire composition of the

committee, along with its periphery. In their struggle against Soviet power, the Petliurists often came into contact with their recent enemies, the Russian White Guards. So, in July 1920, an underground group was uncovered in Odessa, headed by Petliurist Klimovich, Ataman Usievich, the secretary of Enlightenment Krachets, and several Wrangel officers. The group had large stockpiles of weapons. In August, the underground organization in Elisavetgrad, which led the partisan movement in the region, was liquidated. It was headed by the Wrangel Colonel Alexander Belichenko, who arrived from the Crimea, and the Petliurist Musiy.

Of great importance for the fight against nationalists was the trial of a group of members of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party. It was this party that had a majority in the Central Rada, and then entered the government of the Directory. And although after the military defeat of the Petliurists, the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries left the government of the UNR and on February 7, 1920 officially announced their refusal to continue the struggle against the Soviet regime, they did not lay down their arms.

continue to maintain contact with the Petliura underground. In particular, a member of the Central Committee V. A. Golubovich, who was the chairman of the government of the Central Rada in 1917-1918, was found during a search with notes that convicted him of relations with the Petliura ataman Yuri Mordalevich. It also became known about the participation of Ukrainian SRs in the

Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine. A special department of the Tsupchrezkom arrested members of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party N. Petrenko (Stodol), I. Lizanovsky, I. Chasnyk, Y. Yaroslav, party activist Y. Skugar-Skvarsky, who repeatedly crossed the front line in 1919 to transmit espionage information to the UNR", party member Professor S. Ostapenko, former minister and then chairman of the Council of Ministers of the UNR in 1919. At the same time, a member of the "Independents" party, the former Minister of War of the "Government of the UNR" G. Sirotenko, who illegally returned to Ukraine and lived on a false passport, was also arrested.

The case aroused great interest in Ukraine. It was considered by the special presence of the All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal with the participation of the state prosecutor Dmitry Manuilsky, later a well-known Soviet figure, one of the leaders of the Comintern. The main defendants were sentenced to five years in prison. In June 1920, the former head of counterintelligence under the Directory,

Julian Tchaikovsky, turned himself in to the Kharkov Cheka with a confession. His case was thoroughly investigated and considered in a public meeting of the All-Ukrainian Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal. Numerous witnesses spoke at the trial, citing terrible facts of the criminal revelry of the Petliura warriors in Kyiv during the reign of the Directory. The testimony of the former chairman of the Directory, Volodymyr Vinnichenko, who arrived in Ukraine in the spring of 1920 from emigration, became sensational. In them, the former "head" of the "Ukrainian state", in fact, admitted that he and his inner

circle did not actually control the situation

in Ukraine: "Two persons, the head of the Directory and the chairman of the council of ministers, me and Chekhovsky, who, ironically, represented the highest power, actually had no power and did not make direct politics. Despite the fact that all resolutions, declarations and resolutions were issued in the spirit of these representatives, it belonged to the national and chauvinist petty bourgeoisie. These last words of Vinnichenko often come to my mind when I watch some contemporary Ukrainian politicians on TV.

All power in the times of the Directory really belonged to the "military", whose leader was Symon Petlyura, and the Western Ukrainian "Sich Riflemen" led by Yevgeny Konovalts were the strike force.

"When the trade union was destroyed for the first time in Kiev by a detachment of Konovalts and representatives of the Bureau of Trade Unions came to me," Vinnichenko testified, "I immediately called those who carried out the destruction and asked them the question on what basis they did it. I was told that, according to counterintelligence information, the Bolsheviks were gathering in the premises of the trade union, threatening peace **and** state power ... I simply gave the order that everything be corrected immediately, that the arrested be released and the books returned ... But after the first another followed in a row, followed by a third. Every time the same story was repeated.

As for the Jewish pogroms, Vinnichenko stated that he and the Directory treated them with "sharp condemnation" and issued appropriate decisions on this matter. However, the military authorities in the person of Petlyura did not take any practical measures to stop them. "Kovenko's detachment, it's true, was given the task of liquidating the pogroms, but in reality, going to the places for liquidation, he himself these carried out pogroms."

The number and scale of actions of nationalist gangs at the end of 1920 were so great that for their liquidation, mainly large military formations of the Red Army were used. In October 1920, two infantry brigades of the Red Army in the area of Verblyuzhka - Novo-Starodub defeated the Alexandria

division of Ukrainian nationalists. During the transition from the Polish front to the South, the First Cavalry Army of S. M. Budyonny cleared the Cherkasy district of bandits. However, at the end of October 1920, Ukrainian partisans led by Ataman Golyi reappeared here in the Cherkassy-Mykhaylovka-Drabovsk-Belozerye region, declaring themselves the "Moshnyanskaya Petliura organization." However, already in early November 1920, as a result of three days of fierce fighting, the Naked detachment was destroyed. From mid-November 1920

and throughout the winter of 1920/21, the 14th army of IP Uborevich was engaged in clearing the Right-Bank Ukraine from nationalist detachments. The 17th cavalry division of G. I. Kotovsky was especially successful, defeating the detachments of atamans Likho, Ivo and others in a number of districts of the Kyiv province. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1921, the activity of Ukrainian nationalists only intensified. In March 1921, detachments of Khmara, Zabolotny, Likho, Klim, Antonovich, Godzikovsky were operating in the Gaysinsky district - each with 150-300 people. Several detachments

concentrated in the Tripolie-Tarashcha-Kanev area. On the territory of the Kyiv military district there were 33 detachments with a total number of 6 thousand people with 92 machine guns. In April 1921, Koshevoy's detachment made a daring raid on Olgopol, trying to capture the headquarters of one of the divisions of the Red Army. The nationalists captured such large settlements as Nemirov, Borodianka, and others.

In the summer of 1921, the Soviet command, having received information about the impending large-scale invasion of the Petliurites from abroad, decided to intensify the fight against the insurgent movement. In June 1921, Zabolotny's gang was destroyed in the Olgopolsky district. Then Levchenko's gang was destroyed. In July, prominent Petliura chieftains Morda Levich, Orlik, Shevchuk and others surrendered. The Matveenko (Musienko) detachment laid down its arms. In August, Soviet troops defeated the most important rebel base in Kholodny Yar and the Matreninsky Monastery, destroyed the detachments of Nagorny, Zheleznyak, Stodoli and other atamans. The detachment of the ataman pursued by the 24th cavalry regim

Likho, numbering up to 120 sabers, crossed the Dniester at the end of August and left for Romania.

In the fall of 1921, the Petliurists went on another adventure. They planned to start a general uprising in Ukraine. Already in September, the Nelgovsky detachment breaks through the border with a reconnaissance purpose. Ataman Likho returns. However, he was not lucky. October 4, he died

in battle. In early October, a detachment of 120 sabers crossed the border and moved to Korosten. In the same region, another detachment dispersed into the villages and conducted agitation among the peasants. Ukrainian Chekists received absolutely reliable information about the planned transfer to Ukraine from the territory of Poland and Romania about two thousand Petliurists. By the way, one of those who reported this data was a close friend of his father, Sergei Karin (Danilenko), in the future a major Soviet intelligence officer. In the summer of 1921, he managed to infiltrate the headquarters of Tyunnik in Lvov and found out

the details of the raid being prepared. Taking into account the situation, the chief of staff of the Ukrainian troops on October 18, 1921, gave the order to detect and liquidate gangs in the Olevsk-Korosten region, prevent new gangs from crossing the Soviet border, and also mercilessly suppress attempts at rebellion or any assistance to gangs from the population.

In mid-October, there were 30 partisan detachments in Ukraine, the largest of which were detachments of Colonel Karyy, Galchevsky, Zabolotny. However, after the summer battles with the red units, their total number was small - 1000 sabers and 500 bayonets. Nevertheless, Petlyura and Tyutyunnik did not abandon their crazy plan to organize a general uprising. They naively hoped that, having broken through the cordon into Ukrainian territory, they would be able to raise the population to fight against the "Kids, Muscovites and Communists."

On the territory of Poland and Romania, interned troops of the UNR were concentrated, numbering 25 thousand people. It was these forces that the nationalists were counting on. In Lvov, at the direction of Symon Petliura, the Central Insurgent Headquarters was formed, headed by Yurko Tyutyunnik,

elevated to the rank of cornet general. The head of the operational headquarters was Colonel Yurko Otmarshtein, the organizational department of the headquarters - Colonel Leonid Kuzmitsky (by the way, during the Great Patriotic War - one of the organizers of the Bandera UPA), the intelligence department - Colonel (still of the tsarist General Staff) Kuzminsky and administrative political - Lieutenant Colonel Dobrotvorsky. The central insurgent headquarters was in fact maintained by the Polish intelligence, the so-called "two" (2nd department of the Polish General Staff). French intelligence also gave money. Petliurists kept their military recruitment centers in a number of cities: Stanislav

(now Ivano-Frankivsk), Lvov, Przemyśl, Ternopil. According to the plan developed by the Central Insurgent Headquarters, the entire territory of Ukraine was divided into five parts, forming insurgent groups, each of which, in turn, was divided into four or five districts, and the latter into subdistricts. These units were organizationally supposed to unite all the Petliura armed forces intended for operations on the territory of these regions. The commanders of the groups were appointed by the Central Staff from among the most experienced commanders, the commanders of the districts were appointed by the commanders of groups from local people or from officers sent from behind the cordon. In addition to the insurgent detachments, according to the plan, it was supposed to organize insurrectionary underground committees - insurgent committees (central, group, provincial, county). The network of insurgent committees was built as follows: insurgent "twos" were created in the villages, volost "troikas" stood out from the representatives of the rural "twos", the latter were supposed to create a county insurgent committee of five people. Committees of higher levels were appointed by the Central Headquarters. At the moment determined by the headquarters, at its signal, this entire system was to begin a general uprising. At the same time, an invasion of the Soviet territory from Poland and Romania by the Petliura troops interned there was planned.

In connection with their plan for a general uprising in the Ukraine, the Petliurists (or rather, their masters) sought to find allies in

their interventionist designs. As such, they counted on the Savinkovsky "People's Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom", Belarusian nationalists, the Zaporozhye and Kuban Cossacks, and even on the notorious old man Makhno, who in the spring of 1921 prepared a draft declaration on the creation of an association of all-Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik forces for the "national liberation of Ukraine". In order to act with certainty, the Petliurists simultaneously with "revolutionary committee" And sought, all the alleged uprising, to provoke a mutiny in the Red Army units in the Ukraine. They managed to recruit many

commanders and cadets of the Kiev school of "Chervonny foremen", several commanders of the 45th Infantry Division led by the division chief Gor-kusha-Savitsky, the commander of the 70th brigade Kryuchkovsky, the commander of the 26th regiment Baylo Vereshchak and some others .

The invasion began on the night of October 27 with a false distraction by the Petliurists. In the Gusyatyn region, a detachment of Ataman Paliy, numbering 500 sabers, broke through to Ukraine. Paliy distributed weapons to the peasants and called them to revolt. After that, up to 280 local residents joined him, but the bulk of the peasants showed complete indifference to the idea of an independent Ukraine. As a result, the Paliy detachment was defeated, losing almost half of its personnel and four machine guns. However, Paliy managed to complete his main task, ensuring a breakthrough of the main forces of the Petliurists. On the night of November 5, 1921, a detachment of the cornet general Tyutyunnik entered the Soviet territory. It consisted of regular troops of several

Petlyura divisions. Tyutyunnik was accompanied by three former Petlyura ministers of civil administration, communications, trade and industry, who, presumably, already saw themselves sitting in warm places in Kyiv in the future Ukrainian government. In the Olevsky district, the nationalists managed to form a rebel regiment of 600 people. At dawn on November 7, Tyutyunnik attacked Korosten, hoping to coincide with the capture of this important strategic

point opening the road to Kyiv, on the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution. However, the defenders of the city threw back the arrogant "independence".

Having been defeated, Tyutyunnik tried to move deep into Ukrainian territory, bypassing the city of Radomysl from the south. However, the advance of his detachment was delayed by a strong storm that broke out on November 10. Meanwhile, the 9th Crimean Cavalry Division under the command of G.I. Kotovsky moved to the scene in a forced march. During November 11-15, the 51st Cavalry Regiment pursued the Tyutyunnik gang, which on November 16, after crossing the Teterev River, split up. The defeat of the main forces of Tyutyunnik was carried out on November 17 by the 53rd and 54th cavalry regiments of the Kotovsky division in a swampy area southeast of the city of Ovruch. At the same time, 250 rebels were killed, 517 were taken prisoner, 22 machine guns were captured. On the night of November 21, 50 people led by Tyutyunnik were able to cross the Polish border in the opposite direction. On November 25, they were joined by the remnants of the other half of the detachment, led by Colonel Cherny, who managed to bring 150 sabers and 100 bayonets with him. Most of the raid participants were unable to break through to Poland and dispersed across the territory of Ukraine, and many of them continued to conduct active anti-Soviet work, delivering a continuous headache to the security officers of Ukraine for several years. It is noteworthy that, according to official data, during the battle with the main forces of Tyutyunnik, the Kotovites lost only 3 killed and 17 wounded.

A little later, the Petliura forces also came forward, based on Romanian territory. November 19

In 1921, Ataman Pshennik invaded the Tiraspol region at the head of a detachment of 150 bayonets. Taking advantage of surprise, he was able to capture the western suburbs of Tiraspol and the village of Parkany for several hours. However, the 451st Rifle Regiment of the 51st Rifle Division, having launched a counterattack, defeated the gang, capturing 15 Petliurists and up to 200 local rebels who joined them. The rest of the detachment fled back to Romania.

According to incomplete information, from June to December 1921, 1281 rebels were destroyed in Ukraine, 1084 were captured and 903 people surrendered voluntarily. In December 1921, the nationalists of the Right-Bank Ukraine were liquidated. In the area of Korsun-Gorodishche-Smela from December 1 to December 15, 1921, 265 insurgents were destroyed and 1,537 deserters were detained. During the same period, 345 nationalists were exterminated and 20 captured in the Kamensko-Chigirinsky district, 2607 deserters voluntarily surrendered or were caught.

By the end of 1921, the main forces of the Petliurists in the Right-Bank Ukraine were defeated. However, the fight against the remnants of the nationalist formations dragged on until October 1922. In April-June 1922, two detachments were destroyed, and their chieftains were

taken prisoner. In July of the same year, flying detachments of the 2nd division of the Chervonny Cossacks and the 24th rifle division pursued the Galchevsky gang in the Podolsk province. In the summer, an energetic pursuit of Levchenko's gangs also unfolded. In September-October, the Right-Bank Ukraine ended with nationalist rebels. During these two months, about 300 voluntarily, and ^{cleaning} people were killed, captured or surrendered one of the detachments was driven into Poland. After the defeat of the Ukrainian nationalists in 1922, my father was transferred to work in the border troops. For some time he served in the county border

department of the city of Izyaslavl, and then at the Slavutinsky border post. In addition to the ongoing, but already clearly declining fight against gangs and the hunt for smugglers, the border guards of Volyn were directly involved in the partisan struggle of the communist rebels against the Polish authorities that unfolded on the territory of neighboring Poland. The fact is that as a result of the Soviet-Polish war, the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine fell under the rule of the Polish lords, who pursued a policy of genocide of the indigenous population in these territories. Ukrainian schools and Orthodox churches were closed, the Ukrainian language and culture were treated in every possible way. The same thing happened in Western Belarus.

The leadership of Soviet Ukraine was interested in using this situation to their advantage. First, under the leadership of Zakordat (Zakordonny department of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U), and later - military intelligence officers (Intelligence) and the Foreign Department of the GPU, large-scale support was carried out for the partisan movement in Poland.

Chapter 3

AFTER THE CIVIL WAR

While serving on the border in 1923, my father joined the Komsomol in the city of Shepetovka. In early September 1923, he filed a report on the transfer to Melitopol from the Slavutinsky border post and returned home. It seems to me that the reason for my father's departure was not only that he was tired of the uninterrupted hostilities that continued for the third year, he missed his family and his native city, but also that in the Ukrainian GPU, as well as throughout the country, there was a reduction in the Chekist apparatus and drastically

reduced budget. Upon returning home, my father was mainly at Komsomol work. Thus, his KGB experience was interrupted for a year and a half. Initially, my father got a job in the apparatus of the Melitopol district committee of the LKSMU. He was the head of the information department of the district committee and a member of the board, commandant of the working youth club, then, in 1924, the secretary of the rural cell of the LKSMU in the village of Novo-Grigorievka, Genichesk district, Zaporozhye region, and at the beginning of 1925, the secretary of the cell of the LKSMU of the plant named after Vorovsky (and at the same time an apprentice fitter at this plant) in the city of Melitopol. In the same year, my father was a trainee at the Melitopol District Consumer Union for a very short time.

In February 1925, the district committee of the LKSMU sent my father back to work in the OGPU. In 1925-1927 he was a matchmaker of the information department of the Melitopol Special Department of the OGPU, in 1927-1928 he was an assistant to the authorized accounting department of the Melitopol regional department of the OGPU,

then - junior operative worker in the district department of the GPU, where the father was responsible for the work of informants operating in the Greek, Bulgarian and German settlements. In 1928, a sharp turn took place in the biography of his father. He went to work in Kharkov, the then capital of Ukraine, and there until 1930 he worked as an authorized representative of the Information Department of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, simultaneously completing two co

Father, recalling that time filled with work, said that my mother, even then being his wife, prompted me to study law at Kharkov University. But he managed to attend only ten lectures and pass one exam - in economic geography. He simply didn't have time for more. Then the father's working day began at ten o'clock in the morning and ended at six in the evening with a short lunch break. After that, meetings with informers began at safe houses. They lasted from half past seven in the evening until eleven. Then the father returned to the service to report to his superiors on the received operational materials. According to Lenin's decree of 1922, the GPU, and later the NKVD-KGB (now the FSB) and

the foreign intelligence service, when making important decisions on foreign and domestic policy of the state, were to become the main sources of information for all levels of the Soviet and Russian leadership. I know that even today the country's leadership receives monthly reports on the situation in the state from the state security agencies through their agents. This kind of report includes a statement of internal difficulties and shortcomings in the work of various organizations, enterprises and institutions.

According to the order established under Stalin, it was not supposed to meet with your informant in the daytime. We met in the evenings. It was known that Stalin stayed up late, and all officials worked in the same mode.

Ironically, the information department of the department in which my father served was headed by the former tsarist officer Kozelsky, who came from an impoverished noble family. Although this man served in the tsarist army, his sympathies for the Bolsheviks, which manifested themselves during the years of the revolution, all

confidence. Nevertheless, their trust did not become a guarantee of a quiet life. My father once said that in 1937 Kozelsky committed suicide to avoid arrest during the purge campaign. It seemed that his father's career was developing upward. However, in 1930, a new turn takes place in his life. He falls into the reserve of appointments of the GPU (without monetary allowance) and soon receives a new - very unusual, but extremely important - task, which is jointly controlled by the leaders of the OGPU and party bodies. The father becomes the head of the cultural and educational part, and then the commissioner of the labor commune (special colony) of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR for juvenile delinquents and street children, located near the city of Priluki in the village of Ladan. After the Civil War, colonies of this kind aimed to put an end to the homelessness of orphans, who were forced by hunger and intolerable

living conditions to take the path of crime. For the maintenance of these colonies, each Chekist had to deduct ten percent of his salary. Workshops and vocational training groups were created at the colonies: the work activity of the children was then given decisive importance. Having won the trust of the colonists, his father, according to his stories, even managed to organize a fire extinguisher factory, which soon began to generate income. The father himself spoke about his work in the children's labor commune in his book *Horizons*, written by him in collaboration with Irina Guro (Raisa Sobol). Therefore, I will limit myself to citing an excerpt from it. In this passage, the first secretary of the CP(b)U Stanislav Kosior and the deputy chairman of the OGPU of Ukraine Karl Carlson are talking about the commune.

"I meant, Stanislav Vikentievich, to report to you on the situation in the Priluki labor commune," Carlson said hesitantly, expecting that the conversation would be postponed. But Kosior

remarked briskly:

— Let's, let's. Following the example of the Bolshevo Labor Commune, where work with juvenile delinquents and homeless children began for the first time, the Ukrainian Chekists created the same commune in Kharkov, and then in

Pryluky district. Several hundred boys, taken from places of detention and from the street, studied there and worked in workshops.

Now Carlson said that, while leaving for the Priluksky district on operational matters, he visited the village of Ladan, where a commune is located in the premises of a former monastery.

"The business is developing well. No more escapes, no major violations. All pantries, stalls are open. And these former thieves and homeless do not even think of taking up the old. Damn talented guys ... They study perfectly.

- And what? They took a sip of life, unfortunately,
she did not indulge them.

And she gave me experience," put in Kosior. — Do they have a seven-year-old there?

- Yes. And the workshops where they work four hours a day. - What are they releasing? What products? - Sports equipment, household utensils - everything is snapped up on the spot ... In the summer they help in the field work, and older boys even repair agricultural equipment. - And the population refers to them ... nothing? With trust? "At

first they were afraid of them like the plague. And now they are used to it. - These are all guys without relatives. Do they have any rest? - Last summer they traveled along the route Priluki

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Kharkov - Sevastopol, on foot to Yalta, from there on the famous motor ship "Crimea" to Odessa ... That's it. "And not one of them left?" Even in Odessa? Kosior laughed. - No

one. In Odessa, the Chekists organized a solemn meeting for them, took them everywhere. And left to rest at a children's resort near Odessa. Are there any special talents that come to light? - Very much! I saw their

magazine. I don't presume to judge about poetry, but they showed Mikitenko, so he says, they should be encouraged, they will be useful. Karl Martynovich felt that the secretary of the Central Committee did not

want to break away from this topic, and understood him: he himself, like many employees of the GPU, found some kind of outlet in the affairs of the commune, some kind of window into the world of the future, embodied in these children saved from most bitter fate.

In 1931-1932, my father worked as an instructor in the organizational instructor department of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in Kharkov. Due to the very high position of his wife in Ukrainian party circles, Pavel Sudoplatov met twice with Kosior, then secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. These meetings were held at Khataevich's apartment, where his father and mother were invited as guests. According to his testimony, my father was especially impressed by the way both of these leaders looked at the future of Ukraine.

They considered economic problems and the tragedy of collectivization as temporary difficulties that should be overcome by all possible means. According to them, it was necessary to educate a new generation absolutely devoted to the cause of communism and free from any obligations to the old morality. The greatest attention should have been paid to the development and support of the new Ukrainian intelligentsia, critical of nationalist ideas. It took another sixty years and the collapse of the Soviet Union for it to become obvious: it was necessary to show at least tolerance and try to understand the other side, and not seek to destroy it at all costs. Parents were flattered that people like Kosior and Khatayevich talked to them as if they were

their party comrades, although they were still members of the Komsomol at that time. Candidates for membership in the party became later.

My father met his future wife, my mother and brother Anatoly, in Kharkov. He was then twenty years old, she was two years older, she came to Ukraine from Belarus. Our mother - Krimker Sula-mif Solomonovna (by her husband - Kaganova, and since 1951 - Sudoplatova) Emma Karlovna, was born on May 1, 1905 in Gomel in a petty-bourgeois family. Her father, a lumberjack by profession, even before the revolution, and then during the NEP, also traded in fabrics received from abroad.

Mom was very capable from childhood, and she managed to enter an educational institution where there was a restrictive norm for Jews. She graduated from the Gomel Women's

a gymnasium with a gold medal (it was handed over to Torgsin at one time to help a large family, in which, in addition to mother, there were six

more children). Later, she began working as a secretary-typist for Khataevich, secretary of the Gomel provincial organization of the Bolsheviks. When her boss was transferred to Odessa, where he headed the party organization, she followed him in 1923. It was in Odessa that my mother moved to the local GPU. She was assigned to work among the German colonists living in the city. A blue-eyed blonde, she spoke a close German Yiddish and could easily pass for a German. In the family, by the way, my mother always spoke Russian with us. She was

transferred to Kharkov a year before her father moved there. The first husband of the mother was an employee of the authorities Gransky Viktor Isidorovich. Dismissed in 1937 from the NKVD, he retained his membership in the CPSU (b), since he had no party penalties. They divorced shortly before my mother and father met.

Mom occupied a more significant position in the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR than such a novice as my father was then. As an educated and attractive woman, moreover, well-read and feeling quite free in the society of writers and poets, she was entrusted with leading the activities of informers among the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia - writers and theater figures. At first, my father met my mother only in the service, and, as he later liked to say, he was struck by her beauty and intelligence.

My mother's father died when she was only ten years old. At the same age, my father also lost his father. She began to work and supported the whole family alone.

And my father had four brothers and sisters who needed his help. So he had a lot in common with his mother: both of them were at one time a support for their families and, due to circumstances, had to grow up early.

For the father, in his own words, "Emma was the ideal of a real woman." In 1928 they got married, although they officially registered the marriage only in 1951. Many of their comrades lived in families in the same way, without formalizing their marriage for years. They

lived together for over sixty years. She always felt intelligence, culture, clarity, large intellectual qualities helped her save her family, survive in difficult times, give her father a ticket to a new life already in adulthood, in a new capacity - as a Soviet writer, translator, publicist. Mom was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, medals. She retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel. She died in 1989. Chapter 4

TEACHERS, MENTORS, FRIENDS

In 1933, the head of the Ukrainian GPU, Balitsky, was appointed deputy chairman of the all-Union OGPU. When he moved to Moscow for a new job, he took several employees with him, including my father. He received the post of senior inspector in the personnel department of the central apparatus of state security, who oversaw the transfer of service and new appointments in the Foreign Department - the OGPU's cordon intelligence. It is known that already from the first months of the existence of the Cheka, it made attempts to conduct intelligence work abroad. At the beginning of 1918, Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky personally recruited the former publisher of the Dengi newspaper A. F. Filippov, who was sent by him to work in Finland. It was, perhaps, the first foreign intelligence officer of the new government. Somewhat later, another illegal immigrant was sent to Turkey, acting under the name of R. K. Sultanov (his real name is still unknown). In December 1918, Special Departments of the Cheka were created in the army and navy, which, in fact, were counterintelligence units. Since August 1919, they were personally headed by Dzerzhinsky, and somewhat later by V.V. Menzhinsky.

Inside the Special Department of the Cheka in April 1920, a special unit was created - a foreign branch. In connection with the serious failures of Soviet intelligence during the war with

Poland in September 1920, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided on its cardinal reorganization. A special commission was created, which included I. V. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky and other prominent figures of the party. On the basis of the proposals developed by the commission, on December 20, 1920, Dzerzhinsky signed order No. 169 on the creation of the already

Foreign All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (INO VChK). This day is independent considered to be the birthday of the VChK-KGB-SVR intelligence.

From that moment on, the foreign intelligence business was concentrated in one hand. For work, special personnel began to be selected. The first head of the INO (before that he headed the foreign branch of the Special Department) was appointed a Bolshevik with underground experience Davtyan (Davydov) Yakov Khristoforovich. From 1921 to 1922, intelligence was headed by S. G. Mogilevsky. From episodic dispatches of agents, they switched to organizing foreign residencies. Exploration began to be done professionally. In January 1922, the Cheka was dissolved and replaced by the GPU under the NKVD. After the creation of the USSR, the GPU was

transformed into the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. INO became part of the Secret Operational Directorate created in the OGPU. Since 1922, INO was headed by Meer Abramovich Trilisser. Together with him, he brought to intelligence a large group of his associates in the underground struggle in tsarist times and during the Civil War and intervention in the Far East. Two of them - S. G. Ve-lezhev and A. V. Loginov (Bustrem) - became his deputies. The rest: J. Minsker, A. Neumann, M. Bo-desco, A. Muller and others - became responsible employees of the department. The department was significantly expanded and strengthened with personnel. The central office in this period 33 2 A. Sudoplatov - 1 reached 70 people. By 1930, the total staff of the INO had reached 122 people, of which 62 were employees of residencies abroad. Since January 1923, at the suggestion of the Deputy Chairman of the OGPU I. S. Unshlikht, active intelligence was

created a special Bureau of disinformation. The Dezinfburo included representatives from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, as well as the RVSR and the Intelligence Agency of the Red Army Headquarters. Later, this interdepartmental body played an important role in the famous operations "Trust" and "Syndicate", as well as in a number of other similar operations: "D-7" (1924-1929) with the participation of the legendary "Military Organization" of former monarchist officers in Leningrad; "S-4" (1924-1932) with the participation of the legendary "Internal Russian National Organization" (VRIO); operations "Overseas" (1929-1932) with the participation of the legendary anti-Soviet organization "North

Caucasian Military Organization" (SKVO); Operation Academy (1929-1934). In all of these operations, INO agents were active. In October 1925, F. E. Dzerzhinsky raised the question of organizing scientific and technical intelligence under the INO OGPU as a special body for obtaining information about technical achievements abroad. Soon such a unit was created, and since 1930, the 8th department of the INO, led by L. L. Nikolsky (Felbin), who later became

infamous under the name of Alexander Orlov, began to deal with this work at the Center. In the 1920s and 1930s, intelligence information about the plans and intentions of the obtained opponents of the USSR, contributed to breaking the blockade, political isolation and economic isolation undertaken by Western countries (the United States recognized the USSR only in 1933), obtained scientific, technical and economic information, neutralized the

subversive activities of white émigré organizations and foreign intelligence agencies. For example, in 1922, during the work of the economic conference in Genoa, the Entente countries tried to put Soviet Russia in conditions of international isolation and dictate their will to it. Intelligence largely contributed to the fact that the Soviet delegation successfully got out of a difficult situation by concluding an agreement with Germany on the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations in Rapallo (a suburb of Genoa). Intelligence v

the terrorist attack on the head of the delegation, People's Commissar G. V. Chicherin, on the eve and during the conference, supplied the delegation with information about the plans and intentions of Western countries.

In 1927, the residencies in Harbin, Tokyo and Seoul obtained a secret plan for the capture by Japan of the regions of the Soviet Far East, China, Mongolia and the countries of Southeast Asia, known in diplomatic literature as the "Tanaka Memorandum" (after the name of its author, the then Prime Minister Japan). The publication of this document through the possibilities of intelligence in the foreign press aroused sharp anti-Japanese sentiments in the world and exposed the aggressive plans of the Japanese militarists towards the USSR.

A lot of work was done by intelligence against various white emigre centers. Operation "Trust"

was carried out to neutralize the subversive activities of monarchist organizations abroad, such as the "Supreme Monarchist Council", "Russian All-Military Union" (ROVS), "Brotherhood of the White Cross", "Brotherhood of Russian Truth", etc. During the operation English spy Sidney Reilly, mastermind of the monarchists, was captured. A number of terrorist and other criminal acts have been prevented. "Syndicate-2" - the fight against the subversive activities of the

Socialist-Revolutionary "People's Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom." During the operation, the leader of the union Boris Savinkov and a number of his associates were arrested, the branches of the organization in Samara, Saratov, Kharkov, Kiev, as well as Savinkov's residency in Moscow and Petrograd were liquidated. A serious blow was dealt

to the ROVS, which united the remnants of the white armies that fled abroad and set itself the task of carrying out terrorist and other subversive actions on the territory of the USSR, preparing military intervention. With the help of our agents, we managed to behead this organization twice. In 1930, the head of the ROVS, General Kutepov, was captured in Paris, and in 1937, his successor, General Miller. Our agents, former tsarist generals P. P. Dyakonov and N. V. Skoblin, Skoblin's wife, a well-known performer of Russian folk

songs of Nadezhda Plevitskaya, as well as a former member of the Provisional Government and the Kolchak government (there was such a thing in Siberia), S. N. Tretyakov, who was in exile. Our agents distracted the leaders of the ROVS from active anti-Soviet actions. For example, General Skoblin managed to convince the Rov-Sovites of the inexpediency of creating terrorist groups. Thanks to agents, a large group of ROVS emissaries sent to the Soviet Union was neutralized. The fate of

some participants in the operation was tragic. So, after the arrest of Miller, General Skoblin, who created the conditions for the success of the operation, fell under the suspicion of French counterintelligence and was forced to take refuge in Spain, where he died. The actress Plevitskaya was arrested and died in a French prison. Tretyakov was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942 and executed as an agent of Soviet intelligence, which was officially reported in the German and white émigré press.

One of the brightest figures who worked for the white emigration was Nikolai Nikolaevich Kroshko, about whom in 1928-1929 publications were placed in the Western press under catchy headings: "The King of the Kremlin Spies", "The Collector of Rotoseans", "The Man Who Passes Through the Wall".

At first, Kroshko takes root in the monarchical organization "Brotherhood of the White Cross" (BBK), enters into the confidence of its leader, becomes his first assistant and adviser. Under the influence of Kroshko, the BBK curtails active anti-Soviet activities and disintegrates. Using his leadership position in the "Brotherhood", Kroshko infiltrates other white emigre centers and collects extensive information on them. He manages to make copies of secret documents kept in the safe of the heir to the throne, Grand Duke Kirill, as well as from the secret documentation of the mission of Denikin and Wrangel in Berlin. After the collapse of the "Brotherhood of the White Cross", Kroshko infiltrates the White émigré reconnaissance and sabotage center located in Berlin, which was headed by the former tsarist judicial investigator for especially important cases, the actual State Councilor V. G. Orlov, and in the years

Civil War - the head of the Volunteer Army.

counterintelligence

One of Orlov's favorite forms of subversive work was the production and distribution of false documents, which were skillfully drawn up according to genuine documents of the Soviet authorities or the Comintern. One of these fakes resulted in a severe blow to the Communist Party of Bulgaria. The other - to a serious complication of relations between the Soviet Union and England, placed almost on the verge of breaking (Zinoviev's well-known letter). Kroshko managed to "catch"

Orlov on one of these fakes, and this led to the liquidation of the intelligence center. Orlov fabricated and slipped to American correspondents a fake about the alleged bribery of two American senators by the Soviet government. Kroshko tacitly removed drafts of the fake from Orlov's archive. When these drafts were brought to the attention of the Americans, the US government demanded that Orlov be tried by Germany. The Soviet side also joined this demand. As a result, Orlov was sentenced by a German court to four months in prison, and after serving his sentence, he was expelled from Germany.

In 1928 , when Kroshko was suspected in the West in connection with Soviet intelligence, a report appeared in the press about his death while crossing the border. In fact, he returned to his homeland, lived and worked in Moscow under the name Kate.

In the 1930s, an intelligence group worked in Romania, which included intelligence agent Georgy Emmanuel (Martovets), who was illegally brought to this country, and local residents - Baroness Eugenia Zoti and her son Yuri Zoti. This group succeeded in putting under control the activities of several White émigré centers and foreign intelligence

services. Thus, the Rovsov colonels Zhelundkovsky and Bogolyubov, as well as the English intelligence officer Muller, gave Martovets tasks to collect strategic and operational information about the Black Sea Navy. Romanian intelligence commissioned the collection of information in the western border regions of the Soviet Union.

On all these issues, through Martovets and other possibilities, information beneficial to the Soviet side was brought to the enemy. Colonel

Bogolyubov, on the instructions of the Brotherhood of Russian Truth, tried to involve Martovets in the creation of bandit groups to organize sorties in the Kiev-Proskurov-Vinnitsa region. The scout, referring to his knowledge of the situation on the ground, managed to convince the colonel of the impossibility and inexpediency of carrying out this work.

Through Martovets, three letters were intercepted by Pyotr Kryuchkov, who fled abroad, the head of an anti-Soviet organization that blew up a gunpowder depot in Sevastopol in 1925, to his accomplices who remained in the Soviet Union. The letters offered to resume hostile activities, it was reported where the weapons were stored, and appropriate instructions were given, of course. these instructions remain

unfulfilled.

As a result of the work of Martovets and his group from 1931 to 1936, more than forty agents sent by white émigré organizations and foreign intelligence services to the USSR were identified and neutralized. At the end of 1936, as a

result of betrayal, Emmanuel (Martovets) Georgy Aleksandrovich, Zoti Evgenia Evstafyevna, Zoti Yuri Konstantinovich were arrested by the Romanian authorities and sentenced to long terms of hard labor. Yevgenia Zoti could not bear the penal servitude and died in prison in 1943.

Martovets and Yuri Zoti were released from prison by the Red Army in 1944 and took part in the battles with the Nazis. At the direction of the country's leadership, the residencies also carried out work for foreign Trotskyist

organizations. In the same period, intelligence was increasingly tasked with actively influencing the foreign policy of foreign states and statesmen in a direction beneficial to the USSR. This task was carried out most successfully during the coming to power and subsequent activities of the Popular Front government in France. Great success

were also achieved in infiltrating international Zionist organizations in the United States.

During this period, the first foreign partners of Soviet intelligence appeared. They were employees of the State Internal Guard of the Mongolian People's Republic, established in 1922, as well as employees of the Turkish counterintelligence, with which official contacts were maintained from 1927 to mid-1931.

Of great importance in the history of the formation of foreign intelligence was the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 30, 1930. Intelligence activity was subjected to a thorough analysis, and in the adopted detailed decision, the priority tasks of intelligence work were determined. The resolution of the Politburo stated that the Soviet Union was on the verge of a new war, in connection with which it was recommended to transfer the work of foreign apparatuses of the INO from Soviet institutions to an illegal position. Intelligence funding has increased dramatically. In the mid-1930s, eight to ten million rubles in foreign

currency were allocated for its needs. The same decree ordered to launch "active actions" to eliminate traitors and defectors, the leaders of white émigré terrorist organizations. At the same time, an independent special group was created under the leadership of Ya. I. Serebryansky, which went down in the history of Soviet intelligence as the "Yasha group", to deploy sabotage and terrorist activities deep behind enemy lines in the event of a war with "Western democracies". Initially, this group acted as part of the INO OGPU, but later it became directly subordinate to People's Commissar Yagoda, and since 1937 it functioned under the secretariat of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Serebryansky and his staff created twelve residencies in the main countries of Europe, Asia and America. In May 1934, the government again considered the issue of increasing

the efficiency of the work of the INO OGPU and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, and improving the coordination of their activities. A permanent commission composed of the chiefs of these bodies was created. On her

were entrusted with the development and coordination of a general plan for intelligence work abroad, the exchange of experience, mutual information about failures, and a thorough study of their causes. In May 1935, in order to closer cooperation and increase the level of intelligence work, the head of foreign intelligence, A. Kh. Artuzov, was transferred to work in military intelligence as its deputy head with the rank of corps commissar. His successor was the former deputy A. A. Slutsky.

Constant operational contact between the two intelligence services at the level of their leaders both in the central apparatus and in the residencies, mutual assistance, coordination in actions - all this played an important role in the successful solution of a number of intelligence tasks. However, in the late 1930s, cooperation was disrupted due to the illegal arrests and charges of a number of senior officials of both intelligence services.

At this time, the father often contacted the service with Artuzov and Slutsky. When in 1935 Artuzov went to work in the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, and Slutsky headed the INO, the experienced intelligence officer Shpigelglas, who had extensive experience working abroad as an illegal immigrant - in China and Western Europe, became Slutsky's deputy. In the early 1930s, in Paris, a fish shop located near Montmartre, which specialized in selling lobsters, served as a "roof" for him.

A prominent role in the leadership of the Foreign Department, in addition to Artuzov and Slutsky, was played by Berman, Fedorov (who led the fight against emigration), Shpigelglas, Minsker, Eitingon and Gorozhanin (V. Mayakovsky dedicated his poem "Dzerzhinsky's Soldiers" to the latter). Father was obliged

to one of the most talented and educated Chekists of that time, also transferred to the central apparatus from Ukraine - Valery Mikhailovich Gorozhanin. The portrait of this man is given by the father himself in the already cited book "Horizons":

"Both in Moscow and in the Ukraine, the leading officials of the State Political Directorate were mainly, as they later called it, 'intellectuals in the first generation'; to put it simply, they came from workers or were themselves

workers. But both in Moscow and in the Ukraine there were **also** indigenous intellectuals among them, people of the type that Lenin once wrote about: intellectuals who had completely committed themselves to the working class.

Valery Mikhailovich was a City dweller and belonged to them, which was clear at first glance at his short, fragile figure with a beautifully planted large head in a cap of thick wavy hair with already noticeable gray hair. He had a low voice of pleasant timbre, and the softness of his speech contrasted with the decisiveness and categoricalness of his judgments.

A city dweller from a student's bench entered the revolutionary movement and was forced to leave Russia, not finding application for his knowledge of languages and legal science. He went to Switzerland and then to Paris. Here he took up journalism and joined the environment of the Russian political emigration. Through Anatoly Vasilyevich Lunacharsky, he was accepted into the circle of Social Democrats - the Bolsheviks. Through him, he also met Romain Rolland and Anatole France, who showed interest in a talented Russian journalist who was patronized by the brilliant, encyclopedically educated Anatoly Lunacharsky. Shortly after the overthrow of the autocracy, the city

dweller returned home."

Among the command staff of the Cheka there were many people who left their favorite work, their favorite profession for the activity that seemed to them at the moment the most important. The city dweller sacrificed his literary gift for the necessity of the state: he devoted himself to the struggle against the counter-revolution. The city dweller was sent to Ukraine by Moscow. It was Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky, who deeply understood how intelligence, thoughtfulness, political flair and an unofficial approach to a person are needed in the important matter of fighting the Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution, who chose Valery Mikhailovich and was not mistaken. The townspeople did a great deal not only to uncover the crimes of active anti-Sovietists, but also to attract misguided people to the side of the Soviet government.

At the first stages of acquaintance with the Citizen, Kosioru had a soft, surprisingly it seemed impressionable, discrepancy artistic nature, so frankly manifesting itself in the whole appearance of the Citizen, the business in which he was engaged. But Dzerzhinsky was also an intellectual. And Menzhinsky too. And if we understand the fight against counter-revolution not unilinearly, not primitively, then after all, it required a variety of forms and approaches. There were their "basses" and their "altos". It was supposed to communicate with a variety of people, because not only hardened counter-revolutionaries made up the periphery of the anti-Soviet underground, but also wavering, disappointed, looking for a way out and, finally, deceived ...

The city dweller had a great influence on the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia, with whom he always communicated: many who were then at a crossroads, thanks to him, entered the wide road of life and creativity. "But what else did I know about the Citizen? Why do I associate his name with the years of the Civil War?

There was something then that created the reputation of a city dweller as a shrewd worker, not only professionally, but also politically ... "Kosior recalled. And suddenly one phrase, one name, uttered by him, immediately pulled the thread of memories. 1921... Gangs are still tormenting Ukraine, Chonovites are still falling under the bullets of Petliura bandits, trains are still falling downhill, and peaceful labor in the fields is being disrupted by bloody raids by gangs formed beyond the cordon. They were led by the Petlyura headquarters, headed by Yurko Tyutyunnik ...

The city dweller then carried out a brilliant deed that went down in the history of the Cheka. He sent Chekist Sergey Tarasovich Karin to the headquarters of Tyutyunnik in Lvov. "Why, I knew him," Kosior recalled. - Such a seemingly inconspicuous person, thin. Sophisticated intellectual. And how he took root in the bandit headquarters, in the very heart of the movement at that time! .. And he reconnoitered everything: the composition, weapons, the number of gangs. And most importantly - the timing, the timing of the march across the border to our land. And this military trick gave us a significant victory: the defeat of a three thousand bandit detachment. Many then came over to us voluntarily... And the same Citizen skillfully used the people who came over to us for our purposes.

Brilliant operation! True, then Tyutyunnik himself managed to escape to Poland. But very little time passed, and the Chekists managed to pull him to our side ... "He had a **great influence**

on his father in those years, in his own words, from the first meeting, a man with whom his life was closely intertwined for decades, right up to until his death - Naum Isaakovich Eitingon. I knew and remember him well.

Eitingon was born on December 6, 1899 in Belorussia, in the city of Shklov, not far from Gomel, where my mother was from. In Lubyanka, among friends and at home, he was called Leonid Alexandrovich, since in the 1920s the Jewish Chekists took Russian names for themselves so as not to attract undue attention to their nationality, both among informers and informers from circles of the nobility and former officers, and and colleagues with whom they worked.

The Eitingon family belonged to the poorest sections of society, but in Europe they had very wealthy relatives. Eitingon joined the Socialist-

Revolutionary Party in 1917. A year later, at the age of nineteen, he joined the Red Army and was soon assigned to work in the Cheka. In 1919 he was appointed deputy chairman of the Cheka of the Gomel region. He left the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and joined the Bolsheviks in 1920. Eitingon's career began when he took an active part in suppressing the uprising of the White Guard officers in Gomel, during which they managed to briefly capture the city.

Dzerzhinsky noticed a young security officer and sent him to lead the Cheka in Bashkiria to suppress banditry. There, in a battle with local bandits, he was wounded in the leg and often complained later of pain. In 1921 he was sent to

Moscow, to the Military Academy, where he studied with future prominent military leaders. I remember that I myself once saw photographs that captured him with Chuikov, later a marshal, defender of Stalingrad. After completing his studies

at the Military Academy, Eitingon was sent to work in the Foreign Department of the OGPU. European

his relatives refused to comply with his request to send the necessary recommendations, papers and money for a trip to Western Europe. And this could be his legal cover for operational work. As a result, Eitingon was sent to China as a resident of the OGPU: first to Shanghai (where he worked together with the network of the Red Army Intelligence Agency, which also included Richard Sorge as one of the agents), and then to Beijing and Harbin. Eitingon managed to achieve the release of a group of Soviet military advisers captured by the Chinese nationalists in Manchuria. He was equally successful in another operation, thwarting an attempt by agents of Chiang Kai-shek to seize the Soviet consulate in Shanghai. After that, he was recalled to Moscow. For a short time in 1930, Eitingon became the deputy of Serebryansky, head of the Special Group under the chairman of the OGPU. This independent intelligence center, independent of the Foreign Department, was created by Menzhinsky, Dzerzhinsky's successor, in 1926 as a parallel intelligence service for the deep penetration of agents into objects of a military-strategic nature and the preparation of sabotage operations in Western Europe and Japan in case of war. To this end, Eitingon traveled from China to the United States, to California, to organize an intelligence network there. In 1932, Eitingon was transferred to the Foreign Department, headed by

Artuzov, and later Slutsky, as head of the department that coordinated the work of illegal residencies. Along with this, he was also responsible for the production of fake passports for covert operations abroad.

His father first met him in Moscow in 1933, as an inspector in the personnel department. At that time, they were probably not yet particularly close, since Eitingon was in a higher position than my father. In his person, his father always saw an experienced head of intelligence, respected for success in work and professional excellence, so he was entrusted with working with illegal immigrants - the holy of holies in intelligence work. In those years, this work was given the utmost importance, since there were relatively few residencies under diplomatic cover. Our intelligence service sought to ensure that the Russians

agents, in case of failure, could not direct Western intelligence services to Soviet embassies abroad.

My father later related how he once brought to Eitingon the personal file of a young Chekist who served near the Polish border, with a request, if possible, to transfer him to work as one of the employees of the department that Eitingon led. The file contained a note from the deputy head of the department of the Ukrainian GPU, recommending him for service in Poland, not far from the place where he lived and worked. Eitingon did not want to send this young man to Poland, near the border, where he might be recognized. And he commented on it like this: "If this guy with no experience is caught in a routine check, then whose head will go? If I begin to listen to such recommendations, I will need to have a special basket for collecting heads.

The very first operational meeting of the father with Eitingon was already in Spain, from where he illegally transported his father to France in 1938 after the liquidation of Konovalts.

Eitingon had been sent to Spain two years earlier than my father, as a deputy resident in charge of guerrilla operations, including railroad and airfield sabotage. After Nikolsky, the Russian resident in Spain (under the name Alexander Orlov), disappeared in July 1938, Eitingon became a resident. When Franco won the Spanish Civil War in 1939,

Eitingon moved to France, where for several months he reorganized and restored everything that was left of his agent network, and kept in touch with Guy Burges, one of the members of the Cambridge group, who went under the code name Young woman. Then Burges was handed over to Gorsky, the NKVD resident in England, for communication. Around the same time, Eitingon managed to attract the nephew of the head of the Spanish fascist party, Primo de Riveira, a friend of Hitler, to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. Until 1942, he was an important source of information about the plans of Franco and Hitler. In 1938, the Center was literally enraged by the flight of the Soviet resident in Spain, Orlov. Later it was said that he

fled for fear of arrest. However, Eitingon suggested, despite Orlov's betrayal, to continue contacts with members of the Cambridge group, since Orlov, living in the United States, could not betray his connections with these people without the risk of exposing himself to prosecution. In 1934-1935, Orlov lived in England on a fake American passport, so if American counterintelligence had checked the Cambridge group, Orlov might not have received American citizenship and would have been deported from the United States. Moreover, undesirable facts would have surfaced for him: terrorist operations under his leadership and with his participation against Trotskyists and NKVD agents suspected of playing a double game in Spain. In 1941, Eitingon was sent to

Turkey and stayed there for almost the entire year 1942 under the name of Leonid Naumov. There he prepared an assassination attempt on Franz von Papen, then the German ambassador to Turkey. According to rumors, von Papen was to head the German government if Hitler was removed from power by Wehrmacht generals. This opened the way to a separate peace between Germany, England and the USA. The assassination attempt was unsuccessful - our Bulgarian agent was nervous, and the bomb exploded ahead of time in his hands. As a result, he himself died, and von Papen escaped with only light scratches.

In his memoirs, my father mentioned, in particular, that Eitingon turned out to be much more realistic in his assessment of our then order than he was. Eitingon often said, for example, that the party was no longer a band of like-minded people devoted to socialist ideas and the principles of justice, but had become just a machine for governing the country. I will quote my father's words on this matter; "At first,

Eitingon's jokes about the country's

leadership upset me, but then I got used to them and began to understand how right he was in believing that our leaders put their own selfish interests above the interests of the people and the Soviet state. His wife, however, always scolded Eitingon as soon as he complained about the inflated privileges of the Kremlin leadership. "On the one hand," she said, "I agree with

you. Too many people use them, most for nothing and certainly not for their hard work. Do not forget, however, that both you and your family received benefits and, like us, did not think refuse them."

In the last years of his life, Eitingon was married to Puzyreva, the only woman in the KGB who was awarded the British order. Eitingon was arrested a second time, along

with my father, in the wake of Beria's removal from power in 1953, and was released only in 1964. Eitingon died in 1981 without being rehabilitated - officially he was considered simply a criminal released to freedom. Only in April 1992 did the family receive a certificate of his posthumous rehabilitation. Eitingon, according to his father and other people who knew him closely, was a truly gifted person and, if he had

not become a scout, he would certainly have succeeded in public service or made a scientific career. Until now, his joke lives in my memory: "Under our system, there is only one, however, also not guaranteed, opportunity not to end your days in prison. You don't have to be a Jew or a security general." **In 1992, I received a call from London from Mary Kay, a distant relative of the Eitingons, who wanted to come to Moscow to collect materials on Nahum Eitingon. I forwarded**

it to my father. Later I got to know her. During a meeting with his father in May 1992, he learned from her that branches of the Eitingon "clan" could be found in Belarus, Moscow, New York and Leipzig. However, relatives who moved from Europe to America and enjoyed special fur trade benefits from the Soviet Union played no role in Eitingon's professional career, and he did not maintain contact with them even after his release from Vladimir prison. The closest friend of my father during this period was Peter Yakovlevich Zubov. He was born on February 7, 1898 in Tiflis into a working-class family. In 1917 he graduated from the railway school and entered

foreman technician for the Transcaucasian Railway. At the same time he attended lectures at the Tiflis People's University. Here he joined the party, conducted illegal work on the railway, distributed Bolshevik literature. In 1919 he became a member of the fighting squad of the Bolshevik Party.

In March 1920, P. Ya. Zubov was arrested by a special detachment of the Menshevik government of Georgia and imprisoned in the Kutaisi prison. In May of the same year, under an agreement between Soviet Russia and Georgia, he was released and exiled to Russia. Together with other communists released from prison, he left for Vladikavkaz, where he worked in the Cheka of the Terek region. After the restoration of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, P. Ya. Zubov worked from 1921 to 1929 in operational positions in the Georgian Cheka-GPU. He supervised the destruction of underground anti-Soviet centers, participated in the liquidation of the insurgent headquarters of the Mensheviks and several underground printing houses. He was deputy head of the secret department of the Transcaucasian GPU. In 1927, P. Ya. Zubov was sent to the foreign intelligence station in

Istanbul, where he worked under the cover of an employee of the consular department of the USSR embassy under the name of P. I. Grishin. During the years of a business trip, which ended in 1930, he was characterized as "one of the best and employees of the residency,

responsible operational
achieve high results. In 1930-1931,

Zubov again worked in the Transcaucasian GPU. He took an active part in the elimination of kulak gangs in Georgia and Abkhazia. During this period, the OGPU collegium awarded him twice: with a personalized weapon and a Certificate of Honor "For the merciless fight against counter-revolution." In July 1931, Zubov was sent to the

Paris residency as an operative, where he remained until May 1933. He was engaged in the development of anti-Soviet Georgian emigration. Acquired a number of sources of information in Georgian emigrant circles. He introduced agents into the emissary groups of the Georgian Mensheviks, who sent their people to the Caucasus to carry out subversive work.

In Paris, he acquired a source of information, which he introduced into the inner circle of the leader of the Georgian Mensheviks, Noah Zhordania. Through this source, the residency regularly received materials from the foreign bureau of the Menshevik Party of Georgia, information about the terrorist actions it was preparing. Thanks

to the purposeful work of Peter Zubov, the Parisian residency uncovered and subsequently successfully controlled the preparation of British intelligence for a major terrorist operation in the Caucasus, codenamed "Sabotage". As a result, the plans of the British to destabilize the situation in this region were thwarted.

The same intelligence agent, through undercover channels, uncovered and neutralized a terrorist group created by the Georgian Mensheviks to carry out an assassination attempt on Stalin. P. Ya. Zubov also developed other anti-Soviet emigrant groups that were sent to Georgia to organize an insurrectionary movement.

During his time in Paris, he also acquired another valuable source of information, which regularly provided intelligence on Iran and Turkey.

Upon completion of a business trip in Paris, P. Ya. Zubov from 1933 to 1937 worked in the central intelligence apparatus. In April 1937 he was sent to the foreign intelligence station in Prague as an operational officer. Here, under the name of N.V. Privalov, he was until 1939 under the cover of the second secretary of the embassy.

During the Great Patriotic War, P. Ya. Zubov led the preparation and deployment behind enemy lines of special reconnaissance groups to collect information about the deployment of German troops, the strategic plans of the German command. In

1946, P. Ya. Zubov was transferred to the reserve for health reasons. For merits in ensuring state security, Colonel Zubov was awarded the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, the Red Star, as well as many medals.

Chapter 5

THE KIDNAPPING OF GENERAL MILLER

The reports that appeared earlier in the West, in which Eitingon was credited with an important role in the kidnapping operation in Paris in 1937 of General Miller, the head of the ROVS ("Russian All-Military Union"), do not correspond to reality. He was abducted with the participation of General Skoblin (code name Farmer), who emigrated to Paris, who acted under the direct supervision of Spiegelglas. Skoblin managed to lure Miller to the safe house of the NKVD, where he was allegedly to meet with German intelligence officers. There he was arrested. In connection with the disappearance of Miller, the French authorities protested strongly to the Soviet ambassador to France, insisting that he had in fact been kidnapped and taken aboard a Soviet ship. They even threatened to send their own destroyer to intercept a Soviet ship at sea. Our Ambassador Surits categorically denied all accusations, warning the French that they would be held responsible if a peaceful Soviet vessel was stopped and searched by them in international waters. In any case, according to the ambassador, General Miller will not be found there anyway. As a result, the Soviet ship was not detained and safely made its way from Le Havre to Leningrad.

Miller was taken to Moscow, where he was interrogated, he refused to sign an appeal to the white emigration to stop the fight against Soviet power, was tried and shot in 1939 at the Lubyanka. His kidnapping made a lot of noise at that time. The fact that the general was neutralized led to the collapse of the entire organization of the former tsarist officers, frustrating their plans for cooperation with the Germans in the war against us.

Skoblin, meanwhile, fled from Paris to Spain by plane, ordered for him by Orlov (when Orlov fled in

1938, he kept Skoblin's gold ring as evidence of his involvement in this case). Myself

Skoblin was killed in an air raid on Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War. His wife was the famous Russian singer Nadezhda Plevitskaya, who kept in touch with the NKVD. She was unaware that Spiegelglas was in charge of the operation to capture Miller and considered him a friend of her husband. She only knew that Spiegelglas (Douglas) was connected with the Soviet representatives and supported them financially. She was arrested in France for her complicity in Miller's kidnapping and sentenced to twenty years hard labor. She died in prison in 1944. If Skoblin had carried out this operation, as some "experts" in the history of our intelligence write, with the knowledge of the Germans, then Plevitskaya would have been released by them, or, in any case, the Germans would definitely have tried to use it to get in touch with our intelligence in France. E. K. Miller

was kidnapped on September 22, 1937. And already on September 29, during the first interrogation in the internal prison on Bolshaya Lubyanka, he handed over to his interrogator a sheet of paper hastily written in pencil and asked him to immediately send it to his wife in Paris.

"Dear Tata, I kiss you tightly, I can't write to you where I am, but after a rather long journey that ended this morning, I want to write to you that I am alive and well **and** physically **feel** good. saw familiar places. How and what happened to me that I left so unexpectedly for myself, without even warning you about a more **or** less possible long absence, God willing, someday I will tell you, for now I ask you, since it is possible to pull yourself together, calm down, and let us live in the hope that our separation will someday end. Of course, I can't write anything about myself. I will only say that I left the Office around noon without a coat, as it was warm and I expected to return in an hour and a half. Here, where I am, although the weather is fine, it is still fresh; I was given a fine new coat, a new jersey, underpants, and woolen socks. So you don't have to worry about that either. I hope that I can indicate the address where you can give me information about your health, children, grandchildren.

I kiss you firmly, my dear, and pray to God that this whole saga ends happily. Warmly loving you (signature)."

In the next few days, the general, placed in the most strictly guarded solitary cell No. 110, probably still hoped that he would be able to make himself known and calm his loved ones. At the same time, he writes a letter (on the same paper and, apparently, with the same pencil) to the head of the office of the ROVS, General Kusonsky:

"Dear Pavel Alekseevich, almost a week has passed today when, when I said goodbye to you at the beginning of the first hour of the day, I handed you a letter, asking you to read it if I don't return in an hour and a half or two. I had some kind of subconscious premonition that the NVS (N.V. Skoblin) was drawing me, perhaps, into something dangerous. But, of course, I did not expect anything like what had happened and had no idea. Of course, I cannot write to you about what and how happened then on Tuesday, how and where I am now, because a letter of this kind would undoubtedly not have been sent to you. I don't know at all what and how happened in Paris after I "got out of action". I want to write to you only on questions of a private and personal nature, concerning other persons who are not at all involved in any politics ... " **The text**

ends with the words:" The future is in the hand of God. **Maybe** be sometime and see you again. Sincerely yours, **Gen.** Miller.

I won't quote the whole letter, it would take up too much space. It contains only information about the unfinished business of ROVS charity. E. K. Miller worries, "so that it is not forgotten, not lost." Here are a few paragraphs from the business part of the letter from the chairman of the ROVS to the head of his office:

"VI. Nick. Labzin lives (followed by the address in French). I promised for his grandson to pay 150 francs a month out of stipend money. to those 350 that he himself promised to pay. In the middle drawer of my desk at home you will find an envelope signed Scholarship Affairs, and in it 300 francs." "... I promised 300 (or 350,

I don't remember - it must have been written down in the scholarship department in a brown notebook) to Ms. Rodionova for her son. I received her letter of thanks a few days before my retirement, and I think you will find it either in a thick yellow folder or in Sergievsky's folder.

"...Then I promised someone else 200 francs a month, it seems to captain Andersen - the entry should be in a brown-red notebook under the heading "Scholarship money". That's about the firmly promised corps scholarships."

"...Then he addressed me on the 14th or 15th with a personal request - I don't remember the rank, the surname is like Shpilevsky, for two cadets, his son and another relative, pointing to the military merits in the Great War of the latter's father. Since I no longer had money, I told him to submit a written reasoned petition to me, with which I could apply to any of the wealthy Russians. I meant Count Pav. Kotzebue, recently married to some German princess; his brother, a former lancer of Her Majesty, lives modestly in Paris, earning his daily bread by personal labor. Aares gr. Colonel Skuratov found Kotzebue for me, and you can always ask him.

I received Shpilevsky's paper only on Monday the 20th or Tuesday the 21st, and therefore Count. Kotzebue did not have time to write. Do it for me and on my behalf. For two, you will have to pay 600-650 francs a month. Another rich man, who was pointed out to me about a month ago and who is quite generously ready to help poor Russians, is a certain Chikhachev. He was promoted at the end of the war to the Cavalry Guards Regiment, but did not appear in the regiment (I don't know why) and is not a member of the regimental association of the Cavalry Guards. As a result of some invention and participation in some business, he became a very rich man, has some kind of office in London. I had his address... I don't remember. But I think that if you address my cousin Georgy Romanovich Miller, who works in Kornilov's restaurant, on my behalf in complete confidence, then he will not refuse to tell you the exact address for me. Maybe Kotzebue won't agree to give the whole amount, then it would be good to divide the money needed for both boys, for whom Shpilevsky asks, between Chikhachev and Kotzebue.

Now there is another serious question about the payment for the premises of the Corps, on October 1 you have to pay 5000 francs to the notary ... Probably, he has already applied to you. This money is available (followed by an indication in which folders and envelopes these or those monetary documents or cash are kept). Thus, this payment can be considered

abundantly provided. The excess in the amount of 1,000 francs was intended by me for the payment of my red-handed promissory note, urgent on October 15 and issued to the lawyer in charge of the Vonsyatsky case against us. Just in case, his correspondence with me, it seems, is also in the folder (yellow) of the Lyceum Corps. When he won the case for the eviction of the Corps-Lyceum from the house belonging to Vonsiatsky, then after the end of all deadlines and appeals, I concluded an amicable settlement about leaving in mid-July, which we did, and paying him 3,500 francs. at different times: 2500 fr. he has already been paid, and my bills, which stipulated payments, have been returned to me in succession. There was one bill for 100 francs. due October 15th. I

would have nothing against - according to the saying "there is no blessing without good" - at least in this case to use my involuntary obscure absence in order to cause this "chief fashpet" a little trouble for all the evil that he caused the Corpus-Lyceum. Let him wait for the money until my return or look for me in God's Light. In view of my forced absence, no one is obliged to him to pay my bill for me, and by that time there will probably not be even a hundred francs left in my bank accounts. I don't have apartments. Let this be a small smile of fate in the midst of the storm that broke over me.

From these first letters it is clear that E. K. Miller continues to live in the interests of his family, is keenly interested in the affairs of the ROVS, takes care that his absence would not adversely affect the activities of the organization. He still hopes to establish at least some kind of connection with the outside world. But most of all he is concerned about the health of his wife, whom he cannot tell that he is

alive and well. It is known that on November 4, 1937, apparently convinced that his first letter to his wife had not been sent, he wrote a statement to the head of the prison asking him to at least briefly notify his wife that he was alive, and thereby reassure her. This request, of course, was in vain.

On the same days, another general, Skoblin, who disappeared from Paris, also addressed a letter, and also to the person in whose hands he was. The request is the same - to help his wife. unknown

where this letter was written, but it can be assumed that Skoblin, having left Paris with the help of his masters, lived somewhere near Moscow, like Sergei Yakovlevich Efron, the husband of Marina Ivanovna Tsvetaeva, who also fled from France after the abduction of General Miller. It turned out that he also collaborated with the NKVD and was somehow connected with the case of the chairman of the ROVS. If Efron was settled near Moscow (this is well known), then why couldn't they do the same with Skoblin? However, the "regime" of the latter was undoubtedly much stricter. Here is Skoblin's letter

addressed to his chief in the NKVD "11.X1.37. Dear comrade Stakh! I take this opportunity to send you a letter and ask you to accept, although belated, but the most cordial congratulations on the anniversary of the 20th anniversary of our Soviet Union. My heart is now filled with special pride, because at the moment I, on the whole, belong to the Soviet Union and I do not have that split that was artificially created before September 22. Now I have complete freedom to speak to everyone about my Great Leader, Comrade Stalin, and about my homeland, the Soviet Union. Recently, I had to look through old magazines here and get acquainted with the number 1 of the Bolshevik magazine of this year. I read it all with great interest, and the article "Bolsheviks at the North Pole" made a great impression on me. At the end of this article, the words of the Hero of the Soviet Union Vodopyanov are quoted, when he was asked the question before flying to the pole: "How will you fly to the pole and how will you land there? What if you break it - go far on foot? "If I break it," said Vodopyanov, "I won't go on foot, because I have strength, power behind me: Comrade Stalin will not leave a person!" This calmly spoken phrase, but with unshakable faith, had an

effect on me as well. Now I am firm, strong and calm, and I also believe that Comrade Stalin will not abandon a person. Only one thing saddened me, this is November 7, when our entire country of many millions of people celebrated this day, and I could not make Vasenka (a family nickname, and possibly an underground nickname of Nadezhda Vasilievna Plevitskaya) feel about the great holiday. I did not have time to look back, as 2 weeks have passed again since the day of your departure. Nothing

nothing new happened in my personal life. Out of idleness and boredom, I study Spanish, but complete ignorance of my "Vasenska" does not allow me to devote myself entirely to this matter. Do you think Georgy Nikolayevich should not now see me and work out some measures directly related to "Vasenska"? I could give a number of purely psychological advice, which would be of great moral importance, given the almost 2-month stay in prison and the need to encourage, and most importantly, reassure. I firmly press your hand. Sincerely yours (signature).

Miller's belief that his situation would change for the better was in vain when, on December 27, 1937, People's Commissar Yezhov personally came to him in solitary confinement No. 110 for a conversation. And the next day, General E. K. Miller sends him statement:

"December 28, 1937 Personally to Mr. People's Commissar Internal Affairs S.S.S. R. Yezhov.

Unfortunately, during our conversation yesterday, I did not know until the last minute who I was talking to, and this question became clear to me only at the moment of your departure. Therefore, in our conversation, I did not consider myself entitled to touch on my testimony to the investigator - I did not know what relation you and your companions had to his work. Now that the situation has cleared up for me, I, no longer fearing to be incorrect in relation to the investigator N. P. Vlasov, can bring to your attention that, in addition to oral testimony about secret work from the 30th to the 37th year, with my knowledge and the approval of a special person, invited by me for this, and with funds specially collected for this, I, at the request of the investigator, also drew up a note with my testimony regarding the Insurrectionary Movement in the S.S.S.R. This note was presented by me to the investigator personally on October 10 during a meeting. Recognizing it as inexhaustible, the investigator left it with me so that I would urgently supplement it with some information, **and promised to come for it the next day, October 11, in the evening. But neither on October 11 nor later did the investigator come to me, and I did not see him again, but a note with my testimony (pp. 1-12). as well as an addition to it (pp. 13-18) lie with me to this day. I consider it my duty to bring it to your attention, especially since**

it contains answers to some of the questions I heard yesterday. The letter is

completed by repeated requests - to inform his wife about it, to allow him to use paper and pen to start writing memoirs, to return his pocket watch, because due to the dark winter time in the cell it is impossible to understand which hour...

An eighteen-page note with an addition, transmitted along with the letter, has also been preserved, from which it follows that neither the ROVS nor General Miller himself had absolutely nothing to do with organizing and leading the insurgent movement in the USSR. The note, deliberately written boringly, does not contain a single specific fact, does not mention a single name, address or date. It is clear why investigator Vlasov did not take this note - for the Soviet special services it was of no value. At the end of the note it says: "In my testimony, I state everything that I have preserved in my memory. I had no direct connection with the organization of insurrectionary movements, and in general during these 7 1/2 years of being chairman of the ROVS, I heard only about two major insurrectionary movements - in 1930 in Eastern Siberia and in the North Caucasus in 1932 or 1933 - I don't remember exactly ..."

That's practically all that the Chekists learned from General E. K. Miller. From the surviving materials it is clear that the secret prisoner, although without much hope, continued to insist on sending his wife at least some news about himself. Here are a few lines from his letter addressed to Yezhov dated March 30, 1938: "... I decide once again to ask you to fulfill my requests, set out in my statements of November 4 and confirmed in my appeal to you on December 28, Ave, and allow sending my wife at least the shortest letter with the notification that I am alive and relatively well ... I remember so vividly how Gen's wife suffered greatly from the unknown. Kutepova, and with her all of us, who knew him well, painting for ourselves a picture of all those horrors and physical suffering that should have awaited him in Moscow ... "

In this letter, E. K. Miller asks Yezhov to allow him to visit the church. He refers to declarations

the Soviet government and even Lenin's writings on "freedom of religion in the USSR": "Assuming that Lenin's precepts are honored and observed by his disciples and successors, the current stewards of the destinies of the Russian people, in whose complete power I am now, I decide to ask your permission to me rebuke next week in one of the Moscow churches of your choice. Further, the general adds: "The

question of the undesirability of meeting with someone who could recognize me, it seems to me, disappears ... I had very few acquaintances in Moscow, and now, after 20 years, death, emigration, expulsions for sure and carried away the last acquaintances. In addition, I can bandage my face with a bandage, and in general, my modern appearance of a civilian old man bears little resemblance to the youthful 47-year-old general, as I left Moscow in 1914. The hopes of the prisoner to visit

the church were, of course, in vain. Without waiting for an answer to the letter, E. K. Miller in mid-April 1938 again wrote to Yezhov: "To the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

General Commissar of State Security Yezhov.

The failure to receive an answer to my request to you of March 30 deprives me of the hope of receiving the requested church visits, even if only for one week during Great Lent. Therefore, referring to the motives I cited in my above-mentioned petition, I decide to additionally ask for your permission to transfer to His Eminence the Metropolitan of Moscow the letter attached with this, in which I ask Vladyka so that in reading the Gospel and the Bible I can find the spiritual consolation that I so need and get some information on the History of the Church. In the event of your consent and the readiness of the Lord to fulfill my request, I ask you not to refuse your appropriate order to deliver the Books I requested through the head of the prison. At the same time, I once again ask for your permission to grant me the right to use paper and pen, if only in order to make short extracts when reading the books I received from the prison library in order to facilitate the assimilation of what I have read.

April 16, 1938 General Miller.

Attached to this sheet is another one - a message to Vladyka Sergius:

"Moscow, April 16, 1938 to His Eminence Vladyka Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow. Your

Eminence, with the permission of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, I appeal to you with the following request. Being isolated from the outside world for a long time, I especially painfully feel the impossibility of attending church. The conditions under which I left my home did not allow me to take with me even the Gospel, the reading of which, especially in these days, would be a great comfort to me.

Therefore, graciously accept my humble request and give me the Gospel in Russian. I would be deeply grateful if you would find an opportunity to give me also the History of the Church, at least one of the textbooks used by the pupils of the Seminary or the Theological Academy. I devote all my time to reading books I get from the local library, but I would be happy if I could devote part of the time of my few remaining years (I am 71 years old) to renewing and expanding my knowledge of the Bible and the Lives of the Saints. These two books I decide to ask you, revered Vladyka, for temporary use for 2-3 months, and after reading I undertake to return them to you. I entrust myself to your holy prayers, I ask you, revered Vladyka, to believe in the feelings of my sincere gratitude. Your Eminence, obedient servant of God Eugene.

And this message, of course, was not delivered to the addressee. Yevgeny Karlovich did not receive any spiritual consolation. The last document written by a prisoner of solitary confinement No. 110, which has come down to us, is dated the summer of 1938

"Into the own hands of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the General Commissar of State Security Yezhov. These

days, 10 months have passed since that ill-fated day when, treacherously lured into someone else's apartment, I was captured by malefactors in the suburbs of Paris, where I lived as a political emigrant under a French document, under the auspices of French laws and under the care of Nansenovsky

Office of the League of Nations, of which the USSR is a member. I have not been a citizen of the USSR for a single day, and my foot has never set foot on the territory of the USSR. Immediately bound - mouth, eyes, arms and legs - and chloroformed, I was taken in an unconscious state to a Soviet steamship, where I woke up only 44 hours later - halfway between France and Leningrad. Thus, for my family, I disappeared suddenly and without a trace on September 22 of last year. My family consists of a wife, 67 years old, and three children, 38-41 years old. Although in the first days after my arrival in Moscow I was still very poorly thinking under the influence of an exceptionally strong dose of chloroform, I still clearly imagined what a blow, what a shock, what anxiety my disappearance must cause my wife and children. That I was abducted by agents of the Soviet government, of course, my wife could not have any doubts about this: the example of Kutepov was too memorable, and all these 7 1/2 years from the day my chairman of the R.O.V. Union, how many times these fears and conversations arose, and the position of a prisoner of Sov. power has always been painted in the most terrible colors, which now should have caused my wife the worst fears for my future fate. My first move, therefore, on my arrival at the prison was to let my wife know that I was alive and well and, for the time being, physically well. At the beginning of October I handed over a short letter to my wife with this news to the interrogator who interrogated me. Not having received his promise to send a letter to the destination, at the beginning of November I handed over to the Head of the Prison, on a special request, a small note of the same content, without signature and without indicating exactly where I was, asking me to add to my note some intermediate address at which my wife could I would like to answer about the state of health of my children and grandchildren. Having received no response to this statement of November 4 (as well as to other statements of the same date regarding money stolen from me belonging to other persons), I asked you in a personal conversation with you to persistently contact me with my wife in order to reassure her regarding conditions

of my existence and to obtain information about her and the children myself. On December 28, in addition to a personal conversation, and then at the end of March and in April and my statements to you,

I don't know anything about my family, and my family apparently doesn't know anything about me. I fully understand that the unintelligent zeal of your agents, who decided to kidnap me in violation of all international laws and placed you before a "fait accompli", put you and all the Sov. government in a difficult **situation and in the future, until a decent way out of the current situation, to hide my presence in the USSR, but still I cannot help but appeal to your sense of humanity - for which you make completely innocent people suffer so cruelly - my wife and children never took any part in politics. I am especially worried about the state of health of my wife, who all her life suffered from great nervousness, expressed in painful attacks with any excitement and anxiety. My mother's wife is the granddaughter of A. S. Pushkin's wife, nee Goncharova, who was Lansky's second marriage, and inherited, like her mother and sisters, the great nervousness inherent in the Goncharov family ... I am horrified by the unknown, how reflected in my disappearance. We have lived together for 41 years! ... Never, in any era of the most cruel reaction, neither Radishchev, nor Herzen, nor Lenin, whose history I got acquainted with**

from their writings published by the Lenin Institute and the Academy, were deprived of contact with their relatives. Is it possible that the Soviet government, which promised to establish a regime of freedom and inviolability of the person with a ban on putting anyone in prison without trial, would want to make me a medieval Prisoner of Chillon or a second edition of the Iron Mask from the time of Louis XIV - and all this only for the sake of preserving my incognito?

I earnestly ask you to look at my request in this case from the point of view of humanity and stop those moral torments of mine, which are becoming more unbearable every day. For 10 months I have been living under the yoke of the thought that I may have become the unwitting murderer of my wife, and all this is due to my careless gullibility towards the vile traitor, and once the hero of the civil war in the Volunteer Army ...

I hope that you will find time to answer other questions and requests contained in my statements and letters. I also hope that you will treat all of the above favorably, I, your prisoner, will wait with understandable impatience for your decision and the approaching annual deadline.

my conclusion.

27/U11 1938 General Miller. One can only guess how Yevgeny Karlovich Miller spent the second half of 1938 and the first months of 1939. There is no data on this. However, it is known for sure that the fate of the kidnapped general was finally and irrevocably decided by the May spring

afternoon

1939. And it was done on an emergency basis within a matter of hours. Why exactly on this day, and not two months earlier or three months later? Of course, no answer to this question can be found in the archive files of the NKVD. But it suggests itself, if we recall the political realities of the beginning of May 1939 both in the USSR and in Europe. During this period, there was a sharp turn in the foreign policy of the USSR - on May 4, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov, who was known as a supporter of the rapprochement of the USSR with England and France and the creation of an anti-Hitler alliance, was replaced by V. M. Molotov. This meant that the path to an agreement between the USSR and Hitler was open. And if before it was still possible to assume that someday in any situation the Russian general kidnapped in Paris could be useful to the Soviet authorities, now such a possibility disappeared even theoretically. This decided the fate of E. K. Miller. May 11, 1939 dated three documents preserved in the archive. Two of them are written on different and very tall forms, but with the same hand and even with the same

green ink. With a high degree of probability, it can be assumed that in the middle of the day or by the evening of May 11 - in the mornings of Soviet institutions then did not work - People's Commissar for Internal Affairs Beria (Yezhov had already been eliminated by that time), having received urgent instructions from Stalin or Molotov - who else could decide the fate Miller! - came to his place in Lubyanka, called Ulrich, and immediately two papers were written by the secretary on duty. One was signed by Ulrich with the same secretary green

with ink, Beria waved another with an authoritative red pencil, and the commandant was called ... The first document. On the letterhead of the "People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR" without numbers, but with the date May 11, 1939, it says:
"Only in person.

To the head of the internal prison of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR,

comrade. Mironov

INSTRUCTION I propose to extradite the arrested Ivanov Pyotr Vasilyevich, held under No. 110, to the commandant of the NKVD of the USSR

Comrade. Blokhin. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria. At the bottom, in a different handwriting and in different ink, a postscript: **"I gave the arrested Ivanov under No. 110 to the commandant**

of the NKVD. Beginning Int. Mironov prison. 11.U.39. Obliquely across the entire sheet, it is written in sweeping red pencil: "I

received one convict. Blokhin. 11/U 39". The second document is an order written on the letterhead of the "Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR" No. Blokhin. It says: **"It is proposed to immediately carry out**

the sentence of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on Petr Vasilyevich Ivanov, who was sentenced to death under the law of December 1, 1934. Chairman V. K. V. Ulrich. On the side of this

document, a postscript is visible: "I

confirm the issued identity of Ivanov

under No. 110. Beginning ext. Mironov prison. 11/U 39.

Apparently, it was very important not to make a mistake and not to "betray" someone else, leaving the right one alive ... And, finally, the third document, written by the hand of the head of the prison, Mironov:

"ACT

The sentence against this Ivanov, convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, was carried out at 23:00 5

minutes and 23 hours 30 minutes burnt in a crematorium in the presence of:

Commandant of the NKVD Blokhin

(signature) N-k Int. Prison of the GUGB NKVD Mironov (signature)

11/U 39. Who

exactly shot Miller - the commandant or the head of the prison, is not said, but it is obvious that no third party was involved in this top secret case ...

Let the name of Pyotr Vasilyevich Ivanov appearing in the documents does not confuse him. Especially secret prisoners were kept in the NKVD under false names, under them they were sent to the next world. This, apparently, caused the need for special confirmation of the identity of "Ivanov under No. 110" by the head of the prison when extraditing him to commandant Blokhin. It is possible that the commandant of the NKVD Blokhin himself (and this is, after all, a general's position) did not find out whom he personally took to be executed in the Moscow crematorium on a May day in 1939. The identity of Evgeny Karlovich Miller and Pyotr Vasilyevich Ivanov should not be in doubt: the

three short documents cited above were kept in one bundle with E.K. / 3 49 year comrade Abakumov (signature)". It is clear that the contents of the folder have been carefully checked. In addition, the coincidence of the camera number also says something. And "Ivanov under No. 110" was destroyed according to a well-known template that was applied only to especially secret

prisoners: they were brought to the crematorium building, in the basement adjacent to the mouth of a fire-breathing furnace, they were shot and immediately or almost immediately, which depended on purely technical reasons, thrown into the fire.

So on May 11, 1939, Russian General Yevgeny Karlovich Miller, who was kidnapped on September 22, 1937 in Paris, was killed in Moscow. At the same time, as they say, the case brought against him by the NKVD was also destroyed. As if there was no general here at all. **Chapter 6**

Apparently, the immediate initiator of my father's transfer to Moscow was Genrikh Samoylovich Lyushkov, who patronized my mother, her immediate boss. Later, they were repeatedly blamed for patronage from Lyushkov.

I will cite here one document that is directly related to the biography of my parents: **“Supplement**

to the certificate of Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov.

Sudoplatov's wife, Kaganova Sulamif Solomonovna, worked for a long time with the enemy of the people Lyushkov, with whose assistance she was transferred to Moscow to the SPO OGPU; when Kaganova S.S. became a candidate member of the CPSU (b), the same Lyushkov recommended her. (Information about Kaganova S. S. is taken from the materials of her LD No. 1423.)

Senior opera. 1st Department OK NKVD USSR, lieutenant GB ... (signature) Ma

Lyushkov is perhaps one of the most colorful figures that my parents met on the path of life. In addition, the example of his fate clearly traces all the intrigues and secret springs of the movements and struggle of the “clans” in the leadership of the state security organs of the USSR in the 30s. Therefore, I will dwell in more detail on his biography, known to me partly from the words of his father and mother, and partly from the surviving archival documents.

Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov was born in 1900 in the family of a poor Odessa Jew tailor. The family, apparently, was quite urban, not particularly religious. So, instead of the traditional heder, the future Chekist was immediately sent to a six-grade elementary state school. Upon graduation, in 1915, the young man continued his studies at evening general education courses, working during the day as a scribe in an automobile office. According to Lyushkov himself, at the end of 1917, under the influence of his brother, he was “involved in the Revolutionary Storm”: in the ranks of the socialist youth squad, he participated in street battles during the seizure of power in the city by the Odessa Soviet. However, already in

March 1918, Odessa was occupied by the German occupation forces, and from that moment Lyushkov went into the city underground. As in many biographies of his contemporaries, “staying underground” is the most obscure episode in Lyushkov's life.

It is only known that in February 1919, during the defeat of the Odessa underground by the whites, on his way to the turnout, he was arrested. They managed to escape from custody and, using forged documents, make their way to Yekaterinoslav, liberated by the Red troops. In March, near Nikolaev, Lyushkov voluntarily joined the Red Army - a Red Army political worker of the 1st Nikolaev Soviet Regiment, from where he was sent to Kiev to the Central Military-Political Courses of the People's Commissar of Ukraine. Here in July 1919 he joined the Bolshevik Party. Soon, together with his fellow cadets, he was transferred to the Zhmerynka station to fight the Petliurists who had broken through, and then worked as an assistant to the military organizer of the Kyiv Provincial Party Committee. When the White

offensive began and Kiev was surrendered, **Lyushkov**, along with the evacuated Soviet workers of Ukraine, ended up in Bryansk. In September 1919, he was sent as a political commissar to the 1st Separate Brigade of the 14th Army on the Southern Front. With the brigade he went all the way to the Mozyr and Rechitsa directions of the Polish Front, being the secretary and head of the political department of the brigade. In September 1920, for the first time, he briefly got to work as a Chekist - as an authorized representative of the Special Branch of the Cheka of the 57th Infantry Division. After the Soviet-Polish war, Lyushkov was demobilized and returned to his native Odessa, went to study at the Institute of the Humanities, but failed to complete his education: in November 1921 he was recalled from school and sent to

work in the Odessa Provincial Cheka. Ukraine, which repeatedly passed from hand to hand of opponents in the Civil War, in the early 1920s remained the scene of a fierce struggle between the VUCHK-GPU of the Ukrainian SSR and numerous opponents of the Bolshevik regime: Petliurists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Polish nationalists, anarchists, peasant rebels and simply criminal gangsters. elements. In addition, on the Right Bank of Ukraine, which had access to two borders - with Poland and Romania, the organs of the GPU fought against armed formations and espionage and sabotage agents of foreign states that penetrated from behind the cordon.

It was this kind of service that Lyushkov got in the period 1921-1924 in a number of border and district departments of the GPU of Tiraspol,

Voznesensk, Pervomaisk, Kamyanets-Podilsky and Volochinsk in the southwest of Ukraine. The work of a Chekist operative in the border area was often associated with a risk to life: in 1921, during the liquidation of a gang in Voznesensky district, Lyushkov was wounded in the arm.

In November 1924, he was nominated for independent leadership work as the head of the Proskurovsky district department of the GPU, which was then part of the Podolsk provincial department of the GPU, which at that time was led by a large, "uphill" Ukrainian Chekist - I. M. Leplevsky. It was he who was to play a prominent role in the fate of Lyushkov. 65' 3

A.

Sudoplatov - 1

Israel Moiseevich Leplevsky (1896-1938), like Lyushkov, came from a poor Jewish family of a tobacco worker. In his youth he was a member of the Bund, but in February 1917 he joined the Bolsheviks. The lack of any education (he was self-taught) was compensated by his natural enterprise, experience of practical work in the Cheka since 1918 and the presence of a patronizing "hand" in Moscow in the person of his older brother - G. M. Leplevsky, who held prominent posts in the Small Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the RSFSR. By the time Lyushkov's rapprochement with Leplevsky, the latter had already "showed himself to be a staunch Bolshevik-Chekist who showed outstanding abilities in the fight against all types of counter-revolution" in Ukraine and in 1921 was awarded the Order of the Red

Banner. When they had to leave in October 1925 (Leplevsky was appointed head of the Odessa regional department of the GPU), Lyushkov's former boss recommended him for a responsible job in the central apparatus of the GPU of Ukraine, thereby giving an initial impetus to his career. Having moved to Kharkov, Lyushkov, as a good "agent", was immediately appointed head of the Information and Information Department (INFO) of the GPU of Ukraine. Having taken over the entire agent-information network of the republican GPU, Lyushkov turned to affairs of a "large scale" and already in 1926 "groped for a terrorist group that was preparing an attempt on the life of the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, comrade. Petrovsky".

It should be said that experience in cases of this kind was very useful to Lyushkov during his Leningrad business trip in connection with the investigation into the murder of S. M. Kirov and contributed to his rapprochement with one of the "curators" of this investigation - N. I.

Yezhov. The death of Kirov, the Leningrad party leader who was assassinated in 1934, is, by the way, a classic example in every respect. This crime still excites the minds of many historians, both in its simplicity and mystery. There is still no complete and exact answer to the question why and how the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Sergei Mironovich Kirov, died. There are only versions. December

1, 1934 in Leningrad in the Uritsky Palace (as the Tauride Palace was then called) at 18.00 a meeting of the regional committee's activists was to be held. S. M. Kirov was expected to speak at this meeting. Until four o'clock in the evening, he sat at home on Krasnye Dawn Street and worked on a report. Then he suddenly packed up and left for Smolny. Apart from the driver and head of personal security M. Borisov, there was no one next to him. Arriving at

Smolny, Kirov went to his office on the third floor of the building. Moreover, he did not go through the official separate entrance in the right (northern) wing of the Smolny, but through the main entrance. Passing a long part of the corridor, Kirov turned left, heading to his office. And it was on this segment of the path that M. Borisov lagged behind him, to whom, according to instructions, this was strictly forbidden. At that moment, a thirty-year-old young man came out of the door of one of the offices. It was Leonid Nikolaev, a former instructor of the party archive. Seeing Kirov, Nikolaev followed him. After walking a few meters along the corridor, he suddenly pulls out a revolver of the Nagant system from his pocket and cold-bloodedly shoots Kirov in the back of the head. Here is the testimony of an eyewitness of those

events, Mikhail Roslyakov: **"And suddenly at five o'clock we hear shots - one, another ... A. Ivanchenko, who was sitting at the front door of Chudov's office, was the first to jump out into the corridor, but immediately returned. Jumping out after Ivanchenko, I saw a terrible picture: to the left of the door of Chudov's waiting room, in the corridor, Kirov lies face down (his head is turned to the right), his cap, the visor of which rested on the floor, was slightly raised and**

head parts; on the left under the arm is a clerical folder with the materials of the prepared report: it has not fallen out at all, but the relaxed hand no longer holds it. Kirov is motionless, not a sound, his body lies in the direction of movement to the office, head first, and his legs are about 10-15 centimeters behind the edge of the door of Chudov's waiting room. To the right of this door, also about 15-20 centimeters away, a man is lying on his back, his arms are outstretched, and there is a revolver in the right one. There is a little more than a meter between the soles of the feet of Kirov and this man, which somewhat exceeds the width of the front door of Chudov's reception room, where his

secretary Filippov was located. I run up to Kirov, take him by the head ... I whisper: "Kirov, Mironych." No sound, no reaction. I turn around, jump up to the lying criminal, freely take a revolver from his relaxed hand and pass it to the bowed

A. I. Ugarov. I feel the killer's pockets, I take out a notebook, a party card from my jacket pocket ... Ugarov, over my shoulder, reads: "Leonid Nikolaev ..." Someone who ran up wants to kick this Nikolaev, but Ugarov and I shouted at him - what is needed is an honest investigation, and not the hasty destruction of the criminal.

Silently, in deep sorrow, Kodatsky, Chudov, Irklis, Struppe and others stand with their heads bowed over Kirov. The secretaries report to the NKVD, they call Medvedev, the medical unit. Out of breath, Kirov's security guard, Borisov, who had fallen behind in a large

corridor, came up ... " On December 2, Stalin himself arrived in Leningrad. First of all, he and the persons accompanying him went to the hospital, where the murdered Kirov lay. There, Stalin interviewed the doctors who performed the autopsy. When asked if it was possible to save Kirov, they answered in the negative. After that, Stalin came to Smolny. Having settled down in Kirov's office, Stalin called one by one: the head of the Leningrad NKVD Philip Medvedev, the murderer of Nikolaev, his wife Milda Draule. Then Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov went to the Taurida Palace, where a fob with the body of Kirov was put up for parting. At 10:00 p.m., the coffin with the body was taken through the streets of the city to the Moskovsky railway station for further shipment to

The official version of the murder of S. M. Kirov became known to the public in a few days. On December 16, 1934, fifteen people were arrested in Moscow, headed by G. Zinoviev and L. Kamenev, who were accused of preparing and carrying out the assassination of Kirov. On December 27, all

newspapers publish the indictment in the case of L. Nikolaev, dated December 25, 1934. The investigation considers it established that "in the period 1933-1934. in Leningrad, from among the former members of the Zinoviev anti-Soviet group, an underground counter-revolutionary terrorist group was organized and operated, which set as its goal to disorganize the leadership of the Soviet government and in this way change the current policy in the spirit of the so-called Zinoviev-Trotskyist platform.

On December 29, L. Nikolaev and thirteen of his "accomplices" were shot by the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev and five more "conspirators" from among those arrested in Moscow were sent into exile. Thus, Stalin and his entourage used the assassination of Kirov for political purposes, to unleash a new bloody terror in the country. This is the basis of the second version of the murder of Kirov.

According to this version, it was Stalin who was the main initiator of the elimination of Kirov. This version was first substantiated by L. Trotsky, then it was picked up

by A. Orlov, A. Rybakov and others. The essence of this version is as follows. In January-February 1934, the 17th Party Congress was held in Moscow. At this congress, not Stalin, but Kirov became a real triumphant. In the elections to the Central Committee, many more delegates voted for Kirov than for Stalin. L. Kaganovich, who was responsible for counting the votes, reported this to the latter. Stalin ordered Kaganovich to falsify the election results. From that moment, according to many researchers, the conflict between the General Secretary and the first secretary

of the Leningrad Regional Committee began. Unlike most members of the then Politburo, S. M. Kirov was the leader most accessible to ordinary citizens. In Leningrad, he was truly loved, and this stung the ambitious Stalin. At the beginning of 1934, he led through

The Politburo asked Kirov, as secretary of the Central Committee in charge of heavy and timber industry, to urgently move to Moscow to work. Kirov in response showed stubbornness. And then Stalin began to use roundabout maneuvers. In August 1934, he invited Kirov to jointly relax in Sochi. There, persuasion to move to the capital continued. After that, from September 6 to 29, Kirov was sent to Kazakhstan to control the harvesting and carry out grain deliveries.

Meanwhile, while Kirov was away, Stalin ordered People's Commissar of Internal Affairs G. Yagoda to reshuffle the Leningrad NKVD. As a result of these reshuffles, the head of the Leningrad NKVD, Fyodor Medved, was to be replaced by Ivan Zaporozhets. When Kirov arrived in Leningrad and found out about this, his indignation knew no bounds. Kirov immediately called Stalin himself, but he cooled the ardor of the forty-eight-year-old secretary of the Central Committee. But Zaporozhets remained at the post of deputy. And it is to him that the adherents of the second version attribute one of the main roles in the murder of S. M. Kirov. In their opinion, Zaporozhets found the perpetrator of the murder - Leonid

Nikolaev. L. Nikolaev until April 1934 worked as an instructor of the East Party Commission of the Institute of Party History. However, on April 8, 1934, the party meeting of the institute expelled him from the party for refusing to appear at the district committee for the selection committee for the mobilization of communists for transport and quarrelsome accusations against leading party workers. On the same days, Nikolaev was fired from the institute. And although a month later he was again reinstated in the party, he was not accepted back to work, and he is unemployed. The wounded Nikolaev writes a letter first to Stalin himself, and then to Kirov. No answer. And then Nikolaev decides to talk to Kirov face to face. On October 15, 1934, he meets him on the street, but this conversation does not lead to anything. And then a plan to take revenge ripens in Nikolaev's head. Zaporozhets, in turn, perfectly sees the state of the young man. He allows Nikolaev to constantly "spin" near the first secretary. Naturally, the guards let Nikolaev into the Smolny on a party card. By the way, with a party card one could enter any party authority, except for the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In Smolny, as in other regional committees,

there was no system of special passes for party members, and Nikolaev only needed to show his party card in order to get to where outsiders were not allowed to enter. On

December 1, at 4:37 p.m., Nikolaev kills Kirov in Smolny. Thus, according to this version, the NKVD eliminates the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee through the hands of an unlucky young man in life and by order of Stalin.

And, finally, the third version of this murder, which is the least studied in Russian history, but which, like the two previous ones, has the right to life.

This version is based on the fact that L. Nikolaev killed S. M. Kirov ... because of banal jealousy. The fact **is that** Nikolaev's wife, thirty-three-year-old Milda **Draule**, liked Kirov. From 1930 to August 1933, **she** worked as an assistant to the head of the personnel **sector** for light industry, and then was transferred to the department of the authorized People's Commissariat of Industry **for** the Leningrad Region as secretary of the personnel sector of this department. The department **was located in** Smolny, so Kirov and Draule had the opportunity to see each other (**according** to other sources, Nikolaev's **wife** Milda Draule, a young and attractive woman, worked as a waitress at the Kirov secretariat in Smolny and served at some Kirov parties, eventually becoming one of his girlfriends). It was known that by nature L. Nikolaev was an extremely

notorious person, he was distinguished by a quarrelsome character, he entered into disputes with his superiors. He was also, as they say, "fatally unlucky." For thirteen years of work experience, he was expelled from eleven jobs. And he was lucky only once: when he, small and frail, met the tall and pretty Milda Draule, and she agreed to marry him. From that moment on, Nikolaev completely and completely fell under the power of his wife. It was she who, being three years older than him and holding a party post (and Nikolaev then worked in the Komsomol committee), began to move her husband upstairs and soon helped him get a job, first in the regional committee, and then in the Institute of Party History. However, the unrestrained and hysterical Nikolaev was also kicked out of there, and after that his wife, it seems, finally lost faith in him. In addition, Nikolaev in the last

time became pathologically jealous, and this completely turned Draula away from

her husband. Since then, there has been an assumption that Nikolaev did not only guessed, but also knew for sure about the relationship

Draule and Kirov. Using this, he, through his wife, turned to Kirov for help, and he contributed to his restoration in the party and getting a job in the district committee, thereby, as it were, confirming his connection with Milda. But as soon as Milda was about to file for divorce from Nikolaev, the jealous husband killed the rival.

Meanwhile, there was another person in this story whose actions hastened the denouement of the tragedy. This man's name was Roman Kulisher, and he was the husband of Milda's own sister, Olga. Personality, it should be noted, is quite peculiar. Twice expelled from the party for depraved actions and intrigue, he was twice reinstated in the party, but he did not give up his secret addictions. In any case, it was with him that many associated the letters that came to the name of L. Nikolaev in April-December 1934 and in which the "relationship" between Milda Draule and Kirov was described in all sorts of colors.

My mother, who in 1933-1935 worked in the NKVD in the Secret Political Department, which dealt with issues of ideology and culture (in particular, her group oversaw the Bolshoi Theater and the Leningrad Opera and Ballet Theater, later the S. M. Kirov Theater), perfectly I knew that Sergei Mironovich was very fond of women and he had many mistresses both at the Bolshoi Theater and in Leningrad. By the way, after the assassination of Kirov, the NKVD department clarified in detail the intimate relationship of Sergei Mironovich with the artists.

Meanwhile, adherents of the first and especially the second versions of the murder of S. Kirov completely dismiss any hint of a "special" relationship between the first secretary of the regional committee and M. Draule, although even then rumors about them were circulating around Leningrad with might and main. And why, in the end, accusing Stalin of cheating on his wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva, because of which she committed suicide in 1932, should we dismiss such suspicions from Kirov? Why not assume that a forty-eight-year-old man, having an ugly, plump wife, took and was carried away by a beautiful young woman and started with her that

Is it called "office romance"? And then much of the behavior of the participants in that tragedy will become clear. For example,

why did Stalin, according to some historians, having a grudge against Kirov, insist on the latter moving to Moscow? Is it because, as a man, he understood Kirov's "delicate" position and wanted to change the situation for him? The same could have happened with the replacement of the head of the Leningrad NKVD, F. Medved, whom Stalin wanted in the end **to replace I. Zaporozhets**. F. Medved was an old and bosom friend of Kirov, in recent times he often took a drink, was under the heel of his wife Raisa Mikhailovna Kopylovskaya. When in November 1933 the manager of the Lensoviet Chudin committed suicide, rumors circulated around the city that R. Kopylovskaya was to blame. So F. Medved could fully understand Kirov's passion and even indulge him in some ways. Stalin, seeing that Kirov took an uncompromising position on this issue, did not give up either. As mentioned above, he lured him first to the south, and after the rest he sent him to Kazakhstan. Was he doing all this because he wanted to tear his friend away from his sudden infatuation? Historians who expose Ivan Zaporozhets as almost the main conspirator in the murder of S. M. Kirov, to put it mildly, sin against the truth. I. Zaporozhets from April 1932 was the deputy head of the Leningrad NKVD and had a good reputation in the city.

Moreover, on many issues he was more energetic than F. Medved, and by 1934 he was quite ripe to replace him as head of the NKVD. So I. Zaporozhets was moved not by G. Yagoda at the request of Stalin, but by his personal business acumen and many years of experience as a personnel security officer. Adherents of the second version often pedal the fact that when L. Nikolaev was detained on the street on October 15, 1934 (he wanted to talk with Kirov), it was Zaporozhets who ordered him to go home. However, given that he knew about Kirov's "relationships" with M. Draule, there is nothing surprising in this. As a man, Zaporozhets could well understand the feelings of a deceived husband, Nikolaev.

And in relation to the protection of Kirov, the Leningrad NKVD behaved by no means treacherously. Until the summer of 1933, the personal protection of the first

The secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee consisted of three people: M. Borisov, M. Bukovsky and an unofficial employee of the UNKVD, who was listed as a doorman in the Kirov house. Then the number of secret guards of Kirov increased markedly and grew to fifteen people. He was now guarded constantly. For these purposes, a cover vehicle with a two-shift mobile group was allocated. However, Kirov himself was burdened by the guards, considered them superfluous and often ignored her insistent requests to behave more carefully.

In the fatal minutes for Kirov, the guard was not next to him. M. Borisov, who accompanied Kirov along the Smolny corridor, at the last moment, as we already know, suddenly lagged behind his boss. Why? Apparently, there was no malicious intent in this. According to many, Borisov worked with Kirov for a long time, treated him well and could not betray him.

On December 2, 1934, at 12 noon, when Borisov was being taken for interrogation to Stalin, an accident occurred with a car and Borisov died. Some claim that he was killed by the guards who were with him in the car, others say that he himself fell out of the back and crashed, thereby committing an act of suicide. Apparently,

Nikolaev ran into Kirov in the corridor by accident. After all, Kirov was not supposed to come to Smolny that day before the meeting of the activists, which means that it was useless to wait for him at the office. Faced with Kirov, who was walking without a guard, Nikolaev could again repeat his attempt to talk to him like a man. Kirov, in response, could brush him aside again. And then, in a fit of rage, Nikolaev pulled out a revolver from his pocket and shot Kirov in the back of the head. After that, realizing what he had done, Nikolaev shot himself, but this shot was unsuccessful. Nikolaev fell to the floor, and a real hysteria happened to him. From this it can already be judged that the murder was committed not by a cold-blooded killer who thought through everything to the smallest detail, but by a desperate man who was clearly at odds with his feelings and nerves. On

December 2, when Stalin arrived at Smolny, he called for interrogation not only Nikolaev, but also his wife Milda Draule. What they talked about, no one knows. Shortly thereafter, M. Draule was arrested. Brother L. Nikolaev, his mother, two sisters, sister M. Draule and her husband were also arrested. In 1936-1937 they were all

shot. So the murderer of Kirov dragged almost all his relatives with him to the grave.

Meanwhile, the only thing that unites all these versions is that Stalin really used the murder of Kirov as a convenient pretext for reprisals against people he disliked. The so-called "Trotskyist conspiracy" that Kirov allegedly fell victim to was fabricated from the very beginning by Stalin himself. Stalin, followed by Khrushchev and Gorbachev, out of their own interests and wishing to divert attention from the obvious failures of the country's leadership, tried to maintain Kirov's reputation as a knight without fear or reproach. The Communist Party, which demanded impeccable behavior from its members in private life, could not announce publicly that one of its pillars, the head of the Leningrad party organization, had in fact become entangled in relationships with married women.

The official versions of the murder published in the press are fiction from start to finish. The Stalinist version was that Nikolaev was assisted by the leaders of the Leningrad NKVD, Medved and Zaporozhets, on the orders of Trotsky and Zinoviev. For Stalin, Kirov's death created a convenient myth of a conspiracy that allowed him to unleash reprisals on his enemies and potential rivals.

Khrushchev's version is as follows: Nikolaev killed Kirov with the help of Medved and Zaporozhets on Stalin's orders. But documents show that Zaporozhets, considered a key figure among the conspirators and allegedly connected with Nikolaev through the NKVD, broke his leg at the time and was undergoing treatment in the Crimea. The question arises: could one of the leaders who prepared the conspiracy be absent for so long during the most decisive period of the tragic events? Khrushchev, emphasizing that many party leaders begged Kirov to nominate himself as a candidate for the post of General Secretary at the 17th Party Congress, accused Stalin of having decided to liquidate Kirov after learning about the existing opposition. For Khrushchev, this version provided an opportunity to add yet another charge to Stalin's long list of crimes. Documents and evidence confirming the involvement of Stalin or the NKVD apparatus in the murder of Kirov do not exist. Kirov was not an alternative to Stalin.

He was one of the inflexible Stalinists who played an active role in the fight against the party opposition, merciless towards the oppositionists and in this respect did not differ from other associates of Stalin. Khrushchev's version

was later approved and adopted by Gorbachev as part of the anti-Stalinist campaign. Hiding the true facts, the leaders tried to save the reputation of the Communist Party, looking for figures popular in the party who allegedly opposed the leader. A myth was created about a healthy core in the Central Committee, headed by Kirov, as opposed to Stalin and his like-minded people.

The entire Nikolaev family, Milda Draule and her mother, were shot two or three months after the assassination attempt. Milda and her family, innocent victims of arbitrariness, were not rehabilitated until December 30, 1990, until their case surfaced in the pages of the Soviet press. The highest

officials of the NKVD, especially those who were aware of Kirov's personal life, knew that the reason for his murder was the banal jealousy of a deceived husband. But none of them even dared to talk about it, since the version of a conspiracy against the party was put forward by Stalin himself and it was extremely dangerous to dispute it.

Before the assassination of Kirov, Stalin could often be found on the Arbat, accompanied by Vlasik, the head of personal security, and two bodyguards. He often visited the poet Demyan Bedny, sometimes visited his acquaintances who lived in communal apartments. Employees of the NKVD and veterans who had the "Honorary Chekist" badge, which depicts a shield and sword, and a certificate for it, could freely pass to the Lubyanka; they had the right of passage everywhere except prisons. The whole system was immediately changed: the assassination of Kirov was a pretext for tightening control, which never weakened again.

Speculation about Kirov's death continued into the 1960s. I remember anonymous letters claiming that the real killer managed to get away. Dmitry Yefimov, Lithuanian Minister of State Security in the 1940s, told me after the war that he was ordered to look for the murderer of Kirov, who was allegedly hiding in a small Lithuanian town. His employees managed to find the author of the anonymous letter, which served as a signal for the search. It turned out to be

alcoholic. However, this anonymous signal was investigated under **the direct** supervision of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU. The conclusion of the Party

Control Commission on the circumstances of Kirov's death was never published. Only after the well-known repression commission was dissolved in July 1990 did the prosecutor's office send a supervisory protest to the Supreme Court of the USSR on the issue of posthumous rehabilitation of members of the Nikolaev family. The case was closed only on December 30, 1990, when all members of the Nikolaev family were officially rehabilitated by the Supreme Court of the USSR. The court ruling noted that there was no conspiracy to assassinate Kirov and that all of Nikolaev's "accomplices" were simply acquaintances of Kirov or witnesses of his excesses.

But even then, under this system of the so-called rule of law, neither Medved nor Zaporozhets were rehabilitated and charges of treason were not dropped from them, including a conspiracy to assassinate Kirov and cooperation with German and Latvian intelligence. What is the reason? It is that the prosecutor's office was simply afraid to raise this issue, since Medved and Zaporozhets are considered guilty of repressions committed in the early period

Stalinist purges.

There has long been an opinion among party historians that Milda Draule's affair with Kirov ended in a fatal outcome due to the jealousy of her husband, Nikolaev, known for his imbalance and scandalous character. If this opinion were made public, then an unsightly picture of Kirov's personal life would be put on public display, and thus the sacred rule of the party would be violated - never to lift the veil over the personal lives of members of the Politburo and not to delve into their dirty linen. On November 4, 1990, the Pravda newspaper published new materials from the KGB and the prosecutor's office

on the investigation into the Kirov case, which stated that his murder was purely personal, although the details and motives of the crime were not disclosed. Pravda did not even mention the name of Milda Draule. The publication contained an accusation against A. N. Yakovlev, who left the post of chairman of the party commission for the investigation of Stalinist repressions,

which allegedly slowed down the rehabilitation of the Nikolaev family and innocent people accused of taking part in the conspiracy.

Outraged, Yakovlev replied through the same newspaper (Pravda, January 28, 1991) that he still believed in the existence of a conspiracy to assassinate Kirov and several versions of how this assassination was planned. At the same time, Yakovlev did not mention either Mild Draul or the alleged attempt to nominate Kirov to replace Stalin as General Secretary at the 17th Party Congress.

In Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, Dmitry Volkogonov refers to rumors about Milda Draule's romance with Kirov, but dismisses them as slanderous. Materials showing the special relationship between Milda Draule and Kirov (which I knew about from the words of my parents, and my mother and father, in turn, referred to General Reichman, at that time the head of counterintelligence in Leningrad), were contained in the operational reports of NKVD informers from the Leningrad ballet . Ballerinas from among the mistresses of Kirov, who considered Draule their rival and did not show sufficient restraint in their statements on this subject, were put in camps for "slander and anti-Soviet agitation."

My father's opinion of Kirov has always remained unchanged. He wrote: "The name of Kirov and his memory were sacred. In the eyes of the people, Kirov was the ideal of a solid Bolshevik, a loyal Stalinist, and of course only enemies could kill such a person. At that time I did not doubt for a moment the need to protect the prestige of the ruling party and not to reveal the true facts concerning the assassination of Kirov. We, the Chekists, were unofficially called people who took on the role of unskilled laborers of the revolution, but at the same time we experienced the most contradictory feelings. In those days I sincerely believed - I continue to believe now - that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky and Bukharin were the true enemies of Stalin. Within the framework of the totalitarian system of which they were a part, the fight against Stalin meant opposition to the party-state system of the Soviet state. Considering them as our enemies, I could not feel any sympathy for them. That is why it seemed to me that even if the accusations leveled against them were exaggerated, they were, in essence, trifles. As an idealistic communist, I realized too late

all the importance of such "little things" and I see with regret that I was wrong ...

Consciously or unconsciously, we allowed ourselves to be drawn into the work of a colossal mechanism of repression, and each of us is obliged to repent for the suffering of the innocent. The scale of this repression horrifies me. Giving today a historical assessment of that time, the time of mass repressions - and they affected the army, the peasantry and employees - I think they can be likened to the massacres carried out during the reign of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. No wonder Stalin is called Ivan the Terrible of the 20th century. It is tragic that our country has such cruel traditions.

Stalin manipulated the Kirov case in his own interests, and the "conspiracy" against Kirov was artfully fanned by him. He fabricated a "grand conspiracy" not only against Kirov, but also against himself. He skillfully used the assassination of Kirov to remove those whom he suspected as his potential rivals or disloyal opponents, which he simply could not bear. First, Nikolaev's acquaintances were among the "conspirators", then the Draule family, after which it was the turn of Zinoviev and Kamenev, who were initially accused of moral responsibility for this murder, and then of his direct organization. Colleagues and acquaintances of Nikolaev were ranked among the Zinoviev opposition. Then Stalin decided to get rid of Yagoda and those officials who knew the truth. They, too, were drawn to the conspiracy and were destroyed. Later, Yagoda was made the main organizer of Kirov's assassination, and, as Raikhman told me, Stalin, who was afraid of revealing the personal motives of Nikolaev's "terror attack", even ordered that Kirov's widow be kept secretly under surveillance until her death. In such circumstances, telling the truth about Kirov was unthinkable. No one in the upper echelons of power

could prevent Stalin from using this assassination for his own purposes. Subsequently, the Kirov case was hushed up for the sake of political considerations or used to divert public attention from the deteriorating economic and political situation. Each new investigation, subject to the requirements of the political situation, only spawned lies, making it even more difficult for

future generations the opportunity to reconstruct actual events. I am convinced

that the assassination of Kirov was an act of personal revenge, but to publish this fact meant to harm the party, which was an instrument of power and an example of high morality for the Soviet people. Until today, the truth continues to be hidden, and Kirov remains a symbol of holiness for adherents of the old regime.

In connection with the assassination of Kirov, who was left unguarded at the time of the assassination attempt, it should be noted that even ten or fifteen years earlier, in the 1920s, the security of the Soviet leaders was quite modest. After 1929, when Stalin finally established himself in power, the staff of guards in the Kremlin began to increase. However, not yet enough to amaze anyone's imagination with its scale.

In 1931, in Kuntsevo, a brick cottage of just one floor was built for Stalin, consisting of seven rooms. The dacha is ordinary, without any luxury. Two wide terraces were glazed, a solarium with a rain booth was arranged on the roof. Not far from the house there is a kitchen and a small sauna with a good heater. The dacha was surrounded by an ordinary wooden fence five meters high, but without barbed wire. The dacha guard consisted of 50 people who worked in three shifts (15 people per shift). However, in 1937, at the height of the repressions, when a mass of "enemies of the people" appeared in the country, they decided to strengthen Stalin's dacha. A second fence appeared, internal, three meters high, with slots for viewing eyes. Security has also been

increased. Since the mid-1920s, Karl Pauker has been the head of the government guard. The one about which A. Rybakov's novel "35th and Other Years" says: "... the indefatigable Pauker, head of the operational department, head of Stalin's personal guard, his especially trusted person and even his personal hairdresser: put your throat under someone else's razor - what trust can be

higher. **Before the war (1914), Pauker was a hairdresser at the Budapest Operetta Theatre, boasting that the biggest operetta celebrities in Budapest found great artistic talent in him and advised him to perform on stage. He really was a first-class comedian, copied anyone,**

He was a master at telling jokes, especially Jewish and obscene ones. A jester by nature, he could make even the gloomy Stalin laugh. We

will trace the history of this man's amazing career according to the words of an NKVD major who served twenty years in the Soviet state security agencies, but in 1938 fled to the United States - Alexander Orlov. Here is what he wrote about K. Pauker in his book:

"Pauker joined the Bolshevik Party and was sent to work in the Cheka. A poorly educated and politically indifferent man, he got the position of an ordinary operative there and was engaged in arrests and searches. In this job, he had little chance of catching the eye of any of the high authorities and moving up. Realizing this, he decided to use the skills acquired back in his homeland (in Hungary), and soon became a hairdresser and personal orderly of the deputy chairman of the GPU V. R. Menzhinsky. He was the son of a major royal official and was able to appreciate the nimble servant ...

Gradually Pauker's influence began to be felt by everyone in the GPU. Menzhinsky appointed him head of the Operations Directorate, and after Lenin's death, he dismissed the then head of the Kremlin guard, Abram Belenky, and made Pauker responsible for the safety of Stalin and other members of the Politburo ... Lenin's personal

bodyguard consisted of two people. After he was wounded by Kaplan, the number of bodyguards was doubled. When Stalin came to power, he created for himself a guard numbering several thousand secret employees, not counting special military units that were constantly nearby in a state of full combat readiness. Pauker organized such a powerful guard for Stalin ... Abram Belenky was just the head of security for Lenin and other members of the government. He

respectfully kept a service distance between himself and the protected persons. And Pauker managed to occupy such a position that the members of the Politburo had to consider him almost equal to themselves. He concentrated in his hands providing them with food, clothing,

cars, dachas: he not only satisfied their desires, but also knew how to kindle them ...

With Stalin, Pauker was even more familiar than with other Kremlin dignitaries. He studied Stalin's tastes and learned to divine his slightest desires. Noticing that Stalin was devouring huge quantities of coarse Russian herring, Pauker began ordering more refined varieties from abroad. Some of them, the so-called "ga blbissen" of the German ambassador, delighted Stalin. Russian vodka goes well with this appetizer. Pauker did not lose face here either, he became the leader's constant drinking companion. Noticing that Stalin loved obscene jokes and Jewish anecdotes, he made sure to always have a fresh supply of them ready for him. As a jester and teller of anecdotes, he was inimitable. Stalin, by nature gloomy and not inclined to laugh, could laugh until he dropped.

Pauker watched Stalin carefully peering into his reflection in the mirror, straightening his hair, how he lovingly strokes his mustache, and concluded that the owner is far from indifferent to his own appearance and does not differ at all from ordinary mortals in this. And Pauker took care of the Stalinist wardrobe. He showed a rare ingenuity in this area. Noticing that Stalin, wanting to appear taller, prefers shoes with high heels, Pauker decided to increase him a few more centimeters. He invented for Stalin boots of a special cut with unusually high heels, partially hidden in the back. Pulling on these boots and standing in front of the mirror, Stalin did not hide his pleasure. Moreover, he went even further and told Pauker to place a small block of wood under his feet when he stood on the Mausoleum. As a result of such tricks, many who saw Stalin from a distance or in newspaper photographs believed that he was of average height. In reality, his height was only about 163 centimeters. To maintain the illusion, Pauker ordered for Stalin a long overcoat that reached the level of heels.

As a former hairdresser, Pauker undertook to shave Stalin. Prior to this, Stalin always looked badly shaven. The fact is that

his face was covered with pockmarks and the safety razor he was accustomed to using left small islands of hair that made the Stalinist physiognomy even more pockmarked. Not daring to trust the barber's razor, Stalin apparently reconciled himself to this shortcoming. However, he completely trusted Pauker ...

Absolutely everything that had to do with Stalin and his family passed through the hands of Pauker. Without his knowledge, not a single piece of food could appear on the table of the leader. Without Pauker's approval, not a single person could be admitted to Stalin's apartment or his country residence. Pauker had no right to escape from his duties even for a minute, and only at noon, having delivered Stalin to his Kremlin office, he had to rush to the Operational Directorate of the OGPU to report to Menzhinsky and Yagoda how the day had passed, and to share with his friends the last Kremlin

news and gossip...

In 1932 or 1933 there was a small incident that revealed the secret Stalinist predilection and at the same time the especially delicate nature of some of the assignments carried out by Pauker. Here is how it was. The Czechoslovak resident of the NKVD Smirnov (Glinsky) arrived in Moscow from Prague. After listening to his official report, Slutsky asked him to go to Pauker, who had some kind of assignment related to Czechoslovakia. Pauker warned Smirnov that the conversation should remain strictly between them. He literally stunned his interlocutor by taking out an album of pornographic drawings from the safe and opening it in front of him. Seeing Smirnov's amazement, Pauker said that these drawings were made by the famous pre-revolutionary artist S. Russian emigrants living in Czechoslovakia should have other drawings of this kind made by the same artist. It is necessary to buy, if possible, all such works by S., but always through an intermediary and in such a way that no one can guess that they are intended for the Soviet embassy. "Spare no money on this," Pauker added. Smirnov, who grew up in a family of exiled revolutionaries and joined the party back in tsarist times, was unpleasantly surprised that Pauker allowed himself to turn to him with such a task, and refused to carry it out.

Extremely indignant, he told several friends about the episode. However, Slutsky quickly extinguished his indignation, warning once again that Smirnov kept his mouth shut: the drawings were purchased for the "owner" himself! On the same day, Smirnov was summoned to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Yakov Agranov, who repeated the same advice with pressure. Much later, Yagoda's old friend Alexander Shanin, whose deputy I was appointed in 1936, told me that Pauker was buying up similar works for Stalin in many countries of the West and East. For faithful service, Stalin generously

rewarded his indispensable assistant. He gave him two cars - a Cadillac limousine and an open Lincoln - and awarded him six orders, including the Order of Lenin...

Pauker was a very expansive person, and it was difficult for him to resist telling his friends this or that episode from the life of the "master". It seemed to me that it probably didn't occur to Pauker that the things he was saying were discrediting his patron. He so blindly adored Stalin, so believed in his unlimited power, that he did not even realize what Stalin's actions looked like, if you approach them with ordinary human standards ... "Thus, K. Pauker turned out to be an excellent servant for

his master, and this, it should be noted, required extraordinary abilities from him. In addition, it was K. Pauker, being the main bodyguard of Stalin, who managed to put the security service of the leader to an unattainable height. And again I will refer to the evidence of A. Orlov:

"It is known that during official celebrations on Red Square, Stalin appeared on the Mausoleum, guarded by selected military units and a mass of bodyguards from the NKVD. Nevertheless, under his jacket he always wore a massive bulletproof vest, specially made for him in Germany. In order to be sure of his own safety during his frequent trips to his country residence, Stalin demanded that the NKVD evict three-quarters of the inhabitants of the streets along which he passed, and provide the vacant rooms to the NKVD officers. Thirty-five-kilometer Stalinist

the route from the Kremlin to the suburban dacha was guarded day and night by employees of the "authorities" who were on duty here in three shifts, each of which numbered one

thousand two hundred people. Stalin did not dare to move freely even within the territory of the Kremlin. When he left his apartment and moved, for example, to the Grand Kremlin Palace, the guards diligently dispersed passers-by from his path, regardless of their ranks and positions.

Every year, going on vacation to Sochi, Stalin ordered that his personal train be prepared in Moscow and the corresponding motor ship in Gorky at the same time. Sometimes he preferred to leave directly from Moscow - in this case a train was used, in other cases he went down the Volga to Stalingrad, and from there a train, also a special one, delivered him to Sochi. No one knew in advance which option Stalin would choose this time, nor the day when he would set off. His special train and special motor ship were in full readiness for several days, but only in the last hours before departure did he finally inform his confidants which option he was choosing this time. In front of his armored train and behind him were two other trains filled with oh-rapa. The Stalinist train was so equipped that it could withstand a two-week siege. In the event of an alarm, the windows were automatically closed with armored shutters.

Having declared himself the leader of the working class, Stalin never visited any of the factories during working hours, being afraid to meet face to face with

the workers. I note that at the end of the 30s, when a campaign to expose the "enemies of the people" began in the country, the fate of K. Pauker was tragic. Even his slavish devotion to the leader did not save him from the worst: in the summer of 1937 he was arrested and subsequently shot. In July of the same year, he was replaced by the protege of the new People's Commissar of the NKVD N. Yezhov, I. M. Dagin. Dagin's immediate protégé in front of Yezhov was the personnel Chekist E. Evdokimov. In 1923-1929, he was the authorized representative of the OGPU in the North Caucasus region, and I. Dagin was one of his deputies. Evdokimov recommended Yezhov his former deputy. In July 1937

he became the head of the Department for the Protection of Party and Government Members of the Main Directorate of the State Security Committee of the NKVD of the USSR. True, he did not stay in this position for long: he was arrested and shot at the

same time as People's Commissar N. I. Yezhov. And Nikolai Vlasik (1941) finally established himself as Stalin's personal bodyguard, the head of his guard at that time. Before that, by the way, he worked under the supervision of his father. He joined the ranks of the CPSU (b) in 1918, in 1919 he met Stalin in Tsaritsyn. In the 1920s, Vlasik served in the Kremlin regiment and in 1931, under the patronage of the chairman of the OGPU V. Menzhinsky, he got into Stalin's guard. In 1937, when the repressions knocked out many of his bodyguards from the leader's guard, Vlasik remained alive and even more than that - he rose to an unattainable height.

In the 1930s, several assassination attempts were made on Stalin. In 1933, two of them were noted at once. In the first case, Stalin almost died from a bomb explosion planted under the bridge of the Lashupse River. However, in that case, Stalin was saved by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Lavrenty Beria, who, just before the bridge, advised the Secretary General to transfer to another car. The car in which Stalin was driving before exploded and fell off the bridge. In the second case (which occurred a few days after the incident on the bridge), Beria again distinguished himself and literally shielded Stalin with himself when they were sailing on a boat and shots were fired from the shore. And although, as it turned out soon, the border guards guarding the General Secretary's dacha in Pitsunda accidentally opened fire, Beria, according to Stalin, showed enviable courage and nobility. Although some people still suspect Beria that he himself arranged both of these assassination attempts. The third attempt on Stalin's life almost happened all in the same Georgia two years later. In the autumn of 1935, or rather, in mid-October, Stalin came to Georgia to visit his mother, Ekaterina Dzhugashvili ... Before that, they had last seen each other eight years ago. However, despite such rare meetings, Stalin did not stay in Gori for long. As it turned out, his guards exposed a conspiracy that had matured in the ranks of the old Georgian Bolsheviks. They invited Stalin to meet with them, to take a picture for memory. At this meeting, the veterans of the party planned to kill their longtime comrade, who, in their opinion, had betrayed the cause of Lenin. However, the plot was exposed.

It was after this incident, according to some researchers, that Stalin had a double. It turned out to be an accountant from Vinnitsa Evsey Lubitsky. In December 1980, the Montreal Gazette told about his fate. In particular, she wrote: **“Lubnitsky was brought**

to a richly decorated dacha in the vicinity of Moscow and entrusted to three silent employees who did not answer any questions. After some time, a group of people arrived at the dacha, consisting of tailors, hairdressers and beauticians, who immediately set to work. “After changing my appearance, they were all destroyed,” Yevsey Lubitsky said.

This, apparently, did not seem enough, and soon the family of Yevsei himself was destroyed, which he learned about only after the death of Stalin. Mastering a new role lasted about six months. The day came for the examinations, which were taken by Stalin himself. He personally arrived at the dacha to check the fulfillment of his order. In other words, the leader wanted to look not at his mirror image, but at a living double. The “father of peoples” was pleased with what he saw, offered Lubitsky cognac and drank with

him. A little time passed, and Yevsey Lubitsky began to fulfill his duties. He first played the role of Stalin at a meeting with a delegation of Scottish miners. It was not too difficult to deceive the Scots, who had never seen Stalin. Much more ability was required in order to appear before Soviet and foreign translators, employees of the Kremlin, who repeatedly saw the leader. But here, too, the role was played brilliantly. The skill of the double was so high that sometimes Stalin even put him in his chair in the Kremlin, especially before the arrival of Yezhov with a report on current events. When Yezhov entered the office, Stalin himself hid in the next room and watched what was happening through a secret window, and noticing the speaker's confusion, he received particular satisfaction. When Lubitsky ascended the Mausoleum on November 7 or May 1, he experienced incomparable

satisfaction. Naturally, the demonstrators did not suspect that the man with a smile on his face, standing on the podium of the Mausoleum, was not their favorite leader. Nor did they know that Stalin was at that time in his office or

hid in the country, afraid to appear in front of the people and seeing in all the people behind the walls of the Kremlin "enemies of the people."

Stalin's close associates - Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov - knew well that Stalin's double was standing next to

them on the podium. **"I remember," Lubitsky continued his story, "these people looked at me like I was an enemy. I don't know why... Maybe they would like to have doppelgangers."**

Further, the author of this sensational article said that in 1952 Lubitsky was arrested and sent to a colony in the Far East. After Stalin's death, he was deported to Central Asia. In 1981 Yevsey Lubitsky died in Dushanbe. Just before his death, in 1980, he met with a Gazette correspondent and told him his story. Reading such "confessions", no, no, yes, and

you will think: "What only does not happen in life." Although it is hard to believe in such a thing. Here is the man who served twenty years in Stalin's guard, Alexei Rybin, categorically declares:

"Stalin had no double. I tell you this, having been in contact with the Generalissimo for more than twenty years. Think about it, otherwise you would need a second guard. And there was no one but us in the apparatus of the OGPU ... I had a

chance to work under Stalin since 1931 at a dacha in Kuntsevo, Sochi, Gagra, during the war years I occasionally accompanied Stalin on trips around Moscow and at the front. However, we did not meet a dangling double in the face of the fictional Yevsey Lubitsky. In addition, none of these writers has official confirmation of this from persons who worked under Stalin: A. Poskrebyshev, N. Vlasik, V. Rummyantsev, Ya. Khrushchev, and others. The

elder sister-owner of Stalin's dacha,

V. Istomin, who worked under Stalin for eighteen years, remarked about Stalin's fictional double: "The late Goebbels, having learned this, would have rolled over in his grave with envy that he hadn't come up with anything like this about Stalin in his entire life. Every day I talked with Stalin, members of the Politburo, I did not see any double. It's a fabrication and a lie."

The former commandant of Stalin's dachas "Zubalovo" and "Semenovskoye" testifies: "I saw Stalin at the dacha only in the original. I reject the shadows of doubles. This version is also

rejected by such luminaries of the Bolshoi Theater as Mark Reizen, Ivan Kozlovsky, Pavel Lisitsian, Bronislava Zlatogorova and others, since Stalin was a frequent guest in their theater. Completely rejected by Stalin's bodyguards and the commandant of the Kuntsevo dacha, I. Orlov (commandant since June 1941), Stalin's presence of a privy councilor, bred in V. Uspensky's novel, obviously, as a collective artistic image. In general, it should be noted that about Stalin, however, as well as about any major political or other figure, there were a lot of all kinds

of rumors and legends. Both during life and after death. Some of these rumors were spread, while others, on the contrary, were debunked. For example, the same A. Orlov mentioned that Stalin, fearing assassination attempts, wore a bulletproof vest under his tunic, and A. Rybin categorically rejects this. Or D. Gai in the story "The Bodyguard" depicts how Stalin at the dacha "Cold River" ran away from his guards through a hole in the fence. And V. Solovyov, the son of a man who in the 30s worked as the head of the construction sector of state dachas of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in the Caucasus, exclaims in the newspaper Arguments and Facts about this : "Such stupidity can be written, **only** without any idea what a dacha is "**Cold River**": it could be reached through **the only** gate at the end of the highway serpentine, **built**

prisoners."

The same situation, apparently, is developing **in** relation to the Stalinist double. Although, if we consider this problem historically, such a concept as a "double" of a politician has been known for **a long** time. Even the Roman emperor Nero had a double in the person of the quiet potter Terentius. After the death of the emperor, Terentius even tried to take Rome with his troops, but was captured and crucified.

If we recall the national history, it turns out that Russia is almost a "country of twins." Let us recall, for example, Emperor Peter III and his double, who, unlike Terentius, did not lay claim to power in Russia, but went to Montenegro, where he

was killed six years after his accession to the throne. Or False Dmitry and Alexander I, whose double made a lot of noise in Russia. It was said that Grigory Rasputin also had a double, who appeared after the death of the elder in 1916. So the soil for Stalin to have a double was already "manured" in Russia.

By the way, that Adolf Hitler also has a double, it was rumored during the life of the Fuhrer. They said, for example, that in 1938 Hitler was killed and now his role continues to be played by a double, Maximilian Bauer. Thus, no matter who

hatched plans for the physical elimination of the "leader of the peoples", no one managed to carry it out. And considerable merit in this belonged to Stalin's personal guard. Sometimes you are simply amazed at how he managed to survive on his own, sending millions of people to the chopping block, including his close associates. In the same years of 1937-1938, he declared thousands of military men "enemies of the people", and not one of them even tried to settle scores with him. In any case, I did not find any mention of

this.

In the mid-1930s, an assassination attempt was made in Georgia on the life of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Lavrenty Beria. When he and his son and wife, as well as the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus Khatskevich, were driving along the Georgian Military Highway, unknown people opened fire on the car from the darkness, as a result of which Khatskevich was mortally wounded, but Beria (against whom this attempt was directed) not injured. After this incident, Stalin sent an armored car for Beria, and he ordered all the other first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union republics to drive in the same cars.

In December 1934, after the assassination of S. M. Kirov, a significant part of the responsibility for what happened could be assigned by Stalin to the current head of the NKVD of the USSR, Yagoda. Yagoda understood that in this case, Balitsky, a member of the Central Committee, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the second largest republic of the Union and the former deputy chairman of the OGPU, had real chances to take his place. Perhaps the only dark spot on the reputation of Balitsky

was the discovery in June 1934 of gross violations of financial discipline in the NKVD of the Ukrainian

SSR. In May 1930, already occupying a firm place in the apparatus of the republican GPU, Lyushkov was appointed head of the Secret (since 1931 - Secret-Political) Department of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR. Then the department "controlled" not only the remnants of the "anti-Soviet political parties" (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists, etc.), but also actively fought against the "intra-party"

opposition. By this time, the situation in the political life of the country had changed dramatically: the NEP was curtailed, the collectivization of the countryside began, the right and left opposition in the party came under powerful pressure from the Stalinist OGPU. "Operative anesthesia" for the Soviet society in this situation were the lawsuits launched by the Chekists from the end of the 20s on "sabotage" - "Shakhtinsky", "Industrial Party" and others. Not lagging behind in the implementation of the "social order" of Stalin and the GPU of Ukraine. Back in December 1929, Lyushkov's senior comrade and patron Leplevsky himself moved to Kharkov. Having become the head of the Secret Operational Directorate (SOU) and a member of the collegium of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, he, together with Lyushkov, actively participated in the development and implementation of the largest Chekist operations in Ukraine. Chairman of the GPU of Ukraine V. A. Balitsky testified that the liquidation of major cases of the "Ukrainian National Center", "Military Officer Organization" (case "Spring") and other large counter-revolutionary insurgent organizations in Ukraine was carried out "thanks to exceptional energy, clarity and prompt leadership and direct participation in practical work on the part of comrade. Leplevsky".

It is significant that for Leplevsky (then head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of the State Security Committee of the NKVD of the USSR), the liquidation of the "fascist military conspiracy in the Red Army" in the spring and summer of 1937 became the realization, with some changes, of his "blanks" of the early 30s. Lyushkov worked side by side with Leplevsky in Ukraine. According to V. A. Balitsky, he played an equally significant role "in the reversal and liquidation of the cases of sabotage and rebel organizations" - the "Ukrainian National Center" and the "Military Officer Organization" (the "Spring" case). "Personal visits of comrade. Lyushkov to the regions, management of agents, effective interrogations of a number of

major defendants largely contributed to the disclosure and liquidation of the organizations mentioned. In August 1931, Balitsky and his Ukrainian Chekists achieved their goal: the cases they "deployed" were noticed and appreciated by Moscow - Balitsky received a promotion and became deputy chairman of the OGPU of the Union. As it happened before, for the new deputy chairman of the OGPU from Kharkov to Moscow, to the central office of the OGPU, his Chekists from Ukraine reached out. The "mass

character" of the Ukrainian flow of Chekists was also facilitated by the opening of vacancies in the Lubyanka. In August 1931, Stalin staged another "shake-up" of the Chekist cadres in Moscow, large Chekists fell into disgrace and were removed: E. G. Evdokimov, Ya. K. Olsky-Kulikovsky, I. A. Vorontsov, L. N. Velsky and others. It was then that for the "people of Balitsky" from Ukraine: I. M. Leplevsky, G. S. Lyushkov, M. K. Aleksandrovsky, Ya. The new head of the Secret Political Department of the OGPU (the former, Ya. S. Agranov, was demoted and appointed plenipotentiary

of the OGPU for the Moscow region) was a little-known "person from the outside", the former plenipotentiary of the OGPU for the Ivanovo industrial region G. A. Molchanov, who advanced to eliminate "sabotage" in the textile industry and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1931. It was to him that the "Ukrainians" got to work in the department - G.S.

Lyushkov and M.K. Aleksandrovsky.

If Lyushkov could then be safely called "Balitsky's man", then Molchanov was and remains one of the most mysterious figures of the Stalinist OGPU-NKVD, just as his role in subsequent events is not entirely clear. Despite the meticulous investigation at the February-March (1937) Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, it was not clear who had the initiative to nominate him in 1931 to this responsible position.

Georgy Andreevich Molchanov (1897-1937) was born in Kharkov in the family of a waiter, graduated from a trading school and in 1917 joined the Bolshevik Party. His service career can hardly be called brilliant: from 1918 to 1925 he worked in the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU

Eastern Front, Turkestan, North Caucasus, Siberia, he remained in secondary positions and was not widely known among the Chekist environment. Only in 1925 was he promoted to independent leadership work - the head of the Ivanovo provincial department (since 1928 - the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the Ivanovo region). For five years (1931-1936), Molchanov led the leading Secret Political Department (SPO) of the OGPU-GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, which was engaged in the development and elimination of political and intra-party opposition. If almost all Ukrainian Chekists (I.P. Leplevsky, Ya.V. Pismenny, M.K. Aleksandrovsky and others) were forced to return to Ukraine with Balitsky in 1933, then Lyushkov completely "got accustomed" to Molchanov and soon became his deputy. In this position from 1934 to

In 1936, he took an active part in all the major cases of the Stalinist NKVD: the Leningrad Terrorist Center (1935), the Terrorist Center and the Conspiracy in the Kremlin (1935), the Trotskyist Ko-Zinoviev United Center (1936).

Particularly significant role in his fate was played by participation in Leningrad investigation into the murder case

S. M. Kirov. The Chekists, who arrived in Leningrad as part of a party government group, performed quite specific duties in the investigative team. Thus, the Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR Ya. S. Agranov led the overall management of the investigation and temporarily acted as head of the UNKVD for the Leningrad Region. The head of the Operational Department of the GUGB NKVD, K. V. Pauker, overhauled the bodyguard system of the murdered party leader. Lyushkov (Molchanov remained in Moscow) was supposed to deal with the political background of the crime. Namely, this side of the matter was most of all interested in Stalin and the Deputy Chairman of the CPC under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, N. I. Yezhov, who "supervised" the investigation and directed it in the direction of the activities of the "Zinoviev opposition". Apparently, Lyushkov, just like Agranov, immediately understood and accepted Stalin's and Yezhov's plan to blame the opposition for the murder. This was not immediately done by Yagoda, which ultimately influenced Stalin's decision on his fate. Correctly "oriented" in this situation, Lyushkov was immediately noticed and won the sympathy of Yezhov, in the near future - Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and P

affairs of the USSR. The mention by Ya. S. Agranov of the name of Lyushkov at the February-March (1937) Plenum of the Central Committee as a Chekist, and in the future, who readily collaborated with Yezhov, indirectly confirms this.

In the meantime, dramatic events were brewing among Lyushkov's former Chekist colleagues in Ukraine. Upon the return of V. A. Balitsky and his employees from Moscow, somewhere at the end of 1933, a conflict broke out between Balitsky and his "right hand" Leplevsky. The reason for the discord, perhaps, was Balitsky's inability to "fix" himself in Moscow, as a result of which "his people" also lost their posts. Employees Dzhirin and Insarov,

personally close to Legshevsky, began to talk among the employees of the GPU of Ukraine, declaring that all the successes of the OGPU in operational work were the result of Leplevsky's efficiency. These conversations reached Balitsky, who immediately removed Leplevsky from Ukraine.

The development of events took on a downright dramatic coloring: at the time of Leplevsky's departure, none of the mourners were at the station, except for Amirov-Pievsky. Leplevsky turned to him in an embittered tone with the following words: I, they say, am leaving Ukraine, but I will return here and settle accounts with everyone. So, quite in the "Mirgorod manner", two former Ukrainian patrons of Lyushkov violently quarreled. At the XVII

Congress of the CPSU (b) in February 1934, a new composition of the Central Committee was elected. Its full members, having equaled their party status with Yagoda, were elected the chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR (from July 1934 - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR) V.A. Regional Committee L.P. Beria.

No less than Balinkiy, the former high-ranking Chekist E. G. Evdokimov was also dangerous for Yagoda. Until his departure for party work (January 1934), Evdokimov was the informal head of a powerful clan of North Caucasian Chekists that developed around him in Rostov-on-Don when he was the Plenipotentiary of the OGPU for the North Caucasus (1923-1929 and 1932-1933). A step aimed at "neutralizing" Evdokimov as his possible successor or deputy was the appointment of Yagoda to

August 1936 G. S. Lyushkov in Rostov-on-Don, head of the UNKVD for the Azov-Black Sea Territory. With this, Yagoda tried to achieve two goals: to get materials compromising them and Evdokimov from Lyushkov, who had nothing to do with the interests of the local party and Chekist leadership, and at the same time get rid of Lyushkov in Moscow as a Chekist who collaborated with Yezhov. In this regard, the statement of R. Conquest (we are talking about 1938) about Lyushkov as "one of the few Yagoda people remaining in the NKVD" seems disputable. As a Chekist from Balitsky's retinue, Lyushkov was not among Yagoda's favorites. M.P. Schrader, who knew Lyushkov from work in Moscow, gives him a very pale characterization, recalling him only as "a modest person and a good worker." The fact that Lyushkov did not have any

noticeable government awards for the period of work in the SPO OGPU-GUGB NKVD of the USSR for 1931-1936 is also significant. In general, for his KGB service from 1921 to 1936, he was awarded only two

badges of the "Honorary Chekist" and twice in Ukraine (1927 and 1931) unsuccessfully presented Balitsky to the Order of the Red Banner. The high, "general" special rank of commissar of state security of the 3rd rank, assigned to him in November 1935, was only the corresponding design in the table of ranks of his responsible position in one of the key departments of the Main Directorate of the State Security Committee of the NKVD of the USSR. Lyushkov arrived

in Rostov-on-Don accompanied by two of his closest Chekist employees, M. A. Kagan and G. M. Osinin Vinnitsky, who were well acquainted with him from his previous work in Ukraine. A month later, in September 1936, Yagoda was removed and N. I. Yezhov, Chairman of the CPC and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was appointed the new head of the NKVD of the USSR. In this regard, the "Rostov mission" of Lyushkov was somewhat c

At the end of 1936 - the beginning of 1937, Stalin and Yezhov intended to strike the first blow at the leadership of two party committees (of the Kyiv regional committee - secretary P.P. Postyshev and Azov of the Black Sea regional committee - secretary B.P. Sheboldaev). The complexity of the upcoming "operation" was that both secretaries had never been in the opposition, had an impeccable party past and were considered solid "Stalinists". Thus,

By Yezhov's decision, Lyushkov was placed at the forefront of repressive practices in the localities, and moreover, when relative calm still reigned in the center. The "Rostov case" implemented by Lyushkov, directed against Sheboldaev, became a touchstone on which Stalin tested the possibility of attacking high-ranking party leaders and suppressing their dissatisfaction with blows inflicted on party cadres. Already at the December (1936) Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Yezhov announced the first results of Lyushkov's activities in Rostov-on-Don, when it turned out that "more than 200 Trotskyists, led by Glebov and Beloborodov and others, were arrested in the Azov-Black Sea organization and Zinovievites. "Enriched" by his "Moscow experience" in conducting investigations and preparing political trials, Lyushkov brilliantly coped with the task of Stalin and Yezhov in the new area of work: after the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 2, 1937 "On the mistakes of the secretary of the Azov-Chernomorsky Regional Committee, Comrade . Sheboldaev and the unsatisfactory political leadership of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" the local party organization was severely defeated, and Sheboldaev was politically discredited and exiled to lead the "secondary" Kursk regional

committee, where he was later repressed during the unfolding "Yezhovshchina". By a sad irony of fate, Lyushkov's exposing campaign in Rostov-on-Don, regardless of Yagoda's plans, acquired a completely different scale and direction, and E. G. Evdokimov was appointed the new secretary of the regional committee (then the Rostov regional party committee) in January 1937. Apparently, it was believed that, as a former Chekist with many years of experience in the North Caucasus, he would be better than others to

organize a "purge" along the party line in line with Moscow's instructions. At the February-March (1937) Plenum of the Central Committee, Yezhov finally trampled on the authority of the former People's Commissar Yagoda. Together with other Chekists (E. G. Evdokimov and L. M. Zakovsky were especially zealous here), he convicted Yagoda of the collapse of personnel work in the NKVD, which allowed "traitors" and "spies" to penetrate its central apparatus. It is characteristic that in this situation, too, Lyushkov, the first of the leaders of the local NKVD, promptly imitated at

It was in the UNKVD in the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory that the first "traitor-Chekists" were exposed - the head of the Taganrog city department of the NKVD E. N. Balanyuk and the head of the Novocherkassk regional department of the NKVD D. I. Shapovalov, who "systematically informed the members of the Trotskyist organization about the anti-Soviet materials available in the NKVD

activities of the latter. In addition to the desire to curry favor with the new people's commissar, there was another circumstance that forced Lyushkov to hastily look for "enemies" among the security officers of the regional NKVD: at the Plenum, Lyushkov's former head of the SPO of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, G. A. Molchanov, was exposed as a "Trotskyist accomplice". Lyushkov, who worked side by side with Molchanov for five years, could also be accused, if desired, of at least "political blindness and the idiotic disease of carelessness." Despite Yezhov's sympathies, Lyushkov felt the ambiguity of his position and, taking on the role of a zealous executor of the policy of exposure and repression, sought to acquire a certain "immunity" to accusations of having links with "Yagoda's people." The case with Molchanov became one of the risky career turns in which Lyushkov would be one or two steps ahead of his approaching death ... The February-March Plenum

of the Central Committee became a turning point in Yezhov's personnel policy in the NKVD of the USSR. From now on, Chekists of the "North Caucasian **group**" of Evdokimov-Frinovsky began to replace the leaders associated **with Yagoda** : V. M. Kursky, **A. M. Minaev-Tsikanovskiy**,

N. G. Nikolaev-Zhurid, I. Ya. Dagin, Ya A. Deutsch and others. It was them and their **main** patron, Yevdokimov, who, according to Yagoda's **plan** , were supposed to be discredited in the eyes of the party **leadership** by Lyushkov. To a certain extent, he, alien to **their** group interests and personally patronized by **Yezhov**, succeeded in this "mission". So, in July 1937, at **the beginning** of Yezhov's "purge" of the Chekist apparatus in **the field**, one of the prominent members of the "North Caucasian group", Lyushkov's predecessor in the leadership of the UNKVD of the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory, Commissar of the State Security Committee of the 3rd **rank** P. G. Rud was arrested. An even more scandalous incident **was** the mysterious suicide in July 1937 **of** the "favo

Yezhov, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissioner of the

3rd rank State Security Service V. M. Kursky. Vladimir Mikhailovich Kursky (1897-1937) worked in the bodies of the VUCHK-OGPU with E. G. Evdokimov since 1921 in the Right-Bank Ukraine and the North **Caucasus**, participated in the investigation of the "Shakhtinsky case" and **was** one of his successful "students". Like Lyushkov, in August 1936 he received a new assignment to Novosibirsk - head of the UNKVD for the West Siberian Territory. Like Lyushkov, in the fall of 1936, he "uncovered" the Trotskyist wreckers-conspirators in the mining industry of Kuzbass and held a show trial in Novosibirsk, which became a serious help to Yezhov, who was preparing the trial in Moscow in the case of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center" (January 1937) . Grateful Yezhov showered Kursky with favors: he promoted him in rank, appointed him the head of the SPO of the Main Directorate of the State Security Committee of the NKVD of the USSR to replace Molchanov. In April 1937, Kursky became Yezhov's deputy and head of the 1st department (security) of the GU GB, responsible for the personal security of the party and Soviet leadership and Stalin himself.

In June, Kursky was unexpectedly removed from his job of guarding the leadership and transferred to the head of the 3rd (counterintelligence) department of the NKVD GUGB. July 8, ost

97 A. Sudoplatov . 1 viv some letter, Kursky committed suicide. For Lyushkov, in order to possibly discredit such a high-ranking appointee Frinovsky, it was quite enough to inform Yezhov about the fact that Kursky was expelled from the party in August 1928 "for his involvement in the murder" of a selkor of the Tualu-Jashau newspaper in the city of Mikoyan-Shakhar in Karachay-Cherkessia. Such a fact of the biography made Kursky's candidacy as head of security clearly inappropriate.

Of course, Yezhov's deputy and head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, Commander MP Frinovsky, tried to prevent the appearance of such materials about his nominees. It is possible that these were the cases when, according to Yezhov, "... as soon as one of the NKVD officers was arrested, he immediately ran to me and shouted that it was all a 'fake', was arrested incorrectly, etc." . Naturally, such actions by Lyushkov in Rostov-on-Don irritated Frinovsky, Evdokimov and all the Chekists of the "North Caucasian group". Note

only the fact that Lyushkov, who was considered by Yezhov to be a "good Chekist", was never appointed to work in the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR, controlled by Frinovsky and his proteges. Nevertheless, the conflict between Frinovsky and Lyushkov did not prevent Yezhov from appreciating the merits of the latter. In July 1937, Lyushkov, Kagan and Osinin-Vinnitsky were awarded the Orders of Lenin and received a new assignment to the Far East. For a deeper understanding

of the circumstances of the further service career and the fate of Lyushkov, it is necessary to turn to the events in the NKVD of Ukraine that followed the February March (1937) Plenum of the Central Committee. At the Plenum, the second secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and the secretary of the Kiev regional party committee P.P. Postyshev, who since 1933 was the second person in the party hierarchy of Ukraine and who invariably supported the political authority of the head of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR V.A. Balitsky, was removed from work. In this regard, the position of Balitsky himself was shaken. In May 1937, he was removed from his post and appointed head of the UNKVD for the Far Eastern Territory in Khabarovsk. The dismissal of the long-term boss and patron caused a real panic among the Ukrainian Chekists, especially among employees close to him.

This state of panic only intensified when the new head of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR was commissioner of the 2nd rank State Security Service I. M. Leplevsky, once Balitsky's "right hand", and now his powerful ill-wisher. The new people's commissar arrived in Ukraine, accompanied by Frinovsky, the "hero" of the liquidation of the "military-fascist conspiracy in the Red Army." If we take into account the fact that the second person in the "conspiracy of the military" was the former commander of the Kiev military district, commander of the 1st rank I. E. Yakir, now the Ukrainian Chekists were to pay for the loss of "vigilance". In July-

August 1937, Leplevsky staged a real pogrom of the "Chekists of Balitsky" in the NKVD of Ukraine. Three former deputies of Balitsky, N. S. Bachinsky, Z. B. Katsnelson, V. T. Ivanov, were removed and arrested; In relation to them, Leplevsky fabricated a case "about a conspiracy in the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR," allegedly headed by

by the People's Commissar Balitsky himself and organizationally adjoining the "military-fascist conspiracy in the Red Army." The extermination of the

"conspirators" from the NKVD of Ukraine was carried out by Leplevsky throughout the USSR, wherever they were. In Tashkent, the head of the 3rd department of the UGB of the NKVD of the Uzbek SSR, P. M. Rakhlis, was arrested. In Voronezh, the head of the regional UNKVD, A. B. Rozanov, was captured. In

Moscow, an employee of the Special Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR V. M. Gorozhanin and deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army M. K. Aleksandrovsky were arrested. Lyushkov could also be

drawn into the whirlwind of this bloody meat grinder. Of course, Leplevsky himself was not going to do this at all, but in Moscow Frinovsky could have obtained evidence from the Ukrainian Chekists who had been transported, including Lyushkov in the list of "conspirators". Perhaps it was then, in July 1937, that a compromise was concluded between Yezhov and Frinovsky: Lyushkov was removed from Rostov-on-Don and sent to Khabarovsk, away from Frinovsky's eyes. In 1937, the gigantic frontier territory of the RSFSR from the regions (Khabarovsk, Primorsky, Amur, Lower Amur, Ussuri,

Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Zeya and Jewish Autonomous) was the so-called Far nine Eastern Territory (DVK) with the administrative center in Khabarovsk. In the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the region was reputed to be heavily "clogged" with right-wing Trotskyist oppositionists. This was connected with the "personnel leapfrog", characteristic of the placement of the party and Soviet leadership of the region.

In January 1937, the first secretary of the Far Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) L. I. Lavrentiev (Kartvelishvili) for "liberalism" and conflicts with the commander of OKDVA Marshal

V. K. Blucher was removed and replaced by a more "hard" party leader I. M. Vareikis. Upon arrival in Khabarovsk, Vareikis began a campaign of "revelations" among representatives of the party, Soviet and economic leadership of the region, the answer to which was a wave of suicides - the head of the Far Eastern Railway L. V. Lemberg, the manager of the trust "Daltransu-gol" I. N. Kotin, Director of the Joint Stock Company Kamchatka I. A. Adamovich. The former chairman of the regional executive committee G.

M. Krugov. From the head of the UNKVD for the DVK, the commissioner of the State Security Service of the 1st rank T. D. Deribas Vareikis demanded the immediate exposure of the regional "right-wing Trotskyist underground".

In April 1937, a group of operatives arrived from Moscow to Khabarovsk, headed by the head of the 3rd (counterintelligence) department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, L. G. Mironov, to assist in exposing the "anti-Soviet espionage and sabotage organization of Trotskyists and rightists." In May 1937, Deribas was dismissed and recalled to Moscow for his passivity in the investigation, and Balitsky, former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, took his place. The next day, after Balitsky took office, Mironov's deputy for the operational group of the GUGB NKVD, A. A. Arnoldov-Ke-selman, received from him a sanction for the arrest of G. M. Krutov. Using the tactics of carrots and sticks (Arnoldov introduced himself to Krutov as the personal representative of People's Commissar Yezhov), he obtained evidence from the arrested person about the existence of a "right-wing Trotskyite conspiratorial organization" in the region. Admired, Balitsky called Arnoldov a "sorcerer." In mid-June, when Balitsky was recalled to Moscow (he was going there for reprisal - there were already testimonies of "conspirators in the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR" against him) and Deribas again took his place, Arnoldov had extensive testimonies from those arrested about the "Far Eastern Parallel Right-

Trotsky Center". However, all the laurels and **the "reversal"** of the "Center" case did not go to Arnoldov's share (**he** himself was soon arrested), but to **Lyushkov**, who was appointed **at the end of** July 1937 as the head of the UNKVD for the Far East. By this time, in Moscow, Yezhov had already carried out a "purge" of the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR (L.G. Mironov was among **its** victims), and therefore **in August-** September Lyushkov launched not only a large-scale extermination of the party and **economic** leadership in the region, but also subjected brutal "purge" **of the local** organs of the NKVD. In a letter to Stalin dated September 8, 1937, Vareikis **reported: "... After the arrival of the new head of the NKVD, Lyushkov, it was opened and established that the former head of the NKVD, Deribas, also played an active role in the right-wing Trotskyite Far Eastern center. A participant in the conspiracy was also his first deputy, the hidden Trotskyist Zapadny. Second**

Deputy Barminsky (who is also the head of the OKDVA special sector) turned out to be a Japanese spy. Arrested as Japanese spies and participants in the conspiracy: Wiesel - head of the NKVD in Vladivostok, Davydov - head of the NKVD of the Amur Region (Blagoveshchensk). He was a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization Pryakhin - head of the NKVD of the Ussuri region, Bogdanov - head of the Political Directorate of the Border Troops, and a significant part of other Chekists. In the future, the list of the

Chekists of the Far East "exposed" by Lyushkov was replenished with the names of two heads of the UNKVD for the Nizhneamur region - L.F. Lipovsky and S.M. Sidorov, the head of the UNKVD for the Sakhalin region - A.P. Lev, the head of the UNKVD for the Jewish Autonomous Region - A. N. Lavtakov and dozens of other Chekists. Their places were taken by Kagan and Osinin Vinnitsky, who arrived with Lyushkov and sent from Rostov-on-Don and Moscow, middle-level security officers: L. M. Khoroshilkin, M. I. Dimentman, A. M. Malkevich, A. P. Malakhov, V. P. Krumin, I. N. Evtushenko, M. P. Rysenko, I. L. Kabaev, M. I. Govlich, V. I. Osmolovsky, D. M. Davydov. On August 15, in accordance

with the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00447 of July 30, 1937, Lyushkov began a mass operation to repress

"former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements" in the region. In total, according to the existing "limits" in the DCK, it was planned to convict by the decision of the "troika" 2,000 people in the "first category" and 4,000 people in the "second category." But these "limits" were soon exhausted and new ones were obtained.

In addition, according to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 21, 1937, the Dalkrai Committee, the Dalkrai Executive Committee and the UNKVD for the FEC were to deport the entire Korean population (about 175,000 people) from the border regions of the region to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Both mass

operations were planned to be completed by January 1938. In the early days of October 1937, Vareikis was removed from the post of first secretary of the Dalkraikom. In the very near future, he himself was to become one of the participants in the "right-wing Trotskyist conspiracy" in the Far East. His place was taken by an appointee from Moscow, the former apparatchik of the Moscow Party Committee, G. M. Statsevich, who for some time had worked with Yezh

Heads of the Personnel Department of the NKVD of the USSR. From that moment, the second wave of repressions began in the region - the "seizure" by Lyushkov and Statsevich of party-Soviet and economic personnel nominated

by the "enemy of the people" Vareikis ... In November-December 1937, candidates for deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were nominated. Across the country, interspersed with the "noble people" of the city and the countryside, candidates were nominated by representatives of the new generation of the Stalinist party-Soviet nomenklatura, which had declared itself in the last months of political terror. Together with the regional leadership - the secretary of the regional committee

Statsevich, the chairman of the regional executive committee P.K.

Legkonravov, the commander of the OKDVA V.K. On October 28, at a meeting of the team of workers of the Amurgosrybtrest timber processing plant in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, his candidacy was unanimously supported by the meeting. The initiative to nominate a "sharp-sighted Chekist" to the Supreme Soviet belonged to a certain "comrade Feldman, who was present at the meeting" and at the same time was the head of the UNKVD

for the Nizhneamurskaya Oblast. From that day on, Lyushkov became a political figure of the regional scale: his photographs and laudatory articles about him appear in newspapers, he speaks at meetings with voters and accepts their "orders", he is invariably included in the "honorary presidiums", stands on the podium with Blucher and Statsevich, taking the November parade of troops of the Khabarovsk garrison. Lyushkov's appearance did not say anything to those around him about the nature of his activities in the region: a somewhat puffy face with bulging eyes, lush, combed back hair and a fly mustache that made him look like a somewhat

exasperated Chaplin character. **Even more honors were brought to him by the celebrations on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the bodies of the Cheka-NKVD in December 1937. At the ceremonial meeting, in a greeting to the Chekists, Statsevich noted "the complexity of the work of the Far Eastern People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, located on the borders with a foreign state,"**

vareikis and other bastards who tried to sell our flourishing region of the Far East to imperialism. Narkomvnudeltsy DVK headed by ~~Lyushkov~~ Lyushkov destroyed the nests of spies, but the capitalist states will continue to send spies and saboteurs to our rear. Therefore, it is necessary to raise vigilance and vigilance even higher, to mercilessly destroy all enemies of the people...* Moscow also highly appreciated the "work" done by Lyushkov in the DVK. At the January (1938) meeting in the NKVD of the USSR, Yezhov set as an example to other

Chekists Lyushkov, who repressed 70,000 (!) "enemies of the people" - this was the highest figure in the country.

However, in January 1938, at the end of the mentioned celebrations, pressure was put on Yezhov from above in order to weaken the wave of mass terror, which threatened to become completely uncontrollable. After Malenkov's report on January 14 at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the well-known resolution "On the mistakes of party organizations in the exclusion of communists from the party ...", there was a tendency for some "rollback" in the practice of mass political terror. Yezhov had to sacrifice the most odious figures from the local Chekists - "exaggerators". Some of them were arrested and an investigation was launched into their "sabotage activities", others were simply "given a

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Kam" and transferred to a new duty station with a decrease in positions.

Lyushkov did not fall into the number of either one or the other, remaining "invulnerable" thanks to Yezhov's personal disposition. However, at the level of the political leadership of the region, the tendency of "rollback" manifested itself: from that time on, the ardent "whistleblower" Statsevich went into the shadows, giving way to the second secretary of the Dalkraikom (and colleague in the MK) A. M. Anisimov. The latter made a report at the regional party activists - "The results of the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the tasks of the party organization of the Far East", shifting all the blame for the mass expulsions of communists to the regional and district party leadership.

One of the last broadcast messages in the Soviet press about the rewarding of the Chekists (there were practically no such in 1938) was the rewarding of the Far Eastern People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs Lyushkov, who "distinguished themselves" during the deportation of Koreans and the transit transportation of

prisoners to the Kolyma camps. On February 6, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On awarding employees of the UNKVD for the Far East and the employees of the NKPS" was published, which featured the head of the UNKVD for the Amur Region M.I. Govlich, the head of the UNKVD for the Primorsky Region M.I. Dimentman and others. The clouds over the head of Lyushkov and his Chekists began to thicken only from April 1938, and this was preceded by terrible events

Among those whom Yezhov was forced to "handle" in January 1938, was Lyushkov's longtime patron, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR I. M. Leplevsky. Already two months after his appointment to Ukraine, in August 1937, Yezhov had to send an NKVD commission headed by his deputy L. N. Velsky to Kiev to consider numerous complaints about the arbitrariness of the new people's commissar. As Belsky found out, Leplevsky focused the Chekists exclusively "on the number" of exposed "enemies of the people" and "liache" in the NKVD of Ukraine, which even against the general all-Union background of Yezhovshchina looked monstrous. In addition, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, Kosior, systematically destroyed the remnants of the party apparatus of his former rival Postyshev with the hands of Leplevsky.

In January 1938, Leplevsky was recalled from Kiev (the new head of the NKVD of the **Ukrainian SSR**, A.I. Uspensky, was now investigating his violent activities in 1937) and was appointed head of the 6th (transport) department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the **USSR**. On April 26, 1938, he was arrested on charges of "active participation in the Right-Trotskyist anti-Soviet organization and carrying out counter-revolutionary treacherous activities." Soon Leplevsky admitted that in 1932 he was involved in the organization of the "right" (then - "right-wing Trotskyists") by his brother G. M. Leplevskiy. Rykov, Bukharin and Tomskey were at the head of the conspirators. After his appointment to Ukraine in 1937, Leplevsky "began

purge the NKVD apparatus of Balitsky's cadres, taking measures to prevent the complete liquidation of the anti-Soviet underground.

Further, Leplevsky testified that "in 1930, Balitsky and Leplevsky created a right-wing Trotskyist group in the apparatus of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, on which they relied in treacherous work." The personal rivalry between Balitsky and Leplevsky, which resulted in the rivalry between groups of Ukrainian Chekists oriented towards them, "was, in essence, a divergence between the rightists and the Trotskyists, connected with the struggle for advantage in the apparatus." Thus, since 1930, two parallel conspiracies have been brewing in the GPU-NKVD of Ukraine - the "Balitsky conspiracy" and the "Leplevsky conspiracy". This version of events, given by the arrested Leplevsky, again placed Lyushkov under indirect suspicion. If Balitsky recognized

the emergence of a "conspiracy in the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR" at the end of 1935 (at that time Lyushkov worked in Moscow), then the dating of the "Leplevsky conspiracy" in 1930 fell on the time of the closest cooperation between Leplevsky and Lyushkov in Ukraine. Moreover, although Leplevsky did not mention the name of Lyushkov among the dozens of names of the new "Ukrainian Chekists-conspirators", in his testimony of May 22, 1938, both "faithful paladins" were named - M. A. Kagan and G. M. Osi-nin- Vinnitsa. Having fallen into a kind of "fork" of suspicion because of them, Lyushkov himself could now become easy prey for Frinovsky.

Most likely, Lyushkov, who was in Khabarovsk, did not know any details, except for the fact of Leplevsky's arrest. At that time, he was busy finalizing his main "case" in the region - the "Far Eastern Parallel Right-Trotskyist Center", which was considered by the visiting session of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR somewhere in the first days of June 1938.

Similar "cases" in the Far East were often considered in absentia, and moreover, without investigation cases, according to information from the NKVD. What this led to is clear from the certificate of the investigator for the most important cases of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the Red Army, Brigadier Dalitz whom, dated March 20, 1940: "The UNKVD DVK compiled album references to those arrested according to the data available in the UNKVD DVK. In order to clarify, the local NKVD bodies were requested by telegraph. In this way, certificates were compiled for 171 people. Of these,

there is a mark "P" (to shoot) and the signatures of Lyushkov (head of the UNKVD), Nikitchenko (prev. visiting session) and Kalugin (assistant of the chief military prosecutor). Based on this, these 170 people were shot. These decisions are framed by sentences." Further, Dalitsky states: "As a result, it turned out that not a single certificate corresponded to the case. These cases were not checked during the investigation, and indictments were not drawn up. Some of the accused were at large. At the same

time, together with the secretary of the Dalkraikom, Anisimov, Lyushkov "stamped" sentences in the "troika" at the regional UNKVD. The last presence of Lyushkov in it was recorded on June 8, 1938, a week before his escape. In the first days of May, Moscow decided to deal with the testimony given by Leplevsky on two "Chekist conspirators" - Kagan and Osinin-Vinnitsa, who were in the Far East. Kagan was the first to be summoned to Moscow. Suspecting something unkind, Lyushkov asked him to call from Moscow to Khabarovsk and report the reasons for the call. Lyushkov did not wait for the call promised by Kagan: Kagan had already been arrested.

Not in the best mood, Lyushkov left Khabarovsk on a business trip to the Primorsky Region. N. S. Kardovsky, a former employee of the UNKVD for the DVK, recalled that Lyushkov found out about the upcoming dismissal from his post while on this business trip: "His deputy G. M. Osinin-Vinnitsky, who remained in Khabarovsk for Lyushkov, the head of the department, notified Lyushkov, who was in Primorye : Gorbach will soon arrive in Khabarovsk. Apparently, the prospect of the arrival and delivery of cases by the NKVD of the region to Gorbach (along with the arrest of Leplevsky and the "disappearance" of Kagan) became a turning point in Lyushkov's decision to escape across the cordon. Major of State Security

Grigory Fedorovich Gorbach (1898-1939), a member of the party since 1916, until 1937 he worked in the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD of the North Caucasus and tightly entered the "clip" of the Chekists of the "North Caucasian group" Evdokimov-Frinovsky. In the summer of 1937, he became head of the UNKVD for the West Siberian (later Novosibirsk) region. In the opinion of such a competent leader as Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR V. V. Chernyshev, "Gorbach enjoyed great authority with Yezhov and

was a close friend of Frinovsky. Gorbach himself told M. P. Schreider, who met him in Novosibirsk, that Frinovsky had been appointed here to "clear the region from the enemies of the people, and especially from the enemies who had made their way

into the NKVD." Lyushkov knew that Yezhov, who patronized him, was increasingly "bogged down" in the affairs of the People's Commissariat for Water Transport, which he had been leading (since April 1938), entrusting the decision of most issues in the NKVD to his first deputy Frinovsky. What could prevent Frinovsky over Ezhov's head from giving Gorbach the task of "clearing enemies" from the NKVD

apparatus for the Far East? On June 11, Gorbach was relieved of his post as head of the UNKVD in Novosibirsk by order of the personnel of the NKVD of the USSR. It is possible that at that time he was already on his way to Khabarovsk.

Tragic events took place in the security agencies, as well as throughout the country. Yezhov carried out the most severe repressions: he arrested the entire leadership of the NKVD counterintelligence in 1937. In 1938, repressions reached the Foreign Department as well. The victims were many of my father's friends, whom he fully trusted and in whose devotion to the Soviet system he had no doubts. He, like many others then, thought that this became possible because of Yezhov's criminal incompetence, which became obvious even to ordinary operatives.

Here I would like to cite a fact that, for all its importance, is not mentioned in books devoted to the history of Soviet special services. Before Yezhov came to the NKVD, there was no unit involved in the investigation, that is, the investigative unit. The operative under Dzerzhinsky (as well as Menzhinsky), working with agents and informants of the supervised area, had to conduct the investigation, interrogations, and prepare indictments himself. Under Yezhov and Beria, a special investigative unit was created, which literally knocked out testimonies from the arrested about "criminal activities" that had nothing to do with reality. Operational workers who supervised specific objects of industry and the state apparatus had more or less clear ideas

about the personnel of these institutions and organizations. Those who came by party call, mostly young, without life experience,

from the very beginning, the personnel of the investigative unit were involved in a vicious circle. They operated on confessions knocked out from the defendants. Not knowing the basics of operational work, checking real materials, they turned out to be accomplices in the criminal massacre of innocent people, committed at the initiative of the highest and middle levels of the country's leadership. As a result, a whole wave of arrests arose, caused by the inflamed imagination of investigators and "evidence" knocked out of those under

investigation. Nevertheless, many hoped that with the appointment of Beria in December 1938 as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, due to his high professionalism and in connection with the well-known decision of the Central Committee, the excesses that had been made would be corrected. It is clear that this hope was naive, but the employees of the Foreign Department sincerely believed then in the decency and unconditional honesty of their immediate supervisors. They knew, for example, that Slutsky and Shpigelglas sent from Moscow and arranged for the residence of the wives and children of some of their colleagues who were

arrested, so that they, in turn, would not become victims of repression. My father deeply respected Slutsky as an experienced head of intelligence and often recalled that on a purely human level, Slutsky invariably showed attention to him and my mother. My father learned about Slutsky's death from a heart attack in 1938 from an obituary in Pravda, when he was in Murmansk on assignment from the Foreign Department. The circumstances of Slutsky's death are still among the

unsolved mysteries of Stalin's time and the fate of the leaders of the NKVD. Abram Aronovich Slutsky was born in 1898 in Fergana. Received a secondary education. He knew German and Uzbek languages. Before the October Revolution, he worked as a fitter at a cotton gin in the Andijan district. In 1917 he joined the RCP(b), took an active part in the events of the October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power in Central Asia. During the Civil War, he fought in the Red Army as a private of the 7th Siberian Rifle Regiment. Then he switched to party work, became a member of the Andijan Ukom of the RCP (b), chairman of the county tribunal, and a member of the bureau of the Fergana regional committee. Since 1919, he worked in the bodies of the Cheka as an investi

Deputy Chairman of the Tashkent Regional Cheka. In 1922 he was appointed a member of the board of the Turkestan military tribunal, then - the executive secretary of the Tashkent Civil Code of the RCP (b), chairman of the military tribunal of the 2nd rifle corps of the Moscow garrison. Since 1925, he was in economic work in the Supreme Council of National Economy, was chairman of the State Fish Syndicate. Since 1926, Slutsky was sent to the Economic Directorate of the OGPU, where he first worked as an assistant chief, then as head of a department. In 1928 he was authorized, and in 1929-1931 he was assistant to the head of the ECU of the OGPU, secretary of the party committee of the OGPU. Slutsky is one of the "creators" of the Shakhty case. At the same time, in 1930-1931, he was assistant to the head of the INO OGPU. In 1931 - 1933 he was at work in the trade mission in Germany. He was the main resident of the INO OGPU for European countries, heading a parallel intelligence center with the Moscow one. In parallel, in 1931 he was appointed deputy head of the INO OGPU. In 1934-1935, he was deputy head of the INO GUGB NKVD, then head of the INO GUGB NKVD. In 1936-1938 he was the head of the 7th department of the NKVD GUGB. Slutsky repeatedly participated in special operations in Germany, Spain, France. November 29, 1935 Slutsky was awarded the title of Commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Slutsky had really great merits. It was he who

at one time managed to steal the technical secrets of the production of ball bearings in Sweden with the help of agents recruited by him. For our industry, this was of the utmost importance. Together with Nikolsky (later known as Orlov), head of the economic intelligence department, they also met the Swedish match king Ivar Kruger in 1930 or 1931. Blackmailing him that we would flood Western markets with our cheap matches, they demanded a compensation sum of three hundred thousand American dollars from the Soviet government. The reception worked - the money was received ...

In the last years of his life, Slutsky was a seriously ill heart; he, in particular, received visitors in a darkened office, lying on a sofa. I think he was doomed to destruction in

in the course of Stalin's reprisals against the leadership of the state security who worked with Yezhov. Yezhov, as follows from interrogations, during the investigation showed that Slutsky was eliminated by an injection of poison carried out by the head of the toxicological laboratory of the NKVD Alekhin, and on February 17, 1938, he died suddenly in the office of the Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD Frinovsky as a result of poisoning. However, this seems unlikely. Why did it have to be staged in front of several witnesses with a violent injection to the well-known seriously ill core in Frinovsky's office? And, finally, and most importantly, Slutsky's younger brother, an employee of the GULAG operations department in the NKVD, also a seriously ill core, died at his age in 1946 from an acute heart attack during lunch in the canteen in front of his colleagues. Therefore, one should be very doubtful about the testimony of Yezhov, Frinovsky, Alekhin about the circumstances of the death of Slutsky, given by them during the investigation, which was carried out with the use of torture against them in 1938-1940, which were referred to in official documents as "measures of physical influence".

From a trip to his small homeland during the leave granted to him in 1937, my father returned to **Moscow**, quite puzzled

by the rumors about the atrocities in **Ukraine**, **which** he had heard from his relatives earlier. He could not bring himself to believe, **for** example, that Khataevich, who by that time had become **secretary** of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, was **an enemy of the people**. Kosior, allegedly in contact with the Communist Party of Poland dissolved by the Comintern, was arrested in **Moscow**. The real reason for all these arrests, I think my father thought at the time, was that they actually made mistakes. In particular, Khataevich, during the mass famine, agreed to the sale of flour, **which was** an emergency reserve in case of war. For this, in 1934, he received a reprimand from Moscow along the party line. Maybe, my father thought, Khataevich **had made** some other mistake of the same kind. **Returning** to that period many times later, I remember he repeated again and again: "Alas, I was

naive."

In 1938, according to my father, the atmosphere in the Foreign Department was literally permeated with fear, something ominous was felt in it. Shpigelglas, deputy head of the NKVD's out-of-band intelligence, became more and more gloomy every day. He left the habit of spending Sundays with my father and mother and other work friends. In September, the secretary of Yezhov, then head of the NKVD, shot himself in a boat while riding on the Moscow River. This was a complete surprise for the employees of the Foreign Department. Soon a perplexing order appeared, stating: arrest warrants without the signature of Beria, Yezhov's first deputy, are invalid. It was rumored that Beria affectionately called Yezhov "my dear

Hedgehog" and used to pat him on the back, but his friendly behavior was purely ostentatious. At the Lubyanka, people seemed reserved and avoided any conversation. A special inspection commission from the Central Committee worked in the NKVD.

Father repeatedly recalled how clearly he saw the events that soon followed: **"November has**

come, the eve of the October celebrations. And at 4 o'clock in the morning I was awakened by a persistent telephone call: Kozlov, the head of the secretariat of the Foreign Department, called . The voice sounded official, but there was an unusual excitement in it.

"Pavel Anatolyevich," I heard, "the first deputy head of the State Security Department, Comrade Merkulov, is urgently calling you to his place. The car is already waiting for you. Come as soon as possible. Spiegelglas and Passov have just been arrested.

The wife was extremely worried. I decided it was my turn. Kozlov

himself met me at the Lubyanka and took me to Merkulov's office. He greeted me in his usual polite, calm manner and suggested that I go to Lavrenty Pavlovich. My nerves were strained to the limit. I imagined being interrogated about my connections with Spiegelglas. But, amazingly enough, Beria did not inflict any interrogation on me. In a very official tone, he announced that Passov and Shpigelglas had been arrested for deceiving the party and that I

immediately begin to fulfill the duties of the head of the Foreign, that is, the department of overseas intelligence. I will have to report directly to him on all the most urgent matters. To this I replied that Passov's office was sealed and I could not enter it. "Remove the seals

immediately, and for the future, remember: do not fool my head with such nonsense. You are not a schoolboy to ask childish questions. Ten minutes

later I was sorting through the documents in Passov's safe. Some were just amazing. For example, a certificate for Heifetz, then a resident in Italy. It talked about his connections with elements sympathetic to the ideological deviations in the Comintern, where he worked at one time. The suspicious nature of his contacts with former graduates of the Polytechnic Institute in Jena (Germany) in 1926 was also pointed out. I still remember Yezhov's resolution on the certificate: "Recall to Moscow. Arrest immediately."

The next document is a submission to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Presidium of the Supreme Council on awarding me, Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, with the Order of the Red Banner for fulfilling an important government assignment abroad in May 1938, signed by Yezhov. There was also an unsigned order on my appointment as an assistant to the head of the Foreign Department. I took these documents to Merkulov. Smiling, to my considerable surprise, he tore them up in front of my eyes and threw them into the trash can for destruction. I was silent, but there was a feeling of resentment in my soul - after all, I was presented with a reward for the fact that I really, risking my life, completed a dangerous task. At that moment, I did not understand how lucky I was: if the order on my appointment had been signed, then, according to the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I would automatically be subject to arrest as a leading

operative worker of the NKVD apparatus, to whom political distrust was expressed. Later, in the office where I worked, the phone rang. It was Kiselyov, Malenkov's assistant in the Central Committee. He

funds from special funds intended to finance the secret operations of the Comintern in Western Europe. He was even more enraged by the fact that at the meeting of the Spanish Commission in the Central Committee there was no representative from the NKVD. I tried to explain to him that I do not know about any funds and do not know who exactly is involved in their transfer. "And at the meeting in the Central Committee," I said, "no one from the NKVD was present because Passov and his deputy had just been arrested as enemies of the people." To this I added that I had taken up my duties only two hours before. Kiselev hung up the phone ... " In November 1938,

among the leaders of the NKVD, Yakov Serebryansky was also under arrest, who for more than ten years led a group called by his own name - the Yasha Group." It was his people who organized in 1930 the abduction of the head of the White Guard ROVS in Paris, General Kutepov. Before the revolution, Serebryansky was a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. He took a personal part in the liquidation of the Okhrana officials who organized the Jewish pogroms in Mogilev (Belarus). The Yasha Group created a powerful network of agents in the 1920s and 1930s in France, Germany, Palestine, the USA and Scandinavia. They recruited agents from the Comintern underground, those who did not participate in propaganda activities and whose membership in the national communist parties was kept secret. He was sentenced to death, but not executed. In 1941, after the war began, he was released and, at the initiative of my father, became the head of the department that recruited agents for deep settling in Western Europe and the USA.

In 1946, Abakumov was appointed Minister of State Security, and Serebryansky had to go to the military headquarters, since in 1938 it was Abakumov who conducted his case and, using brutal torture, knocked out false testimony. Naturally, Serebryansky could not stay at work with the arrival of a new minister. He retired with the rank of colonel and received a pension. After Stalin's death, he was returned to the service and appointed one of his father's deputies in connection with a plan to expand reconnaissance and sabotage operations. Ego was with Beria in April 1953, and in October of the same year he was arrested with his wife for the second time - now he was accused of participation in

the so-called Beria conspiracy to assassinate members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party. He died in prison in 1956 during another interrogation and was posthumously rehabilitated in 1971 under Andropov, who learned about the fate of Serebryansky during the preparation of the first textbook on the history of Soviet intelligence, which began to be written at his direction.

It was only in 1963 that my father found out what was really behind the cardinal reshuffling and "purge" in the ranks of the NKVD in the last months of 1938. The full truth about these events, which was never made public, was told to him by Mamulov and Ludwigov, who headed the secretariat of Beria - together with their father they were in the Vladimir prison.

This is how the fake was launched, which opened the way for the campaign against Yezhov and the people who worked with him. Spurred on by Beria, two heads of regional NKVD departments from Yaroslavl and Kazakhstan wrote to Stalin in October 1938, slanderously alleging that in conversations with them Yezhov was alluding to impending arrests of members of the Soviet leadership on the eve of the October celebrations. The action to compromise Yezhov was successfully carried out. A few weeks later, Yezhov was accused of plotting to overthrow the legitimate government. The Politburo adopted a special resolution in which the top officials of the NKVD were declared "politically unreliable." This led to mass arrests of the entire leadership of the security agencies, and my father was really lucky that Yezhov's order for his promotion remained unsigned in Passov's safe.

In December 1938, Beria officially took over the reins of government in the NKVD, and Dekanozov became the new head of the Foreign Department. He had experience in the Azerbaijan GPU under Beria as a supplier. Later in Georgia, Dekanozov was the people's commissar of the food industry, where he became famous for his immoderate love of luxury. **My father spoke in detail about how he**

handed over cases to Dekanozov: "I, as the acting head of the department,

explained to him some of the features of our intelligence work in Western Europe, the USA and China. But Dekanozov, without listening to me

to the end, ordered me to follow the things of the fugitive Orlov, which were sent from Barcelona to Moscow. I was supposed to deliver them to his office - he wanted to personally

get to know them."

The next day, Beria introduced Dekanozov to the intelligence service. In an official and stern tone, he announced the creation of a special commission headed by Dekanozov to check all intelligence operatives. The commission was supposed to find out how traitors and adventurers who deceive the Central Committee of the Party are exposed. Beria announced the new appointments of Garanin, Fitin, Leonenko and Lyagin. He also stressed that all remaining employees will be carefully checked. New leaders came to intelligence through party recruitment. The Central Committee flooded the ranks of the NKVD with party activists and graduates of the Frunze Military Academy. The father recalled

related to this:

"As for me, I was demoted to Deputy Head of the Spanish Section. Other veterans of the intelligence service were similarly treated, who were also demoted to assistant section chiefs. Beria, in a conversation with every employee who was present at the meeting, tried to find out if he was a double agent, and

said that everyone was now under suspicion. My wife was one of four female intelligence officers. Having brazenly measured her with his eyes, Beria asked who she was: a German or a Ukrainian. "Jewish," she answered, to Beria's surprise.

From that day on, my wife constantly warned me to be wary of Beria. Assuming that our apartment might be bugged, she came up with a code name for him so that we would not mention his name in our conversations at home. She called him Prince Shadiman after the hero of Antonovskaya's novel The Great Mouravi, who fell in the struggle for power between the Georgian feudal lords. My wife's foresight regarding the fate of Beria and her constant advice to stay away from him and his entourage turned out to be prophetic.

After the introduction of the new leadership, Beria was followed by a party meeting - this was the next stage of the campaign. On it, my colleague, whom I knew from Kharkov, Gukasov, an Armenian, unexpectedly suggested that the party bureau examine my suspicious connections. He said that I was transferred to Moscow by an "enemy of the people" Balitsky. He also accused me of maintaining friendly relations with other recently exposed "enemies of the people" Spiegellas, Raisa Sobol and her husband, Revzin, Yarikov, our deputy resident in China, known for his sarcastic witticisms about fulfilling the five-year plans (I one of them comes to mind: "In the fourth final blat is decisive"). The Party Bureau set up a commission on my case. One of my close acquaintances,

Hesselberg, the head of the photographic laboratory (he was responsible for the reliability of photojournalists who filmed Stalin), asked stupid questions and claimed that I was defending myself as "a typical Trotskyist double-dealer." I do not hold a grudge against either Gukasov or Gesselberg ... "

Three years later, Gukasov, as Soviet consul in Paris, awoke as the Gestapo stormed the building where he was staying. Our cipher clerk Marina Sirotkina started burning the code books, and when one of the Gestapo men ripped Stalin's portrait from the wall, Gukasov used this as an excuse to start a fight. He was severely beaten, but during this time all the ciphers were destroyed. Gukasov was deported by the Germans to Turkey to be exchanged for employees of the German diplomatic mission in Moscow. Later, Gukasov was assigned to lead the department for the development of repatriates and emigrants. He died in Moscow in 1956.

"... Gesselberg prepared a draft decision of the party bureau under the dictation of Dekanozov. It proposed to expel me from the ranks of the Communist Party for association with "enemies of the people" and not exposing Spiegelglas. It is characteristic that in this document Slutsky, although he died in February 1938 and was buried **with all due honors, also appeared as an "enemy of the people."** **The Party Bureau**

adopted this decision with one abstention. Fitin, recently appointed to the position of Deputy

head of the Foreign Department, abstained because, according to him, I was completely unknown to him. His honesty and decency, quite unusual in the circumstances, did not hurt his career. In 1939, he became head of the Foreign Department of Overseas Intelligence and died of natural causes in 1971. In December 1938, the Party Bureau decided to expel me from the Party. This decision

was to be approved by the general party meeting of the intelligence service, scheduled for January 1939, but for now I came to work and sat at my desk in my office, doing nothing. New employees did not dare to communicate with me, fearing to compromise themselves. I remember that the head of the department, Garanin, talking with his deputy in my presence, switched to a whisper, fearing that I might overhear. In order to do something, I decided to replenish my knowledge and began to study the files from the archive, waiting for my fate to be decided. I felt depressed. My wife was also very worried, realizing that a serious threat hung over us. We were sure that we already had compromising evidence fabricated and knocked out during the

investigation from our friends. But I still hoped that, since I was personally known to the leadership of the NKVD as a dedicated worker, my arrest would not be sanctioned. In those years, I still lived with the illusion that injustice could be done to a party member only because of incompetence or a simple mistake, especially if the decision of his fate depended on a person standing high enough in the party hierarchy and also enjoying full Stalin's support.

Knowing that a terrible injustice was being committed against me, I thought of turning to the Party Control Commission of the Central Committee with a request to look into my case, but my wife believed that it was necessary to prepare a letter addressed to Stalin, which she herself would send, and if we were both arrested, will send
my mother.

When our friends were arrested, we all thought there had been a mistake. But with the advent of Dekanozov, for the first time they understood

that these are not errors. No, that was a deliberate policy. Incompetent people were appointed to leadership positions, who could be given any orders. For the first time, we feared for our lives, threatened to be destroyed by our own system. It was then that I began to reflect on the nature of the system, which sacrifices people who serve it faithfully. Another of my friends, Petr Zubov, also fell victim and fell into the same meat

grinder. In 1937 he was appointed resident in Prague. For the first time in his intelligence service, he worked under diplomatic cover. Zubov met with President Eduard Benes and, on Stalin's instructions, handed over ten thousand dollars to the latter, since Benes could not use his money to organize the departure of loved ones and people he needed from Czechoslovakia to Great Britain. A receipt for the money was given to Zubov by the secretary of the Czechoslovak president. Benes himself fled to England in

1938. Zubov did an excellent job. The British and French authorities did not have the slightest idea of our connections with persons who had left Czechoslovakia. Six months after Benes left Prague, Zubov was recalled to Moscow and arrested on Stalin's personal order. The reason for the arrest was that

Beneš—through Zubov—offered to Stalin that the Soviet Union should subsidize the 1938 coup against the Stojadinović government in Yugoslavia in order to establish a military regime there and thus relieve pressure on Czechoslovakia. Beneš asked for two hundred thousand dollars in cash for the Serbian officers who were to stage the coup. Having received this amount from the Center, Zubov went to Belgrade to get acquainted with the situation on the spot. When he became convinced that the officers in question were just a bunch of unreliable adventurers and no successful plot could be expected, he was shocked and refused to pay them an advance. Returning to Prague with the money, he reported to the Center about the situation. Stalin was furious: Zubov dared to disobey the order. On Zubovskaya

In a telegram explaining his actions, Stalin wrote in his own hand: "Arrest immediately." (I saw this telegram in 1941, when they showed me the Zubov case.) Meeting with

Zubov in the corridor of the seventh floor on the Lubyanka on the very first day of his return from Czechoslovakia made me happy: from day to day the party bureau was supposed to raise the question of my expulsion at the meeting from the party, and I hoped for his support, as he enjoyed great prestige in the Foreign Department. We agreed to see him the next day, but he did not come. I thought he was just avoiding contact with me, but Emma met his wife on the street and found out about his arrest. I had no idea what exactly he was accused of: those were the times when you could only look closely at what was happening and try not to lose hope.

And then the unexpected happened. The meeting scheduled for January, which was supposed to approve my exclusion from the ranks of the party, was postponed. Yezhov, who had been dismissed from his duties as People's Commissar back in December of last year, was soon arrested. The case of Yezhov, as I learned later, was personally handled by Beria and one of his deputies, Bogdan Kobulov. Many years later Kobulov told me that Yezhov had been arrested in Malenkov's office at the Central Committee. When they led him to be shot, he

sang the Internationale. I still consider Yezhov responsible for many grave crimes - moreover, he was also a professionally incompetent leader. I am sure that Stalin's crimes took on such an insane scale due to the fact, in particular, that Yezhov turned out to be completely unsuitable for intelligence and counterintelligence work.

To understand the nature of Yezhovshchina, it is necessary to take into account the political traditions characteristic of our country. All political campaigns under a dictatorship invariably take on insane proportions, and Stalin is guilty not only of the crimes committed on his orders, but also of allowing his subordinates on his behalf to destroy those who turned out to be objectionable to the local party authorities at the district and regional levels. Party and NKVD leaders

got the opportunity to resolve even the most ordinary disputes that arose almost every day, by eliminating their opponents.

Of course, in those days I did not yet know everything, but in order to have reason to fear for my life, my knowledge was enough. Based on the logic of events, I expected to be arrested at the end of January, or at the very least, early February

1939. Every day I came to work and did nothing - sat and waited for arrest.

My wife was concerned about my rapid promotion back in 1938. She preferred that I remain in an inconspicuous position, and she was right, since the persecution of me began precisely because of this, although the appointment was purely temporary. I was not an "enemy of the people", but an enemy of envious colleagues - such was the ordinary motive for persecution in years of purges.

The new appointment left no time for long reflections on the campaign against me, which nearly cost me my life. The dizzying speed with which events unfolded carried me away.

... The Party meeting never considered my personal file. Two days after the conversation with Stalin and Beria in the Kremlin and the task I received to eliminate Trotsky, I was informed that the party bureau had reconsidered its decision to expel me from the party and instead issued a reprimand with entry on the registration card for losing vigilance and not exposing the hostile actions of the former leadership Foreign Department..."

A serious shock for me was familiarization with the protocols of the party meeting stored in my father's personal file, at which he was expelled from the party. I was struck by how courageously and nobly behaved during this, perhaps, the most dangerous period in his life, his father. This is the minutes of the party meeting of the 5th collective of the GUGB, at which, among other issues, the personal matter of the father was discussed.

The first to speak was Secretary of the Party Committee Leonenko, who in his report formulated the main points of the accusation: connection with

arrested by that time "enemies of the people" - major Soviet intelligence officers Gorozhanin, Raisa Sobol, Ivan Kaminsky, Dmitry Bystroletov. The last of the accusations was the illegal receipt of things from abroad. Then my father's colleagues spoke in turn. Almost

every one of them tried to "sink" it in one way or another. Blagutin stated that Sudoplatov was a lackey, had connections with the "enemies of the people" Gorozhanin, Sobol, Spiegel Glas, Slutsky (officially dead and solemnly buried!), After which he proposed to expel him from the party. Then Dudukin spoke, who, justifying his surname, stated that his father was

friends with Raisa Sobol and Slutsky, did not expose the "enemies of the people" and, moreover, spoke in defense of some of them, in particular, Gorozhanin and Kropotov. He also suggested expelling his father from the party. The third was Chernebov, who also said that my father did not

expose the "enemies of the people", that under the guise of operational necessity he received things with diplomatic mail (what kind of things - I don't understand, we always lived very modestly), who also suggested expelling his father from the party.

The fourth was Nagibin, who stated that his father relied on Slutsky in his work, was arrogant, was friends with Raisa Sobol, hid the facts known to him about Bystroletov and Gorozhanin, received things from abroad, did not report "where to go" that Spiegelglas, in his presence, admitted that he was a spy, knowing that Beria already had material on him, that he was friends with Kaminsky, that Kaminsky, in his time characterizing Sudoplatov's relationship with Passov and Shpigelglas, called him "a convenient person." He also suggested expelling his father from the party. The fifth was Prudnikov, who

said that Sudoplatov had "arrogance", since the head of the department and his deputies patronized him, disregard for his lower comrades, that he was friends with Gorozhanin, did not expose his enemies, that Passov brought him closer to himself, that around Sudoplatov and his Kaganova's wife grouped the old cadres of the INO (a special circle of people who did not digest new people), that he was in a special position with Slutsky, was at his party, and also offered to expel his father from the party.

The sixth was Pudín, who stated that Sudoplatov, being a member of the party committee of the GPU of Ukraine, knew about the Trotskyist past of Gorozhanin, but defended him, that Gorozhanin facilitated the transfer of Sudoplatov to Moscow, that his father participated in the New Year's Eve at Slutsky (cover to gather enemies), at which Slutsky expressed his satisfaction with the selection of the apparatus and its efficiency, while later all these people were arrested, accused his father of a "bad" and "bureaucratic" attitude towards Senkin and Nagibin, who came from the Central Committee, that in his, Pudín, in the presence of Shpigelglas, he told Sudoplatov that he was a spy, and also offered to expel his father from the party.

The seventh was Yezepov, who accused his father of unwillingness to expose the "enemies of the people", that he, together with the former secretary of the party committee Dolmatov, "played to the tune of Slutsky."

The eighth speaker was Khripunov, who, pointing out that his father refers to his long trip abroad as an excuse for blunting his vigilance, said that it was not true that his father was a person convenient for enemies, so he was appointed assistant head of the department and special conditions were created for work that his father had more than just business relations with Spiegelglas, that his father was especially close to Slutsky, that he treated ordinary workers arrogantly and did not help them in their work, did not expose enemies. Khripunov also suggested expelling his father from the party.

The ninth was Odintsov, who turned out to be more than original in his speech. According to him, at first his father was good, but gradually the enemies entangled him, which was especially facilitated by his marriage to Kaganova. According to this "subtle psychologist", the mother firmly held the father in her arms. It was she who drew him into the circle of enemies. That the father was in close relations with Slutsky, Passov and other arrested "enemies of the people", after which he regretted that these enemies did not all talk about Sudoplatov during interrogations, "but there is something." Father, according to Odintsov, became "not our man", the best friend of "enemies of the people." He spoke in defense of the city dweller, Shpigelglas trusted him, he was appointed to the head of the department. In addition, the father had a bad attitude towards party assignments (work in the wall newspaper), and also suggested expelling his father from the party.

The tenth was Gesselberg. Oddly enough, it was he who "watered" his father least of all, but it was his speech that his father remembered, attributing to him the words of other speakers. Hesselberg only joined the previous speakers and their proposal to expel his father from the party. Then Samuil Perevoznikov spoke,

Yakov Serebryansky's closest assistant, a resident of the Yasha Group in Shanghai, who had recently returned from abroad. He himself had only a few days to go. In his speech, he repeated all of the above: he did not expose his enemies, enjoyed the support of Spiegelglas, offended Nagibin, defended the city dweller, was at the evening at Slutsky's, got along with Passov, was friends with Raisa Sobol and Kaminsky. In conclusion, he proposed to expel his father from the party.

The twelfth was Senkin, already named by Pudín as offended by his father, who stated that abnormal relations had developed in his father's department, that his father did not lead, but commanded, that he was not interested in work and used people for other than their intended purpose, that he was arrogant, supported Passov's line to remove new workers from the department, and offered to expel him from the party.

Epstein was the last to speak. Repeating the set of accusations that has already become traditional (Citizen, Bystroletov, Sobol, Kaminsky), he added that the former secretary of the party committee Dolmatov patronized his father, in connection with which he also proposed to expel his father from the party.

After all the speeches, the floor was given to the father. In his defense, he said that he did not know about the "Trotskyist past" of Gorozhanin, that he did not expose the enemies, as he was busy preparing for the "big operational business" (obviously, he meant the liquidation of Konovalts), that Slutsky had only two times: on New Year's

Eve and when he was sick. Then Leonenko spoke again, who delivered the final speech. Summing up the discussion, he put to a vote the only proposal that had been made: expel Sudoplatov from the party. "For dulling The

in the fact that the resolution read: Bolshevik vigilance, expressed

working for a number of years in the department, being in close relationship with the former head of the department Slutsky, the former deputy. the head of the department, Shpigelglas, a former employee of the 5th department, Sobol and her husband Revzin, did not try and failed to expose them as "enemies of the people."

He was in close relations with the now exposed "enemy of the people" Gorozhanin, with whom he worked before joining the INO in Ukraine, when the party organization exposed Gorozhanin as a hidden Trotskyist, Sudoplatov defended Gorozhanin. He did not

take measures to expose the Socialist-Revolutionary, the White Guard Bystroletov, materials about which Sudoplatov had had since 1933, and he, Bystroletov, worked in the department in 1937 and attracted Sudoplatov to design the newspaper.

For not taking an active part in the struggle of the party organization for the cleansing of the department from traitors and spies who made their way into the department, for using his official position for personal purposes Sudoplatov Pavel Anatolyevich should be

excluded from the ranks of the CPSU (b). The protocol was signed by the secretary of the party committee of the 5th department, Leonenko. The following document refers to July 14, 1939. This is the protocol of the meeting of the bureau of the NKVD party committee, which indicates that the member of the CPSU (b) Sudoplatov, while working in the party organization No. 5, made a number of gross political mistakes, but it was decided to limit himself to a reprimand with entry on the registration card "for dulling political vigilance" for two reasons : firstly, knowing that Spiegelglas received materials exposing him as a Japanese spy, and that Spiegelglas instructed Yarikov to select materials that would rehabilitate him, he did not report this, and secondly, because Sudoplatov and his wife Kaganova were in close relations with the "enemy of the people" Revzin. The decision was signed by the secretary of the NKVD party committee

Gorbulin. And only on January 18, 1941, the reprimand was lifted. With many of the above persons, my father was somehow connected by the nature of his activities in the authorities. When even now, many decades after the hellish repressions that have taken place, you bring to the light of God from the former super-secret archives a list of these persons or other lists similar to their fatal fate, you suddenly feel that all of them, tightly

sequentially, logically, one after another set in motion by a single engine, they are integral parts of a terrible mechanism, consciously controlled by one powerful lever at one of its "command" ends, while the other "working" one blindly destroys all life around it. Each name from this list pulls other names, and those - more and more ... ad infinitum!

Chapter 7

DEFLECTORS

A wave of mass repression literally covered the country headlong and even went far beyond its borders. On June 12, 1938, the head of the NKVD Directorate for the Far

Eastern Territory, thirty-eight-year-old General Genrikh Samoylovich Lyushkov, accompanied by the deputy head of the Intelligence Department of the regional NKVD K.N. Strelkov, who lay down at a distance of three hundred meters from the "meeting point", never saw his boss again.

On the night of June 12-13, 1938, G.S. Lyushkov crossed the state border and surrendered to the Japanese occupation authorities in Manchuria. Lyushkov fled, fearing that the Moloch of Stalinist repressions would also affect him, a career Chekist since 1919.

Later, Richard Sorge also commented on the "case of General Lyushkov": "I am of the opinion that Lyushkov defected not because he was dissatisfied with the actions of the Soviet leadership or committed any unlawful act, but because he himself was afraid of being a victim of the purges that swept across ranks of the GPU. I believe that it was Lyushkov who gave his desertion a political coloring."

And today, when we know a little more about the "Lyushkov case", it remains to agree with the conclusion of the famous Soviet intelligence officer: taught by the bitter experience of the Kremlin caliphs for an hour from the NKVD - Yagoda, Molchanov, Balitsky, Leplevsky and others, Lyushkov did not wait for the moment when he would be thrown into the Lubyanka cellars "as useless" ...

Meanwhile, Lyushkov, who had fled from his colleagues, fell into the hands of the Japanese special services, and they decided to use him in preparing an assassination attempt on Stalin himself. After all, who else could describe in detail the routes of travel, habits, Stalin's security system better than a person who until 1937 worked in the central apparatus of the NKVD in very high positions. Who, if not he, could promise his new masters that the execution of the terrorist act against Stalin, some in the leadership of the NKVD and other institutions would provide the necessary support. In a word, with the help of Lyushkov, the Japanese began to prepare an assassination attempt on Stalin. The main executors of this action were to be the White Guards, of whom there were plenty in those days in Manchuria. From Turkey, they were going to move to the territory of the USSR in order to leave in the Sochi region. There, through the underground sewer, enter the pavilion in

Matsesta, where Stalin usually took baths. Special explosive bullets were intended to kill Stalin. The plan did not provide for the return of the terrorists, so they all went to voluntary death. The Japanese researcher Hiyama Yoshiaki, in

his book Japanese Plans for the Assassination of Stalin, noted that this assassination attempt was prevented by the Soviet special services at a very early stage of development. And all thanks to an NKVD agent - a certain Boris Bzhemansky, a translator from the Manchukuo Foreign Ministry, who acted under the nickname Leo. However, the version of the Japanese researcher is refuted by our domestic historian A. Rybin, who writes: **“Did the terrorists in Matsesta have the**

opportunity to shoot Stalin with explosive bullets? No. The internal guard consisted of about two hundred employees. The outer ring in the forest area was a detachment of border guards. Commissars N. Vlasik, V. Rummyantsev and A. Bogdanov headed Stalin's guards. The tail escort group was armed with machine guns even before the war. Specifically, there were Rakov, Kuznetsov, Kirilin, Kuzmichev and Melnikov. There were more than fifty other employees on Malaya

Matsesta itself. We appeared there three hours before Stalin's arrival and subjected everything to a check, right down to communications. The almost deserted territory of Matsesta and the forest adjacent to it

combed through. All suspicious persons were checked and, if necessary, detained. How, with such a tight guard, could even our nosy opposition arrange an assassination attempt? And it's not even worth talking about the

Japanese ... " Meanwhile, X. Yoshiaki talks in his book about the second assassination attempt on Stalin prepared immediately after the first. On May 1, 1939, during a festive demonstration on Red Square, the terrorists were supposed to blow up no less than ... The Mausoleum. On the eve of the holiday, the terrorists were abandoned in the USSR, but from that moment on, communication with them was interrupted, and their fate remained unknown. Apparently, they all shared the fate of the terrorists thrown into the Sochi

region. And the fate of the defector General Lyushkov was no less tragic. In 1945, his body was found in Dairen, near the city of Dalian. He was strangled and thrown from a motorboat by Japanese intelligence officers. As they say, "he knew too much."

Just eleven days after Lyushkov's flight, at the end of July 1938, the Soviet residency in Spain suffered another serious blow: he unexpectedly left his post and disappeared with his wife (resident employee) and teenage daughter A. M. Orlov. A month later, the Permanent Mission of the USSR in Paris received a letter from him addressed to People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov. In it, the fugitive explained that his act was due to the unwillingness to be subjected to unreasonable repression at home, as had already happened to many of his

colleagues and friends. Orlov Alexander Mikhailovich is also referred to in the cadres **of the OGPU- NKVD** as Nikolsky Lev Lazarevich, he is Shved or Leva in the materials of operational correspondence. His real name is Felbing (or Feldbin) Leiba Lazarevich (1895-1973). In the West, however, after his flight he became known as Alexander Orlov. He graduated from the law faculty of Moscow University. From 1916 he served in the army. There he joined the Party of Social Democrats Internationalists, then became a member of the RCP (b). In 1918-1919 he became an employee of the Supreme Financial Council. Participated in the Civil War in the south of Russia. In 1920 he was appointed to the Special Department of the 12th Army. Then he was appointed head of the secret operational unit of the Arkhangelsk Cheka.

Investigator of the Supreme Tribunal at the CEC and Assistant Prosecutor of the Criminal Cassation Collegium of the Supreme Court. Since 1924, he was an employee of the Economic Department of the OGPU, then he served as head of the border guard of the Sukhumi garrison. Since 1926, he worked as part of the Foreign Department of the OGPU. In 1926-1930 he was on illegal intelligence work in France. In 1930 he was transferred to the central office of the INO OGPU in Moscow. In 1933-1937, he was an illegal resident of the INO in France, Austria, and Italy. In 1935, Orlov received the rank of major of state security. In 1937-1938 he acted as a resident of the NKVD and an adviser to the republican government on security in Spain. From July 1938 he lived in the USA. In July 1938, on the eve of Orlov's escape from Spain, rumors circulated that he would soon replace Pasov as head of NKVD intelligence. However, the arrest of his son-in-law, Katsnelson, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, who was repressed in 1937 or 1938, frightened Orlov.

My father met him both in the West and in the Center, but fleetingly. Nevertheless, it makes sense to dwell on this figure in more detail, since it was his revelations in the 50s and 60s that greatly contributed to understanding the nature of the repressions of 1937. By the way, contrary to his assertion, Orlov was never a general of the NKVD. In fact, he had the rank of major of state security, a special rank equated in 1945 with the rank of colonel. In the early 1930s, Orlov headed the economic intelligence department of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, was a member of secret contacts and connections with Western businessmen, and played an important role in the export of new foreign technology from Germany and Sweden to the USSR. In addition, Orlov was also a talented journalist. He was not in Moscow when there were arrests and reprisals in 1934-1937, but

his book version of these events was accepted by the public as true. Some of our authors even use this version even today to describe the atrocities of the Stalinist regime. Of course, there is a lot of truth in what he wrote, but we must remember: this man was not very aware of real events, since he was not

eyewitness.

Orlov was fluent in English, German and French. He played very successfully on the German stock market. He wrote an intelligent textbook for the higher special school of the NKVD on attracting foreigners to agent cooperation. Raisa Sobol, my mother's closest friend, who became the well-known writer Irina Guro, worked in the Economic Department of the GPU under him in the 1920s and highly valued him. And there were reasons for that. For example, from among his informants, he was able to create a group of unofficial audits, which revealed the true income of the Nepmen. This secret revision service of Orlov was personally led by Slutsky, at that time the head of the Economic Department, who then, having become the head of the Foreign Department, transferred Orlov to serve in foreign intelligence. In 1934-1935, Orlov was an illegal resident in

London, he managed to consolidate ties with the **now** world-famous group: Philby, McClean, Burges, Cairncross, Blunt and others. In August 1936, he

was sent to Spain after a tragic love affair with a young NKVD officer, Galina Voitova. She shot herself right in front of the Lubyanka building, after Orlov left her, refusing to divorce his wife. Slutsky, his close friend, immediately nominated him for the post of resident in Spain just before Yezhov's appointment as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in September 1936. Orlov was entrusted with the most important secret tasks, one of which was the successful delivery of gold from the Spanish Republic to Moscow. For this daring operation, he was promoted to

rank.

The Pravda newspaper reported that Senior Major of State Security Nikolsky was being awarded the Order of Lenin for completing an important government task. The same issue of the newspaper reported that Major Naumov (actually Eitingon) was being awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and Captain Vasilevsky was being awarded the Order of the Red Star. Orlov was also highly respected by Shpigelglas. He often visited Spain and told my father

that Orlov, who was there, did an excellent job of recruiting an important

agents. By the way, Orlov played a prominent role in the liquidation of the leader of the Spanish Trotskyists, Andres Nin. The entire operation to remove Nin from prison was carried out with the personal participation of Orlov-Nikolsky with the help of a special group of militants - German anti-fascists, fighters of a sabotage partisan detachment. At the head of the German group was Gustav Ruberlein, later in the days of the GDR the head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The participation of the Germans in this action, as it were, confirmed Nikolsky's version of the involvement of the German special services in the kidnapping of his agent from the republican prison. However, the scandal surrounding Nin's kidnapping was never resolved. The Republican government of Spain reacted extremely painfully to this incident. It was precisely because of these circumstances that Nin was arrested

by the republican authorities for participating in the rebellion of 5 A. Sudoplatov - 1 Trotskyists in Barcelona, and then abducted by Orlov from prison and killed near

Barcelona. 129 The action to liquidate Nina appears in the archives of the NKVD as Operation Nikolai. The prehistory of this case is connected with the successful penetration of agents of Orlov-Nikolsky into the Trotskyist movement. Through the minister of the republican government of Catalonia, Gaodo-sio Orivero, succeeded in blocking the arrival of anarchist reinforcements to aid the Trotskyist rebels in Barcelona in June 1937. In addition, the head of the Catalan Republican Security Service, V. Sala-Hota, recruited by Nikolsky, regularly reported on the intentions of the Trotskyists and contributed to complete control over the correspondence and negotiations of all the leaders of the Trotskyist movement in Catalonia, where it had its support.

It was Jota who captured the German couriers who provoked the riots in Barcelona, which quickly escalated into armed Trotskyists. secret Irrefutable evidence of the involvement of the German services in organizing the riots in Barcelona radically compromised the Trotskyist leaders. Then Orlov wrote an anti-Trotskyist pamphlet, circulating it on behalf of Andres Nin, and created a version accepted by the official authorities about the assistance of the German secret services to Nin's escape from custody.

This action caused serious damage to the prestige of the Trotskyist movement in Spain. Yezhov directly reported to Stalin about the successful disinformation actions of Orlov and the liquidation of the

Trotskyists in Spain. In July 1938, Shpigelglas, as planned in advance, was to meet with Orlov aboard a Soviet ship in Belgian territorial waters to receive a regular report. Spiegelglas suspected that the French and Belgian secret services had reason to detain him, since a year earlier they had arrested some of his agents who were involved in the kidnapping of the White Guard General Miller. For this reason, Spiegelglas was afraid to go ashore. Orlov, on the other hand, was afraid of something completely different: he suspected that the meeting on the ship was set up in order to capture him and arrest him. He never showed up for the meeting with Spiegelglas.

Orlov disappeared, and only in November the leadership of our special services became aware that he had turned up in America. Before this happened, my father, according to archival documents, signed the so-called "orientation" on his search, which was to be transmitted through communication channels to all residencies. This document contained a full description of Orlov and his habits, as well as a description of his wife and daughter, who were last seen with him in France. The orientation indicated the reason for the possible disappearance of Orlov and his family - their abduction by one of the special services: British, German or French. In particular, the fact that Orlov was known to the French and British authorities as an expert of the Soviet delegation, who participated, moreover, twice, in the work of the International Committee for Non-Intervention in the Civil War in Spain, was emphasized. Another reason, indicated in

the "orientation", could be his treason: sixty thousand dollars, intended for operational purposes, disappeared from the safe of the residency in Barcelona. His disappearance worried the Soviet leadership also because Orlov was well aware of the OGPU-NKVD spy network in England, France, Germany and, of course, in Spain. In November 1938, Beria called my father and, giving various

instructions, unexpectedly ordered to stop the further search for Orlov. To resume the search, my father had only to

direct instruction. Orlov, it turns out, sent a letter from America personally to Stalin and Yezhov, in which he explained his flight by the fact that he feared the inevitable arrest on board a Soviet ship.

The letter also stated that in the event of attempts to find out his whereabouts or establish surveillance on him, he would instruct his lawyer to release documents he had placed in a safe in a Swiss bank. They contained information about the falsification of materials handed over to the International Committee for Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War. Orlov also threatened to tell the whole story related to the export of Spanish gold, its secret delivery to Moscow, with reference to the relevant documents. This revelation would have embarrassed both the Soviet government and the many Spanish refugees, since Soviet military support for the Republicans in the Civil War was considered officially disinterested. The payment we received in the form of gold and jewels was surrounded by secrecy. Orlov asked Stalin not to persecute his elderly mother, who remained in Moscow, and if his conditions were accepted, he would not reveal the

foreign agents known to him and the secrets of the NKVD, which he knew.

I personally do not believe that the reason why Orlov did not betray the Cambridge group or the circumstances of the kidnapping of General Miller was his loyalty to the Soviet authorities. This, I think, was simply about survival, since Orlov knew perfectly well that the possibilities of the NKVD to detect defectors were unlimited. It just needed time.

The abductions and liquidations of Trotskyists and defectors were actively carried out by the OGPU-NKVD in Europe in the 1930s. In this regard, the case of a career Soviet intelligence officer, deputy head of Soviet military intelligence in Western Europe, Ignatius Reiss (real name Poretsky), an illegal intelligence agent sent to Western Europe, deserves some clarification. He received large sums of money for which he could not account, and Reiss feared that he might become a victim of repression. He took the money intended for operational purposes and fled. He deposited money in one of the American banks. Before his escape in 1937

Reiss wrote a letter to the Soviet embassy in France condemning Stalin. This letter later appeared in one of the Trotskyist publications and became fatal for him, although it was clear from the Reiss dossier that he never sympathized with either Trotsky himself or any of the groups that supported him. Nevertheless, after this letter appeared in the Trotskyist press, Reiss was sentenced to death in absentia.

Reiss led a rather hectic life, and Spiegelglas's network of agents in Paris very soon spotted him. The liquidation was carried out by two agents: a Bulgarian (our illegal immigrant) Afanasiev and his brother-in-law Pravdin in Switzerland. They sat down with him at a table in a small restaurant in the suburbs of **Lausanne**. Reiss enjoyed drinking with two **Bulgarians who** pretended to be businessmen. Afanasiev and **Pravdin** imitated a quarrel with Reiss, pushed him out of the restaurant and, stuffing him into their car, took him away. On **September 4**, 1937, three kilometers from this place, they shot Reiss, leaving the corpse on the side of the road. My father, as he said in

his memoirs, received Afanasiev and Pravdin at a safe house in Moscow, where they returned after completing their assignment. Together with them was Spiegelglas, who supervised them. Afanasiev and Pravdin were awarded orders. By special government decree, Pravdin's mother, who lived in Paris, received a lifelong pension. Afanasiev became an intelligence officer and served until 1953, while Pravdin joined the Foreign Literature Publishing House in Moscow, where he worked until his death in 1970. It should be clarified here: the rumors that Sergei Efron, the husband of the poetess Marina Tsvetaeva, was

one of those who brought the NKVD to Reiss, is pure fiction. Efron, who actually worked for the NKVD in Paris, did not have any information about the whereabouts of Reiss.

Another episode that also requires comments concerns Georgy Atabekov. In the 1920s, Atabekov was a resident of the OGPU in Istanbul. He became a defector because of his closeness to Blumkin, who was accused of sympathizing with Trotsky's views. It is believed that his love for the daughter of a British intelligence officer in Istanbul also played a role.

Desperate for money, Atabekov wrote and published two books in the West. He was also involved in dark machinations with Caucasian emigrants, whom he promised to smuggle the family treasures hidden by them from the Soviet Union. It was reported that Atabekov disappeared in the

Pyrenees on the border with Spain. In fact, he was liquidated in Paris, lured to a safe house, where he was supposed to agree on the secret export of diamonds, pearls and precious metals belonging to a wealthy Armenian family. The Armenian he met in Antwerp was a decoy. It was he who lured Agha bekov to a safe house, playing on his national feelings. There, at the apartment, a militant, a former officer of the Turkish army, and a young illegal immigrant Korotkov, who in the 40s became the head of illegal intelligence of the USSR Ministry of State Security, were already waiting for him. The Turk killed Agabekov with a knife, after which his body was stuffed into a suitcase, which was thrown into the river. The body was never found. Turk and Korotkov carried out another terrorist

operation in 1938. Eil Taubman, a young agent with the code name Yunets, a native of Lithuania, managed to gain the confidence of Rudolf Klement, who headed the Trotskyist organization in Europe and was the secretary of the so-called Fourth International. For a year and a half, Taubman worked as Clement's assistant. One evening, Taubman invited Clement to have dinner with his friends and brought him to an apartment on the Boulevard Saint-Michel, where the Turk and Korotkov were already. The Turk stabbed Clement, again the body was put in a suitcase, then thrown into the Seine. The body was found and identified by the French police, but by this time Taubman, Korotkov and the Turks were already far from Paris. In Moscow, they were waiting for awards, and my father had to

take care of their future work. The Turk became the "owner" of a safe house in Moscow. Taubman changed his surname to "Semyonov" and was sent to study at the Institute of Chemical Engineering. He later moved to serve in the state security agencies. The next episode is connected with the fate of one of the

defectors in the 30s, Krivitsky. Military intelligence officer Krivitsky, who fled in 1937 and appeared in America in 1939, published a book under

titled "I was an agent of Stalin." In February 1941, he was found dead in a Washington hotel. It was assumed that he was killed by the NKVD, although it was officially reported that it was suicide. True, there was an orientation about the search for Krivitsky, but such was the usual practice in all cases of defectors. In the Intelligence Agency of the Red Army

and the NKVD, of course, they did not regret his death, but, as far as I know, it was not the work of Moscow. On the contrary, even in the Soviet state security agencies it was believed that he shot himself as a result of a nervous breakdown, unable to cope with depression. When a defector or one of the

political figures dies, they immediately begin to put forward a variety of versions of the person's departure from life. The most natural cause of death or the most logical motive for murder is often buried under layers of lies due to omissions and

mutual settling of accounts. **Chapter**

8

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

In 1933, my father was appointed to the position of responsible for operational monitoring and combating Ukrainian emigration in the West. Arthur Khristianovich Artuzov offered this position to his father, knowing that he was from Ukraine and had experience working in local conditions. By that time, my mother had also transferred to Moscow and was assigned to the Secret Political Department. Since 1934, her duties included working with a network of informers in the newly created Writers' Union and among the creative intelligentsia.

The main anti-Soviet organization that my father had to deal with even during his work in the Ukrainian branch of the Foreign Department, and then in the central organs of the GPU, in particular in the Foreign Department in Moscow, where my father was transferred in 1933, was the infamous OUN - Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists .

The Soviet security officers, and first of all the employees of the Foreign Department, diligently monitored and repeatedly suppressed, in particular,

increased attempts by OUN leaders to find allies in various nationalist movements in different countries, including Germany. First of all, the attention of the OUN for many years was riveted to their neighbors and "colleagues" - the Lithuanian

nationalists and national chauvinists.

I have lived quite a long life. It seemed that I had seen such a thing that I would never be surprised at anything. And yet, I'm surprised. For example, what is being done now in the

former Soviet Baltic republics, especially in Latvia, where Russians living there are blatantly denied all civil rights. The situation in Lithuania is no better. The current government of this state is forcing the people, without asking their will, to live according to the pre-war constitution. And even more to the fact that dodgy politicians call it the constitution of an "independent democratic state", and more "frank and principled" bashfully - the constitution of a "bourgeois republic". So I wonder: who is this verbal decoration designed for? For simpletons? On the naive and gullible? For strangers? After all, those and other interpreters of history, to put it mildly, tell lies. Is it not known that until 1940 fascist laws and orders existed in Lithuania, that the fascist regime ruled here? Moreover, the Nazis came to power in Lithuania earlier than in Germany, namely in 1926. Antanas Smetona led the fascist coup. Such a constitution is being imposed on the population of the former Lithuanian SSR, according to which foreign-speaking groups of citizens are already being discriminated against, political, economic and territorial claims are being made against neighboring republics. Yes, these are the familiar notes and ambitions of the fascist Smetona.

Here, for example, is one remarkable case from pre-war history. 1933... Hitler becomes

Chancellor of Germany. One of the first to congratulate him on his victory was the Fuhrer of the Lithuanian fascists Smetona. In the same year, a lively correspondence was conducted between Hitler and Smetona about a very important and topical problem at that time that worried them - the establishment of relations

between the USA and the USSR. Strengthening contacts with our country was sought by Roosevelt, who became the American president in the same memorable year for mankind - 1933. A noisy resonance in the world was caused by a trip to Washington and negotiations there with Roosevelt by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov. But there was also a "quiet, secret reaction." It was attended by German, Lithuanian and OUN intelligence. Rather, the fascists of Lithuania and Germany financed, and the OUN members carried out a plan to disrupt the negotiations, or rather, the assassination attempt on Litvinov.

The assassination of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Maxim Litvinov, which was to take place in early November 1933, when Litvinov arrived in the United States to establish diplomatic relations with America, could have become the most "loud" assassination attempt on the OUNs in the first half of the 40s. **The details** of the

alleged terrorist act **were discussed** at a special meeting (in Brussels, in **the apartment** of the architect Dmitry Andrievsky) by members of the OUN **Central Wire** (leadership) Konovalovs, **Bogush**, Andrievsky and Stsiborsky. Of particular concern **to** the nationalist leaders were the difficulties with informing the people about revenge on "Muscovites who had taken over **(captured)** Ukraine." It was about **how** to distribute in the Ukrainian Soviet regions **appeals and** leaflets printed in Lithuania (in the Kaunas **prison** printing house), which would announce the "murder of **the Soviet** people's commissar." Frequent failures of OUN agents in the USSR made it difficult to carry out a propaganda **campaign**.

The rest did not seem to cause concern **among the leaders** of the OUN. For the assassination attempt on Litvinov, a reliable "five" of Ukrainian nationalists from among US citizens, led by Luka Mishuga, was **selected** . The militants had detailed instructions and were **provided** with weapons. This special terrorist **group** in October 1933 arrived from Western Europe **in** the United States. However, this plan had already been revealed by the Soviet intelligence

officer Ivan Kaminsky, who reported on the impending terrorist attack in Moscow. Our intelligence through representatives of Amtorg (US-Soviet trade organization; diplomatic relations with the United States

we haven't had yet) informed President Roosevelt about the assassination attempt on Litvinov being prepared by Ukrainian nationalists. Roosevelt made a smart decision. In order to prevent an undesirable excess and at the same time "not offend" the faithful servants of American intelligence - the OUNs, he ordered that the entire Mishugi group be taken into custody for the period of

Litvinov's stay in the United States. However, Litvinov's security after that was nevertheless strengthened, and all the agents of the NKVD in Poland, Germany,

France (the countries through which the people's commissar passed on his way to the USA) were put on alert. On November 7, 1933, when the ocean liner Berengaria anchored in the outer roadstead of New York harbor, the terrorists had already been neutralized. But the security measures were still extreme. On the ship, Litvinov was guarded by eight hefty American bodyguards who did not step aside from him. All movement in America took place only by car. During all the days of their stay in the USA, the Soviet delegation went on foot only twice. The building of the Soviet embassy in Washington, where the delegation stayed, was surrounded by a dense ring of guards. The negotiations were successful, and on November 18, 1933, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the USA. November 25 alive and unharmed People's Commissar Litvinov left

America. The attempt did not take place. I would like to draw the attention of readers to one small but remarkable book. Its author is Sergey Tarasovich Danilenko. It was published in 1970 in Kyiv by the publishing house "Naukova Dumka" ("Scientific Thought") in Ukrainian with a circulation of 15,000 copies under the title "The Road of Shame and Betrayal." The main advantage of the historical chronicle of S. T. Danilenko, who created this work, having already lost his sight, is that, exposing the Uniate politicians, she brings to light nationalists of various stripes - Polish, German, Ukrainian, and also talks about the close connection them and clergymen with imperialist intelligence services. Moreover, Danilenko does this on the basis of documents. The history of these documents,

which I once had to get acquainted with, is also remarkable. It dates back to 1914, when Metropolitan Sheptytsky was arrested by the Russian tsarist

government as an agent of Austrian intelligence. Here is how Danilenko's book says about it: "And yet, no matter how much the Vatican wished it, the campaign for the release of Sheptytsky soon failed. The reason was that the tsarist government unexpectedly obtained documents that exposed the Uniate metropolitan not only as the main political leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, but also as a secret imperial adviser, who always intrigued and incited the government of Austria-Hungary to war against Russia and even personally developed plans for the capture of Ukraine and its "state structure". What were these documents that forced us to reconsider the role of the

metropolitan and attitude towards him, and how were they obtained? As it became known to Russian counterintelligence, securities exposing Ukrainian nationalists, together with the Uniate Church, were kept in Sheptytsky's personal cache - in one of the basement walls of St. George's Cathedral in Lvov, where the Metropolitan's residence was located. The secret archive, discovered on February 11, 1915, contained the memos of Sheptytsky and other leaders of Ukrainian nationalists to the Austro-Hungarian government, minutes of meetings of the "Main Ukrainian Council", "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine", "Combat Directorate of Sich Riflemen", a Vatican certificate that provided Sheptytsky the right to "organize and lead the Uniate Church throughout Russia."

Of great interest was Sheptytsky's draft memorandum dated August 15, 1914 to the government of Austria-Hungary, which detailed the military, social and ecclesiastical structure of Ukraine, as well as recommendations to the Austrian occupation authorities. The Metropolitan persistently advised his patrons to tear off the Ukrainian lands from Russia as completely as possible, to subordinate them to the Habsburg monarchy. In his opinion, this required the highest imperial decree on the appointment of "the most prominent commander of the Austrian army" to the post of hetman of Ukraine. In order to mislead the Ukrainians and play on their national feelings, Sheptytsky proposed to introduce into the hetman's army a military uniform modeled on the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks. He pinned great hopes on church reorganization, thanks to

who could become, under the high Austro-Hungarian royal patronage, the head of the Uniate Church, not only in Galicia, not only throughout Ukraine, but also acquire an obedient flock from the Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean. In accordance with the plans of the future all-Ukrainian and all-Russian pastor, it was necessary (for the time being, on the lands allegedly occupied by the Austrians), along with the Austrian secular laws, to establish an "independent", "fully separated from the Russian Orthodox Church" Ukrainian

Church. The latter should earnestly pray for the Austrian emperor, but not for the Russian tsar, and "Moscow saints will be crossed out from the calendar."

Apparently, here it is appropriate to tell in more detail about Sheptytsky himself. His name rose to prominence in 1888. Still would! A brilliant lancer and darling of fate, heir to the title of count and rich estates suddenly took the veil as a monk. Moreover, he began to serve not the prestigious order of the Jesuits, but the second-class - Basilian. In the aristocratic salons of Warsaw, Vienna, Lvov, they only talked about this. But few people knew that, moving from the Catholic Church to the bosom of the "servile", Uniate Church, the young Count Sheptytsky carried out the strategic task of the Vatican itself and Pope Leo XIII. Moreover, in order to carry out this task, the Catholic elite had to "persuade" both the "God's chosen one" himself and his influential aristocratic parents for a long time to agree to the transformation of not only the promising Polish officer Roman Sheptytsky into a mentor of the Uniate Ukrainian flock, Father Andriy (himself Sheptytsky called himself Andrey), but also a Pole - into a Ukrainian. He was to become one of the "re-enactors" of the expansive Basilian (Basilian) order, which had lost its significance, which, in the prudent plans of "catholization of the Russian East," was elected as a strike force. Since the ancestors of the noble Pan

Sheptytsky were well-known Uniate figures, the top of the Roman Church made a big "strategic" stake on him as a person capable of strengthening the shaken positions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy with the help of the Basilians in the near future and suppressing the "Moscow-Philo movement" in Galicia.

Here is how the Uniate priest and writer Ivan Rudovich spoke about this frankly: "At the beginning of 1888, the war between Russia and Austria seemed inevitable... The former German ambassador in St. independent Ukraine. Separation of Ukraine would be the most difficult amputation for Russia. Pope Leo XIII quickly got his bearings in the tangled world politics... The **Pope** 's Uniate plans ordered him to care even more about our Greek Catholic Church... plan for this innovation. At **the end of** April 1888, Roman Sheptytsky entered **the** Order of Basilians in

the Dobromilsky Monastery under **the name**, as already mentioned, Andria (Andreya). This **made** an unambiguous "historical" allusion to **the Apostle Andrew** the First-Called, who, according to biblical **legend**, **was the first** to establish a cross on the

Dnieper bank. **And** so a similar mission of "initiating" Ukraine and all of **Russia to** the "true faith" was entrusted to the new chosen one. **Moreover**, contrary to the statute of the order, Sheptytsky became its **member** without the proper mandatory six-month probationary period. His "strategic usefulness" played a role not only for the Catholic and **Uniate** Church, but also for the intelligence of the Austrian General Staff. He confirmed this main usefulness even **before his initiation** in basilian, when he was sent to Russia **to** "acquaint himself with the situation in the East."

During the trip, Sheptytsky presented himself in the aristocratic salons of Warsaw, St. Petersburg, Kyiv as a private person, as the son of a famous Polish magnate. He was especially interested in the mood of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. After some time, he reported on his observations and conclusions, amusing the hearts of both the "bosses" in the Vatican and in Vienna. According to the spy information of the future metropolitan, Kyiv was seething, showing strong dissatisfaction with the secret decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the tsarist government, Valuev, to ban the Ukrainian printed word. Referring to the example of the Ukrainian historian, archaeologist and ethnographer \

(he at one time changed his Catholic faith to the Orthodox one, but began to show hesitation towards the Uniate Church after the well-known royal decree), Roman - still Roman - Sheptytsky is very optimistic about cooperation with the Ukrainian intelligentsia. In his opinion, the latter is capable of recognizing the union "as the only correct way of bringing the Ukrainian people closer to the culture of the West."

Intelligence work

also contributed to a quick church career. Here are its stages: 1888 - monk, master of the Basilian order; 1890 - abbot of the Basilian monastery; 1893 - priest; 1899 - Bishop; 1900 - Metropolitan, head of the Uniate Church. But this is not enough for Sheptytsky. He is no less ambitious than his Vatican mentors. He constantly repeated to his flock: "I am the Russian Metropolitan." But of course, not only, or rather, not so much

these ambitions forced the Uniate metropolitan to again make his way to Russia with a new spy assignment. This is how the Vatican and General Staff owners wanted it. After all, the Austrian and German headquarters were intensified preparations for the war with Russia and new information was urgently needed. Having received the permission of the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph and the highest papal blessing, Sheptytsky, having grown a beard and acquiring a false passport made by Austrian intelligence in the name of a lawyer Yevgeny Olesnitsky, made his way to the territory of the Russian Empire. He began his spy voyage from Vilnius, where he met with old agents, and also acquired new ones. With the same purpose he visited Minsk, Slutsk, Vitebsk and other cities. From Belarus, he intended to leave for Ukraine, but suddenly discovered that his false passport was missing. I had to hastily make my way to Lvov with the help of agents.

Russian counterintelligence, studying the false passport of Yevgeny Olesnitsky and making inquiries about him, could not believe for a long time that the "holy father" was hiding behind this name. But since then, she has taken note of the Uniate Metropolitan Sheptytsky as a dangerous spy. However, according to the biographer of the last Longin Tsegelsky, who published a book in Philadelphia in 1937 with a brief biography of the master of basilian, Sheptytsky several times

traveled to Russia, supplying valuable information to Vienna, Berlin and the Vatican.

There is much evidence of Vatican intelligence activity in the years leading up to World War I. The intelligence network in Russia was especially extensive. The bishops of the Catholic churches in Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine collected and delivered valuable information to the pope's residence. There were agents of the Vatican even in St. Petersburg. Sheptytsky kept in touch with many of them. His brother Stanislav, an officer of the Austrian **General Staff**, helped him process the information. However, the latter himself was engaged in active intelligence work, especially at the time when he was the military attaché of Austria-Hungary to the Russian army in Manchuria. The sly and cunning

nature of the "holy spy", his secular manners trained from childhood, helped him find confidants among the Russian aristocracy. For example, he learned a lot of interesting information for the Vatican and the German General Staff from frequent conversations with the princes Obolensky. Well, Princess Natalya Ushakova was his secret agent. This is evidenced by a letter of instruction from Metropolitan Andrei to Princess Natalya, in which it is not difficult to catch instructions of a spy nature behind the spiritual instructions. "I ask you to keep this letter of mine to you in complete secrecy, **taking** into account the fact that my jurisdiction is secret ..." Sheptytsky warned Ushakova in response to her question about the powers of the metropolitan, who entrusted her with the recruitment of sympathizers of the Uniate Church. - She was determined by the Most Holy Father orally and unofficially ... Natalia Sergeevna! It's about something very important. If Russia retains its bright ritual and gradually begins to turn towards unity... Russia will influence the whole world through Rome and renew the entire East, since everything in the East depends on Russia. So, act energetically, carefully, but do not remember my letter. Even more convincingly reveals the

unscrupulous mission of "Andrew the Newly Called" in Russia by an undercover report of the Uniate resident in St. Petersburg, Leonid Fedorov, to Metropolitan Sheptytsky. Here is an excerpt from that letter:

“... the business of building dreadnoughts and, in general, strengthening the fleet is advancing at a snail's pace; in the War Ministry, work is going on more vigorously: new corps are being created, aviation business is expanding, but there are no fundamental reforms even there. In the General Staff there is a struggle going on between moldy old tacticians and young talented officers, with victory leaning towards the former. At the head of the War Ministry is an absolute zero - General Sukhomlinov, at the head of the Academy of the General Staff - a complete nonentity, capable only of revelry and dancing, General Engalichsv. The commissariat continues the system **of theft and bribery. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as they say, the horse did not roll. Maklakov himself is a narrow-minded bureaucrat and a stupid Black Hundredist. The Ministry of Finance is better: Kokovtsev left behind a good inheritance and enough money for a rainy day. But the poor fellow did not please the Black Hundreds and Grishka, and he was asked to**

resign ...” Russian counterintelligence, taking note of the Uniate spy, nevertheless managed to arrest Sheptytsky. This happened in early September 1914, when Russian troops cleared Galicia of the Germans. On September 19 of the same year, he was taken from Lvov to Russia. The detention was, however, rather conditional. The Metropolitan was traveling in a saloon car, accompanied by Botsyan's personal confessor (rector of the Uniate Seminary), the personal secretary of the monk Grodsky, and a personal servant. The honorary arrest and the special detention of such a dangerous person for Russia were explained not only by his high position, but also by the favor that he enjoyed among many aristocrats close to the tsar. The cunning and duplicitous Sheptytsky hurried to establish this favor even in the tsar's opinion. He sent a letter of greeting to Nicholas II, in which he expressed his joy over the “victory of the Russian army and the reunification of Chervonnaya Rus with Russia”, and also due to the fact that “the three million Russian population of Galicia joyfully welcomes Russian soldiers as their brothers.” And this is a month after he, indignant precisely at the joyful meeting of the Russian army with the population of Galicia, he turned to his “traitorous flock” with a threatening message in which he called on the faithful to strictly fulfill their obligations “to God and Caesar”, promised

a terrible punishment to all who will welcome the Russian army and even more so help it.

Subsequently, hypocrisy will become not only a character trait of the former lancer-monk, but also his "consistent political manner." So, he will greet Hitler with personal letters after the entry of fascist troops into Lvov, Kiev, on the Fuhrer's birthday. Well, in 1944, when the invaders flee west from Soviet soil, he will send a congratulatory "frank" message to Stalin. Moreover, he will send a special delegation to Moscow, which will include his second brother, the rector of the **male** Uniate monastery Kliment Sheptytsky. **The delegation** will attest to its "high charitable" presence not only in the patriarchate, but also in the Supreme Soviet, in the NKVD, where, on behalf of the leadership, my father received them.

The eloquence of the holy fathers, who talked about love for the motherland, the people, about friendship and peace, about the great feat of the Soviet and especially Russian people, disappeared when it came to the past glorifications of their supreme shepherd in honor of Hitler, about the activity of Uniate priests when gathering among the population occupied areas of food for the needs of the German army, about the toasts proclaimed in Uniate churches in honor of fascist weapons, about fascist flags hung in these churches.

But let us return to an earlier time, to 1914. So, although Nicholas II caught the prudence of the metropolitan spy, although he made an eloquent note on Sheptytsky's letter: "Asp", this did not in the least affect the "prisoner regime" of Father Andrei. In Kyiv, he was kept in the most luxurious city hotel "Continental", in Nizhny Novgorod - in a private apartment with complete comfort. He was not deprived of special privileges in Kursk, where he lived in luxury in a mansion allocated for him. And this despite the fact that the "prisoner" was actively working as the "supreme Uniate resident", inclining new agents to anti-Orthodox and espionage work. He was in constant contact with his St. Jurassic residency in Lvov. Sheptytsky felt at ease even when the Russian counterintelligence found the archive incriminating him, which had already been discussed.

True, in the summer of 1915 the prison regime for the metropolitan was somewhat tougher. By that time, the military situation for Russia had become much more complicated. Russian troops were forced to leave almost the entire Galicia, Poland, and the Baltic states. Sheptytsky lost all sense of proportion and openly blessed the Austrian army for a bloody terror against the Galicians, who welcomed the "Muscovites" and thus "betrayed the holy cause." The Ukrainian nationalists and "leaders" of the Uniates were ordered to identify all those who assisted the Russian troops and authorities. After that, Sheptytsky was sent to the Suzdal Monastery, and from there to Yaroslavl, interrupting his active resident work. But this was a purely external tightening of the regime in relation to him. That can be

judged by this fact. Every year, the royal treasury allocated the same amount of money for the maintenance of the "holy" Austrian and German spy as for the bishop of the Orthodox Church, that is, 4,000 rubles. At the same time, a soldier of the tsarist army, who at that time was shedding blood on the fronts of the world war and whom Sheptytsky, referring to his "flock", urged to destroy everywhere and everywhere, received only 18 rubles a year.

The Provisional Government reacted even more favorably to the Uniate pastor. Thus, the then Minister of Justice, Kerensky, in March 1917 informed Sheptytsky that he could choose the place of his stay in Russia himself. The metropolitan decided to go to Petrograd, where he had a strong, influential agency. There, with the help of these agents, as well as acquaintances from among the metropolitan aristocracy, he managed to obtain the return of his personal archive, including such an important, incriminating document as a secret act authorizing Sheptytsky to carry out activities in the interests of the Vatican within the borders of all of Russia. Having received the originals (certified copies remained in the archival files of the Russian counterintelligence) of almost all the materials from his Lvov cache, Sheptytsky deployed to the fullest extent of his adventurous active nature the fulfillment of the instructions of the spiritual and intelligence authorities. A curious record of one of Sheptytsky's numerous conversations with the ministers of the Provisional Government has been preserved. He saw the main reason for all the troubles of the former Russian Empire in the fact that, in his opinion, the rude, ignorant and weak Orthodox Church undermined the people

authority of the authorities. The eternal enemy of Russia suddenly began to appear as

her frantic guardian. "In the very first days of the revolution," he persuaded the ministers-temporaries to his side, "I saw with my own eyes cases that testified that in Russia there are no more hated representatives of the past regime, like the priest and the policeman. I will tell you more, my observer, a police **officer in Yaroslavl, is already in prison, and some of the Orthodox priests are afraid that angry crowds will inflict some kind of violence on them. You will renew order and obedience only when the renewed Church will help you in this. And Orthodoxy will be able to renew itself only when it unites with the Western Church. Only the teaching of our Church with its centuries-old experience will promote order and peace in your state. Give the opportunity to freely live and act in Russia to our Greek Catholic Church, and it will quickly help Russian Orthodoxy to be renewed. Then you will see all the beneficent influence of our Church on the souls of people angry in the conditions of the revolution ...**" Sheptytsky's cunning plan intended to accomplish in one fell swoop what the Catholic elite

had been striving to achieve for centuries - to subject the peoples of Russia to its spiritual influence. In order to save itself from the threat of the growing revolution, the Provisional Government decided to grab onto the "Uniate saving straw." It not only decided to legalize the Greek Catholic Church in Russia, but also instructed the relevant authorities to invite to all official "spiritual meetings" his Uniate exarch Leonid Fedorov, appointed by the metropolitan-spy-on. The October Revolution prevented the fulfillment of plans for the total catholicization of the population of Russia. This was enough for Sheptytsky to declare an anathema to

revolutionary ideas, to Bolshevism, and to Soviet power. His anger and hatred knew no bounds, he did not support any adventure and all the adventurers who spoke "with a word or a sword" against the Soviets. That is why he became the organizer, inspirer and spiritual mentor of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO, later

OUN), which was a former sabotage and espionage-terrorist formation of nationalist militants. The role of Sheptytsky

in the activities of the UVO-OUN is convincingly evidenced by his correspondence with one of the leaders of the "nationalist wire" Konovalts. After the failure of the aggression of the White Poles against the Republic of Soviets, when Poland was forced to make peace, the Ukrainian nationalists played a double game.

"Now that Poland has established peace with Soviet Russia," Konovalts wrote to Sheptytsky, "the situation forces us willy-nilly to raise the flag of struggle against the Poles. Otherwise, we will lose influence not only in the region, but even in the internment camps ... However, realizing that the Bolsheviks will still remain our mortal enemy in the future, we raise the flag of struggle against the Poles, but we will fight the Poles only to the extent that they force us to resort to self-defence. This will be the case until the Poles understand the need to give us the opportunity to live and breathe. We will continue to direct all our efforts against the Bolsheviks, preparing our final blow against them.

The approval and blessing of Sheptytsky Konovalts sounded
So:

"I have no objections, colonel, either to how you perceive the situation that has developed, or to the action you have determined. I have to make only such remarks. I imagine that you have set yourself the goal of creating a Ukrainian mafia in the region. Well, in the existing conditions you have a full reason. But remember: peace with Bolshevik Russia is a continuation of the war with her in other ways. The whole force of the impact of your organization must continue to fall on the head of the Bolsheviks. The main thing is to get Ukraine."

Wishes and advice of Metropolitan Konovalts, other OUN members and leaders of the Ukrainian military organization perceived as orders and acted in accordance with them. Despite the fact that the people of Galicia, suffering from the brutal Polish occupation, opposed it in every possible way and placed certain hopes on the UVO, the latter was thrown by the leaders of the "Ukrainian secret mafia" not to fight against the Polish invaders, but to contain it. After all, any wide public performance

against the Poles - was a significant support for the patriotic forces seeking reunification with Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia. At the same time, in order not to completely lose authority among the broad sections of Galicia and to fuel those illusory liberation hopes that were pinned on the UVO, Ukrainian nationalists nevertheless undertook terrorist acts against individual Polish leaders. German intelligence also persistently pushed them to this, in which the leaders of the UVO, for example, Yevgeny Konovalets and his deputy Andrei Melnik, became their own people. Among the agents of German intelligence, headed by Colonel Walter Nikolai (formerly a Kaiser intelligence agent), there were many former Petliurists, Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and other rabble who received spy assignments during the First World War. Konovalets's report to Sheptytsky describes in detail how the connection between the UVO and German intelligence

was established: **“Previous conversations with secondary representatives of the German intelligence service so interested its responsible leaders that Colonel Walter Nikolai arrived for the next meeting in person. The chief of German intelligence was interested in everything: the history of the creation of the UVO, its composition, the direction and scope of its activities, but most of all, the real possibilities of the UVO in Soviet Ukraine. He again and again returned to the conversation about the connection with the residents sent there and about the difficulties of undercover work on Soviet territory. Carefully inquired about contacts with the intelligence of the Polish General Staff.**

Further, Konovalets told Sheptytsky that he had told the chief of German intelligence about everything, guided by the advice of his "spiritual mentor" to rely on "true friends - the Germans" in everything. In addition, he apparently feared that Nicolai, through his agents, would definitely find out under whose auspices the UVO was created. Konovalets could have known or guessed that from the very beginning of the existence of pan-Poland, German intelligence had introduced its agents into its state apparatus, the army, and even into the highest bodies of the Polish government.

In another message to his spiritual mentor, Konovalets thanked the Metropolitan for his happy prophecy that it was the Germans, sincere friends of Ukraine, who were to have the mission to ensure the independence of the new Ukrainian state, as well as the main "fighter against Bolshevism." Around the same time, Sheptytsky received an official message from the Vatican that in July 1933 England, France, Germany and Italy had signed a joint document in Rome. The report from the Vatican noted: "The pact of agreement and cooperation between the four states is based primarily on the unity of views of these states regarding the policy **against Bolshevik Russia. Germany must be armed to fight communism. It is surprising that some of the statesmen of Poland do not understand this ...** "

Such incomprehension of fellow countrymen discouraged Sheptytsky as well. It was their intractability with other countries that could serve as a pretext for the "liquidation of Poland as a state." This was reported to Sheptytsky by the envoy of Konovalets. "Poland as a state does not exist in the plans of the Fuhrer," he informed the metropolitan. - Great Germany wants to have a joint border with Great Ukraine. This will be preceded by various combinations with Poland, depending on many circumstances, the main of which will be the development of a strategic plan for a decisive offensive against Moscow. The last phrase somewhat softened the bitterness from the futility of "obstinate Poland." It was precisely the "decisive attack on Moscow", which could bring Sheptytsky the coveted crown of the patriarch not only of all Ukraine, but of all Rus', that forced him to come to terms with the hopeless fate of Poland. The rest of the news delivered by the messenger of

Konovalets was optimistic. The OUN leader reported that the "Ukrainian secret mafia" spread its influence not only in European countries where there is Ukrainian emigration, but also spread its agent network in the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other places. All this was done only with the help of the Germans, who, in turn, according to Konovalets, recognize the OUN as the only combat-ready force and place great hopes on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. "Our

the task," Konovalets wrote to Sheptytsky, "is to justify these hopes. Regarding the tasks that are set before us today. German government officials gave us instructions to intensify our anti-Bolshevik activities in the Great Ukraine in every possible way, while at the same time intensifying the anti-Bolshevik action in the region.

Konovalets, judging by his report, did not see any difficulties in implementing these plans against Poland. But the activities of the OUN in the "Soviet" bothered him. They have a lot of losses there. True, the German servant was encouraged by the fact that with the help of the Germans it was possible to encircle the entire Soviet border from **Finland to Romania** with spy operational **points from** which agents would be sent to the territory **of Soviet** Ukraine. There was a similar operational **point**, according to Konovalets, **in** the Far East. **Nikolai** personally entered into an agreement with the Japanese **representatives, and** with their help, OUN-German agents **were** able to more safely penetrate deep **into** Russia and Ukraine. Thus, the **longer** route compared to crossing **the Polish-Soviet** border turned out to be, in fact, shorter. Konovalets finished his

report by statement

strategic intent. "We have before us the path of decisive struggle under the leadership of National Socialist Germany **for** our own sovereignty. May we today be in **the service** of German government officials. But tomorrow **we have** hope, with their help and under their leadership, to achieve our own sovereignty ... "It must be said that Konovalets appointed the lively son of the Uniate priest

Stepan Bandera, who underwent thorough espionage training in Germany and Italy, as a messenger to the Metropolitan. He was heading to Galicia in order to head the regional organization of the OUN and carry out several terrorist attacks. One of them is an attempt on the life of the Soviet consul in Lvov Timoshenko. "This act," he assured his patrons in Berlin, "will be an anti-Bolshevik signal not only for the region, but for the whole Great Ukraine." But the "German officials" did not have to be convinced for a long time. In this attempt, they saw not only an anti-Bolshevik act, but also an opportunity to harm the two sides,

complicating Polish-Soviet relations. Approved the planned murder and "Saint Andrew." The

assassination attempt on the consul failed by pure chance. The terrorist Lemek, who allegedly appeared at an appointment with the consul in October 1933, did not know the latter by sight. Therefore, he shot at the secretary of the consulate, Andrey Maylov, who was receiving the population that day instead of the consul. Milov was a great friend of my father, and they named me Andrei after him.

Bandera organized the second action eight months later. This time they killed the Minister of the Interior of Poland, General Bronisław Peracki. It was a very daring action, considering that six months before it, that is, in January 1934, Germany and Poland signed a treaty of "friendship". Bandera found himself between several fires. First of all, he found himself in a Polish prison. The investigation into his case was conducted officially by the Polish side, and secretly by the wire of the OUN. This was taken care of by the enraged Sheptytsky, whose heart, aching for Poland, somewhat departed after the establishment of "Polish-German friendship." Soon, Melnik, by that time the manager of the metropolitan estates and at the same time a full-time agent of German intelligence under the nickname Consul 1st, reported to the angry lord about Bandera's "wild self-will" as follows: "This is his peculiarity. Bandera is a sadist, from whom it is useless to demand discipline and a real look at the prospects of our struggle. With his wild action, he not only violated discipline, but also disrupted the contact that was imposed on us with the Polish government officials in the matter of the unhindered transfer of our people across the Polish border to the Soviet ... "

Melnik's reaction is understandable. He, like Bandera, was concerned not so much with business as with his personal career. In the arrogant "chief of the executive" he saw a possible rival for the replacement of Konovalets, whose place he had long and not without reason predicted for himself. Well, the cunning Bandera, apparently, calculated all the possible consequences of his action

against the Polish minister. Firstly, by doing this, to a certain extent, he corrected the authority of the OUN in the eyes of ordinary Galicians, which was significantly shaken after the murder of an employee of the Soviet consulate in Lvov. The people demanded revenge on the Polish occupiers for the

pacification. Secondly, the calculation was that the bosses from German intelligence would not "mourn very much" for the Polish minister. Thirdly, the metropolitan's wrath is also not eternal, and Bandera hoped to win the lord's more lasting favor with the subsequent services. One way or another, but his calculations were largely justified. Especially with regard to German intelligence and its longtime resident, Sheptytsky. The first benefited from the enmity between the leaders of the OUN, as well as constant anxiety in the Polish camp, the second needed decisive and cruel executors. Bandera's terrorist act, unexpected and daring in **the eyes of** Sheptytsky, Konovalets and other nationalists, marked **the beginning of his** rapid career both in the OUN and in **fascist** intelligence.

Their "colleagues" from Lithuania willingly provided support and assistance to the Ukrainian nationalists. Terrorist fighters from the UVO, and later from the OUN, were abroad **on** Lithuanian passports and received "monetary allowance" from Lithuania. For example, Roman Sushko, the representative of the OUN in Austria, was for a long time considered a "wealthy life-burner" among the **Viennese** zhuyers of the 1930s. He had a Lithuanian passport and systematically received large sums from Kaunas. He rented housing from the former artist of the Vienna Opera, **Helen** of Hungary (Duvergasse, 18), however, the Austrian headquarters of the OUN was **also** located here .

The true face of Roman Sushko was known not only to Lithuanian and German intelligence, but also to ours. They also heard about him in the Polish General Staff. After all, Sushko began his espionage and anti-Russian, and then anti-Soviet activities even during the years of the first imperialist period, when he was a member of the OSS ("Ukrainian Sich Riflemen"). In the post-October years, he was already a colonel in the Hetman-Petliura service. In 1921, during the raid of the Tyutyunnik gang in Soviet Ukraine, carried out under the auspices, as can be seen from the letter of Sheptytsky to Konovalets, the Polish General Staff, Sushko was the closest assistant to the ataman. He performed a task of particular importance: he singled out and instructed the organizers of the anti-Soviet underground, left in Ukraine during the raid. So, he prepared and ensured active work in the Volyn province of the nationalist Petrik (pseudonym - Kirtep),

organized the so-called "Volyn rebel army" numbering 700 people.

Nikolai Stsiborsky, one of the members of the OUN Central Wire, was also among the organizers of the assassination attempt on the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov. He also carried out many tasks of German and Lithuanian intelligence, as well as intelligence of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists under the guise of a citizen of Lithuania. He lived in Paris, secretly represented the OUN in France, maintained contact with other members of the "Ukrainian secret mafia" through the OUN newspaper "Ukrainian Word". Leading an idle life on handouts from the fascist government of Lithuania, he recruited new agents, distributed the OUN press organ among French miners from Western Ukraine, and waited for a signal for a more serious matter. One day in 1933, such a signal came. Using the same

Lithuanian passport, Stsiborsky hurried to Warsaw. Together with him, another OUN member, Yevgeny Lyakhovich, went out, in whose documents it was stated that he was a citizen of Canada. Both terrorists were to take part in organizing an explosion at the Soviet embassy in the Polish capital, but this action was also prevented.

our Chekists.

Lithuanian intelligence also assisted the OUN in organizing an assassination attempt on the Soviet consul in Lvov. So, Ivan Gabrusevich (pseudonym - John) and Bogdan Kordyuk (Snip) who developed the operation were provided with Lithuanian passports. Both played an important role in the "Ukrainian secret mafia", for some time leading the regional organization of the OUN. In the mid-30s they settled in Berlin, living in the Charlottenburg region. Here, in the Ethnographic Museum, was the headquarters of the OUN.

It was not difficult for Gabrusevich-John and Kordyuk-Snip to change his residence permit from Kaunas to Berlin, since after Hitler came to power in Germany, contacts between the two fascist states (German and Lithuanian) were strong. It is no coincidence that the assassination of Polish Minister of the Interior Bronisław Peracki did not take place without Lithuanian complicity. It must be said that fascist Lithuania rather willingly substituted, if the opportunity presented itself, the leg of the panorama

Poland. This expressed both the long-standing historical contradictions of the two states, not devoid of imperial ambitions, and their eternal desire to possess Galicia.

Yevgeny Konovalts moved around Europe and, in particular, arrived in Rotterdam also on a Lithuanian passport in the name of Joseph Novak. When the Dutch police were collecting what was left of the former leader of the OUN (he was torn apart by a mine explosion), they **also picked up a**

passport. Then, **in 1938**, many **newspapers wrote about it**, in including white émigrés.

Comprehending both the described and other facts, I am more and more surprised at the naivety and impudence with which some current politicians are trying to turn a blind eye to history. But after all, much of what is happening now in the political life of both **our country** and other countries has already happened ... I

am reading excerpts from the so-called "Bormann memorandum", or rather, his original diary (minutes) records of meetings of the Hitlerite elite. On July 16, 1941, he wrote: "The most important thing is that we do not betray our goals to the whole world. This is not necessary at all. The main thing is that we know what we want. We should not obstruct our way with excessive chatter..." I read this and catch the methods of achieving political goals by the current Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalists.

Remember the behavior of the Lithuanian parliamentarians at the first two Congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR. After all, they were set as an example for their ability to conduct parliamentary discussions, for the progressive idea that they persistently introduced only for themselves - the transition to republican self-financing, etc. If there were more far-sighted and principled people who tried to prove that the Lithuanian representatives were preparing the ground for secession from the USSR, those (primarily the same Lithuanians) were accused of disrespect for the Lithuanian people. They, they say, are paving the way for other republics, they are worried about the flourishing of all peoples living in the USSR, they are for unity and commonwealth ... Now they are looking for patrons abroad, armed with the laws of the fascist constitution ... Chapter 9

Illegal scout in the OUN

After the tragic murder of the Soviet diplomat Maylov in Lvov, committed by the OUN terrorist Lemek, in 1934 the chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky issued an order to develop an action plan to neutralize the terrorist actions of the Ukrainian nationalists.

The Ukrainian GPU reported that it had succeeded in infiltrating the underground military Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Exile (OUN) with its trusted agent, Lebed. This was a major achievement. Slutsky, by that time the head of the Foreign Department, at the same

time suggested that my father become an illegal employee working abroad. Father later recalled that at first it seemed unrealistic to him, since he had no experience of working abroad and he knew nothing about living conditions in the West. In addition, his knowledge of German, which should have been needed in Germany and Poland, where he had to work, was equal to zero. The father wrote about that offer as follows: **“However, the more I thought about this offer, the more tempting it seemed to me. And I agreed. After that, he immediately began an intensive study of the German**

language - classes were held at a safe house five times a week. Experienced instructors also taught me the techniques of hand-to-hand combat and the use of weapons. The meetings with the Deputy Head of the Foreign Department of the OGPU-NKVD Shpigelglas were extremely useful for me. After eight months of training, I was ready to go on my first foreign assignment, accompanied by Lebed, the “chief representative” of the OUN in Ukraine, and in fact our secret agent for many years.”

From 1915 to 1918, Lebed spent time with Konovalets in a prisoner of war camp near Tsaritsyn. During the First World War, Lebed and Konovalets fought together as officers of the Austro-Hungarian army against Russia on the Southwestern Front as part of the so-called corps of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. During the Civil War, he became the deputy of Konovalets and commanded

infantry division that fought against the Red Army in Ukraine. After Konovalets retreated to Poland in 1920, Lebed was sent by him to Ukraine to organize an underground OUN network. But there he was arrested. The choice before him was simple: either work for the Soviets or die. As a result,

Lebed became a key figure for the Soviet security agencies in the fight against banditry in Ukraine in the 1920s. His reputation in nationalist circles abroad remained as before high: Konovalets considered his representative as a person capable of carrying out preparatory work for the seizure of power by the OUN in Kiev in the event of war. From Lebed, who was allowed to travel to the West in the 1920s and 30s through illegal channels, it became known that Konovalets cherished plans to seize Ukraine in a future war. In Berlin, Lebed met with Colonel Alexander,

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris's predecessor as head of the German intelligence service in the early 1930s, and learned from him that Konovalets had seen Hitler twice, who suggested that several of Konovalets's supporters be trained by the Nazis. party school in Leipzig. **"I went abroad as a "nephew" of Lebed," my father later recalled, "supposedly to help in his work. My**

wife was transferred to the Foreign Department of the NKVD so that through her I could keep in touch with the Center. She was supposed to act as a student from Geneva, which allowed her to meet with agents in Western Europe from time to time. For this purpose, she took a special course. Lebed did not know that another agent, Poluvedko, the main representative of Konovalets in Finland, was working for Soviet

intelligence. He lived on a false passport in Helsinki, organizing contacts between Ukrainian nationalists in exile and their underground organization in Leningrad. OUN members hid their archives in Leningrad, in the famous library named after Saltykov Shchedrin. Although they knew about it, it was possible to discover the archives only after the end of the Second World War, in 1949. Father left for Helsinki, accompanied by Lebed. Lebed handed him over to the care of Poluvedko and immediately returned to Kharkov.

through Moscow. Poluvedko, who knew nothing about his father's true work, regularly sent reports about him to the NKVD through Zoya Voskresenskaya-Rybkina, who was in charge of communication with him. The father had to let the Center know that he was all right, and, as agreed beforehand, he wrote a note to his "girlfriend" and then tore it up and threw it into the wastebasket. Acting as an involuntary assistant, Poluvedko collected these scraps and handed them to Zoya. And at some stage, Poluvedko offered to remove his father altogether, which he reported in one of his reports, but, fortunately, the solution of this issue did not depend on him. In Finland (and later in Germany), my father lived very poorly: he had no pocket money and he constantly went hungry. Poluvedko allocated only 10 Finnish marks a day, and they were barely enough for lunch - at the same time, one coin had to be left for the evening for the gas meter, otherwise the heating and gas stove would not work. For secret meetings between them, the schedule of which was determined before leaving Moscow, Zoya Rybkina and her husband Boris Rybkin, a resident in Finland who led intelligence activities in that country, brought sandwiches and chocolate. Before they left, they went through my father's pockets to make sure he hadn't taken any food with him, which could have ruined the whole "game." After

two months of waiting, messengers from Konovalets arrived in Helsinki - Gribivsky (Chancellor) from Prague and Andrievsky from Brussels. Everyone then went to Stockholm by steamer.

Upon boarding, my father was given a fake passport, issued by the Lithuanian special services at the request of the OUN leadership. When we arrived in Stockholm, all passengers were gathered in the dining room and the waiter began to distribute passports that had passed the border control. At first, he refused to return the passport to his father, saying that the photo clearly did not match the original. Indeed, the passport was in the name of Stsiborsky, a member of the central leadership of the OUN, a Ukrainian activist, with his own photograph. Fortunately, an indignant Poluvedko intervened, threatening the waiter and forcing him to return the document. After a week in Stockholm, they went to Germany, where there were no more problems with the same passport. In June 1936, they arrived in Berlin, and there my father met with Konovalets.

The meeting took place in an apartment located in the building of the Museum of Ethnography and provided by the German intelligence service to Konovalts. In September, my father was sent for three months to a Nazi school in Leipzig, where he had the opportunity to get acquainted with the OUN leadership. The students of this school, of course, were interested in the personality of my father, but there were no problems with his "legend".

The plans of Konovalts also included the preparation of administrative bodies for a number of regions of Ukraine, which were supposed to be liberated from the Bolsheviks in the near future, and Ukrainian nationalists were to act in alliance with the Germans. They already had two brigades at their disposal, a total of about two thousand people, who were supposed to be used as police forces in Galicia (part of Western Ukraine, which was then part of Poland) and in Germany. The OUN tried in every possible way to

involve his father in the struggle for power, which was going on between their two main groups: the "old men" and the "youth". The former were represented by Konovalts and his deputy Melnik, while the "youth" was led by Bandera and Kostarev. My father's main task was to convince them that terrorist activities in Ukraine had no chance of success, that the authorities would immediately crush small pockets of resistance. He insisted that all forces and the underground network should be kept in reserve until war broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union, in which case they should be used immediately. The Soviet security agencies were especially concerned

about the terrorist ties of this organization, in particular, an agreement with Croatian nationalists and participation in the assassination of the Yugoslav King Alexander and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. All these terrorists were financed by the Abwehr, the intelligence and counterintelligence service of the Wehrmacht. The news came as a complete surprise that the assassination of the Polish Minister General Peratsky in 1934 by the Ukrainian terrorist Maceyko was carried out contrary to the order of Konovalts and that Bandera was behind this, vying with the latter for power. Bandera sought to control the organization, playing on the natural hostility of Ukrainians to Peratsky, who was responsible for the repression against

Ukrainian minority in Poland. According to Konovalts, by this time a friendship treaty had been signed between Poland and Germany, so that the Germans were in no way satisfied with any hostile actions towards the Poles. They were so furious that they betrayed Bandera, who was hiding in Germany. The general's killer, Macejko, managed to escape.

The matter was as follows. Maciejko planned to kill Peracki by detonating a grenade, but for some reason it did not explode, and he shot the Polish minister. A crowd of people immediately followed him. Matseyko managed to slip in front of the oncoming tram, which cut him off from his pursuers, ran into the entrance of the first house, climbed to the platform of the seventh floor, there threw off his raincoat and hat, threw away his revolver and, unrecognized, calmly went out into the street. Polish counterintelligence set up an ambush at all the safe houses of Ukrainian nationalists in Warsaw, but he did not appear at any of them. He spent the night with his girlfriend, also a Ukrainian terrorist, Chemerinskaya. It was she who organized his escape through the Carpathians to Czechoslovakia, using her connections in the

Czech police. In Czechoslovakia, the OUN had strong support from the authorities. President Beneš had a personal relationship with Konovalts since the First World War. However, when the OUN "got out of control" of the authorities and carried out the assassination of Peratsky, these relations

worsened. Despite Bandera's emotional speech in court in defense of the cause of Ukrainian nationalism, he and other organizers were sentenced to death by hanging. However, German pressure on the Polish authorities eventually saved their lives. The death sentence was commuted to prison. The Germans, after the capture of Poland, immediately released Bandera to freedom. And between the two groups of Ukrainian nationalists, a bloody internecine war began to boil. In dealing with his

colleagues in the Nazi party school, the father, according to him, behaved absolutely confidently and independently; after all, he "represented the head part" of their underground organization in Ukraine, while they were just emigrants who existed on German handouts. He had the right to veto their proposals as long as he followed the instructions of his

"uncles" ("vuiko"). If you didn't like something in their statements, it was enough just to say: "Vuiko didn't order!" It was in this way that my father turned

down an offer to meet with Colonel Lahousen of the Abwehr headquarters. Enter into direct contacts with the German **City of Kharkov. This is where my parents first met. Their**

united not only love, but also the KGB work S. V. Kosior, secretary

of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)

of Ukraine M. M. Khataevich, secretary of the Central

Committee of the Communist

Party (b) of Ukraine I Emma Karlovna

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Sudoplatov. 30s Messrs. Krimker). 30s Posters of the 1920s reflecting the

sharp struggle of the young socialist state against banditry and enemies of the

order F. E. Dzerzhinsky. For my parents, he was always a model for the

fulfillment of the KGB duty. December 1925 Meeting

of the Revolutionary

Military Council of the South-Western Front chaired by Commander-in-Chief

S. S. Kamenev (in the first row, second from the right). Sitting (from left to right):

A. I. Egorov, commander of the front,

X. G. Rakovsky, (?), F. E. Dzerzhinsky; standing

(from left to right): B. M. Shaposhnikov, N. N. Petin, R. I. Berzin, (?), A. P.

Rozengolts

S. G. Mogilevsky S. F. Redens OGPU ”-

the fundamental document of the

organization of intelligence and

counterintelligence nature created on December 20, 1920 by foreign work V.

A. Vaupshasov (second from left)

By management

comrades-in-arms in

partisan struggle in Western Belarus. Mid 20s.

1 F. E. Dzerzhinsky V. I. Mezhlauk and A. Ya. Belenky

heading to the Bolshoi Theater for the Congress of Soviets Moscow, 1925. V.

M. Gorozhanin and V. V. Mayakovsky in Yalta. Late 1920s

N. A. Prokopkzh (in the second row, first from the right) during service in the Slavuta border detachment. 1926

Intelligence service memo on Dobrov's fulfillment of the task of establishing contact with the leading circles of the Nazi Party in Germany dated July 14, 1932.

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ZhP

Evgeny

Konovalets,

founder

OUN

(**Organization**

of Ukrainian

Nationalists)

Autobiography

**P. A. Sudoplatov, written with his own hand in the mid-20s,
and a certificate of attestation of an NKVD officer P. A. Sudoplatov**

:d

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A. V. Loginov n. G. Samsonov I. A. Chichaev
(Bustrem) (**Semyon**)

B. K. Ilk (Beer) B. D. Berman (Artem) N. N. Kroshko (Kate) age) on
the nature of his cooperation with the OGPU,
signed by him on September 4, 1930, JS. - COMMITMENT

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Yakov

Serebryansky

(Bergman),

head of the

NKVD special

service

General

P.P. Dyakonov

Signature in which General N.V. Skoblin undertook

cooperate with the intelligence of the OGPU. Berlin, 21 January 1931

Former Minister of the Provisional Government S. N. Tretyakov

N. S. Khrushchev and L. M. Kaganovich in the presidium of the meeting plenum of the Moscow city party organization. 1935

S. M. Budyonny, L. M. Kaganovich, M. I. Kalinin on one of Kremlin meetings. 1933

Major General von Mnttelberger (right) and Major Felmi before flying to the German air center in Lipetsk (USSR) to inspect the training of their pilots 1934. In the picture: Voroshilov,

Budyonny, Tukhachevsky, Yegorov, Levandovsky, Frinovsky, Yakir, Dybenko, Kamenev, Gorbachev, Orlov and others. Field Marshal Hindenburg meets members of the Soviet military delegation headed by M.N. Tukhachevsky, who participated in the maneuvers of the Wehrmacht

troops. 1932 Reich Chancellor of Germany A. Hitler and Minister of War von Blomberg "God is with us" - this banner adorned the parade ground of one of the German units. By the start of

the war, Germany had a million and a half trained soldiers. The Nazi order

was in place. Prisoners are being checked

in one of the concentration camps in Oranienburg. Germany, 1933

German President Paul von Hindenburg, General Field Marshal at a meeting with the military. He is accompanied by General Hammerstein-Ekvard Under the

Turkish flag. L. D. Trotsky, his wife N. Sedova and A. Sobolevichus in the initial period of exile from the USSR (Sobolevichus, as the Trotskys later learned, was an agent of the OGPU). 1929 Father and son Lev (Sedov)

Trotsky in France Lev

Sedov was one of the main organizers

Trotskyist movement Mark

Zborovsky Yakov Blyumkin Georgy Atabekov (Etienne)

intelligence would have been risky, as the Germans could try to force cooperation. Father then again and again had to

repeat your objections to meeting someone from the Abwehr.

Father later recalled with humor how once, when they were walking with Konovalts, a street photographer approached them and took a picture of them, passing the film to Konovalts, who paid two marks for it.

The father was indignant: "It was clear that the Berlin environment wanted to have a photograph in their file, so that later, when they needed, they could find me. Then, on the street, I expressed my unequivocal protest to Konovalts. It would be an unforgivable mistake if such a photograph were in the hands of the Germans, I told him, without any doubt that this was his true goal. Konovalts tried to somehow calm me down. According to him, there was nothing reprehensible in the fact that some street photographer who earns his living took a picture of the two of us walking along a Berlin street. Later I found out that I was right. During the war, SMERSH captured two scouts in Western Ukraine, one of them had this photo. When asked why he needed her, he replied: "I have no idea who this person is, but we have received orders to eliminate him if we find him." The father managed to gain confidence in Konovalts by giving him the contents of one confidential conversation.

Once Kostarev and several other young Ukrainian nationalists, students of the Nazi party school, began to tell their father that Konovalts was too old to lead the organization and should be used only as a decorative figure.

"When they asked my opinion, I replied indignantly: "Who are you to suggest such a thing? Our organization not only fully trusts Konovalts, but also regularly receives support from him, and we did not hear anything about you before my arrival here. When I told Konovalts about this, his face turned pale. Later Kostarev was destroyed. I don't think it's a coincidence."

It was decided at the Center that as soon as the father arrived in Germany, he should be completely independent and not have any contact with anyone.

7 A-Sudoplatov - 1 16* Soviet residency, not with illegal immigrants. Konovalts took his father under his care and often visited.

As my father recalled: "The two of us wandered around the city. Once he even took me to a performance at the Berlin Opera, but in general there were not so many entertainments in my life there. The Ukrainian community was very poor, and it was out of the question to afford any luxury. If you were invited to tea, it was customary to bring sugar with you. The Ukrainians I talked to naively thought that they could help finance the OUN with the income of some shoe polish factory owned by their relatives in Poland. They literally longed for the war of Germany with Poland and **the USSR** as a liberation from the yoke of "national oppression". Konovalts became attached to me and even suggested that I accompany him on an inspection trip to Paris and Vienna in order to check the state of affairs in the Ukrainian emigre circles that supported him. He had money received from the Germans, and this allowed him to play the role of leader of a powerful organization. We stayed in different hotels in Paris. During our stay in the city there was a general strike and all the restaurants were closed, so Konovalts took me to dinner in... Versailles. The subway did not work either, and we had to take a taxi, which, by the way, was very expensive. I was very impressed with Paris and

I remain a fan to this day."

The Center was aware that the father and Konovalts intended to spend three weeks in Paris, and decided to use this opportunity to arrange a meeting with the courier for the father. According to the instructions from Moscow, they were to, if possible, go to such a meeting in Paris and later in Vienna. "For this," my

father said, "I had to appear twice a week between five and six in the evening at the corner of Place de Clichy and Boulevard de Clichy. The courier was supposed to be personally known to me, but his name was not disclosed to me - these were the "conspiracy rules" - he could be anyone. On my first appearance at the agreed place, I saw ... my own wife, dressed in the latest fashion: she was sitting at a cafe table on the street and slowly sipping black coffee. At that moment I was overwhelmed by the most diverse feelings. With an effort of will, I managed to force myself

make sure I wasn't being followed, and only then did I approach Emma. It immediately became completely clear to me: the place for the rendezvous was chosen extremely unsuccessfully, since the crowd **scurrying** around did not make it possible **to check** whether there was a "tail" behind you or not. The experience of my work **in Kharkov** against the Polish agents taught me that almost **all** the failures were due to the poor choice of the meeting place. **Pulling myself** together, I asked in bad German for **permission to sit** next to a table. We were both extremely stressed. Emma, when I sat down next to her, asked if I was **all right**.

"Though you've lost some weight, I think you look great," she added with a smile. - Yes, and shaved **this** time perfectly. This remark of hers

clearly hinted at the fact that at home, in **Russia**, I often shaved every other day. After sitting

at a table for a while, we quietly left: **this** cafe was too open for prying eyes. Walking **towards** the boulevard, we noticed two gendarmes, **obviously** heading in our direction. On **instinct**, we immediately crossed the street to avoid the **police**. Now, looking back, I see how stupid it was.

Emma's budget hotel (quite **appropriate** for a student spending her holidays in **Paris**) was only a few blocks from where we met. Although I was delighted to meet my wife, whom I had not seen for almost a year, I was afraid to put her at even the slightest risk by dating me. We hugged, **and I** immediately told her to convey to the Center my demand: under **no** circumstances should Emma be my contact. After all, I was not one of those who live permanently in the West, so I could say with full confidence: all my contacts are carefully studied and analyzed by both the intelligence of Ukrainian nationalists and the Germans. And if German or even French counterintelligence has reason to believe that Emma is connected with me, then **she** will certainly be captured and subjected to interrogation with prejudice. That is why I ordered her to immediately return to Switzerland, and from there home. I had to do this in order to get rid of anxiety for her fate and feel safe. Emma immediately assured me that she would leave.

to Bern immediately. I informed her about the state of affairs in Ukrainian émigré circles and about the significant support they received from Germany. Particularly curious seemed to her the information concerning the strife within the Ukrainian organization: I told Emma about my proposed trip with Konovalts to Vienna and convincingly asked her not to appear there as a courier near the Shenbrunn Palace - the place of the proposed meeting.

During his stay in Paris, Konovalts invited my father to visit with him the grave of Petlyura, who, after the defeat of his detachments by the Red Army, fled to the capital of France, where he was killed in 1926. Father later recalled: "Konovalts

idolized this man, calling him "our banner and most beloved leader." He said that the memory of Petliura must be preserved. I was pleased that Konovalts took me with him, but one thought haunted me: it is supposed to put flowers on the grave during a visit. Meanwhile, my purse was empty, and I did not consider it possible for myself to remind Konovalts of such trifles. It would be simply tactless in relation to a person who occupied such a high position, although, in essence, it was his responsibility to take care of the flowers in this case, and not me. What to do? All the way to the cemetery continued to torment me

this thought.

We walked through the entire cemetery and stopped in front of a modest tombstone on the grave of Petlyura. Konovalts crossed himself - I followed his example. We stood in silence for a while, then I took a handkerchief out of my pocket and wrapped a handful of earth with graves.

- What are you doing?! exclaimed Konovalts. "I will take this land from Petliura's grave to Ukraine," I answered, We will plant a tree in his memory and look after him.

The horseman was delighted. He hugged me, kissed me and warmly praised me for a great idea. As a result, our friendship and his trust in me has become even stronger." Konovalts told his

father that one of his assistants, Gribivsky, was suspected of collaborating with the Czechoslovak counterintelligence, and asked his father to meet with him and try to probe him. After the assassination of General Peracki in Warsaw

Ukrainian nationalists, the Czechs promptly, in one day, seized all the appearances of the Ukrainian organization in Prague and took away many of the dossiers that were under the jurisdiction of Gribivsky. This story was already known to my father. His close friend **and** colleague Kaminsky, who had been in Germany two years earlier as an illegal immigrant, tried to recruit Gribivsky, allegedly on behalf of the Slovak police, to work as an informant, although in fact it was about working for the USSR. Gribivsky, for his part, intended to capture Kaminsky during the appointed meeting, but he, seeing the shadowing, avoided the trap, having time to jump into a passing tram. Konovalets quite correctly suspected that Kaminsky was not a Slovak, but a Soviet agent, and his father, knowing this, strongly objected to his meeting with Gribovsky, stating that the Bolsheviks might control him (after all, he could deliberately pretend that he failed to capture Kaminsky), and therefore contacts with him can lead to failure. Father also recalled such an episode: "After our arrival in Vienna, I went to a predetermined meeting place, where I found my curator and mentor for work in Moscow, Zubov. He was an experienced scout, and I always tried to get as much knowledge from him as possible. I informed him in detail

about the activities of Konovalets and informed him that our trip to the opera was scheduled for the next day. Zubov managed to buy a ticket for the same performance - he was sitting right behind us and could hear everything that we talked about with my companion. Leaving the theater, I deliberately ran into Zubov in the crowd of spectators and even apologized for pushing him. In essence, it was a stupid children's

trick".

From Vienna, my father returned to Berlin, where for several months there were futile negotiations about the possible deployment of underground forces in Ukraine in the event of a war. During this period, he traveled twice from Germany to Paris, where he met with the leaders of the Ukrainian government in exile. Konovalets warned his father about these people: according to him, they should not be taken seriously, since in reality everything will be decided not by these gentlemen who wiped their pants in Parisian cafes, but by his military organization.

Meanwhile, "Uncle" Lebed, using his connections, sent through Finland an order for the return of "nephew" (my father) to Ukraine, where he was to be registered as a radio operator on a Soviet ship that regularly called at foreign ports. This would enable him to maintain constant contact between the OUN underground in Ukraine and nationalist organizations abroad.

Konovalts liked the idea, and he agreed with the return of his father to the Soviet Union. With false documents, accompanied

by Sushko, Konovalts's deputy (Konovalts wanted to make sure that his new ward crossed the border safely), his father reached the Soviet-Finnish border through Finland. Sushko led him to a place where it seemed safe to cross the border, which ran through the swamp here. However, as soon as my father approached the very border, he was intercepted by the Finnish border patrol. He was arrested and imprisoned in Helsinki. There he was interrogated for a month: "I explained to them that I was a Ukrainian nationalist and I was striving to return to the Soviet

Union, following the order of my organization."

All this month the atmosphere in the Center was very tense, since Zoya Rybkina reported from Helsinki about my father's return from a trip with Konovalz across Europe. To find out what happened, Zubov and Shpigelglas went to the border. Everyone thought that most likely my father was liquidated by Sushko. Nevertheless, three weeks after his arrest, the official Ukrainian representative in Helsinki, Poluvedko, received an inquiry from the Finnish police and Abwehr officers "about a certain Ukrainian who was trying to get into the Soviet Union." Between the Abwehr and Finnish intelligence there was an agreement on control over the Soviet border - any defectors were checked by them jointly. In the end, the father was handed over to Poluvedko, who accompanied him to Tallinn. There he was given another false Lithuanian passport, and the Soviet consulate issued a short-term tourist visa for a trip to Leningrad. This time there were no problems crossing the border: the border guard stamped the passport, and then the father managed to slip away from the foreign tourist guide who was waiting for him at

Leningrad: "I am sure that this caused a real commotion in the Intourist department and the police must have been put on their feet to find the missing Lithuanian tourist in the city."

A successful mission changed my father's position in intelligence. The results of the work were reported to Stalin and Kosior, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, as well as Petrovsky, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. In Slutsky's office, where his father reported in detail about his trip, he was introduced to two people: one of them was Serebryansky, head of the Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - an independent and at that time strictly secret Center for Cordless Intelligence of the security agencies - and the other, Vasilyev, an employee of Stalin's secretariat.

Later, my father was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, which was presented to him by the head of state M. I. Kalinin. Together with his father in the Kremlin, Zarubin also received the Order of the Red Banner, who had just returned from an illegal trip to Western Europe. They met then for the first time. Later they became close, and this friendship lasted a lifetime, although Zarubin was much older than his father. My father recalled how during a friendly dinner in honor of him and Zarubin at Slutsky's apartment, his father had to drink - for the second time in his life - a glass of vodka:

"For the first time it happened in Odessa, when I was fifteen years old. Although I was a physically healthy person, the doctors determined that alcoholic beverages with a strength of more than twelve degrees are contraindicated for me. However, Slutsky and Shpigelglas ordered me to accept the "norm" for a military order, and the next day I lay in bed. The reaction of the body was terrible: an unbearable headache and vomiting.

Throughout 1937 and part of 1938, my father repeatedly traveled to the West as a courier. The roof for him was the position of a radio operator on a cargo ship. When he met with Konovalets, he was horrified to hear that the OUN had given the Germans misinformation that a number of Ukrainian Red Army commanders—Fedko, Dubova, and others (all of whom were later liquidated by Stalin)—expressed their sympathy for the Ukrainian nationalist cause. The people of Konovalets made up stories like this to impress the Germans and get the best out of them.

more money. Later, my father happened to read in the Ukrainian émigré press that such Red commanders as Dubovoy, Fedko and a number of others allegedly divided their loyalty between the Soviet government and Ukrainian nationalism. Konovalets decided to tell his father about this, because he knew that "as the organizer of the Ukrainian underground" he would be able to find out the truth.

When in 1937 my father reported this to Spiegelglas, he suggested that contacts between Dubovoy and other commanders with Ukrainian nationalists and Germans were not impossible. Obviously, Spiegelglas just wanted to cover his father in case he passed on this information that was unpleasant for the leadership - the fate of these commanders was already a foregone conclusion. **Chapter 10**

ON THE ORDER OF STALIN

In November 1937, after the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the October Revolution, my father was summoned along with Slutsky to Yezhov, then People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. His father met him for the first time, and, as he later said, he was literally struck by Yezhov's unsightly appearance and personality:

"The questions he asked were about the most elementary things for any intelligence officer and sounded incompetent. It was felt that he did not know the very basics of working with sources of information. Moreover, it seems that he was not at all interested in strife within the organization of Ukrainian emigrants. Meanwhile, Yezhov was both People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and Secretary of the Party's Central Committee. I sincerely believed that I was simply not able to appreciate the intellectual qualities that allowed this man to occupy such high positions. Although by this time I was already a very experienced professional in the intelligence service, I remained a naive person when it came to a career in the highest echelons of power: after all, the leaders I have encountered so far, such as Kosior and Petrovsky, who headed Communist Party of Ukraine, were highly intelligent people with a broad outlook.

After listening to his father's message regarding upcoming meetings with Ukrainian nationalists, Yezhov suddenly suggested that he accompany him to the Central Committee. The father was simply amazed when their car drove into the Kremlin, the admission to which had a very limited circle of people. His surprise increased even more after Yezhov announced that Comrade Stalin would personally receive them. It was the first meeting of the father with Stalin. He recalled the event as follows:

"I was thirty, but I never learned to restrain my emotions. I was beside myself with joy and could hardly believe that the head of the country wanted to meet with an ordinary operative worker. After Stalin shook my hand, I couldn't bring myself to answer his questions clearly. Smiling, Stalin remarked:

"Don't worry, young man. Report the main data. We only have twenty minutes.

"Comrade Stalin," I answered, "for an ordinary member of the Party, meeting you is the greatest event in life. I understand that I was called here on business. In a minute I will pull myself together and be able to report the main facts to you and Comrade Yezhov.

Stalin nodded and asked me about the relationship between the political figures in the Ukrainian émigré movement. I briefly described the fruitless discussions among Ukrainian nationalist politicians over which of them would play which role in the future government. The real threat, however, was Konovalts, since he was actively preparing to participate in the war against us along with the Germans. The weakness of his position was the constant

pressure on him and the organization he leads from the Polish authorities, who wanted to direct the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia against Soviet Ukraine. - Your suggestions? Stalin asked. Yezhov remained silent. Me too.

Then, gathering my courage, I said that I was not ready to answer now. "Then in a week," Stalin

remarked, "submit your proposals. The audience is over. He shook hands with us and we left the office.

Returning to the Lubyanka, Yezhov immediately instructed his father to immediately begin work with Shpigelglas on these proposals. The next day, Slutsky, as head of the Foreign Department, sent a prepared note to Yezhov. It was a plan for intensive implementation in the OUN, primarily in Germany. For this, in particular, it was proposed to send three employees of the Ukrainian NKVD as students to the Nazi party school. It seemed necessary to send along with them, as a safety net, one genuine Ukrainian nationalist, preferably not too smart at the same time. Yezhov did not ask a single question and only said that Comrade Stalin had given instructions to consult with Comrades Kosior and Petrovsky, who might have their own ideas. My father was to immediately leave for Kyiv, have a talk with them, and return to Moscow the next day. The conversation took place in Kosior's office, where Petrovsky was also present. Both of them showed interest in the double game proposed by the scouts. However, most of all they were concerned about the then proposed proclamation of an independent Carpathian Ukrainian Republic. Exactly one week after returning to Moscow, Yezhov again brought my father to Stalin's office at eleven o'clock in the evening.

This time there was Petrovsky. In just five minutes, my father outlined a plan of operational measures against the OUN, emphasizing that the main goal was to infiltrate the Abwehr through Ukrainian channels, since the Abwehr is our main enemy in the upcoming war.

Stalin asked Petrovsky to speak. He grandiloquently, with some solemnity in his voice, announced that in Ukraine Konovalts was sentenced to death in absentia for the gravest crimes against the Ukrainian proletariat: he ordered and personally supervised the execution of the revolutionary workers of the Kiev "Arsenal" in January 1918. Stalin, interrupting him, said:

- This is not an act of revenge, although Konovalts is an agent of German fascism. Our goal is to decapitate the movement of Ukrainian fascism on the eve of the war and force these bandits to destroy each other in the struggle for power. - Immediately he turned to my father with a question: - And what are the tastes, weaknesses and affections of Konovalts? Try to use them.

"Konovalets loves chocolates very much," his father replied, adding that wherever they went with him, the first thing he did was buy a chic box of chocolates. "Think about it," suggested

Stalin. During the entire conversation Yezhov did not utter a word. **"Saying goodbye," my father writes in his memoirs, "Stalin asked me if I correctly understood the political significance of the combat mission entrusted to me.**

"Yes," I replied, and assured him that I would give my life, if necessary, to fulfill the task of the party. "I wish you success," Stalin said, shaking my hand. On that visit to the leader, the father was ordered to liquidate Konovalets. After this meeting with Stalin, Slutsky and Shpigelglas developed several variants of the operation. The first of them assumed that the father would shoot Konovalets point-blank. True, this had its own difficulty, he was always accompanied by an assistant Baranovsky, whose code name was Pan Engineer. It was almost impossible to find the moment when the father would be left alone with Konovalets

possible.

The second option was to give him a "valuable gift" with a built-in explosive device. This option seemed the most acceptable: if the clockwork worked as expected, the father would be able to leave the meeting place in time. An employee of the department of operational and technical means Timashkov was tasked with making an explosive device that looked like a box of chocolates, painted in the traditional Ukrainian style. The whole problem was that the father had to quietly press the switch to start the clockwork. Father did not like this option too much, since a bright box would immediately attract the attention of Konovalets. In addition, he could transfer this box to Baranovsky, who constantly accompanied him.

Using his cover as a radio operator on the Shilka cargo ship, my father (although this fact is already widely known, but I will still repeat it) met with Konovalets in Antwerp, Rotterdam and Le Havre, where he came on a fake Lithuanian passport in the name Mr Novak. Lithuanian authorities in the 30s

regularly supplied functionaries of the OUN are fake with passports. The

game, which had been going on for more than two years, was about to end. It was the spring of 1938, and war seemed imminent. Soviet intelligence knew that with the outbreak of war, Konovalts would lead the OUN and be on the side of Germany. In the end, an explosive device in the form of a box of

chocolates was made, and the clock mechanism did not have to be actuated by a special switch. The explosion was supposed to occur exactly half an hour after the change in the position of the box from vertical to horizontal. My father was supposed to keep the box in the first position in the big inside pocket of his jacket. It was assumed that he would give this "gift" to Konovalts and leave the premises before the mine went off. Shpigelglas escorted his father to Yezhov's office, who personally wanted to receive the intelligence officer Sudoplatov before leaving. This is how my father later described his attempt on Konovalts: **"When we left Yezhov,**

Shpigelglas said: "In case of failure of the operation and the threat of capture by the enemy, you must act like a real man, so that under no circumstances fall into the hands of the police.

In fact, it was an order to die. It meant that I would have to use the Walther pistol, which he gave me.

Spiegelglas spent more than eight hours with me, discussing various options for me to leave the scene. He provided me with a seasonal train ticket valid for two months throughout Western Europe, and also handed me a fake Czechoslovak passport and three thousand US dollars, which at that time was a lot of money. On his advice, I had to definitely change my appearance after "leaving": buy a hat, raincoat in the nearest store.

I carefully studied all possible escape routes in those cities where our meeting with Konovalts could take place. For each of them, I had a detailed plan. However, before the last trip to meet with Konovalts, unexpected problems arose. in response to my

a call from Norway, he suddenly suggested that we meet in Kiel (Germany) or I would fly to him in Italy on a German plane, which he would send for me. I replied that I did not have time: although the captain of the ship was a member of the Ukrainian organization, but this time I was not allowed to leave during the stops for more than five hours. Then we agreed that we would meet in Rotterdam, at the Atlanta restaurant, located not far from the central post office, just a ten minute walk from the railway station. Before disembarking at Rotterdam, I told the captain, who was instructed to carry out all my orders, that if I did not return to the ship by four o'clock in the afternoon, she should sail without me. Timashkov, the manufacturer of the explosive device, accompanied me on this trip and loaded it ten minutes before I left the ship. He himself remained on board the ship. (Later, Timashkov became the head of the department of operational equipment, it was he who designed magnetic mines: one of them killed the German Gauleiter of Belarus, Wilhelm Kube. This happened in 1943, and after the end of World War II, he served as an adviser to the Greek partisans during the civil war.)

On May 23, 1938, after the last rain, the weather was warm and sunny. The time is ten minutes to twelve. Walking along the alley near the Atlanta restaurant, I saw Konovalts sitting at a table by the window, waiting for my arrival. This time he was alone. I entered the restaurant, sat down to it, and after a short conversation we agreed to meet again in the center of Rotterdam at 17.00. I gave him a gift, a box of chocolates, and said that I had to get back to the ship now. As I left, I placed the box on the table next to him. We shook hands, and I left, holding back my instinctive desire to run immediately. I remember leaving the restaurant and turning right into a side street lined with numerous shops on

both sides. In the first of them, which sold men's clothing, I bought a hat and a light raincoat. As I was leaving the store, I heard a sound like a blown tire. People around me ran towards the restaurant. I hurried to the station, sat on

the very first train that went to Paris, where in the morning I was supposed to be met by a person personally familiar to me in the metro. So that the train crew would not remember me, I got off at a stop an hour from Rotterdam. There, near the Belgian border, I ordered lunch at a local restaurant, but was unable to touch the food due to a terrible headache. I crossed the border in a taxi - the border guards did not pay the slightest attention to my Czech passport. I took the same taxi to Brussels, where I discovered that the next train to Paris had just left. The next one, fortunately, departed fairly soon, and by evening I was already in Paris. Everything went off without a hitch. In Paris, I remember, I was deceived at the exchange office at the station when I exchanged one hundred dollars. I decided that I should not be staying at a hotel in order to avoid registration: the Dutch stamps in my passport, put at the border, might be of interest to the police. The counterintelligence service will probably begin to check everyone who entered France from Holland.

I spent the night walking along the boulevards that surrounded the center of Paris. To kill time, I went to the cinema. Early in the morning, after many hours of walking, I went to the hairdresser's to shave and wash my hair. Then I hurried to the agreed meeting point to be at the metro station by ten in the morning. When I stepped onto the platform, I immediately saw our intelligence officer Agayants, who worked as the third secretary of the Soviet embassy in Paris. He was already leaving, but, noticing me, he immediately returned and made a sign to follow him. We took a taxi to the Bois de Boulogne, where we had breakfast, and I handed him my pistol and a small note, the contents of which were to be sent to Moscow in cipher. The note read: "The gift has been presented. The package is now in Paris, and the tire of the car I was traveling in blew while I was shopping." Agayants, who had no idea of my assignment, escorted me to a safe house in the suburbs of Paris, where I stayed for two weeks.

There was not a single line in the newspapers about the incident in Rotterdam. However, the emigrant Russian newspapers wrote with might and main about the future fate of Yezhov: in their opinion, he is doomed as another vi

purge campaigns. As I read this, I couldn't help but laugh to myself, "How stupid all these articles are. After all, just two months ago, this man wished me success in completing the assignment, and besides, I myself saw that Comrade Stalin completely trusted him.

From Paris, my father, using forged Polish documents, went by car, and then by train to Barcelona. Local newspapers reported on a strange incident in Rotterdam, where Ukrainian nationalist leader Konovalets, who was traveling on a false passport, was killed in a street explosion. Three versions were put forward in newspaper reports: either he was killed by the Bolsheviks, or by a rival group of Ukrainians, or, finally, he was removed by the Poles - in retaliation for the death of General Peratsky.

Fate would have it that Baranovsky, who arrived an hour after the explosion in Rotterdam from Germany to meet with Konovalets, was arrested by the Dutch police, who suspected him of committing this action, but when he was taken to the hospital and showed the body of the murdered man, he exclaimed: "My Fuhrer! - and this, coupled with a train ticket, was enough to convince the police of his complete innocence. The day after the explosion, the Dutch

police, accompanied by Baranovsky, checked the crews of all Soviet ships that were in the port of Rotterdam. They were looking for the person in the photo they had. It was the same photo taken by a street photographer in Berlin. Baranovsky knew that Konovalets was going to meet with a courier-radio operator from a Soviet ship that was appearing in Western Europe. However, he was not at all sure that it was exactly the same courier - "Swan's nephew." The Dutch police knew about the telephone call to Konovalets from Norway and naturally suspected that his agent had called. True, no one knew for sure who exactly Konovalets met on that fateful day. When there was an explosion on the street, there was no one near him. His identity remained unidentified by the police until late in the evening, while the ship "Shilka" had long since left Rotterdam harbor.

My father always considered the liquidation of Konovalets justified from all points of view and was proud that innocent people were not injured in the explosion. Neither the Abwehr nor the Organization of Ukrainian

nationalists had no evidence to reveal the true causes of the death of Konovalets. Of course, they could suspect a courier or messenger who arrived for a meeting in Rotterdam, but they had no evidence.

There was another important circumstance that convinced my father that the work he had done was right. The nationalist leaders he encountered in Berlin and Warsaw belonged to the so-called "pro-Western" Ukrainians, who already had a poor command of their native language, mixing Ukrainian words with German. These people, as my father sincerely believed, were doomed by history itself. Completely cut off from real life in Ukraine, they did not understand the essence and strength of the Soviet system. Nor did they know about the rise of Ukrainian literature and art. They received their education mainly in Vienna or Prague. Ukrainian culture and language in Polish Galicia at that time were ruthlessly suppressed by the local authorities. Regularly following the periodicals, they nevertheless could not explain the difference between collective farms and state farms or understand the relationship of various state and public organizations responsible for social policy in Ukraine. They claimed that their views were supported by the rural population and consumer cooperatives, not knowing that in reality consumer cooperatives in the countryside had long become an integral attribute of the collective farm system. The death of Konovalets caused a split in the OUN. The fate of other leaders of the OUN who worked under Konovalets was tragic in 1939-1945. During the struggle for power within the OUN between Bandera, who was liberated by

the Germans in 1939, and Konovalets official successor Melnik, prominent militants and associates of Konovalets died. Bandera shot Baranovsky, Stsiborsky, Gribovsky, Sushko in Zhytomyr and Lvov in 1942-1943. The militant Lemek was liquidated by them in Poltava in 1942.

About the events that followed that influenced the future the fate of his father, he told this:

“Having received my message from Paris about the successful operation to liquidate Konovalets, Shpigelglas called my wife to him and said: “Andrey (my code name) is safe. He saw how people rushed to the scene, and everything became clear to him. After all, in Western Europe

no one will run to see a blown car tire nearby.” In 1938, on the way, going to meet with Konovalets, his

father, as he was instructed, checked the work of a network of illegal immigrants in Norway, whose task was to prepare sabotage on German and Japanese ships based in Europe and used to supply weapons and raw materials to the regime Franco in Spain. This network was headed by Ernst Wollweber, known at that time under the code name Anton. Under his supervision was, in particular, a group of Poles who had experience in mines with explosives. These people had previously emigrated to France and Belgium due to unemployment in Poland, where Soviet intelligence recruited them to participate in sabotage in case of war. Wollweber spoke almost no Polish, but his father's Western Ukrainian dialect was quite sufficient for communication. They met with a group of five Polish agents in the Norwegian port of Bergen. He heard a report on the operation on the Polish cargo ship Stefan Batory, en route to Spain with a

shipment of strategic materials for Franco. It never reached its destination, sinking in the North Sea after a fire broke out in its hold as a result of a bomb explosion planted by terrorists working for the Soviets.

Wollweber made a strong impression on his father. A German Communist, he served in the German Navy and led the sailors' uprising against

the Kaiser in 1918. A military tribunal sentenced him to death, but he managed to escape first to Holland and then to Scandinavia. He was later arrested by the Swedish authorities, and the Gestapo immediately demanded his extradition. However, he received Soviet citizenship, so his deportation from Sweden to German-occupied Norway did not take place. Already after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in 1939, he came to Moscow and was ordered to continue preparing sabotage in the inevitable war with Hitler. The Wollweber organization played an important role in the Norwegian Resistance. Wollweber and his people, who returned to Moscow in 1941-1944, helped in the recruitment of German prisoners of war for our intelligence operations after the outbreak of the war.

After the end of the war, Wollweber headed the Ministry of State Security of the GDR for some time. In 1958, in connection with the conflict that arose between him and Khrushchev, Ulbricht removed Wollweber from his post. And the following happened. Wollweber told Serov, then chairman of the KGB, about the differences among the leadership of the GDR, considering them a manifestation of pro-Western sentiments that ran counter to the line of the international communist movement.

Serov reported this conversation to Khrushchev. And the one at lunch accompanied by heavy drinking, Ulbricht said:

- Why do you keep the Minister of State Security, who informs us about ideological differences within your party? This is a continuation of the tradition of Beria and Merkulov, whom Wollweber met in the forties when he came to Moscow.

Ulbricht understood what had to be done and immediately fired Wollweber for "anti-Party behavior". Wollweber died, being in disgrace, in the 60s... My father

later recalled the completion of the operation to liquidate Konovalets and his further appointment as follows: "In July 1938,

the ship on which I was moored in the Leningrad port. I immediately took the night train to Moscow. I was met at the station by Passov, who had just been appointed to replace Slutsky, Shpigelglas, and my wife. I was congratulated and hugged. Needless to say, how happy I was to return to Moscow to my former life. The next day, early in the morning, I was summoned to

Beria, the new head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD, Yezhov's first deputy. Before his first meeting with Beria, his father knew only that he headed the GPU of Georgia in

the 1920s, and then became secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. Passov, who replaced Slutsky as head of the Foreign Department, took his father to Beria's office, located next to Yezhov's reception room. This meeting between my father and Beria lasted, it seems, for about four hours. All this time, according to his recollections, Passov kept silent. Beria asked question after question, wanting to know about all the details of the operation against Konovalets and about the OUN from the beginning of its activities.

An hour later, Beria ordered that Passov bring a folder with the lettered file "Stavka", where all the details of this operation were recorded. From Beria's questions to his father, it became clear that he was a highly competent person in matters of intelligence work and sabotage. Later, he realized: Beria asked his questions in order to better understand how his father could fit into Western life.

Beria was especially impressed by the seemingly simple procedure for acquiring seasonal railway tickets, which allowed my father to travel freely throughout Western Europe. Beria was interested in the technique of selling railway tickets for passengers on domestic lines and on foreign routes. And it wasn't idle curiosity either. In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, passengers traveling to other countries approached the cashier one at a time - and only after the call from the attendant. It was not difficult to assume that this was done for a specific purpose, namely to allow the cashier to better remember those who purchased tickets. This is how my father interpreted this procedure of Beria. Next, Beria asked if attention was paid to

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at the exits, including the spare one, at the safe house, which was located in the suburbs of Paris. He was rather surprised that his father did not do this, "because he was too tired." And this was another confirmation that before the father there was a man experienced in matters of underground work and conspiracy.

The father described the details of this meeting with Beria as follows: "He was dressed, I remember, in a very modest suit. It seemed strange to me that he was without a tie, and the sleeves of his shirt, by the way, of quite good quality, were rolled up. This circumstance made me feel a little uneasy, as I was wearing a well-tailored suit: during my brief stay in Paris, I ordered three fashionable suits, a coat, and several shirts and ties. The tailor took measurements, and Agayants came to get things and sent them to Moscow

by diplomatic mail. Then, as the reader remembers, his colleagues at the party meeting will remind his father of this, demanding his expulsion from the party. After

the liquidation of Konovalts, before returning to his homeland, on the instructions of the intelligence services, he was first sent to Spain, where he remained for three weeks as a Polish volunteer in the international partisan unit under the republican army led by the NKVD. Beria showed great interest in the subversive partisan detachment based in Barcelona. He personally knew Vasilevsky, one of the partisan commanders - at one time he served under him in the counterintelligence of the Georgian GPU. Beria spoke Russian well, with a slight Georgian

accent, and behaved extremely politely towards his father, his subordinate. However, he failed to remain unperturbed throughout the conversation. So, Beria became very excited when his father began to tell what arguments Konovalts had given in order to dissuade him from carrying out terrorist acts by the OUN against representatives of the Soviet authorities in Ukraine. The father argued to Konovalts that the attacks could lead to the death of the entire Ukrainian nationalist underground, since the NKVD would quickly attack the trail of the terrorists. Konovalts, on the other hand, believed that such acts could be carried out by isolated groups. This, he insisted, would give them a halo of heroism in the eyes of the local population, serve as an incentive to launch a broad anti-Soviet campaign, in which Germany and Japan would intervene. It was these arguments of Konovalts that irritated the future owner of the house on Lubyanka. Being nearsighted, Beria wore pince-nez, which made him look like a modest co-

worker. Probably, my father later recalled, he specially chose this image for himself: in Moscow no one knows him and people, naturally, when they meet, do not fix their attention on such an ordinary appearance, which gives him the opportunity, visiting safe houses to talk with agents, to remain unrecognized. It must be remembered that in those years some of the safe houses in Moscow maintained by the NKVD were located in communal apartments. Later, my father found out: the first thing Beria did when he became

Yezhov's deputy was to switch over to himself connections with the most valuable

agents who were previously in contact with the heads of the leading departments and departments of the NKVD, who were subjected to repression.

After meeting with Beria, the father received a five-day leave to visit his mother, who was still living in Melitopol, and then his wife's parents in Kharkov. It was assumed that, returning to Moscow, he would receive the post of Assistant Chief of the Foreign Department. Shpigelglas and Passov were delighted with the meeting of their protégé with Beria and, seeing off their father at the Kiev railway station, assured him then that upon his return to Moscow he would also be entrusted with the direct supervision of work in Spain. And so it happened. reconnaissance and sabotage
After a vacation in Moscow, Passov and

Shpigelglas reported that father expects a new appointment - the position of Assistant Chief of the Foreign Department. This appointment, however, was still subject to the approval of the Central Committee of the party, since it was a question of a leading position that was part of the nomenklatura. And although there was no order for a new appointment, in fact, from August to November 1938, the father performed these duties.

The beginning of work in a new position could not be called successful. Father quickly realized that his current boss, Passov, had no operational experience abroad. For him, the recruitment of agents in the West and contacts with them were real terra incognita. He completely trusted any information received from agents, and had no idea about the methods of verifying reports from foreign sources. The experience of his operational work in counterintelligence and in the field of investigative actions against "enemies of the people" could not help him. The father was simply horrified to learn that Passov had signed a directive

allowing each operational officer of the foreign residency to use his own cipher and, bypassing the resident, send messages directly to the Center if he could have reasons not to trust his immediate superior. Only later did it become clear why such a document was born. At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party in March 1937, the NKVD was required to "strengthen the cadres" of the Foreign Department. The criminality of this demand lay in the fact that they covered up the desire of the country's leadership to get rid of the

objectionable to the old leadership of the Soviet intelligence agencies. But this is our story below.

Chapter 11

SPAIN. CIVIL WAR

During the years 1936-1939 in Spain there was, in fact, not one, but two wars, both not for life, but for death. One war clashed between the nationalist forces led by Franco, assisted by Hitler, and the forces of the Spanish Republicans, assisted by the Soviet Union. The second, completely separate war was fought inside the Republican camp. On the one hand, Stalin in the Soviet Union, and on the other, Trotsky, who was in exile, both wanted to appear before the world as saviors and guarantors of the republican cause, in order to thereby become in the vanguard of the world communist movement.

In Spain, the Soviets sent both their young, inexperienced operatives and experienced professional instructors. This country became a kind of testing ground, where future Soviet military and intelligence operations were tested and practiced. Many of the subsequent moves by Soviet intelligence relied on contacts established in Spain and on the conclusions that Moscow was able to draw from the Spanish experience. Yes, the Republicans in Spain were defeated, but the people who worked for the Soviet Union became our permanent allies in the fight against fascism. When the civil war in that country ended, it became clear that there was no more room in the world for Trotsky.

In Spain, there was another meeting between my father and N. I. Eitingon. He was responsible for conducting partisan operations in the rear of the Francoists and the introduction of agents into the top of the fascist movement. His pseudonym in Spain was General Kotov, and in the Center he went under the names Tom and Pierre. It was Eitingon, following the instructions of the Center, who in 1938 organized the return of my father to Moscow through France. He accompanied him to Le Havre and put him on board our ship. Much later, when they both met at our house, my father recalled with a smile how Eitingon looked then, in France.

“Look at him and think that this is an ordinary French street vendor - without a tie, in an unchanged cap, which he wore even in the heat ...”

A number of unknown

episodes of the most important foreign policy actions of the Soviet leadership carried out during the years of the civil war in Spain. He managed to persuade Ferdinando de Cuesta, one of the founders of the fascist party of the phalanx, to cooperate, the only leader of the fascists who was captured by the Republicans, who was spared his life. Through the Soviet illegal Yuzik (Gri-gulevich), with the help of de Cuesta, they managed to maintain a secret channel of negotiations with Franco. De Cuesta was later exchanged for prominent Republicans in 1938. Unfortunately, through him, with his secret mediation, it was not possible to agree on a peaceful compromise in the civil war after the defeat of the Italian expeditionary force in the battles near Guadelaajara in March 1937. However, on the recommendations of Cuesta, it was possible to reach a number of prominent officials from Franco's entourage and force them to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. Eitingon also carried out a deep reconnaissance of the rear of

the fascist troops on the Aragonese front. The data obtained, however, did not play their due role. The unexpected blow of the Republicans in the battle on the Ebro River in 1938, although it delayed the advance of Franco's troops, did not change the general unfavorable

development of the military situation. Secret mediation negotiations were conducted

under the control of Eitingon with one of the founders of the Spanish Communist Party X. Hernandez, Minister of Justice in the republican government. In exile in Mexico, his relations with Dolores Ibarruri and Jose Diaz, who were in Moscow, sharply worsened. Eitingon's attempts to resolve the conflict by personal correspondence with Pedro were not successful. In Moscow, Hernandez was declared "an agent and a schismatic, Tito's henchman." During the civil war in Spain, events

unfolded related to the transfer of the Spanish gold reserves to the Soviet Union. Later, after returning to Moscow, my father found himself in

in some way involved in this story, so I will dwell on it in more detail. This gold was taken out of

Madrid at one of the critical moments of the war for the Republicans back in 1936 and, by decision of the Spanish Republican government, was transferred to the Soviet Union for storage, which provided the Spaniards with significant assistance with weapons and food. Passing unhindered through the Mediterranean Sea, the Strait of Sicily and the Bosphorus, the ship loaded with ingots safely arrived in Odessa. In November 1936, in Moscow, an act on the acceptance of gold was signed by the People's

Commissar for Finance of the USSR G.F. Grinko, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR N.N. Krestinsky and the Ambassador of the Spanish Republic to the USSR Marcelino Pasqua. It says that the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR received gold from Spain, packed in 7,800 standard-type boxes, for state storage. The total weight is 510,079,529.3 grams. A copy of the act was handed over to the Spanish government. After the end of the civil

war, this copy was kept by Juan Negrin, and then, after his death, was transferred to the Franco government. This gold was not spent on the maintenance of Spanish children in the USSR (the total number of which by the end

of 1939 was 2,965, 58 teachers came with them), as some authors claim. The life of the "Soviet Spaniards" was financed mainly from the funds of an unprecedented solidarity campaign that unfolded throughout the country. Suffice it to say that according to the reports of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the assistance of the Soviet people to the women and children of Republican Spain in 1936 in August-December alone amounted to 115,487,588.28 thousand rubles. Only in

In 1938, for example, at the expense of this fund, 300,000 poods of wheat, 100,000 cans of canned milk and meat, 1,000 poods of butter, and 5,000 poods of sugar were sent to Madrid. Things got to the point that on November 27, 1938, the secretariat of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions informed all trade union organizations: in connection with the sufficient flow of funds to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, further collection of them was considered inappropriate.

Spanish gold, stored in the USSR, was spent by the republican government for completely different purposes - for the purchase of weapons and equipment in various countries. All expenses were recorded with accounting accuracy - up to a gram, and this data is stored in the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. There are also in Madrid. The entire gold reserve stored in Moscow was thus used up

already in 1938. In 1936, the Spanish Republicans agreed to deposit in Moscow most of the Spanish gold reserves, worth over half a billion dollars. In addition, in the spring of 1939, the Republicans also took large national values belonging to Spain to Mexico by ship from France. In March 1939, Agayants sent a telegram from Paris to the Center, in which he reported that far from all Spanish gold, precious metals and stones had been sent to Moscow. The telegram indicated that allegedly some of these stocks were squandered by the republican government with the participation of the leadership of the NKVD station in Spain.

The telegram was immediately reported to Stalin and Molotov, who ordered Beria to check the information. However, when they turned to Eitingon, a resident in Spain, for an explanation of the circumstances of this case, he sent an indignant telegram in response, consisting almost of curses.

"I," he wrote, "are not an accountant or a clerk. It is time for the Center to resolve the issue of trusting Dolores Ibarruri, Jose Diaz, me and other Spanish comrades who risk their lives every day in the anti-fascist war in the name of a common cause. All inquiries should be forwarded to trusted representatives of the leadership of the Central Committee of the French and Spanish Communist Parties, Jacques Duclos, Dolores Ibarruri and others. At the same time, one must understand that the

export of gold and valuables took place in the conditions of hostilities. Eitingon's telegram made a great impression on Stalin and Beria. An order followed: to understand the relationship between the employees

of the NKVD residency in France and Spain. My father also received a personal assignment from Beria to familiarize himself with all the documents on the

Gokhran of the USSR. But this was easier said than done, since V. M. Molotov had to sign the permission to work with the materials of the Gokhran. Meanwhile, his assistant refused to submit a document for signature without a visa for Yezhov, People's Commissar of the NKVD - the signature of Beria alone was not enough then. At that time, my father was completely unfamiliar with all these bureaucratic rules and passed the document to Yezhov through his secretariat. The next morning it still hadn't been signed. Beria scolded his father on the phone for being slow, but he replied that he could not find Yezhov - he was not in the Lubyanka. Beria angrily threw:

"This is not a personal, but an urgent state matter. Send a courier to Yezhov's dacha, he is unwell and is staying there.

His irreverent tone towards Yezhov, a candidate member of the Politburo, somewhat puzzled and surprised his father. He later recalled the details of this event:

"Together with a courier, we were taken to the dacha of the People's Commissar in Ozyory, not far from Moscow. Yezhov looked somehow strange: it seemed to me that I was giving a document for signature either to a terminally ill person, or to a person who had been drinking all night long. He endorsed the paper without asking a single question and without expressing his attitude to this matter in any way. I immediately went to the Kremlin to hand over the document to the government secretariat. From there I went to Gokhran, accompanied by two auditors, one of whom, Berenzon, had been the chief accountant of the Cheka-NKVD since 1918. Before the revolution, he held the position of auditor in the Russian

insurance company, the premises of which were occupied by Dzerzhinsky. The auditors worked in

the Gokhran for two weeks, checking all available documentation. They did not find any scarce shortages. Neither gold nor jewelry was used for operational purposes by NKVD residents in Spain and France in 1936-1938. It was then that my father learned that the document on the transfer of gold was signed by the Prime Minister of the Spanish Republic, Francisco Largo Caballero, and the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Nikolai Nikolayevich Krestinsky, who was later shot as an "enemy of the people" along with Bukharin after a show trial in 1

The gold was smuggled out of Spain on a Soviet freighter that brought the treasure from Cartagena, the Spanish naval base, to Odessa and then placed in the vaults of the State Bank. At the time, its total cost was estimated at \$518 million. Other valuables intended for the operational needs of the Spanish government of the Republicans in order to finance covert operations were illegally taken from Spain to France, and from there delivered to Moscow as a diplomatic cargo.

Spanish gold largely covered Soviet spending on military and material assistance to the Republicans in their war with Franco and Hitler and Mussolini who supported him, as well as to support the Spanish emigration. These funds were also useful for financing intelligence operations on the eve of the war in Western Europe in 1939. However, after the revelations of Orlov in 1953-1954, the

question of gold received a new development. The Spanish government of Franco has repeatedly raised the issue of compensation for the exported valuables. About the fate of my father's and Eitingon's gold were interrogated by KGB intelligence officers in 1950-1960, when they were in prison. As a result, a decision was made "at the top" in the 1960s to compensate the Spanish authorities for the gold reserves lost in 1937 by supplying oil to Spain at clearing prices.

The Spanish Civil War in 1936-1939 gave rise to an extensive historical, journalistic and memoir literature in many countries of the world, including the Soviet Union. The main aspects of the Spanish problem have been studied in sufficient detail and thoroughly by historians and political scientists. Some prominent Soviet state, political and public figures, as well as military leaders who took a direct part in the battles and served as advisers in the republican armed forces, shared memories of those significant events. And yet it is hardly possible to consider this topic exhausted. In particular, information about the work that was done in Spain by Soviet foreign intelligence has not yet been retrieved from archival repositories and made available to the general readership.

As you know, an agreement on mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations was reached between the republican leadership of Spain and the USSR back in 1933. But in fact, the embassy of the USSR in Madrid began to function only in August 1936, when Spain was already engulfed in civil war. In accordance with an interstate agreement, the Soviet Union undertook not only to provide the Spanish government with military and military-technical assistance, but also to send its specialists to work "as advisers in the highest headquarters of the Republican army and in other institutions." By the latter, both sides meant, first of all, the security agencies. In September 1936, with the sanction of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in fulfillment of the official request of the Spanish side, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR established its representative office at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Spain, which was referred to as a residency in official correspondence. This body was headed by Alexander Mikhailovich Orlov, already known to the reader. Naum Markovich Belkin

became his deputy. The main duty of the residency, operating under the guise of the Soviet embassy, was to provide the leadership of the USSR with intelligence and counterintelligence information on the entire spectrum of Spanish problems. As for cooperation with the Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs, this meant providing Spanish partners with advisory and other assistance in creating and organizing the activities of their own state security agencies. A. M. Orlov and N.

M. Belkin quickly established direct contacts with the Spanish leadership: the Minister of Defense Prieto, the ministers of the interior and justice, with their deputies, as well as with senior officials at all levels in the security service (Segu-ridad). During the two and a half years of war, these posts were held by many figures who differed significantly from each other in political convictions and preferences, business and personal qualities. They treated the Soviet Union differently and assessed its help, role and significance in the Spanish epic. But almost all of them were distinguished by a lack or low level of professionalism and, as a result, an underestimation of the active work of the Francoist special services and the foreign intelligence services that supported them. I also felt

an acute shortage of trained, and most importantly, reliable local personnel. In such a complex and volatile political and operational environment, Soviet intelligence officers had to deal with numerous delicate problems on a daily basis with their Spanish colleagues and, in parallel, acquire sources of the necessary intelligence and counterintelligence information. The

Spanish Republicans at the end of 1936 did not have any state body, which, even with a very big stretch, could be called foreign intelligence. However, the idea of creating such a body, born in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, was readily taken up by the Soviet resident and his deputy. With their assistance, already at the beginning of 1937, a special information service of the Foreign Ministry was launched with branches in a number of European capitals. It was named the Diplomatic Cabinet, with the task of "gradually establishing awareness in different countries, mainly among journalists and diplomats."

A few months later, a variety of political, economic and military information began to arrive from Spanish foreign missions. Of greatest importance were data on the military build-up of Germany and Italy and on their military-political plans in Europe and in the world. Work was especially productive in France and Czechoslovakia. Until the end of the war, the Spanish friends fraternally shared the information they had obtained with their Soviet colleagues and mentors.

The cooperation of the NKVD of the USSR with the Spanish security agencies went far beyond the contacts between their representatives in Madrid, Valencia and Barcelona. Up-to-date information about the secret plans of Germany, Italy and other states regarding Spain, obtained by Soviet intelligence as a whole, was used to guide the Spanish leadership. Various operational activities were also carried out, aimed at facilitating the Spanish friends in their struggle against the Francoists. For example, in France, Soviet intelligence officers helped the Spaniards in organizing meetings with agents working in the territory occupied by the Francoists.

In accordance with the personal sanction of I.V. Stalin of January 19, 1937, Soviet intelligence officers, together with their Spanish colleagues

organized the transfer to Spain of several hundred Russian internationalist volunteers from France, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Among them, Russian emigrants prevailed, including former White Guards who left Russia after 1917. The selection of candidates, their primary check, training and instruction were carried out by the Unions for the Return to the Homeland, which were officially registered public organizations in the countries mentioned above. This contingent of international brigades was used with great dedication as leaders and instructors of military affairs in training centers, senior in reconnaissance and sabotage groups, fighters guarding important facilities, as well as military translators.

A lot of work on the Spanish line was carried out in France by an illegal residency under the leadership of a prominent Soviet intelligence officer Ya. I. Serebryansky. In August-September 1936, with the help of agent Bernadette, 20 French military aircraft were purchased, including several aircraft of the latest design. Specially selected and trained pilots successfully overtook this aircraft from Paris to Barcelona on several flights. The entire complex and risky operation from beginning to end was kept secret from the French authorities, as well as from the "all-seeing eye" of German and Italian intelligence, who worked closely with the Francoists.

Here are two more facts. Agent Ernst's group in France mined seven German transport ships en route to Spain with a cargo of weapons and ammunition for the Francoists. After the explosions, these ships sank in the open sea. Agent F., acting alone in one of the European ports, disabled the engines of German transports equipped to sail to Spain by pouring mercury into them. After the fall of the republican regime, Soviet

intelligence officers made a feasible contribution to saving a number of Spanish colleagues from imminent physical reprisal and alleviated the desperate situation in which some of the fighters and commanders of the international brigades found themselves. **G**

The Spanish Republicans did not inherit from the previous political regime institutions that would professionally deal with issues of ensuring national security. At first, they did not feel a conscious need for them, often confusing and mixing the usual struggle against criminal and other anti-social elements with the suppression of subversive activities and counter-espionage. After long and difficult discussions, the Soviet representatives managed to convince the local leaders of the need to create a specialized counterintelligence department under the Ministry of Internal Affairs with branches in regional centers and large cities. Along with this, the system of counterintelligence services for the headquarters and formations of the republican army was also formed and debugged at an accelerated pace. In order to protect the international brigades from enemy agents penetrating their ranks, a special department was formed in the city of Albacete with its grassroots structures in the military units of foreign volunteers. An important and purely Spanish in nature link of the created counterintelligence system was a specialized unit within the Seguridad, which received the code name "information department". It was vested with the right to arrest and investigate. A detachment of 100 armed police officers was assigned to him as a rapid reaction task force.

Already at the beginning of 1937, this joint work of Soviet and Spanish colleagues began to bring the first goodies. In a number of cities, the underground Francoist organizations "United Spain" and "Spanish Phalanx" were uncovered and neutralized, a network of German and Italian agents in the army, navy and police was revealed. Information about their subversive work was used by the Prime Minister in an address to the people, and was widely covered in the local press.

During the entire period of the war, the Spanish counterintelligence officers waged a fierce and sometimes bloody struggle with the agents of the Francoist special services, called the "fifth column". By the way, this term, born during the Spanish Civil War, has firmly established itself as a common noun and has become international. It should be noted that the "five-columns" operating in the rear of the Republicans were well organized,

their operations were distinguished by audacity and ruthlessness. For example, in the summer of 1937 in Cartagena, the battleship *Chacabuco* of the Republican Navy was blown up and sunk. On January 10, 1938, an artillery ammunition depot located in an underground tunnel of the Madrid Metro was destroyed. A huge explosion completely destroyed the facility, killing 173 people, including all employees and warehouse workers. A few days later, the Francoists gleefully reported on the radio about this sabotage, noting that it was carried out by their agent - the secretary of the warehouse office, "who died the death of the brave in the performance of the task." On the Central Front, an underground organization of military hospital doctors was exposed, who massively amputated the limbs of wounded soldiers, and especially officers, in cases where such a surgical intervention was not at all caused by a medical need. commonplace

become sniper firing of
"five-columns" from the roofs of houses at military personnel, signaling with rockets at night during the bombing of Soviet ships by Francoist aircraft, which were unloading in Cartagena and Alicante.

The testimonies of numerous, timely neutralized accomplices of the enemy testified that the "fifth column" had agents in state institutions, military structures, political parties and trade unions. That is why the Francoists knew a lot about the situation in the republican leadership, about its

military-political ideas and plans.

The young Spanish counterintelligence, relying on the advisory assistance of Soviet representatives, sometimes delivered tangible blows to the "fifth column", but was not able to completely defeat it until the end of the war. The "five-columns" kept their underground warehouses of weapons and military equipment, a printing house and a radio station in Madrid. Before the troops of General Franco entered the capital, they occupied the main strategic points of the city.

The work of the Soviet representatives with the Spanish partners contributed to the security of the citizens of the USSR, whose number in Spain at that time reached several hundred. Sometimes it was about their life and death in the truest sense of the word. In particular, the Francoists captured the crews of two Soviet

ships, and also captured four of our pilots. Measures were taken to rescue them, but they did not give positive results even with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross, until the Spanish friends, at the request of the residency, offered the Francoists to exchange Soviet hostages for a group of "fifth column" agents sentenced to death for espionage and awaiting execution. In Soviet memoirs, the most

complete coverage was given to the practice of using partisan methods during the Spanish Civil War. The very idea of reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the Francoist rear came from the Soviet Union and was put into practice by the Spanish partners with the active assistance and direct participation of the NKVD of the USSR. Memories on this topic, left by some "Spaniards" of that era, can now be supplemented with information from the archives of Russian foreign intelligence. Already at the end of 1936, under the republican security agencies, a school was organized to

train the command staff of reconnaissance and sabotage groups and detachments for operations behind enemy lines. Later, three more such closed educational institutions were created. The selection of Spaniards and volunteers of other nationalities for training was carried out quite carefully. The greatest contribution to the organization of work on the line "D" was made by the staff of the residency Lev Petrovich Vasilevsky and the military intelligence officer Ilya Grigoryevich Starinov. The first was a senior adviser to the Special Department of the Madrid Front. After returning from Spain, he continued to work in Soviet foreign intelligence. After his retirement, he devoted himself to literary work. In particular, he wrote a fascinating story about a prominent Soviet intelligence officer G. S. Syroyezhkin, who was also a residency officer in Spain. I. G. Starinov not only taught the technical support course for sabotage units at the above-mentioned schools, but also took a direct part in

the manufacture of explosive devices and special-purpose equipment. The fighters of special groups and detachments rightfully considered him a "co-author" of a number of operations, as a result of which the Francoists lost

22 railway echelons with military equipment and manpower. During the Great Patriotic War, Starinov served in the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. In the 70s he taught at the Red Banner Institute of the KGB of the USSR. He became a candidate of technical sciences, professor, prepared more than 40 scientific papers. Among specialists, his monograph "Partisan War" is well known. Reconnaissance and sabotage units soon operated on all fronts. They obtained valuable military and military-political information, captured "languages"; disabled important facilities, undermined railway and highway bridges, disrupted communication lines, destroyed enemy military equipment and manpower. The archives have preserved many reports on the operations carried out. Here, for example, are excerpts from the resident's report on this topic to the Center dated December 9, 1937:

"The work carried out in the rear of the "D" led to a serious disruption of individual sections of the rear of the Francoists and significant material and human losses. The uninterrupted and consistent actions of our "D" groups, their use of the most diverse, improving methods, our coverage of almost all decisive sectors of the front, the fast changing And constantly advance of "D" actions deep in the rear caused great panic in the fascist ranks. About

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8 A. Sudoplatov - 1 **This is evidenced by all intelligence reports and our agents, this is also confirmed by a number of official materials known to us (newspaper articles, fascist orders, radio broadcasts). This state of the fascist rear, the constant**

tension of the Francoists, the fear of the "tricks of the red dynamites" that constantly haunts them, sometimes exaggerated and inflated by all sorts of rumors, we consider the main achievement in the "D" work. We know for sure that in order to combat sabotage, the fascists are forced to keep significant military forces and armed groups

of phalangists in the rear. All, even insignificant, objects are heavily guarded. In August 1937, the commander of the Southern Fascist Front, General Chiappa de Llano, issued

an order declaring the provinces of Seville, Huelva and Badajoz under martial law. The activities of the fascist command related to the implementation of this order provide for the diversion of significant military forces from the front.

In addition to the NKVD, work along the "D" line was also carried

out by representatives of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. They started sabotage activities a little later, and its scale was smaller. In the fall of 1937, the Spanish leadership, in agreement with the Soviet side, decided to unite the entire "partisan economy" within the 14th special corps, which was subordinate to the General Staff of the Republican Armed Forces. At the same time, the institute of advisers to the NKVD and the RU General Staff of the Red Army was preserved. At the end of 1938, a new reorganization took place, carried out without taking into account the critical remarks of the Soviet side: reconnaissance and sabotage groups and detachments were reorganized into companies and attached to separate military formations at their locations at the front. This led to the dispersal of the forces of the partisan units and to their use mainly for solving problems in the front line. Operations in the deep rear, thus, faded into the background, and soon ceased altogether. In time, this reorganization coincided with the strengthening of opinion in the highest echelons of the political leadership and the military command of Spain against the further deployment of guerrilla warfare. The supporters of this position managed to prove the need to "slow down the partisanship", since the more powerful the attacks on the rear of the Francoists became, the more fiercely they took countermeasures, which led to an increase in losses in the troops and increased repression against the civilian population. Moreover, some figures openly declared that this type of struggle is foreign and in no way suitable for Spanish conditions. They resolutely opposed the creation of large detachments for long-term use in the deep rear, confining themselves to authorizing only short raids of small groups in the front line.

strip.

There were other difficulties in relations with the Spanish partners, which were based on both objective

circumstances, as well as purely personal mistakes and blunders of Soviet instructors and advisers. For example, there was a strict ban on residency officers from taking personal part in combat operations behind enemy lines. Nevertheless, it was violated quite often, although such cases, as a rule, became known after the return of the "guilty" from the raids or their death. Although very rare, "misconducts" took place, one of which the resident reported indignantly to the Center on September 9, 1937:

"The excellent qualifications of K. P. Orlovsky are known, but politically he is not well developed. He let us down badly: instructing seventeen German communists before the operation, he promised them one hundred pesetas per person for a successful job. Naturally, they were outraged by the bribery, and we hardly managed to make amends."

As noted above, Soviet foreign intelligence in Spain was represented by the NKVD and RU General Staff of the Red Army. They exchanged military and operational information obtained on the spot, consulted on emerging problems, and coordinated their actions in matters related to maintaining relations with their Spanish colleagues. The merit in establishing such comradely interaction belongs by right to A. M. Orlov and N. M. Belkin (on the part of the NKVD) and Yan Karlovich Berzin and Grigory Mikhailovich Stern, who were the first chief military advisers. Archival documents and memoirs of many "Spaniards" testify that it was these four that showed a sincere and fundamental interest in business cooperation, in creating a favorable environment for joint operational activities. So, in December 1937, a slightly damaged German Heinkel-111 high-speed bomber made an emergency landing on the territory controlled by the Republicans. During difficult and lengthy negotiations with the Spaniards, Prime Minister Negrin and Minister of Defense Prieto were persuaded to transfer this aircraft to the Soviet Union. It was dismantled into parts, packed in boxes and sent by sea to the USSR. It cannot be said that the relations of Soviet intelligence officers with Spanish partners have always been problem-free and

cloudless. First of all, they were sometimes adversely affected by the political and ideological heterogeneity that was characteristic of the Spanish republican leadership in general, in particular the Popular Front. In his message to the Center dated December 29, 1936, the resident, for example, noted: "The advice that we give to the central apparatus of state security, and all our assistance in the form of instructions and operational guidance, has not yet reached the places. There, political parties create their own counterintelligence agencies, they are led by local committees of the Popular Front. On April 22, 1937, he again touches on this topic: "The fight against counter-

revolution and espionage quickly increased, but it became extremely difficult politically. Each party considers it its duty to protect the spies who are its members, thus trying to whitewash itself. Anarchists and Trotskyists were especially zealous in this regard. There was such a case: one of the

leaders of the Madrid police obtained irrefutable evidence that his subordinate was a Francoist agent who had stolen cipher documents from the headquarters of the Madrid Front. Since the traitor was in the anarchist party, they defended him with a mountain and did everything so that he avoided the deserved punishment. Moreover, in their newspapers, the anarchists posted a photo of his whistleblower with an appeal: "Know how to remember the faces of provocateurs!" Difficulties in relations with Spanish partners also arose because of the incompetence and irresponsibility of some

senior officials of the local special services. With the help of the residency, for example, the procedure for regularly informing the Minister of the Interior in the form of secret reports and bulletins of Seguridad was established. One of these documents reported on the discovery in Valencia of a large underground group of Francoists and on the operational measures that were proposed to be carried out to neutralize it. What a shock the Spanish counterintelligence officers and their Soviet colleagues experienced when their report was published in the press at the direction of the minister himself! The resident ended his report to the Center about this emergency with bitter words:

“As a result, the planned operation was failed. And the Minister of the Interior passed it with impunity. Such are the customs here ... ”

Unfortunately, complications also arose due to certain ill-conceived actions of the Soviet side. So, in a special report of the NKVD on Spanish affairs dated March 27, 1937, addressed to I. V. Stalin, it was stated: “The employees of our residency are directly involved in the interrogations of the most prominent spies - Germans and Italians, the sanction against which is already a foregone conclusion.” As you can see, this course of action was recognized as normal. However, such interference could not but cause dissatisfaction among the employees of the Spanish investigative authorities. The realization of this came only after some time, and this practice was discontinued.

The scouts made mistakes in accurately informing the Center and the Spanish leaders. For example, one late evening, a message was received from a residency officer in the city of Albacete that a major sabotage had been committed at the local airfield. Without verifying the accuracy of this information, the deputy resident sent a telegram to Moscow, and there, on its basis, they compiled a special message addressed to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and K.E. Voroshilov. In Valencia, Minister of Defense Prieto was raised from his bed, by order of which a police detachment was urgently transferred to the emergency area on trucks to search for and detain saboteurs. It soon became clear that there had been no emergency, but only an isolated explosion of several old artillery shells in one of the warehouses. This incident infuriated Prieto and did nothing to improve his relationship with his Soviet colleagues. Such incidents were very painfully experienced by the staff of the residency and were assessed self-critically. In particular, in a report on the work for 1938, Naum Isaakovich Eitingon, who replaced A. M. Orlov as a resident, wrote: “I think that it is necessary to put an end to fraud once and for all and teach our workers to tell you things as they really are. . Once again I emphasize how dangerous it is to fantasize instead of deeds. The service library of the SVR of Russia in Yasenevo holds a unique book - "Espionage in Spain", published in Barcelona

by the publishing house "Unity" in 1938, and its translation into Russian, but under a different title - "Spanish Trotskyists in the Service of Franco". Its author, Max Rieger, calls himself a member of the Socialist Party, an ordinary fighter, and then the commander of a machine-gun company of an international brigade. According to him, he fought at the front for fifteen months, and with this publication he intends to "give the reader the human truth about the heroic struggle of the Spanish people and, with official documents in hand, expose his traitors on the territory of the republic itself." We must pay tribute to the author: his book contains a lot of factual material, mainly about the unseemly activities of the Spanish Trotskyists (United Marxist Workers' Party - POUM), which is of historical value even today. Apparently, the reader of that time could not help wondering how an ordinary

International Brigadier, who was almost constantly at the forefront of the front, managed to collect such essentially secret data, process them and coherently present them. It also arose among modern researchers, and the answer was found in archival intelligence documents: materials for the mentioned book were collected by A. M. Orlov. Their literary processing belongs to the pen of a professional journalist, a confidant of the residency. The publication itself was one of the active measures of Soviet intelligence against international Trotskyism.

The Spanish Civil War coincided with the height of a broad campaign against Trotskyism in the Soviet Union and in the international communist movement. It is quite logical that work against the "foreign" supporters of this trend was included in the list of tasks facing the Soviet foreign intelligence in general and the Spanish residency in particular. And it must be admitted that the activities of the small, but active and aggressive POUM objectively created many grounds and reasons for this. Numerous facts testify that the Trotskyists openly allowed themselves to demand the dispersal of parliament and the overthrow of the government of the Popular Front, they attacked the Prime Minister: "Franco is a fascist. Negrin is also a fascist." Their arsenal included such methods as spreading provocative rumors, supporting defeatist

sentiment and sabotage the formation of a regular army. The Trotskyists were especially embittered about everything that was connected with the Soviet Union. Their press organs constantly held the palm in all anti-Soviet campaigns of those years. Here, for example, are the texts of their leaflets:

"Spanish workers! Do not trust the help of the USSR. Think carefully about the real aims of these newfound "friends";

"Down with interference in Spanish affairs from outside Germany, Italy and the USSR! They are all trading in our people!"

The leaders of the republican government and the Popular Front paid almost no attention to such antics, motivating their passivity by the fact that the POUM was a small organization that did not have a broad social base. Only the Communist Party of Spain expressed concern. But its activists were usually objected to: the KPI and POUM are communist organizations, so sort out your own strife. And this connivance ended in May 1937 with a bloody anti-state rebellion in Barcelona, which was inspired and organized by Trotskyists and anarchists. For three days, government troops fought heavy battles with the rebels in the capital of Catalonia. About a thousand people died, there were almost 3,000 wounded. Only after that, on June 16, by order of the Minister of the Interior, almost the entire composition of the Central Committee of the POUM, headed by Andreas Nin, was arrested. An investigation has begun. The party was not outlawed, but its party committees and press organs were closed, archives seized and sealed. In September 1937, the security forces captured the Francoist resident and uncovered his extensive network of agents, which also consisted of members of the POUM. Several protracted trials were held, but the defendants received almost token punishments. The main result of all these measures was that the POUM ceased to exist as a political organization even before the end of the civil war. It is worth mentioning another delicate side of the Soviet-Spanish cooperation through the special services. When the Soviet Union began to provide republican Spain with a broad and

assistance, the Soviet mass media began to report daily on the course of hostilities in this country, on many domestic and international aspects of the Spanish problem from a specific angle. First of all, the names of the leaders of the Spanish communists were mentioned: Dolores Ibarruri, José Díaz. And people could not help but get the impression that it was the CPI that was the only leading political force, the main inspirer and organizer of the popular resistance to the Francoists. In reality, however, this was not entirely the case. In no case should one underestimate the truly heroic merits of the communists, their consistency in the fight against the fascists, patriotism and selflessness, however, their role in the system of the multi-party Popular Front, the degree of influence on state affairs by the Soviet side was unjustifiably exaggerated and overestimated. Naturally, all departments, including foreign intelligence, were obliged to strictly and strictly adhere to the line set by the leadership of the CPSU (b), and focus on the KPI.

In the initial period of the war, the major political parties of the Popular Front created their own intelligence and counterintelligence services, as well as entire security paramilitary units. In a report to the Center dated January 10, 1937, the resident, in particular, noted that the communists were being assisted in organizing their own intelligence and counterintelligence and that this work was considered a priority. The residency workers led the security brigade of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPI, although officially this was not part of their duties in accordance with the Spanish-Soviet agreements and agreements on the interstate line. Special reports on the actions of reconnaissance and sabotage groups and detachments in the Francoist rear, compiled according to Soviet instructors and advisers, were sent personally to the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and ... to the military commission of the Central Committee of the KPI, which could not be classified as an organ of the Spanish state system. apparatus. Using their capabilities and personal authority, Soviet instructors and advisers, in accordance with the instructions of their leadership, sought to promote and secure in key positions

in the local special services, first of all, members of the Communist Party. Meetings of the leaders and employees of the residency with prominent figures of the KPI were held, as a rule, without observing the elementary requirements of conspiracy, perhaps everyone who could be interested in them knew about them. Such a demonstration of "special" relations with the Communist Party could not but irritate other top Spanish leaders and aroused their corresponding opposition. By July 1937, the "honeymoon" (according to A. M. Orlov) of the friendship between socialists and communists was over. Communists began to be expelled from important state institutions, including law enforcement agencies. All this, as well as the deterioration of the situation at the front every day more and more negatively and painfully affected the state of interaction with the Spanish partners.

In order to judge as objectively as possible about the work of Soviet intelligence officers in Spain, one must also remember and take into account the fact that they acted in conditions when mass unreasonable repressions were carried out in their homeland, tried and physically destroyed "enemies of the people", exposed "spies" of foreign states, they branded "renegades", "deviators", etc., etc. This information reached Spain not only through official means. People were nervous, unsettled, sometimes in a state of deep depression. Here are a few such everyday situations.

The families of a group of military advisers suddenly, without explanation, ceased to pay the required allowance. It turned out that these commanders fell under suspicion, since before leaving for Spain they were received and admonished by M.N. Tukhachevsky. A specialist who worked as the director of a military plant in Barcelona learned in a roundabout way that his wife had been arrested

in Moscow. The residency received instructions from the Center to take into "development" the stenographer of the trade mission T., since she had previously allegedly maintained friendly relations with M.N. It was also proposed to take control of the Polish General Karol Swierczewski, an international brigade officer, because he allegedly had an "unhealthy mood" in connection with the arrest in Moscow of three representatives of the Polish section.

Executive Committee of the Comintern on charges of espionage. and resident reported:

“The head of the group of Polish internationalists has an embittered, hostile mood. He openly expresses doubts about the credibility of the charges brought against the arrested. He has known these people for twenty years and does not believe that they can be "enemies of the people*." Yezhov's ax thoroughly walked through

the staff of the residency, who returned to their homeland at the end of the business trip. Some did not wait to be taken to the dungeons. In particular, on the report of Inna Natanovna Belenkaya about her work in Spain there is a note made in 1938: “Subject to arrest. She was not arrested because she committed suicide.” This brave intelligence officer has been working illegally in Germany, Austria and China for many years. In Spain, she conducted undercover work, assisted Spanish colleagues in investigative activities. She was distinguished by integrity, independent character and directness of judgments.

After the flight of the Soviet resident A. M. Orlov from Spain, Naum Isaakovich Eitingon was appointed acting head of the foreign apparatus in Spain. Having assumed leadership of the

residency during a critical period for it, N. I. Eitingon ensured the solution of the OS-Ion operational problems, which kept multiplying and multiplying. In general, the foreign apparatus continued to function more or less normally, although after Orlov's flight, nervousness persisted, which hindered the initiative and the completion of previously begun cases. It was not possible to avoid large expenses. In particular, the implementation of the plan to create a deeply secret agent reserve for the future on the eve of the visibly impending war between the USSR and Nazi Germany was terminated. This project was codenamed "New Set". Its essence was as follows: to select from the fighters of the international brigades about seventy people who had experience of underground work and proved their reliability and loyalty in a combat situation, train them properly in a special school near Barcelona, and then send them to various countries (the main

way European) as illegal immigrants to settle as a backlog of intelligence for wartime. By the summer

of 1938, this work was in full swing, but in November of that year it was put to an end on the grounds that such "enemies of the people" as A. M. Orlov, the heads of foreign intelligence I. 3. Passov were involved in it and S. M. Shpigelglas. The last two were shot. Authorized the closure of the "New Set" on November 23, 1938, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria. But during the Great Patriotic War, such a reserve for Soviet foreign intelligence, apparently, would be very useful.

From the middle of 1938, the interaction of the Soviet foreign intelligence with the Spanish partners began to gradually curtail. For some time, the functions of an intermediary between the Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs and the residency were assumed by Prime Minister Negrin, who delegated specific contacts to his son. With the approach of the front line to Barcelona, it was necessary to send en masse released instructors and advisers, as well as to assist in the evacuation of employees of other Soviet institutions. On instructions from Moscow, a large group of leading figures of the KPP and material assets belonging to the party were secretly transferred to the USSR. In all these events, the participation of the Parisian residency was invaluable.

From January 1939, Soviet intelligence officers continued to perform their duty in fact in front-line conditions. The residency radio station was moved from Barcelona to the outskirts and then to the open field. But thanks to the personal courage, high skill and dedication of the radio operator Nikolai Ilyich Lipovka, reliable communication with the Center was uninterrupted. This modest employee later, in the 1940s, went abroad twice and worked in the central intelligence apparatus until his retirement. In February 1939, the residency of

Soviet foreign intelligence in Spain ceased to exist. One can evaluate her efforts and their results in different ways during that period, but one cannot help but pay tribute to the "Spanish scouts", as they proudly called themselves. These were high-class professionals, each of them left his mark on the history of the national intelligence service. Now they are no longer with us, but their reports, letters, and other

documents, memoirs of veterans who knew them personally. They belong to history. Eternal memory to them.

Undoubtedly something else. The intervention of the Nazis and the Italian fascists in Spain was the eve of the Second World War in Europe. The duel between Soviet intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers was of international importance, reaching far beyond the borders of Spain. Hence the special acuteness and tragedy of the Spanish events, the attention to the history of the confrontation between the secret services in the Iberian Peninsula, which has not weakened until recently. **Chapter 12**

LIQUIDATION OF TROTSKY

In the plan of the operation to liquidate the Old Man, as Trotsky was called in the NKVD, perhaps the meeting of my father with Stalin was of decisive importance. I would like to dwell on this episode in detail,

using his notes.

“On one of the March days of 1939,” writes my father, “I was summoned to Beria’s office, and unexpectedly for **myself I heard a reproach that I had been idle for the last two months. At the same time, Beria did not consider it necessary to comment on his statement in any way and ordered to accompany him to an important, in his words, meeting. I assumed that we were talking about a meeting with one of the agents, whom he personally supervised, at a safe house. In September 1938 I accompanied him twice to similar events. Meanwhile, the car took us to the Kremlin, where we entered through the Spassky Gate. The driver stopped the car at a dead end near Ivanovskaya Square. Then I suddenly realized that Stalin would receive me. The entrance to the Kremlin**

building, where Stalin worked, was familiar to me from past meetings with him. We climbed the stairs to the second floor and walked along a long deserted corridor covered with red carpet, past cabinets with high doors, such as are found in museums. Beria and I were let in by the same security officer who was also on duty when Yezhov brought me here. Now

he no longer greeted Yezhov, but Beria: "I wish you good health, comrade Beria!"

Beria opened the door, and we entered a reception room of such enormous size that the three desks standing there looked quite tiny. There were three people in the waiting room: two in tunics of the same cut as Stalin's, and one in military uniform. Beria was greeted by a short, seemingly stocky man in a green tunic, whose voice sounded low and impassive. (Later I learned that it was Poskrebyshev, the head of Stalin's secretariat.) It seemed to me that in this room the rule was the complete absence of external manifestations of any kind of emotion. Indeed, such was the unwritten and once for all approved by Stalin and Molotov order in this building. Poskrebyshev led us into Stalin's office and then silently closed the door behind us. At that moment, I experienced the same feelings as in previous meetings

with Stalin: excitement, mixed with intense expectation, and delight engulfing you all. It seemed to me that the beating of my heart could be heard by those around me. At our appearance, Stalin rose from the table. Standing in the middle of the office, we shook hands, and he motioned for us to sit down at a long table covered with green cloth. The desktop of Stalin himself was very close in the corner of the office. Out of the corner of my eye, I managed to notice that all the folders on his desk were laid out in perfect order, above the desk - a portrait of Lenin, and on the other wall - Marx and Engels. Everything in the office looked the same as the last time I was here. But Stalin himself seemed different: attentive, calm and focused. Listening to the interlocutor, he seemed to consider every word said to him, which seemed to have a special meaning for him. And it simply could not occur to the interlocutor that this person could be insincere.

Was it really so? Not sure. But Stalin really listened to Beria with great attention. "Comrade Stalin," he turned

to him, "at the direction of the party, we exposed the former leadership of the NKVD overseas intelligence and thwarted their treacherous attempt to deceive

government. We are submitting a proposal to appoint Comrade Sudoplatov as deputy chief of intelligence of the NKVD in order to help the young party cadres mobilized to work in the organs to cope with the tasks of the government. Stalin frowned. He still held his pipe in his hand

without lighting it. Then he struck a match (a gesture familiar to anyone who has watched at least one newsreel magazine) and pulled the ashtray towards him. He did not say a word about my appointment, but asked Beria to briefly describe the main directions of intelligence operations abroad. While Beria was speaking, Stalin got up from the table and began to pace the office, he moved slowly and completely inaudibly in his soft Caucasian boots. Although Stalin walked without stopping, it seemed to me that he did not relax his attention, on the contrary, he became more concentrated. His remarks were distinguished by a certain harshness, which he did not think to hide. Such harshness towards the people invited to the reception was, perhaps, the most typical feature in his behavior, forming an integral part of Stalin's personality - the same as the pockmarks on his face, giving him a stern look.

According to Beria, overseas intelligence in modern conditions must change the main directions of its work. Its main task should not be the fight against emigration, but the preparation of residencies for war in Europe and the Far East. A much greater role, he believed, would be played by our agents of influence, that is, people from the business government circles of the West and Japan, who have access to the leadership of these countries and can be used to achieve our goals in foreign policy. Such people should be looked for among the leaders of the liberal movement, who are tolerant of the communists. Meanwhile, according to Beria, the "left" movement was in a state of serious confusion due to the attempts of the Trotskyists to subjugate it. In this way, Trotsky and his supporters posed a serious challenge to the Soviet Union. They sought to deprive the USSR of the position of the leader of the world communist movement. Beria proposed to deliver a decisive blow to the center

Trotskyist movement abroad and put me in charge of these operations. In conclusion, he said that it was precisely for this purpose that my candidacy was put forward for the post of deputy head of the Foreign Department, which was then headed by Dekanozov. My task was to use all

the possibilities of the NKVD to eliminate Trotsky. There was a pause. Stalin continued the conversation: "There are no important political figures in the Trotskyist movement, except for Trotsky himself. If Trotsky is done away with, the threat to the Comintern will be eliminated.

He again took his place opposite us and began to slowly express dissatisfaction with the way intelligence operations were being conducted. In his opinion, they lacked proper activity. He stressed that the elimination of Trotsky in 1937 was entrusted to Spiegelglas, but he failed this important government task. Then Stalin became stern and, minting words, as if giving an order, he said:

Trotsky must be eliminated within a year before the inevitable war breaks out. Without the removal of Trotsky, as the Spanish experience shows, we cannot be sure, in the event of an attack by the imperialists on the Soviet Union, of supporting our allies in the international communist movement. It will be very difficult for them to fulfill their international duty to destabilize the rear of the enemy, to launch a guerrilla war. We have no historical experience of

building a powerful industrial and military power at the same time as strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat," Stalin continued, and after assessing the international situation and the upcoming war in Europe, he turned to the question that directly concerned me. I was to lead a group of militants to carry out an operation to eliminate Trotsky, who was at that time in exile in Mexico. Stalin clearly preferred streamlined words like "action" (instead of "liquidation"), while noting that if the action was successful, "the party will never forget those who participated in it, and will take care not only of themselves, but of all members their families."

When I tried to object that I was not quite suitable for this assignment in Mexico, since I did not speak Spanish at all, Stalin did not react in any way. I asked permission to bring veterans of the sabotage operations in the Spanish Civil War into the cause.

“It is your duty and the duty of the party to find and select suitable and reliable people to carry out the task of the party. You will be provided with any help and support. Report directly to Comrade Beria, and to no one else, but remember: the entire responsibility for carrying out this action lies with you. You are personally obliged to carry out all the preparatory work and personally send a special team from Europe to Mexico. The Central Committee authorizes the submission of all reports on the operation exclusively in handwritten form.

The audience ended, we said goodbye and left the office. After meeting with Stalin, I was immediately appointed deputy head of intelligence. I was assigned an office on the seventh floor of the main building of the Lubyanka at number 755 - once it was occupied by Shpigelglas.

The next day, as soon as I arrived at my new office, I got a call from Eitingon's house, who had recently returned from France. - Pavlusha,

I've been in Moscow for ten days, doing nothing. The operations department set up constant surveillance of me. I'm sure my phone is being tapped. You know how I worked. Please report to your superiors: if they want to arrest me, let them do it right away, and not arrange childish games.

I replied to Eitingon that it was my first day in a leadership position and I was not aware of any plans for his arrest. I immediately invited him to come to me, then called Merkulov and reported on the conversation. He laughed and said:

“These idiots are taking Eitingon and his group under the observation, and do not understand that they are dealing with professionals.

Ten minutes later, Beria called me over a direct wire and suggested: since Eitingon is a suitable candidate for

known to me, by the end of the day he is waiting for both of us with proposals.

Father told Eitingon about the plan of the operation in Mexico. He played a leading role in it. He agreed without the slightest hesitation. Eitingon was the ideal figure to lead the special illegal residency in the US and Mexico. It was possible to get close to Trotsky only through our agents, who settled in Mexico after the end of the war in Spain. Nobody knew these people better than him. The order to liquidate Trotsky did not surprise him - for more than ten years the OGPU-NKVD had been waging a real war against Trotsky and his organization.

Forced to leave the Soviet Union in 1929, Trotsky went through several countries (Turkey, Norway and France) before settling in Mexico in 1937. Even before his expulsion, he essentially lost to Stalin in the struggle for power and, while in exile, made considerable efforts to split and then lead the world communist movement, causing unrest in the ranks of the communists, weakening the position of the USSR in Western Europe and especially in Germany in the early 1930s. At the suggestion of Eitingon, the operation against

Trotsky was named "Duck". In this code name, the word "duck" was naturally used in the sense of "disinformation": when they say that "ducks have flown", they mean the publication of false information in the press. Eitingon knew our network of agents in the United States and

Western Europe, so he was able to realistically imagine which agents he could rely on with confidence. But Maria de Las Heras, Patria's best agent, whom the NKVD managed to infiltrate into Trotsky's secretariat during his stay in Norway and who was with him in Mexico, had to be recalled. Spiegelglas planned to use her in 1937-1938, but the flight of Orlov, who knew her well enough, ruined this plan. The father, as the head of the operation, and Eitingon, could not risk this agent. They took her out of the game and they were right. I do not rule out that the forced temporary abandonment of the military operation in Mexico led to the tragic fate of Spiegelglas. He knew too much and ceased to be needed.

The fate of Mary de Las Heras turned out to be legendary. During the Great Patriotic War, she was parachuted into the rear of the Germans, where she fought in the partisan detachment of Hero of the Soviet Union Medvedev. After the war, she actively worked in the KGB spy network in Latin America, performing the duties of a radio operator. In total, Maria de Las Heras was an illegal immigrant for more than two decades. She returned to the USSR only in the 70s, having vast life experience behind her, with the rank of colonel, and died in 1988. Two months

after his flight to America, Alexander Orlov wrote an anonymous letter to Trotsky, warning that plans were being developed to assassinate him and this action would be carried out by people from his entourage who had come from Spain. At that time, Soviet intelligence did not know about Orlov's letter with such a warning, but it was quite possible that Orlov might take such an action. The original plan was to use agents recruited by

Eitingon among the Trotskyists in Western Europe and especially in Spain. Eitingon, in particular, personally recruited the leaders of the Spanish Trotskyists, the Rouen brothers. He was in touch with former anarchists who sympathized with Trotsky, the ministers of the republican government of Spain, Gaodosio Olivero and Frederico Amundseni. However, Eitingon insisted on using those agents in Western Europe, Latin America and the United States who had never been involved in any operations against Trotsky and his supporters. In accordance with his plan, it was necessary to create two independent groups. The first group "Horse" under the leadership of David Alfaro Siqueiros, a Mexican artist personally known to Stalin, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War. He moved to Mexico and became one of the organizers of the Mexican Communist Party. The second is the so-called "Mother" group under the leadership of Karidad Merkader. Among her wealthy ancestors was the vice-governor of Cuba, and her great-grandfather was the Spanish ambassador to Russia. Caridad left her husband, a Spanish railroad magnate, for anarchists and fled to Paris with four children in the early 1930s. She **had to** earn a living by knitting. When, in 1936, **Spain** began

civil war, she returned to **Barcelona**, joined the anarchists and was badly wounded **in** the stomach during an air raid. The eldest son **Caridad** died, and the middle one, Ramon, fought in a partisan detachment. The youngest son Louis came **to** Moscow in

In 1939, together with other children of the Spanish **Republicans** who fled from Franco, the daughter remained **in**

Paris. My father first met Ramón Mercader del Río during his stay in Barcelona. He recalled that Ramon was then a very young lieutenant, who had just returned from a partisan mission in the rear of the Francoists. A charming young man - at that time he was only twenty years old. His older brother died heroically in battle: having tied himself with grenades, he rushed under a German tank that broke through to the positions of the Republicans. Their mother Caridad was also highly respected in the Republican guerrilla underground, showing miracles of bravery in combat operations. At that time, my father could not even suspect what kind of future was in store for Mercader: after all, he was destined to liquidate Trotsky, and it was my father who was to lead this operation.

Since Ramon was completely unknown among the Trotskyists, Eitingon, then still in Spain, decided to send him from Barcelona to Paris in the summer of 1938 under the guise of a young businessman, adventurer and playboy who would occasionally financially support political extremists from -for its hostile attitude towards any authorities.

By 1938, Ramon and his mother Caridad, both living in Paris, had committed themselves to cooperating with Soviet intelligence. In September, on a tip from the Rouen brothers, Ramon met Sylvia Ageloff, who was then in Paris, and the Rosemers, who were friends with the Trotsky family. Following Eitingon's instructions, he refrained from any political activity. His role was to sometimes help friends and those with whom he sympathized with money, but not to interfere in politics. He was not interested in the affairs of these people and rejected offers to join their movement.

We also had another important agent under the code name Harry - the Englishman Morrison, unknown to either Orlov or Spiegelglas.

Harry worked for Serebryansky's Special Group and played a key role in the December 1937 theft of Trotsky's archives in Europe. At the prompting of my father, this archive was requested by Dmitry Volkogonov and used by him in his book Trotsky, published in 1992. Harry also had strong connections in the seventh arrondissement of the Paris police department. This helped him obtain genuine seals and letterheads from the French police and gendarmerie to forge passports and residence permits that allowed Soviet agents to settle in France. Eitingon believed that his agents

should operate completely independently from local residencies in the US and Mexico. The father agreed with him, but warned that it was impossible to relocate all the necessary people from Western Europe to America, relying only on ordinary sources of funding. At that time, it was necessary to have at least three hundred thousand dollars to relocate and equip groups. To create a reliable cover, Eitingon offered to use his personal family ties in the United States in the operation. Father and Eitingon outlined all their considerations to Beria, emphasizing that there was no one in Trotsky's entourage who would have direct access to him. They did not rule out that his residence would have to be taken by storm. Frustrated by the recall of Patria's agent from Trotsky's entourage, agreeing to use Eitingon's personal connections, Beria unexpectedly offered to use Orlov's connections, for which you need to contact him on his behalf. Orlov was known to Beria from Georgia, where he commanded a border detachment in 1921. Eitingon strongly objected, and not only for personal reasons: in Spain, he had a strained relationship with Orlov. He believed that Orlov, being a professional who participated in the liquidations of defectors, would certainly not believe, regardless of whose name he was addressed. Moreover, noticing surveillance or any attempts to reach him, he can jeopardize the entire operation. Reluctantly, Beria was forced to **agree**. **As** a result, his order was: leave Orlov alone **and** not look for any connections with him.

Beria was very preoccupied with how to use his **old** personal connections in operational affairs. Through his **wife** Nina, he had two famous **Gegechkori relatives**: one was a convinced Bolshevik, a district in Georgia was named after him, the other, who lived in

in exile in Paris, minister of foreign affairs in the Menshevik government of Georgia. Later, this was the basis **for** the accusation, fabricated against Beria, that he, through his relatives, was connected with imperialist intelligence services. The Soviet residency in France was literally inundated with his directives to work out **the Georgian** emigration, especially the Mensheviks, whose government was in exile in Paris.

Beria, however, realized that a new agent network would really be needed, which would exclude the possibility of betrayal. He ordered that the father and Eitingon begin to act without worrying about the financial side of the matter. After the group was formed, he wanted to add to it several agents known to him personally. Beria ordered that my father also go with

Eitingon to Paris to assess the group sent to Mexico. In June 1939, Georg Miller, an Austrian émigré who served as head of the "passport technique" department, supplied them with false documents. From Moscow they went to Odessa, and from there by sea to Athens, where they changed their documents and sailed on another ship to Marseille. We got to Paris by train. There, the father met with Ramon and Caridad Mercader, and then, separately, with members of

the Siqueiros group. The two groups did not communicate and were not aware of each other's existence. My father found them to be quite reliable, and more importantly, they were involved in sabotage operations behind Franco's front line. This experience must have helped them in their action against Trotsky. Only after that, he suggested that Eitingon stay with Caridad and Ramon for a month, introduced them to the basics of undercover work. They had no knowledge of such basic things as source development techniques, agent recruitment, surveillance detection, or appearance alteration. This knowledge was necessary for them to avoid the traps of the counterintelligence service of a small group of Trotskyists in Mexico, but the delay almost became fatal for Eitingon. Father returned to Moscow at the end or middle of July, and in August 1939 Caridad and Ramon sailed from Le Havre to New York.

Eitingon was to follow them shortly, but by then the Polish

the passport with which he arrived in Paris became a dangerous document. After the German invasion of Poland, which marked the beginning of the Second World War, he was going to be drafted into the French army as a Polish refugee or interned as a suspicious foreigner. At the same time, new, more stringent restrictions on foreign travel for Poles were introduced, so that Eitingon urgently had to go underground. My father recalled that he returned to Moscow,

cursing himself for the delay caused by the preparation of agents, but apparently he had no other choice: **"We instructed our resident in Paris, Vasilevsky**

(code name Tarasov), who worked as Consul General, to do everything possible in order to provide Tom (as Eitingon got through the operational correspondence) with the appropriate documents for a trip to America. It took Vasilevsky almost a month to complete this task. While the court and the case, he placed Eitingon in a psychiatric hospital, the chief doctor of which was a Russian emigrant. On my instructions, Vasilevsky used Morrison's connections to get Tom a fake French residence permit. Now Tom has become a Syrian Jew suffering from a mental disorder. Naturally, he was unfit for military service, and the document gave him the opportunity to stay in France and could be used to obtain a foreign passport. Vasilevsky was sure that the passport was genuine (the French official received a bribe), but still the problem of obtaining an American visa remained.

Our only connection to the American consulate was through a respectable businessman from Switzerland—actually our illegal Steinberg. However, there is an additional difficulty here. He refused to return to Moscow, where he was recalled in 1938 to do. In the letter, he declared his loyalty, but said that he was afraid of a "purge" in the NKVD. Vasilevsky sent a liaison officer, our illegal Takhchianov, to meet him in Lausanne. He was insured by another illegal immigrant, Alakhverdov. During the meeting, Steinberg was ready to shoot the contact, fearing that he was the killer.

In the end, he agreed to arrange a visa for a Syrian Jew: he did not recognize Eitingon in the passport photo - he grew a mustache and changed his hairstyle. A week later, Steinberg got a visa, and our envoy returned with it to Paris.

Eitingon arrived in New York in October 1939 and set up an import-export firm in Brooklyn, which he used as his communications center. And most importantly, this firm provided "roof" for Ramon Mercadera, who settled in Mexico with a fake Canadian passport in the name of Frank Jackson. He was now able to make frequent trips to New York to meet with Eitingon, who provided him with money.

Gradually, a cover was found in Mexico for the Siqueiros group. They had two illegal radio operators, but, unfortunately, radio communication was ineffective due to the poor quality of the equipment. Eitingon developed options for infiltrating Trotsky's villa in Coyoacan, a suburb of Mexico City. The owner of the villa, the Mexican painter Diego Rivera, rented it to Trotsky. The Siqueiros group planned to storm the building, while Ramon, who had no idea of the existence of the Siqueiros group, was to use his love affair with Sylvia Ageloff to befriend Trotsky's entourage.

Ramon looked like the current star of French cinema, Alain Delon. Sylvia succumbed to his peculiar magnetism back in Paris. She traveled with Ramon to New York, but he tried to keep her away from Eitingon. It happened that Eitingon watched Ramon and Sylvia in a restaurant, but was never introduced to her.

In Trotskyist circles, Ramon kept himself independent, making no attempt to win their confidence "by expressing sympathy for the common cause." He continued to play the part of a businessman "supporting Trotsky by virtue of his eccentricity" and not as a devoted follower. The Siqueiros group had a plan for the rooms of Trotsky's

villa smuggled in by Maria de Las Heras before she was recalled to Moscow. She gave a description of Trotsky's bodyguards, as well as a detailed analysis of the activities of his small secretariat.

At the end of 1939, Beria suggested to his father that he strengthen the network of illegal immigrants in Mexico. He brought him to a safe house and introduced him to Grigulevich (code name Yuzik), who came to Moscow after working as an illegal immigrant in Western Europe. He was known in Trotskyist circles for his political neutrality. No one suspected him of trying to infiltrate their organization. His presence in Latin America was quite natural, since Grigulevich's father owned a large pharmacy in Argentina.

Grigulevich arrived in Mexico in January 1940 and, at the direction of Eitingon, created a third, reserve, network of illegal immigrants for operations in Mexico and California. He collaborated with the Siqueiros group. Grig-levich managed to make friends with one of Trotsky's bodyguards, Sheldon Hart. When Hart was on duty on May 23, 1940, Grigulevich knocked on the gate of the villa in the wee hours. Hart made an unforgivable mistake - he opened the gates, and Siqueiros' group broke into Trotsky's residence. They riddled with automatic bursts the room where Trotsky was. But since they fired through a closed door and the results of the shelling were not verified, Trotsky, who hid under the bed, remained alive. Hart was eliminated because he knew Grigulevich and could

tell everyone. The incident ended with the arrest of only Siqueiros, which provided a good cover for the continuation of the actions of Grigulevich and Mercader, who were still unaware of each other's existence.

The first attempt failed due to the fact that the capture group was not professionally trained for a specific action. Eitingon, for reasons of secrecy, did not take part in this attack. He would certainly have corrected the actions of the attackers. There was no one in the Siqueiros group who had experience of searches and inspections of premises or houses. The members of his group were peasants and miners with elementary training in guerrilla warfare and sabotage. **Eitingon** radioed a coded message **about the failure** of the operation. The message arrived with **some** delay, because it went through a Soviet **ship** that was **in** New York harbor, from there **the cipher message** went by radio **to** Paris to Vasilevsky. **He handed** it over **to** Moscow, but did not attach **much** importance to the message,

because he did not know the code. As a result, **Beria and Stalin** learned about the failed assassination attempt from a **TASS report** .

Father recalled: "I

don't remember the exact date, obviously it was a May Sunday in 1940. I was called to the dacha to Beria. His car was sent for me. There were guests at the dacha: Serov, the then People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and Kruglov, Beria's deputy for personnel. When I entered they were having lunch. Beria,

apparently, did not want to discuss our case in their presence. He motioned me to a garden where subtropical plants grew! shya, planted by him in the hope that they will be able to survive in the harsh climate of Moscow. His wife Nina, an agronomist by education, and son Sergey were engaged in the garden. Beria introduced me to them and walked with me to the far corner of the garden. Om was furious. Looking at me point-blank, he began to ask about the composition of the group approved by me in Paris and about the plan for the destruction of Trotsky. I replied that the professional level of the Siqueiros group is low, but they are people dedicated to our cause and ready to sacrifice their lives for it. I expect a detailed radio report from Mexico in a day or two. After our conversation, we returned to the dining room and Beria ordered me to immediately return to work and inform him as soon as I learned about further events. Two days later I received a brief report from Eitingon from Paris and reported to Beria. Eitingon reported that he was ready, with the approval

of the Center, to start implementing an alternative plan - to use Mercader, the main of our "outsider" agents, to eliminate Trotsky. To carry out this plan, it was necessary to abandon the use of Mercader as our agent in Trotsky's entourage and not introduce new ones: the arrest of an agent who tried to kill Trotsky could mean the failure of the entire agent network connected directly with Trotsky and his entourage. I felt that neither I nor Eitingon could make such a decision on their own. It could only be accepted by Beria and Stalin. The introduction of agents into Trotskyist groups abroad was one of the important

priorities in the work of Soviet intelligence in 1930-1940. How else could one get information about what would happen in Trotskyist circles after the assassination of Trotsky? Will the Trotskyists wield power and pose a threat to the USSR without their leader? Stalin regularly read messages coming from our agent, who managed to get a Trotskyist newspaper published in New York into the staff. From him we received information about the plans and aims of their movement and accordingly organized our activities in the fight against Trotskyism. Often, Stalin had the opportunity to read Trotskyist articles and documents even before they were published in the West.

Now, for the sake of the political situation, the activities of Trotsky and his supporters abroad in 1930—

1940s are reduced only to propaganda work. But it is not so. The Trotskyists were active: they organized, using the support of people associated with the Abwehr, a rebellion against the republican government in Barcelona in 1937. From Trotskyist circles to the secret services of France and Germany there were "suggestive" materials about the actions of the Communist parties in support of the Soviet Union. The connections with the Abwehr of the leaders of the Trotskyist rebellion in Barcelona in 1937 were reported by the agent Schulze-Boysen, who later became one of the leaders of the Soviet underground group Red Chapel. Subsequently, after his arrest, the Gestapo accused him of passing this information to Moscow, and this fact figured in the death sentence of the Nazi court in his case.

Other examples of the use of Trotskyist connections by the Abwehr to search for leaders of the Communist Party of France who were hiding in the underground in 1941 were reported by Vasilevsky, a resident in Paris, appointed in 1940 as a representative of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Father outlined all this to Beria. At first he did not react at all. Father returned to his office and waited...

He didn't have to wait long. Father recalled that just through two hours he was called to the third floor to Beria.

"Come with me," he said to me. This time we went to Stalin's Blizhnaya Dacha, half an hour's drive west of Moscow. The first part of the meeting was very short. I reported a failed attempt

Siqueiros to eliminate Trotsky, explaining the alternative threat of losing the anti-Trotskyist network in the United States and Latin America after Trotsky's destruction. Stalin asked just one question: - To what extent is the intelligence network in the United States and Mexico, led by Ovakimyan, involved in the operation against Trotsky? I replied that the Eitingon operation, which was given special powers to independently recruit and attract people without the sanction of the Center, is completely independent of Ova Kimyan, whose intelligence activities under the cover of our Amtorg company are carried out without connection with the action against Trotsky. Stalin confirmed his earlier decision, remarking: "An action against Trotsky would mean the collapse of the entire Trotskyist movement. And we will not have to spend money to fight them and their attempts to undermine the Comintern and our ties with the "left" circles abroad. Proceed with the alternative plan, despite the failure of Siqueiros, and send a telegram to Eitingon expressing our full confidence.

I prepared the text of the telegram and added at the end: "Pavel sends his best wishes." Pavel was the code name for Beria. When I was arrested in 1953, the investigators, looking through the materials of Operation Duck in my working documents stored in a safe, asked who was hiding under the name Pavel. I did not consider it necessary to emphasize that Eitingon highly valued Beria, who by this time had been arrested and shot, and said that this was my name, added to confirm the authenticity of the message being sent.

The time was already late, eleven in the evening, and Stalin invited Beria and me to stay for dinner. I remember the food was the simplest. Stalin, joking about the fact that I do not drink, suggested that I try Georgian wine mixed with Lagidze sparkling water. This water was daily delivered to him by plane from Georgia.

Contrary to what they write about it now, Stalin was not at all furious because of the unsuccessful attempt on Trotsky's life. If he was angry, he masked it well. Outwardly, he looked calm and ready to complete the operation to destroy his enemy, putting the fate of the entire agent network surrounded by Trotsky at stake.

Eitingon later told me that Ramon Msrkader

volunteered for the task himself, using the knowledge he had gained during the guerrilla war in Spain. During this war, he learned not only to shoot, but also mastered the technique of hand-to-hand combat. Considering that our people at that time did not have special equipment at their disposal, Mercader was ready to shoot, stab or kill the enemy by striking with a heavy object. Karidad gave her son her "blessing". When Eitingon and she met with Ramon to analyze the security system at Trotsky's villa and choose the murder weapon, they came to the conclusion that it was best to use a mountaineer's knife or small ice ax: firstly, they are easier to hide from the guards, and secondly, these murder weapons are silent, so that no one from the home environment has time to run to the rescue. Physically Ramon was strong enough. It was also important to put forward a suitable motive for the assassination in order to compromise

Trotsky and thus discredit his movement. The murder was supposed to look like an act of personal revenge on Trotsky, who allegedly tried to dissuade Sylvia Agsloff from marrying Mercader. If Mercader were captured, he should state that the Trotskyists intended to use the funds donated by him for personal purposes, and not at all for the needs of the movement, and report that Trotsky tried to persuade him to join an international terrorist organization that aimed to kill Statn and other Soviet leaders .

On a winter evening at the beginning of 1969, I met Ramon Mercadser at Eitingon's apartment, then we went to dinner at the restaurant of the House of Writers in Moscow. Almost three decades have passed since we last met. And only now Ramon was able to tell me in full detail about what happened on August 20, 1940.

At a meeting with his mother and Eitingon at a **safe** house in Mexico City, Eitingon, according to Ramon, proposed the following: while Mercader was at Trotsky's villa, Eitingon himself, Caridad, and a group of five militants would attempt to break into the villa. A shootout with the guards will begin, during **which** Mercader will be able to eliminate Trotsky. Mercader did not agree with this

plan and convinced him that one would carry out the death sentence. Contrary to what has been written

about the assassination itself, Ramon did not close his eyes before hitting Trotsky on the head with a small, sharp ice pick that was hidden under his raincoat. Trotsky sat at his desk and read Mercader's article written in his defense. As Mercader prepared to strike, Trotsky, absorbed in reading the article, turned his head slightly, and this changed the direction of the blow, weakening its strength. That is why Trotsky was not killed immediately and screamed for help. Ramon was confused and could not stab Trotsky, although he had a knife with him. "Imagine, after all, I went through a guerrilla war and

stabbed a sentry on a bridge with a knife during the Spanish Civil War, but Trotsky's cry literally paralyzed me," Ramon recalled.

When Trotsky's wife ran into the room with bodyguards, Mercader was knocked down and unable to use his pistol. However, this turned out not to be necessary. Trotsky died the next day in the hospital.

"I was knocked down with the butt of a pistol by one of Trotsky's bodyguards. Then my lawyer used this episode to prove that I was not a professional killer. I adhered to the version that I was guided by love for Sylvia and that the Trotskyists squandered the funds that I donated to their movement and tried to involve me in terrorist activities, Mercader later explained. - I did not deviate from the agreed version: my actions are caused by purely personal motives. According to the original plan, it was assumed that Trotsky would be killed

quietly and Ramon would be able to quietly leave - after all, Mercader regularly visited the villa and the guards knew him well. Eitingon and Caridad, who were waiting for Ramon in a car not far from the villa, were forced to hide when an obvious commotion began in the house. First they

fled to Cuba, where Caridad, using her family connections, managed to go underground. Grigulevich fled from Mexico City to California - there

few people knew him.

The first message came to Moscow through TASS channels. Then, a week later, Eitingon sent a coded radio message from Cuba, again via Paris. It was officially announced to the father that they were satisfied with the people of Eitingon and their work at the top, but the participants in the operation would be awarded only after returning to Moscow. As for my father, he was too busy at that moment with our affairs in Latvia to think further about the Trotsky affair. Beria asked him if Caridad, Eitingon and Grigulevich managed to escape and hide safely. He replied that they had a good hiding place unknown to Mercader. Mercader was arrested as Frank Jackson, a Canadian businessman, and his real name of the authorities is not

known for six years.

My father, at one point in the preparations for the assassination attempt at a meeting in Paris, gave Ramon and his mother advice: "If any of you are caught, start a hunger strike in prison, but at the same time try not to arouse unnecessary suspicions in your jailers. At first, eat less and less each time, preparing for a complete rejection of food. In the end, they will begin artificial feeding, and the investigation period will stretch for an indefinitely long time, and passions will cool down. This is what you will need." Mercader went on a hunger strike for two or three months, during the investigation he

claimed that he was one of Trotsky's angry supporters. He was beaten twice a day by members of the Mexican special services - and this went on for six years until his true name was revealed. In addition, he was kept all this time in a cell where there was no window.

Beria announced his decision to spare no means to protect Mercader. The lawyers had to prove that the murder was committed on the basis of squabbles and internal discord in the Trotskyist movement. Eitingon and Caridad were ordered to remain underground. They spent six months in Cuba, and then sailed to New York, where Eitingon used his contacts in the Jewish community to get new documents and passports. Together with Caridad, he crossed America and ended up in Los Angeles, and then in San

Francisco. Eitingon took the opportunity to renew contacts with two agents he and Serebryansky had sent to California in the early 1930s, who took over the duties of liaison to the illegal spy ring that had mined American nuclear secrets from 1942 to 1945. In February 1941, Eitingon and Caridad sailed for China by steamer. In May 1941, just before the start of the Great Patriotic War, they returned to Moscow from Shanghai along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The identity of Mercader, as **mentioned above, the secret services managed** to establish only after one of the prominent figures **of the Spanish** Communist Party, who was **in** Moscow before his escape, defected to the West **in** 1946 . By the way, this man was a distant **relative** of Fidel Castro. Caridad **bears** part of the blame for the information leak . During the war, Ramon's mother **was evacuated from** Moscow **to** Tashkent, where she **lived from** 1941 to 1943 . It was there that she told her friend **that** Ramon had killed Trotsky. Caridad was convinced **that** he would keep what he said **a** secret. After the end of the

Second World War, Caridad repeatedly tried to obtain the release of Ramon, even offered to find a wife for him, but Stalin opposed this plan, since Ramon's personality still attracted a lot of attention. Caridad went to Mexico, then to Paris, took all measures for the early release of her son.

When the Mercader dossier was brought to Mexico from the Spanish police archives, his identity was established, it became pointless to deny it. In the face of irrefutable evidence, Frank Jackson admitted that he was in fact Ramon Mercader and comes from a wealthy Spanish family. But he never admitted that he killed Trotsky on the orders of Soviet intelligence. In all his open statements, Mercader invariably emphasized the personal motive for this murder. Ramon's conditions in prison

immediately improved after the defector's real name was revealed, and he was even allowed to make occasional forays into Mexico City, where he could dine in a restaurant with his jailer. The woman who looked after Ramon in prison fell in love with him and now

visited weekly. He later married her and brought her with him to Moscow when he was released from prison on August 20, 1960. He served twenty years in prison.

Until 1960, Ramon had never been to Moscow. Lived here in 1939 —1942 his fiancée, who died of tuberculosis.

In Moscow, Mercader was received by KGB chairman Shelepin, who presented him with the Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. However, when some time later Mercader asked for a meeting with the new KGB chairman Semichastny, he was denied. By special decision of the Central Committee of the party and at the personal request of Dolores Ibarruri (Pasionaria), Mercader was hired as a senior researcher at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. In addition, he and his wife were given a state dacha in Kratov, near Moscow. Mercader received money from the Central Committee and from the KGB. In sum, this was equal to the pension of a retired major general. However, his relations with the KGB remained quite tense throughout the 60s: he did not stop demanding first from Shelepin, and then from Semichastny that Eitingon and Sudoplatov be immediately released from prison. He raised this issue with both Dolores Ibarruri and Suslov. The oldest member of the Politburo, Suslov, was not touched by this intercession, moreover, in angry annoyance at the fact that Mercader allowed himself to address him personally, he told Mercader: "We decided for ourselves the fate of these people once and for all. Don't poke your nose into other people's business." At first,

Mercader lived in the Leningradskaya Hotel near the Leningradsky railway station, and then received a four-room apartment without any furnishings near the Sokol metro station. Of those who were once associated with Mercader at work, Vasilevsky remained the only one who was not subjected to repression, although he was expelled from the party. He stood up for Mercader - and furniture was provided for his new apartment. Mercader's wife, Roquel Mendoza, worked as an announcer in the Spanish edition of Moscow Radio. In 1963, they adopted two children: a twelve-year-old boy, Arthur, and a six-month-old girl, Laura. Their parents were friends of Mercader. His father, a participant in the Spanish Civil War, fled to Moscow after the defeat of the Republicans, and later, returning to

home as an illegal agent, was captured by the Francoists and shot. Mother died in Moscow during childbirth. Mercader

was a professional revolutionary and was proud of his role in the struggle for communist ideals. He did not repent that he had killed Trotsky:

"If I had to relive the forties, I would do everything I did, but not in today's world. No one can choose the time in which you live.

In the mid-70s, Mercader left Moscow for Cuba, **where he was** an adviser to Castro. He died **in** 1978. **His body** was secretly delivered to Moscow. **Mercader's** widow tried to contact my father, but **he** was not in Moscow at the time. Eitingon **attended** the funeral ceremony. Mercader was buried at the Kuntsevo cemetery. There he rests under the name of Ramon **Ivanovich** Lopez, Hero of the Soviet Union. It is quite clear that today's

moral principles are incompatible with the cruelty that characterizes both the period of the struggle for power that follows the revolutionary upheaval and the Civil War. Stalin and Trotsky opposed each other, resorting to criminal methods to achieve their goals, but the difference is that in exile Trotsky opposed not only Stalin, but also the Soviet Union as such. This confrontation was a war of annihilation. Stalin and his entourage could not treat Trotsky in exile simply as an author of philosophical writings. He was an active enemy of the Soviet state.

Life has shown that the hatred of Stalin and the leaders of the CPSU (b) for political degenerates and rivals in the struggle for power was justified. The decisive blow to the CPSU and the Soviet Union was dealt precisely by a group of former party leaders. At the same time, these figures masked the initial narrowly selfish interests of the struggle for power with the slogans borrowed from Trotsky "the fight against bureaucracy and the domination of the party apparatus."

Trotsky's son, Lev Sedov, who bore his mother's surname, was under constant surveillance by Soviet state security agencies. He was the main organizer of the Trotskyist movement in Europe after he came to Paris from Turkey in 1933. Soviet

foreign intelligence had in Paris two intelligence outlets independent of each other. In one, the leading role was played by Zborovsky (underground nickname Etienne, aka Tulip). About him in detail ® A.

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wrote Volkogonov. The other was headed by Serebryansky, Zborovsky brought to the trail of Trotsky's archives, and Serebryansky, using the information received, seized these archives hidden in Paris and secretly delivered them to Moscow. He did this with the help of his agent Harry, who was in Paris, and an agent who worked in the French police. In the book Trotsky, Volkogonov

claims that the archives were taken out by Zborovsky, when in fact he had no idea how the information he obtained was used. Volkogonov also writes that Zborovsky helped kill Sedov, who was in a French hospital at the time. Trotsky's son, as you know, did die in February 1938 under very mysterious circumstances, after an appendicitis operation.

It is only known for certain that Sedov died in Paris, but neither in his dossier nor in the materials on the Trotskyist International was found any evidence that it was a murder. My father said that if Sedov had been killed, then someone would have to receive a government award or could claim it. At the time in question, there were many accusations against the intelligence service, which allegedly attributed non-existent laurels to itself for the elimination of prominent Trotskyists, but no details or examples were given. It is generally accepted that Sedov fell victim to an operation carried out by the NKVD. Meanwhile Shpigelglas, reporting to Yezhov about Sedov's death in Paris, mentioned only the natural cause of his death. Yezhov, however, commented on the message with the words: "Good operation! Good job, huh?" Spiegelglas had no intention of arguing with the people's commissar, who tried to attribute the merit of the "murder" of Sedov to his department and personally reported this to Stalin. This contributed to the NKVD being held responsible for Sedov's death.

When the father and Eitingon discussed with Beria the plan to liquidate Trotsky, the elimination of his son was never mentioned. It is easy to assume, of course, that Sedov was killed, but personally I am not inclined to believe this. And the reason is the simplest. Trotsky unconditionally trusted his son, so he was closely monitored

from our side, and this made it possible to receive **information** about the plans of the Trotskyists to send agents and propaganda materials to the Soviet Union through Europe. Its destruction would lead to the loss of control over information about Trotskyist operations in Europe.

I would like to continue this chapter not only of ours, but also of the global history with evidence of what **is called** "third parties", namely the memoirs **of the outstanding** Mexican artist Siqueiros, taken **by me** from his book "They Called Me the Dashing **Colonel**: Memories", translated by the Moscow Politizdat in 1986. The fact is that the story **of Siqueiros** is repeatedly and closely intertwined with **the memories** of my father, who was also a direct participant in those events.

It all started back in Spain, when the USSR learned that General Cardenas, yielding to the requests of Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo, especially Frida Kahlo, at that time a convinced Trotskyist, agreed to grant asylum to Leon Trotsky in Mexico. In Moscow, this caused terrible indignation, which directly affected the attitude towards the Mexicans who fought against fascism in Spain in various positions - from brigade commanders to company commanders. The great sympathy for Mexico in the early stages of the struggle against the Francoist rebels and gratitude for the weapons that the Mexican government provided to the republican government of Spain were replaced by general indignation, from which the Mexicans suffered first of all.

Carlos Contreras, commissar of the army corps and organizer of the famous 5th regiment, General Kleber, a famous Austrian commander during the Spanish war, and D. A. Siqueiros, who then had the rank of lieutenant colonel and commanded the 82nd brigade, who fought near Teruel, were invited to the plenum of the Communist Party of Spain, which took place in Valencia. Siqueiros recalled how they sat together in the meeting room and waited

that Pasionaria (Dolores Ibarruri) will make a speech at the opening and, of course, say words of gratitude to the countries that have supported the Spanish people in their struggle against fascism.

"The appearance of Pasionaria caused a real ovation. When the room quieted down, she began to speak. And indeed, she began by **saying: "The first aid to the Spanish people in their mortal battle with fascism was provided by the first country of victorious socialism - the Soviet Union." We all stood up and enthusiastically applauded this announcement. Which country will be named next? The question was clearly visible on all faces. Therefore, during a short pause in Pasionaria's speech, all those present turned in my direction and were already preparing to applaud me, or rather Mexico. After all, the second most important political and material assistance, as we then believed, undoubtedly, was provided by Mexico. Spanish women, both at the front and in the rear, wore bracelets and medallions made from empty Mexican cartridge cases. Soldiers proudly displayed their Mexican-made Mausers. We thought that Pasionaria would continue his speech with the words: "Secondly, let's thank Mexico, the country of Lázaro Cárdenas." But Pasionaria went on listing countries that had helped Republican Spain, and Mexico was never named."**

Siqueiros, like many of his associates in the Spanish war, considered the indignation of the Spanish communists with the actions of the Mexican government in general and Lázaro Cárdenas in particular, which allowed Trotsky to set up his headquarters in Mexico and direct the struggle against the Soviet Union from there, completely justified. This headquarters, given the development of the internal political situation in the country, would inevitably turn into a potential ally of the United States government, even if its leaders did not want it. New events only aggravated the awkward situation in which,

for the reasons already mentioned, the Mexican participants in the war in Spain found themselves. Once, as a liaison officer for Lister, who commanded the famous 5th Regiment, Siqueiros accompanied a group of Soviet officers to the theater, where a grand rally of the working people of Republican Spain was being held.

Soviet officers were greeted with a storm of applause. But when those present learned that a Mexican officer, who had recently taken part in the battles of Maranhosa and Pingarron, had arrived with them, everyone again began to applaud and drum on the backs of chairs, expressing warm sympathy for Mexico. To the comrades of Siqueiros, the Spanish communists who were there, it seemed superfluous: "The Spanish people should not be deceived - the assistance of Mexico is incomparable in its volume and significance with that provided by the Soviet Union." **"In an indirect form, I was given**

to understand," recalled Siqueiros, **"that I tried not to appear at public events, especially in military uniform, so that a similar situation would not arise again.** During one of his trips to Valencia, Siqueiros wanted to

listen to the speech of the then member of the government, Jesús Hernández, and, having changed into civilian clothes, he went to the meeting. But unexpectedly, one of those present recognized him, exclamations were heard: "Long live Mexico! .. Long live the Mexican and Latin American fighters for the cause of the Spanish people! .." What to do? Siqueiros literally slipped out of the hall and walked away from the theater without listening to the speaker.

"The situation was becoming absurd, something had to be done. I went straight to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain and expressed my opinion with my characteristic vehemence. Is it fair to cool down the great feeling of sympathy that the Spanish people have for Mexico? Is it right for this to remain completely silent about Mexico and not allow the presence of Mexican fighters at public meetings? Doesn't this tactic backfire, because it gives the socialists and especially the anarchists from the FAI (Federation of Anarchists of Iberia) an excellent pretext for the prudent and cunning use of the issue of Mexican aid in their anti-Soviet propaganda? First of all, it is necessary to explain to the Spanish people what is the real significance of the help of one and the other country, what is the true role of each help, given the nature of the political system of each of them; and we Mexicans who came to fight in

Spain, are ready to take the greatest part in this. In order to appreciate the help of the Soviet Union, it is not at all necessary to completely hush up the help of Mexico. The Spanish

Communist Party took these considerations into account and launched appropriate explanatory work among the population. Mexico sent only a small number of Mauser carbines and ammunition to Spain, which were used in the very first months of the war. In addition, this weapon was not provided free of charge, it was paid for by motor launches built at Spanish shipyards for coastal navigation in the Gulf of Mexico. In this case, the Mexican side won more. At the same time, practically all artillery, all tanks, all ships, all aircraft were sent by the Soviet Union. Without the help of the

Soviet Union, any resistance of the republican government would have been impossible, because Germany and Italy helped the enemy, Moroccan units fought on his side, and German aviation made direct flights from its territory to the zone occupied by the Francoists; the high military command of France and England actually acted against the republican government. Trains with military equipment were detained in the Toulouse region and even in the villages closest to the Spanish border, and all this was done with the tacit connivance of the socialists of a number of other countries.

The Mexicans fought in the Republican army in different parts. Each fought where he was sent: Juan B. Gomez commanded the 92nd brigade, his nephew Comandante Antonio Gomez served in some other unit; Ruperto Garcia Arana, having received the rank of commandant, fought in the brigade of Siqueiros; Pujol - in a tank corps near Madrid; Bernabe Barrios, due to his inconsistency and self-will, moved from one part to another; Nestor Sanchez fought in the Polish International Brigade (the only Latin American who fought not in the Spanish, but in the international units). In general, the names of many Mexicans who fought against fascism on the side of the Republican Spain were not known until the message came about their death. Naturally, the Mexicans had to constantly listen to

reproaches against Mexico because of the decision taken by her regarding

Trotsky. Everyone - from top commanders and commissars to ordinary soldiers - asked us the same question: "How to explain that General Lazaro Cardenas, a friend of the Spanish Republic, an outstanding leader of Mexico, could give refuge to Trotsky and thereby actually contribute to his hostile activities against the Soviet

Union — the only force really capable of providing decisive assistance in the struggle against the reactionaries of the whole world?" In

those conditions, it was really a stab in the back, and a strong blow, if we talk about Spain - a country where the people took up arms to defend their democratic institutions and lead their country along the path of social progress. POUM, the Spanish Trotskyist party, which was part of the IV International, whose headquarters was now in Mexico, more precisely, in Trotsky's house, where meetings of this organization were held, together with the anarchists, raised an uprising in the deep rear of the republican army - in Catalonia, or rather in Barcelona, that is, only a few tens of kilometers from the French border. Just at that time, parts of the Spanish Republican

army, including those commanded by the Mexicans (the 46th brigade of Siqueiros at that time defended the bridge at Guadalupe), fought intense battles with the enemy on the fronts. The Trotskyist putsch cost the Republicans five thousand killed in Barcelona alone, and more than thirty thousand fighters were transferred there to suppress the rebellion. Trotsky usually wrote his articles in Excelsior. Then

they were translated and printed in all American newspapers. The theme of his writings was, of course, attacks on the Soviet Union, the Russian revolution, etc. All this testified to the fact that the patronage extended to him by the Mexican government had a much more serious background than it seemed at first. Undoubtedly, such guardianship testified to a certain evolution of the highest Mexican government officials towards anti-Sovietism.

After the theoretical defeat of Proudhonism by the founders of Marxism, the Spanish anarchists, with their unimaginable theoretical confusion, represented the only more or less

a significant "relic of the past" in the work environment; in order to achieve the defeat of the communists, they were even ready to cede the victory to Francoism. This position of the anarchist leaders led them to the path of a monstrous crime against the revolution. This vile betrayal was committed by order from the headquarters of the Trotskyists, located in the Mexican capital, in the Coyoa can region, and guarded by the Mexican police. The letters and telegrams that the Mexicans who fought in Spain received on this occasion were blazing with anger and indignation. Siqueiros later recalled that "there was no case that in a conversation with me on the eve and even during the operation I was not asked the same question: "Is the help provided by Mexico sincere? Perhaps the small amount of weapons sent by Cárdenas serves only as a cover for the support of those anti-communist forces that operate within the Spanish Republican army, which is fighting against international fascism?

Soon an extremely difficult order for all foreigners was issued: to leave Spain. The republican government, having taken this decision - under pressure from outside - hoped to force Franco to withdraw Italian military units, countless Moroccan divisions, etc., from Spanish territory, and the Western countries to stop providing military, financial and other assistance to the rebels. In the hope of this, it was decided to disband the international brigades and even withdraw from the front the Latin American officers who commanded the Spanish units.

Siqueiros then made an entry in his diary: "It was to this circumstance that we, the surviving Mexicans, were obliged to come together for the first time on Spanish soil. We constantly asked each other the same question: "Can we allow Trotsky to sit in Mexico under the tutelage of the government, and even such a government headed by General Cardenas and whose Minister of the Interior is Don Ignacio Garcia Telles, then are there people whose views on some issues were close to our views and the views of those who fought in Spain? It was there and then that we swore an oath of honor to put an end to this disgrace at all costs. We must do this in the name of the Spanish people, with

whose blood was mixed with the blood shed by us, in the name of the vital interests of Mexico and the development of the Mexican revolution.

When we arrived in Mexico, we saw for ourselves what we knew from the reports that reached us. Diego Rivera sheltered Trotsky in his house and turned this house into a real fortress. There the members of the so-called

IV International, who came from all over the world, but most often from the United States. And what is extremely symptomatic, Diego Rivera agreed to take the post of head of the propaganda campaign in support of the candidacy of Almasan and managed to win over to his side Don Ramon P. Denegri, who enjoyed special authority among the "leftists". In order to get to Pozoblanco, the Estremadura town, where the

command post of the 8th army, which included military units under the command of Siqueiros, was located, it was necessary to pass through Valsequillo, where the 92nd mixed brigade was stationed, commanded by his compatriot Juan B Gomez. This circumstance allowed the Mexican officers to sometimes get together and discuss their Mexican affairs.

"This time," recalled Siqueiros, "our exchange of opinions was given a special drama by a terrible event: a rebellion in Barcelona, organized by the POUM and leading to great loss of life. This tragedy brought us all literally to white heat. What we had previously discussed somewhat abstractly, suddenly acquired a completely concrete shape. "Come what may," we said, "but Trotsky's headquarters in Mexico must be

destroyed, even if it were necessary to resort to violence." But to make it easier to implement our plans, it was necessary to expand the composition of the group at the expense of Argentines, Brazilians, Colombians, Cubans and other Latin Americans who arrived in Spain, since they all spoke

Spanish.

Juan B. Gómez, Ruperto Garcia Arana, Antonio Gómez and myself took an oath to carry out our decision upon our return to Mexico; in other words, one colonel, one lieutenant colonel (I) and two

major. We still had to discuss the details, each of us gave the word of honor. However, when will this decision be implemented? Naturally, until the end of the war, which, as we hoped, would end with the victory of the Republican Spain, this was out of the question. And if the war drags on, one of us will have to make a short trip to Mexico to try to fulfill our oath with the help of civilians. The forced departure from Spain brought us Mexicans together. By

order of the higher authorities, we were to assemble in Barcelona and prepare to leave the country.

We found ourselves on a part of Spanish territory cut off by the enemy, that is, behind Valencia and Teruel, along the line of which the Francoists broke through to the Mediterranean Sea, and we had to get out of the encirclement in full view of the enemy who had taken the coast. We left on speedboats under heavy machine-gun and cannon fire, not to mention the bombing of enemy aircraft. Then all the Mexicans

who survived the Spanish war gathered in Paris. I was placed in charge of a Mexican group of ex-Republican fighters. Fifty-four men boarded the ship at Le Havre, but on the way we had to be delayed by repairs to the ship at Southampton, which enabled us to spend a few days in London. Then, after a long journey, we called at the Canadian port of Halifax. Then - New York, where we were met by crowds of demonstrators, supporters of Republican Spain. But I can't hold a rally, because we, the Mexican Republican fighters, were forbidden to stay in this city. We spent several days in Tricornia, and then, at the request of the President of Mexico, General Cardenas, we were put on a bus, and under the vigilant supervision of American police agents, our long journey across the United States began, marked by many incidents. I especially remember the episode in the city where we were almost lynched for such a serious crime as disregarding the rules of racial segregation. And it happened like this: when all

we wanted to enter the nearest public toilet, its employees blocked the way for the most "black" of us. Then, in protest, we decided: "We are all going to the black toilet," but this seemed to them even more insulting. The visitors of the restaurant at the bus station tried to force us to push in different directions: "whites" - to the left, "blacks" - to the right. The skirmish ended in our victory, and we en masse entered the Negro toilet. But when we came out, we saw a huge crowd of indignant whites who were going to deal with us and would certainly have done it if the policemen accompanying us had not received almost a whole company of local peace officers in reinforcements.

During the trip, we, those who agreed to liquidate Trotsky's headquarters, decided not to let any of our other comrades and companions into our plans, except for David Serrano - Chivo. When discussing this issue, we always tried to retire.

However, in Mexico, we realized that we had no other choice but to tell other former Republican fighters about everything, although not everyone inspired us with absolute confidence, and even those who did not return from Spain with us, such as, for example, Nestor Sanchez. Naturally, the "left" political parties, in particular the Mexican Communist Party, could not and should not have known anything about our plans. We understood that if the leadership of the Communist Party found out about our intentions, it would not only oppose, but also strongly forbid us such violent actions. It is well known that Marxism-Leninism has always opposed such acts of violence as a putsch or any kind of attempt on a person, even indirect ones, as in our case. Marxism-Leninism sees its main strength in the actions of the organized masses, beginning with an open, peaceful protest and ending with an armed uprising, if circumstances so require. Individual acts or performances of small groups, even those of a heroic nature, but contrary to the principles of discipline, are completely excluded. Such methods are inherent in anarchism and above all

nihilism. History confirms that such actions only harm the struggle of the masses.

But we could not renounce the oath we swore in the face of our comrades who fell in Spain; all too vivid were the memories of the dastardly murders in Barcelona, of that treacherous stab in the back of the Republican army, a stab no doubt planned at Trotsky's headquarters in Coyoacan. Could the armed Trotskyist units in Spain have committed such a heinous crime without the consent or instigation of the Trotskyists who settled in Mexico under the protection of the absurdly interpreted right of political asylum and under the protection of 40 Mexican policemen specially assigned by the Ministry of the Interior, as well as a group of foreigners armed to the teeth in breaking all Mexican laws?

Before resorting to violence, one should, I thought, use all, so to speak, peaceful means of solving the problem. To this end, I decided to talk with the President of the Republic, General Lazaro Cardenas, but, despite our great friendship in 1914-1916, when we were in the same rank and often walked in the same army companies, this representative of the highest authority, knowing that I would ask to cancel the decision to grant asylum to Trotsky in Msk-sik, because I wrote to him about this in my letters and telegrams from Spain, under any pretexts I tried to avoid this meeting.

I tried to get a meeting through Luis I. Rodriguez, the personal secretary of the president, but every time I lost my temper when I heard him constantly: "Wait a little" (unfortunately, in our country it is very common practice to keep a person in a state of constant waiting until finally he patience will not burst and he ceases to bother). Desperate to break through this "door" with my forehead, I turned to the licentiate Ignacio Garcia Telles, the Minister of the Interior. The minister chose a different tactic: he did not argue about whether it was right or wrong to grant asylum to Trotsky, but he did not object to discussing this issue with General Cardenas ... "

It is known that during a meeting with the President, Siqueiros accompanied his demands with a warning that he and his friends would be forced to use force if the issue could not be resolved peacefully. Then General Cardenas (damn him!) suddenly ordered the Minister of Finance to give each of the participants in the struggle in Spain 500 pesos.

“Naturally,” Siqueiros writes, “I spent my pesos primarily on bombarding General Cárdenas with telegrams in which I no longer asked, but demanded that “Trotsky’s counter-revolutionary headquarters in Mexico” be closed, but all this did not bring any success.

We were beginning to lose all patience. It was during this period that Trotsky increasingly began to publish articles of a clearly anti-Soviet nature in the most reactionary newspapers in the United States; in particular, he placed a whole series of his writings in various newspaper editions of Hearst. The Mexican Excelsior reprinted these materials along with the most important editorials.

At the same time, we noticed how the influence of Trotsky and his team on the internal political situation in Mexico increased, which was largely facilitated by the activities of Diego Rivera and Tuerto Hidalgo. The Almasanists have clearly stepped up their protests against a potential successor to Cárdenas as president of the republic. At first, the Trotskyists, like most Mexicans, believed that the candidate for the presidency of the republic, the “dark horse”, as the people say, would be General Francisco X. Mujica, a man, at first glance, even more radical than Cárdenas, but, undoubtedly, not without whose participation the president decided to grant asylum to Trotsky in Mexico.

According to rumors, the "Trotskyist evolution" of General Mujica was primarily the result of Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo's long political influence on him. Perhaps Tuerto Hidalgo played a significant role in this. However, I have not been in my homeland for a long time, and therefore it is difficult for me to say with absolute certainty what influenced Mujica's position. When Cardenas nominated not Mujica, but Avila Camacho as a candidate for the presidency,

then Trotsky, together with Rivera, Hidalgo, and later with Ramon Denegri, came out in support of Almasan. Diego Rivera was appointed, as I have already mentioned, the leader of the election campaign of the Almasanists in the struggle for the government of the country, and don Ramón, like Hidalgo himself, became an active organizer of this campaign.

All this convinced us even more that Trotskyism, not only by propagating anti-communist was engaged ideas, but actually their anti-Soviet And turned into a counter-revolutionary movement both internationally and nationally. Thus, it became necessary to accelerate the implementation of our intention regarding the headquarters of Trotsky in our country, led, as we were sincerely convinced then, by representatives of the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist circles of the national bourgeoisie. But what to do? All participants in the war in Spain, who sought the liquidation of Trotsky's headquarters in Mexico, understood that any of their actions would be considered illegal. Then they decided to split into several groups so that none of the groups knew about the composition of the others. The group leader had to know only the members of his group, each of the groups had a certain specific task. The main goal of the whole operation was as follows: to seize all the documents if possible, but at all costs to avoid bloodshed. The participants in the attack on Trotsky's villa had already come to the conclusion that the death of Trotsky or one of his accomplices would not only not stop the development of Trotskyism as an international movement, the anti-Soviet and anti-communist character of which had already been clearly defined, but would have the opposite effect. However, they faced the same difficult question: how to implement their plan?

“From the very beginning,” continues Siqueiros, “we believed that even if we did not manage to succeed and obtain documentary evidence, first of all, regarding the amounts that Trotsky and his most prominent henchmen received from the owners of ultra-reactionary US newspapers, mainly from the Hearst concern, nevertheless, the scandal caused by our actions will be another powerful pressure on

the Cárdenas government and force him to ban Trotsky's headquarters in Mexico. We were

further strengthened in our intentions when we learned that General Cardenas had finally come to a negative assessment of Trotskyism and the recognition of the socialist character of the Soviet state. In carrying out the operation conceived by us, the first task was to disarm the Mexican police, without which we would not have been able to penetrate the shelter of Trotsky, who turned his house really into a fortress, erecting a high fence around it and illuminating all the approaches to it. For the Mexican police, a small room was built near the eastern corner of the fence, where an alarm system was installed in case of an alarm, and four booths, which were also equipped with alarm devices, at each corner of the house. In planning the operation to disarm the Mexican police, we agreed that if it failed, we would

retreat, making as much noise as possible with firearms, but trying - as was firmly agreed - in no case to hurt anyone. We discussed the details of the operation with the help of "anonymous" letters, "anonymous" because we did not know the commanders of the respective groups and even the methods used to obtain information. However, we have learned that the leader of the group assigned to enter the house managed to ferret out the secret of the system by which the Trotskyist thugs opened the door and identified the visitors. I think it was the Mexican police themselves who blabbed about it, having, as it happens, "on the hook" of our women. I also think that we learned about a kind of barricades built inside the residence from small sandbags from the conversations of the foreign bandits themselves with the Mexican gendarmes during their joint drinking. And by presenting more or less accurately the plan of the house, the person responsible for carrying out the operation inside it could quite accurately determine the location of the guards.

Having exhausted all our possibilities by peaceful means to put an end to the existence of Trotsky's headquarters in Mexico, we turned to Vicente Lombarda Toledano and the Lombardists. Vicente Lombarda Toledano gave a real theoretical battle to Trotsky in Mexico. It was he who, in our country, sharply, in all directions, rebuffed the endless writings of Trotsky himself and other Trotskyists, especially Trotskyists from the United States. In practice, Vicente Lombarda Toledano did not leave a single statement of Trotsky unanswered, using all possible forms of polemics: reports, speeches, articles.

Who, we thought, former Republican fighters, when they despaired of finding support in the Cardenas camp, could be our "godfather" if not Vicente Lombarda Toledano? Surely he saw Cardenas and had a conversation with him about the activities of the Trotskyists in Mexico, but everything remained the same." The position of

the Mexican authorities, Siqueiros believed, could not be the result of simple bureaucratic stubbornness. Here, as he thought, the influence of other facts could also affect, and most likely - the ideological confusion, political short-sightedness of General Lazaro Cardenas. Perhaps at that time he saw in Trotsky's struggle the usual "family quarrel" and did not see him as a tool in the hands of fascism, on the one hand, and American imperialism, on the other. Of course, Cardenas did not see what Trotskyism could become in the event of a war with fascism. However, there is no doubt that Hitler viewed Trotsky and Trotskyism as a reserve pawn to be used at the right moment - during the war or after it - to "settle accounts with communism." Don't the counter-revolutionaries and imperialists use such notorious people from other countries for their own purposes?

"In a word," writes Siqueiros, "it was no longer a question of "revenging" the former Mexican fighters who fought in the ranks of the Spanish Republican army against the Trotskyists for the dastardly rebellion organized by the POUM in Barcelona, deep in the rear of the Republican front. From now on, it was a question of preventing that furious propaganda that arose from

Trotsky's headquarters, allegedly from a truly Marxist, proletarian position against the Soviet Union. In addition, it has become quite clear to us what services this kind of united "Marxism" could render to the aggression of the imperialist forces against the socialism. possible first country of

Our desire to liquidate this counter-revolutionary political center corresponded to the very dynamics of the development of the international situation, characterized by the growing threat of war, which could break out even before the implementation of our intention, and therefore, we believed, it was justified from beginning to end. This is how the situation developed when we, the participants in the national revolutionary war in Spain, considered that

the time had come to carry out the operation we had planned to capture the so-called Trotsky fortress in the Coyoa-can quarter. The details of this, yet another, our military operation are detailed in fifteen, and possibly more volumes of the trial against us. With regard to the personal participation of Siqueiros in this operation, one can only say that his task was to block the external guard of the Trotsky house, which consisted of thirty-five Mexican policemen armed with Mausers, and he duly completed this task.

During the trial, he, by the way, took revenge that the government of General Cardenas, and specifically, the Minister of the Interior, Licentiate Garcia Telles, bears indirect responsibility for their actions to a large extent. Speaking of this, the militants did not fail to recall his progressive ideological positions in the past. "Poor José Clemente Orozco," Siqueiros remarked with a smile, "how horrified he would be to hear that phrase! For him, it was pure "Marxist jargon".

In all of Siqueiros' testimonies at the trial, as well as in subsequent statements written by him in prison, he always insisted on the justice of the political actions carried out by them, pointing to political reasons of a preventive nature and to the regrettable contradictions in which in this case the government of General Cárdenas became entangled, what was at that time

the highest exponent of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution, and, as he saw then, it was just that.

It should also be said that Siqueiros never denied that formally, based on the legislation in force at that time in the country, his participation in the attack on Trotsky's house on May 24, 1940 was certainly a crime. For this, he spent a long time in prison, over three years in exile, lost a large amount of money deposited as bail, and was subjected to insulting attacks in the outside world. This is how Siqueiros assessed his participation in the attack on Trotsky's house and did not grumble at fate. Naturally, the memoirs of Siqueiros are not the only description of the events connected with the assassination attempt on Trotsky. This topic has

been open for decades and, although it would seem that it has already been studied in detail, it becomes relevant again when the official ideology changes in a country, when a particular society rethinks its own history. Here is how, in the post-Soviet era, the Russian historian Fyodor Razzakov tries to investigate the assassination of Trotsky from a post-perestroika perspective:

“In early February 1938 ... in Paris, with a diagnosis of appendicitis, the son of Leon Trotsky, thirty-two-year-old Lev Sedov, went to the hospital. The operation was successful, and the patient was waiting for discharge from day to day. However, four days after the operation, there was a sudden deterioration in the patient's health. A new operation was urgently carried out, but it did not bring success. February 16, 1938 Lev Sedov died. Many then associated this death with the intrigues of the NKVD. Lev Sedov was the most active assistant to Leon Trotsky, and this, no doubt, irritated Moscow. Therefore, it was decided to remove L. Sedov. The action to eliminate him was entrusted to the agent of the Foreign Department, Pavel Sudoplatov. This order followed immediately after Sudoplatov on May 23, 1938 in Rotterdam personally blew up the leader of the Ukrainian

nationalists Yevgeny Konovalts.

Meanwhile, after the death of his son, the threat hung over his father - Leon Trotsky ...

In the same February 1939, when Lev Sedov died in Paris, L. Trotsky in Mexico received a letter from the United States from the former NKVD major ... Alexander Orlov. In his message, A. Orlov wrote that after the elimination of L. Sedov, the murder of L. Trotsky himself was put on the agenda of the NKVD. "The main thing, Lev Davidovich," wrote A. Orlov, "be on guard, do not trust any man or woman whom the provocateur can send you or recommend." As subsequent events showed, A. Orlov was absolutely right in his warnings. However, L. Trotsky himself did not take them into account. All of the above practically

did not add anything new to the story of the assassination of Trotsky, just like the subsequent narrative, only with individual nuances, shades, completes the overall picture of this event. "The plan for the assassination of L.

Trotsky," it says further, "the NKVD began to work out in detail in 1938. For its implementation, a career Soviet intelligence officer, P. Sudoplatov's deputy, Naum Eitingon, was sent to Barcelona, who had a mistress in this city - a very popular woman in Barcelona, the mother of five children, Caridad Mercader (Eitingon met with her back in the Spanish war in 1936). One of the children of this woman, Ramon Mercader, was initially assigned a certain, although not the main role in the plans of the NKVD. However, in the future, fate decreed otherwise. In the summer of 1938, the NKVD sent Ramon Mercader to Paris, where he was

to make acquaintance with two Trotskyites, the Ageloff sisters. Meetings of the Fourth International were then held in Paris, so finding sisters for Mercader was not difficult. Introducing himself to them as Jacques Mornard, the son of a Belgian diplomat, Mercader immediately attracted the attention of one of the sisters, Sylvia Ageloff. Sylvia came to Mexico from time to time as a courier, working as L. Trotsky's secretary. Being lonely, Sylvia willingly accepted the courtship of a handsome young man, whose only drawback she considered was that he had little interest in politics. The young spent several months together, during which Mercader littered with money and arranged

his beloved grand parties. Then they parted for a while, as Sylvia was forced to leave for the United States on business. However, the separation did not last long. In February 1939, Mercader visited Sylvia in New York. He was carrying a fake Canadian passport in the name of Frank Jackson. To Sylvia's surprised remark about this, Mercader replied that he had gone on a forgery so that he would not be taken to military service in Belgium. Sylvia was quite satisfied with this explanation. Of course, she did not want to let her lover go to

the army at such an alarming time. In the same February 1939, Leon Trotsky changed his next refuge. Prior to that, for two years he lived in Coyoacán, in the Blue House of the famous artist, former member of the Mexican Communist Party, Diego Rivera. Rivera literally idolized Trotsky, and when he arrived in Mexico in January 1937, the artist immediately offered him his shelter. Trotsky agreed. True, he soon repaid Rivera with black ingratitude. The fact is that Rivera had a beautiful wife - Frida Callo. In the same year, Trotsky began an intimate relationship with her. And although their secret meetings took place on the hacienda San Miguel, one hundred and thirty kilometers from Mexico City, rumors about them reached first Trotsky's wife Natalia Sedova, and then Diego Rivera. Relations between men deteriorated. Trotsky broke off contact with Frida, but a chill of

estrangement between him and the owner of the house persisted. And finally, in February 1939, their friendship finally fell apart. After that, L. Trotsky and his wife left and rented a house on Aven ila Viena, on the outskirts of Coyoacan. This house was quite old and did not meet the requirements of security. Therefore, Trotsky's guards immediately after the entrance began to strengthen him . An observation tower was placed at the gate, sandbags were placed against the walls and an alarm system was installed. Five police officers guarded the house outside around the clock, the remaining ten guards were on duty inside the h

neighbors, wandering around without protection near the house. The guards always reprimanded him for such actions, and Trotsky eventually finally resigned himself to the position of a recluse.

His rare trips were always surrounded by deep secrecy. In the car, Trotsky was usually accompanied by his wife, driver, and security guard. However, these trips had to be stopped when a message came from Romania about the assassination of the country's prime minister, Armand Calinescu. It happened on September 21, 1939. A. Calinescu became prime minister of Romania quite recently, having previously been the country's interior minister. IN

In 1939, he ordered mass arrests of fascist legionnaires, after which many of them were shot. This cost the life of the new prime minister. On September 21, when he was driving in a car to a meeting of the Council of Ministers, a cart suddenly blocked the road on one of the streets of Bucharest. At the moment when the Prime Minister's chauffeur applied the brakes, nine terrorists jumped out of a car parked around the corner of a neighboring house and literally riddled the Prime Minister's car with pistols. A. Cylinescu was killed on the spot. After that, the terrorists broke into the building of the central radio station and announced to the whole country that they, the legionnaires of St. Michael the Archangel, had just killed the country's prime minister and took power into their own hands. However, the legionnaires did not succeed in enjoying power. Literally a few minutes after the broadcast, they were detained by the police. All nine were brought to the scene of the murder of A. Cylinescu and shot in front of the crowd. The dead bodies were not removed during the night and the next day, as if as a warning to future terrorists... A.

Cylinescu became the second Prime Minister of Romania in the 30s, who was killed by terrorists. The first was Ion Duca, who was shot dead on the platform of the Sinai railway station on December 29, 1933.

Meanwhile, by 1940, Stalin had destroyed all his political opponents, those with whom he carried out the October coup in 1917. G. Zinoviev, N. Bukharin, A. Rykov, L. Kamenev, A. Bubnov, G. Sokolnikov, M. Tomsy, N. Krestinsky, Ya. until 1924) composition of the Politburo. By 1940 alive

I. Stalin, M. Kalinin, V. Molotov and L. Trotsky remained from that composition. Neighborhood with the latter irritated Stalin most of all. After all, Trotsky, even expelled from the USSR, thrown out, it would seem, from politics, continued his struggle with Stalin, wrote a book about him. And at the end of April 1940, Trotsky composed a "Message to the Soviet Workers, Peasants, Soldiers and Sailors", in which he declared: "Your newspapers lie to you in the interests of Cain-Stalin, his corrupt commissars, secretaries and agents of the GPU ... The shameful deeds of Stalin deprive the Soviet Union of sympathy abroad, isolate it and strengthen its enemies. These crimes are the main source of danger for the Soviet Union..."

Apparently,

this message hastened the tragic denouement in the fate of L. Trotsky. The Soviet state security intensified its actions to eliminate it. In this regard, Ramon Mercader was given the task of infiltrating Trotsky's house on Avenida Viena. He arrived in Mexico in October 1939, ostensibly to work for one of the export-import firms. While living in Mexico City, Sylvia regularly visited Trotsky, as she worked as his secretary. And Ramon Mercader drove her in his car to the house on Avenida Viena. In March 1940, Sylvia urgently left

for New York. By that time, Mercader was already well known in Trotsky's house, although he had never entered it. Sylvia herself told Trotsky, his wife, and even the guards about him. With the latter, Mercader often whiled away the time on the street, waiting for Sylvia near the car. However, there was no way to enter Trotsky's house. And only in March, when Sylvia left for New York, this opportunity finally presented itself.

The Rosmer family also lived in Trotsky's house. In March, **Alfred** Rosmer fell ill and Mercader-Jackson was asked to drive him to the hospital in his car. And after recovering, Mercader began to bring medicines to Alfred. It was then that he entered Trotsky's house for the first time. He entered not to kill the old man, but for the time being in order to study the situation in the house, to get acquainted with his layout. By that time, the security of the house had been **increased**, although it should be noted that among the guards there were also inexperienced people, one of whom turned out to be a young man named Robert Sheldon Hart.

On the night of May 23, 1940, a group of twenty-six people (it included Iosif Grigulevich, an illegal spy, in the future a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences), led by the famous Mexican artist and communist David Alfaro Siqueiros, attacked Trotsky's outer guard and disarmed it. After that, a prearranged signal was given, and Robert Sheldon Hart opened the gate to the raiders. They penetrated the territory of the house, disarmed the internal guards and, setting up a machine gun on the street, opened fire on the windows of Trotsky's bedroom. During this shelling, about two hundred bullets were fired, and, most surprisingly, not one of them (!) Caused the slightest harm to Trotsky, his wife Natalya, or their grandson Seva.

Having shot in this way from the street and without going inside the house, the raiders left as lightning fast as they came. Half an hour later, the police came to the house, led by Colonel Salazar. And the first thing he thought about when he saw Trotsky and his whole family alive and unharmed: is it all a hoax? After all, why was it easier for the raiders to enter the bedroom of the unarmed owner of the house and calmly shoot him, and not hit the windows with a machine gun, so that they could then leave without even making sure that the one they

were shooting at was alive or not? Meanwhile, Trotsky himself insisted that the raid was the work of Stalin's agents. Many researchers of L. Trotsky's life adhere to the same version. But there is another version. It is based on the fact that Siqueiros, being a friend of Diego Rivera, learned about how Trotsky repaid Rivera for his hospitality, and decided to arrange a demonstrative act of retribution for Trotsky.

After the raid, Trotsky's friends presented him with a bulletproof vest, which, however, he almost never wore. Trotsky disregarded the advice of his guards, who insisted on a thorough search of all persons who entered the house. But he forbade it, not wanting to embarrass his guests. In the end, this complacency cost Leon Trotsky his life.

On May 28, 1940, that is, five days after the raid, Trotsky saw Ramon Mercader for the first time. This meeting was accidental, but not fleeting. Mercader was supposed to transport the Rosmer family from Trotsky's house, and before leaving they arranged a small feast, to which Mercader was invited. After this incident, he

appeared at Trotsky's house again on July 12, but stayed there for only a few minutes. And on July 29, Trotsky and his wife invited Sylvia Ageloff and Ramon Mercader for tea. This meeting lasted about an hour, and at it Mercader showed himself to be an excellent actor. He was moderately shy, moderately apolitical, and mostly talked about mountaineering, which he was fond of. Only twenty-two days remained before the assassination of L. Trotsky.

On August 17, Mercader held a "dress rehearsal" for the upcoming assassination attempt. He came to Trotsky with his article on the situation in France and asked the old man to edit it. Trotsky, knowing that Mercader was taking his first steps in the political arena as a Trotskyist, agreed to devote time to the young man. They retired to Trotsky's office and spent about ten minutes there. As eyewitnesses later said, after this conversation, Trotsky had **some** suspicions about Mercader. However, even this did not **make** Trotsky's household and his guards alert. On August 20, 1940, at about five o'clock in the evening, Trotsky was doing his

favorite thing - feeding rabbits. At this time, Mercader approached him. Despite the heat, he was wearing a hat and overcoat slung over his arm. He brought the article, now corrected, and asked Trotsky to review it again. As Natalya Sedova later said: "Lev Davidovich did not want to part with the rabbits, and he was not at all interested in the article, but, taking control of himself, he said: "Well, what will you say if we go through your article?" Leisurely, he closed the cages, took off his work gloves... He cleaned his blue jacket and slowly silently walked with me and "Jackson" to the house. I accompanied them to the door of Lev Davidovich's office. The door closed and I went into the next room. Entering the office, Trotsky took the papers with the article and sat down at his desk. Mercader stood to the side. When he realized that the old man was carried

away by reading, he took out an ice pick hidden in his clothes and brought it down on Trotsky's head. And he did it extremely clumsily, apparently closing his eyes. Despite the fact that the ice ax pierced Trotsky's skull, in the next second he jumped up from the table and screamed in a wild voice. Mercader clearly did not expect such a turn of events. According to plan he

he had to quietly kill the old man, leave the house and leave in a car that was a hundred meters from the gate of the house (his mother and her lover, NKVD colonel Naum Eitingon, were waiting for him in the car).

The next second, having stopped screaming, Trotsky snatched an ice pick from Mercader's hands and even bit him on the finger. Mercader was in obvious confusion, sluggishly defended himself and did not use the revolver and dagger hidden in his clothes in the fight. Attracted by the noise, the guards ran into the room and began beating him with pistol butts. But Trotsky, who was lying on the floor of his office and supported by his wife, ordered them to stop the beating.

Soon the police, an ambulance, arrived at Trotsky's house. At 19.30 in the hospital he underwent a craniotomy. The wound on his head was two and three-quarters of an inch. The right parietal bone was pierced, fragments pierced into the brain. During the operation, Trotsky lost consciousness and never regained consciousness. August 21 at 19.25 he died.

And Ramon Mercader at that time was interrogated by the police. Interrogated as Frank Jackson (his real name will be revealed to researchers only in 1953). However, these interrogations did not lead to anything, since Mercader presented himself as a lone killer) completely rejecting the involvement of the NKVD in this murder! Subsequently, this will give rise to some historians to consider the reason for the murder of L. Trotsky ... banal jealousy. Like, Mercader was jealous of his beloved Sylvia Ageloff for the old man. Well, knowing about Trotsky's "loving nature", this version cannot be completely dismissed either. So the historian N. Vasetsky, in his annotation to I. Deutscher's book Trotsky in Exile, writes: "Playing on the feeling of revenge on Trotsky of the man insulted by him will take a central place in the chain of measures to prepare for the assassination of Trotsky. This once again suggests that stories like his flirting with Frida were not some kind of emergency in Trotsky's life. Hence the calculation of the future

organizers of his murder. On June 6, 1941, a document of the following content:

"A group of NKVD workers in 1940 successfully completed a special task.

The NKVD of the USSR asks to award six orders of the USSR comrades involved in this task.

I ask for your decision. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria.

Stalin wrote "for" on the document and signed. By a closed decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, signed by Kalinin and Gorkin, the following were awarded: the Order of Lenin - Mercader Karidad Ramonovna and Eitingon Naum Isaakovich; the Order of the Red Banner - Vasilevsky Lev Petrovich and Sudoplatov Pavel Anatolyevich; Order of the Red Star - Grigulevich Joseph Romualdovich and Pastelnyak Pavel Panteleimonovich ...

Ramon Mercader served time in a Mexican prison "from bell to bell". Apparently, on the instructions of the NKVD, he was visited by a previously unfamiliar cabaret artist Roque-lia, who would later become his wife. In the early 60s, Mercader will be released from prison **and** will receive **political** asylum and citizenship in Czechoslovakia. **However**, he will not go there, but will arrive **in Moscow** via Havana **and** Riga and get an apartment on Frunzenskaya Embankment. His **mother**, Caridad Mercader, by that time will live in Mexico (she left the USSR in 1944) **and** will visit one of her most misguided **sons in** Moscow only twice. She will die in France in 1975. Ramon **Mercader** will not outlive his mother by much. Seriously ill, he will beg the Soviet government to let him go to **Cuba**. He died there in 1978. However, his body will be brought to **Moscow** and buried without special honors. One of the main organizers

of the assassination of L. Trotsky, Soviet intelligence officer Naum Eitingon, having lived 82 years, most of which was given to Soviet intelligence, died in May 1981 and was buried at the Donskoy cemetery in Moscow. According to Vladimir Eitingon, the son of a scout, the action to eliminate L. Trotsky was the loudest, but by no means the largest operation of his father. N. Eitingon was a recruiter for Richard Sorge, developed an operation to eliminate Yakov Blumkin in 1929 (the same one who shot the German ambassador V. Mirbach in 1918), worked with Kim Philby, Abel, "atomic intelligence", created a sabotage detachment of Colonel Medvedev, deciphered the German operations "Middle Volga" and "Kremlin", etc. After the death of Stalin, N.

Eitingon was arrested as Beria's man and imprisoned for twelve years. He returned an aged and emaciated man. According to his son, "at the end of his life he had an ordinary pension, wore out old clothes and lived in an ordinary two-room apartment. And nothing was said about his unusual fate and extraordinary personality "(Razzakov F.I. The Age of Terror: Chronicle of Assassinations. M., 1997. P. 87-95).

In the secret correspondence of the Mexican NKGB residency with Moscow, Ramon Mercader went under the pseudonym Troll. The liquidator of Trotsky, who was serving a 20-year term in the Lecumberry prison, really became related to the faceless stone walls of the "black castle". This is how the Mexican artist David Alfaro Siqueiros christened the prison. On May 24, 1940, a battle group of Spaniards and Mexicans literally riddled with bullets the walls of Trotsky's refuge in Coyoacan, but that time providence saved the Old Man.

Siqueiros was captured after a while, but he, the lucky one, was lucky. Mexican President Manuel Avila Camacho "absolved" the artist of his sins on the condition that he leave the country for a long time. Already famous then David Alfaro, without delay, went to the airport and then, changing routes and means of transportation (due to the persecution of the FBI and the threats of the Trotskyists), took refuge in Chile. But Ramon Mercader, who inflicted a fatal blow on Trotsky with an ice ax on August 20 of the same year, was "stuck" in Lecumberry. His lawyer, Eduardo Ceniceros, after many years of effort, managed to "cut off" the client's term by only four months.

Everyone who wrote about Mercader usually wondered why he was not helped to leave ahead of schedule? As a rule, special services do everything possible and impossible to help out their people. What happened? What did not work in the mechanism of such a well-functioning and omnipotent organization?

One of the reasons is obvious. Ten months after the assassination of Trotsky, the Great Patriotic War began. All the efforts of foreign intelligence were focused on providing strategic information to the Soviet leadership and command of the Red Army. Other tasks, no matter how important they may have seemed before June 22, immediately lost priority.

Probably, Ramon himself understood that his patrons from the NKVD were busy with more important issues. Not before him! It is enough that the head of the operation in Mexico City, Nahum Eitingon (Leonid Kotov, Tom), leaving the country, left a kind of "support group", the main task of which was to help the prisoner with money, additional food, in organizing protection against attempts by criminal elements hired by Trotskyists. The necessary funds were also left to Seniceros.

In such a static position, the Mercader case was accepted by Lev Petrovich Tarasov (Vasilevsky), a resident of Soviet intelligence, who arrived in Mexico with the passport of the first secretary of the embassy in May 1943. There is no doubt that among the tasks assigned to him was this one: to rescue the Troll at any cost, who patiently stayed in the "black castle" for the third year, showing no dissatisfaction: he already had to sit in prison casemates in Spain in the early 30s for belonging to the Komsomol and the organization of strikes. But the Mexican experience was harder. More than once he was attacked by criminals, the blades of knives sparkled centimeters from his throat. I had to get guards from the same inveterate criminals, and he himself did not part with a knife-darling. Annoying journalists and publishers harassed him with visits, waiting for the moment when he would relax and be ready to "tell everything". Ramon lost weight because

he suffered from stomach pains. It seemed to him that he was being poisoned on purpose in order to be thrown like a dog into an unmarked grave in the prison cemetery. He yearned to communicate with like-minded people, and visits from "sympathizers" caused him anxiety. Isn't it a trap? The troll had above average intelligence, a flexible psyche that allowed him to grasp the inner mood of the interlocutor, but this also instilled fear in him: you can always make a mistake ... Believe and make a mistake ... After all, Trotsky himself and his entourage were deceived in him!

History of unfinished (unrealized) Mercader escapes
- this is partly the way to atone for his guilt ...

In Moscow, they really remembered Ramon Merkader and his mother. Once, after a short conversation with Pavel Fitin, the head of intelligence, Lavrenty Beria finally made a decision regarding Caridad Mercader: once he asks, he insists - from

countries to release. Let him go. Under reliable supervision. Somewhere away from Europe, for example, to Cuba. Let him wait there for his son.

Signing the report on the business trip of Karidad (**Ki-Ry**), Beria knew that all the anxieties and worries in this matter *would fall* on the shoulders of Fitin and the new Minister of Security V. N. Merkulov. It is useful for him to worry, to lose excess fat. Caridad has a masculine character, she is self-willed, unrestrained in her language, self-centered.

She did not fit into Soviet life: she is too independent. And in the Caribbean latitudes she has the right place. Maybe there will moderate his temperament? Although it is very, very

doubtful ... Caridad del Rio was born in 1892 in Santiago de Cuba. Her father was the governor of the province and entered the history of the island by being the first to give free rein to black slaves. At the beginning of this century, the family moved to Spain. Caridad was sent to the privileged school "Sagrado Corazon de Jesus", where she stood out for her remarkable abilities, good memory and independence. She loved horses and was a brave rider. There were many applicants for her hand, but the choice of Caridad fell on Pablo Mercader Marina from a wealthy family of owners of textile factories in the city of Badalona near Barcelona. He was too kind and gentle in character, which predetermined the future of this married couple. For some time, the beautiful Amazon became a respectable mother, regularly gave birth to children: four sons - Pablo, Ramon, Jorge, Luis and daughter Montserrat. However,

already in the early 20s, she became interested in politics - recklessly, selflessly - and became close to anarchists, bohemians, and rebellious intellectuals. Apparently, not without her consent, the textile factories of the Mercaderes were attacked by "bombists". For her, it was a symbolic act of "breaking with the exploiting classes". For some time, the anarchist was sent to a psychiatric hospital. In 1925, she left her husband and left for France with her children. At first I tried to become a "civilized farmer", but it did not work out. Then a restaurant in Toulouse. Under the influence of failures and disappointments, she tried to commit suicide. Somewhere in 1934-1935, she joined the French Communist Party, foreseeing that it was in the ranks of the Marxists that she would find a way out for the overwhelmed

desire to rebuild the world on the basis of universal justice. In October 1934 she took part in the Barcelona uprising. In 1936, the fiery Karidad attracted the attention of the NKVD...

Preparations for the operation to leave Caridad and her companion, Anna Karataeva (Ines), who, according to cover legend, was the "daughter of Kira," began in the spring of 1944 and took about five months. Without any complications, "Duet" (as they went through operational **correspondence**) overcame the path along the route Moscow - **Vladivostok** - San Francisco - Mexico City. Here a small respite, for two or three days, was supposed, and then the last stage - through Veracruz to Havana. But in **the Mexican** capital there was a failure: Caridad **categorically** refused to

follow on. Yu. A. Markov recalled: "Something similar **was expected of her**. Maternal pain, unbridled feelings, dissatisfaction with our "slowness" in the release of her son pushed her to insubordination. The then resident in Mexico City Tarasov, who knew her from **Spain and** France, had a hard time with Kira. Caridad constantly reproached him with Eitingon, with the swagger **and** efficiency with which Tom carried out the most risky operations. She could not understand that the desperately romantic times in intelligence had passed, **and intelligence officers who** had carte blanche for improvisation had irrevocably gone into the past. Intelligence operations were tightly controlled by the powerful apparatus of the Center, for **which** the intelligence officer was a "strictly accountable" executor. Every serious step was coordinated. They were punished for **improvisation and** gag."

So, Caridad appeared in Mexico City in mid-December 1944. As expected, the "Duet" immediately broke up. Kira refused to meet with Karataeva, with whom she did not find a common language. She generally does not get along well with women, even if it was Dolores Ibarruri, and the constant presence of her companion "from the NKVD" annoyed her, although, according to the plan of the operation's developers, Ines was supposed to act as a Caridad liaison with a "legal" residency in Havana. This would save the outwardly conspicuous Kira from unnecessary risk. Neither Tarasov, nor later Grigory Kasparov, who succeeded him as a resident, overcame the

stubbornness and bitterness of Karidad. Already by Christmas, Ramon's escape from prison was fully prepared by the "support group". He was to b

Veracruz and, after a "preventive" term in a safe house, be transported to Havana on a ship that regularly traveled between these ports. The Cuban passport for Troll was prepared and was waiting in the wings in the resident's safe. Caridad's intrusion into

the operation - there's no other way to say it - was a disaster. It's hard to justify this. She probably wasn't in complete control of herself. The Spaniards who knew Caridad from Moscow later recalled the bouts of hysteria that came over her. The state of overexcitation, mental instability associated with feelings (increasingly intense) for his son, required an exit, relaxation, decisive action to free him. She was filled with rage and anger at everyone involved in the Troll's cause. Without consulting with anyone, neglecting conspiracy, Caridad began to act independently, without understanding the situation, without really discussing the situation with either Tarasov or Kasparov. She decided to rely on the people of Eitingon, many of whom were "frozen" after the operations to eliminate Trotsky. Caridad Mercader was well known in Mexico City. In 1936, the Spanish government sent her here to buy weapons. Negotiations

were held with many influential people, including the country's president, Lázaro Cárdenas, and attracted widespread attention, including the press and secret services. Caridad took part in mass acts of solidarity with the struggle of the Republicans against the fascist rebellion. Together with Lombardo Toledano, a trade union leader, a major politician of the left orientation, she, wearing the protective overalls of an international brigade, walked at the head of the demonstrations. Once in Mexico City again, Caridad could not expect to go unnoticed. The large face of a dramatic actress, the unfemininely stern look of

uncompromising eyes, a stubborn forehead, a confident tread - she was noticed everywhere. "I was always looked at, always singled out from the crowd, all my life," she once admitted to her youngest son Louis. And Mexico City was no exception. Of course, Kira tried to change her appearance: she bleached her hair, cut her hair, went without glasses, updated her wardrobe, not stinting on expensive clothes and shoes. But it hardly helped to disguise. And the absence

glasses and completely made her helpless: she stopped noticing external surveillance behind

her. If the identity of Trotsky's murderer Ramon Mercader - Jacques Mornard - was previously associated with the Soviet Union and the NKVD on indirect grounds, on the principle of "who benefits?" workers inexorably led to the exposure of her son. More and more Spaniards arrived in Mexico City, communicating with Caridad in Moscow, more or less initiated into her past life. They did not forget the Order of Lenin on the lapel of her jacket and guessed what it was for. The Spanish colony in the Soviet capital was like one big family, secrets "leaked out", and rumors about Ramon spread more and more actively. Well, in Mexico City there were no restrictions on "talking": Beria was far away.

And three weeks had not passed since the arrival of Caridad in Mexico City, and the consequences had already affected: the regime of keeping Ramon in prison became stricter, additional guards appeared, more attention was paid to his "visitors". Unfortunately, two criminals escaped from Lecumberry, which forced the authorities to take up a change of personnel. The threat of dismissal affected the existing agreements with a number of guards and prison officials. But Kira continued to act alone. When meeting with Kasparov, she was silent about the nature of her many contacts. One of the first visits to Caridad was made by Martha Meller...

Around the same time, Alvaro Baez, a secret agent of the Security Directorate (UB) of the federal district, became interested in Martha Meller. Let's make a small digression... Baeza

knew that he was terminally ill. The heart attacks he suffered foreshadowed an imminent end. Alvaro treated this gloomy prospect with a fatalism worthy of the son of a Basque and an Indian. In the service, he did his best to hide his ailments: if the next and, it is possible, the last attack happens at work, his wife and children will receive an additional insurance payment for him. But Baeza did

not want to leave life without a trace and therefore decided to leave a kind of "written report" about himself. Say, once upon a time there was a police agent Alvaro Baez, he honestly performed his duty, etc.

Agents don't write memoirs, but he will. Anyone who picks them up and reads them will, as it were, resurrect him, bring him

back from oblivion... This is how the UB agent described the motives that prompted him to take the manuscript to the Grafos printing house in mid-1948. In November he died. According to one of the capital's magazines, death came from

a "break of the heart." In the book *The Price of Crime*, Baeza told a lot of interesting things about himself. Dismissed from the oil fields, Alvaro enlisted in the police, where he began with a minor position as an "auxiliary agent". Then he was transferred to the protection of all the same oil fields, where "for the future" he accumulated information about the abuses of the Americans to conceal income. These materials Baeza handed over to Lazaro Cardenas, who in 1938 nationalized the enterprises of the British and American oil companies. The knowledge of the secret dealings of the Yankees came in handy, and Baeza quickly moved up the ranks. In 1935, he saw Trotsky "live" for the first time: the Mexican was assigned to lead the guards of the "Russian revolutionary" during the September celebrations and was told that he was responsible for the life of this man with his head. The Mexican government took Trotsky's "right of asylum" seriously and tried to keep him out of trouble. Anyone who dared to encroach on a state guest became an enemy of Mexico, worthy of the most severe punishment. In his book, Baeza also mentioned the police agent Agustin

Darca, a former member of the Communist Party of Catalonia, a participant in the Spanish Civil War. This Darka, about six months after Trotsky's assassination, handed over to his police chief a report in which he gave the real name of Jacques Mornard. It turns out that the Catalan knew his family well from Barcelona, and the killer himself - as Ramon Mercader, a Komsomol activist. No one in the police took this information seriously. It was more convenient to be content with the information provided by Sylvia Ageloff, Jacques' fiancée. She knew Mornar's entire "backstory" (from his own words), and the investigation considered this data to be reliable, although for the most part it was "fake".

It was only in 1944 that Baeza remembered Dark's unclaimed message and, in between, for his own amusement, began to check it. Soon, to his **surprise**, he came to

the conclusion that the agent did not invent **Mercader** in order to extract additional **rewards from the UB**. However, Baeza did not contact the Catalan again, because he found out about his work for the FBI in Mexico City. Alvaro began to act through his own channels. His **operational** capabilities were fantastic: he **was introduced** to the elite "presidential intelligence", created on the personal orders of Miguel Alemán. The task of **the group**, which was part of the UB structure for disguise, was to collect information about the political situation in the country. The position allowed Baes to develop Morna-ra- **Merkader** and not report to the head of intelligence, **Lieutenant Colonel** Serrano, about his innocent hobby.

Alvaro soon discovered that another person in Mexico City was showing **a constant** interest in the "Belgian": **Marta** Meller, an elderly Spanish immigrant, a well-known women's rights activist, a journalist **who** was given a job by the Mexican government **in** the Ministry of Education. Meller's intermediary in **maintaining** contact with the prisoner was her thirty-year-old daughter Magda. Martha did not hide her

pro-Soviet views, she was active in publicistic activities, glorifying the power of the Soviet Union and the Red Army. The Spaniard took an active part in the work of the Federation for the Protection of the Interests of Spanish Emigrants (FOARE), which included representatives of various emigrant organizations. The police and the FBI considered FOARE a forge of personnel for Soviet intelligence in Mexico.

Baeza found out that the Spanish and Mexican communists were distrustful of Meller. She was accused of "hidden Trotskyism", "treacherous activity", even in cooperation with German intelligence, which, they say, began back in the First World War, when Martha married a prominent German diplomat who worked in Spain. Baez did not go unnoticed by the

fact that the Spaniard was not invited to receptions at the Soviet embassy: this indirectly confirmed the emigrant gossip about Meller. On the other hand, there were rumors that the journalist's son, Garcia, fought on the side of the Red Army and died in battle. *0 A. Sudoplatov

257 Yes, all riddles, and secret agent Baez tested the pleasure of being able to reveal them. The leaders of the section of the Spanish Communist Party in Mexico did not trust Meller. Rather, they pretended not to trust. She was pressed for a frank confession about the nature of her connection with the NKVD: "You should not have secrets from the party. Everything will remain between us. What exactly do you help the sovietikos in?" True to her word of "non-disclosure," Dona Marta was silent, and the party leaders could not forgive her for this. As a result, Meller was expelled from the party "for Trotskyism". The rumors did the rest. The elderly woman, already painfully experienced this injustice, persistently sought a review of the decision. She repeatedly addressed the Soviet embassy on this issue, and threatened her former party comrades with exposure if she was kept as a political pariah.

About her cooperation with Soviet intelligence, Meller was silent as a stone. Still, in 1939-1940, her apartment in Mexico City served as the operational base for Eiting-gon: there he waited out raids, kept documents and the "treasury", from there he directed the operation through liaisons. Meller was

also a member of Troll's "support group", constantly pushing her fellow Spaniards Juan and Harry to energetic actions. It was the perfect time to get Ramon out of jail. No one would associate Troll's escape with the "hand of Moscow", since the Soviet embassy settled in Mexico City only in the second half of 1943. Unfortunately, Meller's attempts to stir up her colleagues turned out

to be useless, and they, dissatisfied with her "intrusiveness", took advantage of her conflict with the Communist Party - she was denied political trust, all the more she should not be allowed near the Troll. And so the false inventions of the party leaders were reported to the New York residency, which took care of Troll from afar: "Meller is a seasoned German agent, she has a suspicious link with the Mexican government, she is a hidden Trotskyist," etc. These intrigues, gossip and a tangle of mutual accusations had to be patiently dealt with

by Kasparov. He **quickly realized** that

the leadership of the Spanish Communist Party expelled **Meller** from the "ranks", fearing her failure in the Troll case. Possible complications would undermine the authority of the party, which the already reactionary Mexican **press** branded as the "fifth column of Bolshevism" in the country. Kasparov was not worried about Meller - "a courageous woman who wrote many books and articles in support of the Soviet Union, despite her illnesses and torn nerves", but the leaders of the Communist Party of Spain, who showed an unhealthy interest in Soviet intelligence operations. **Such** signals constantly came **to** the resident, **and**, given that the Spanish emigration

was increasingly **stratified**, losing its former militancy, ideological **homogeneity** (communist, of course), often **spreading** to a hostile camp, the excessive **curiosity** **of** the "party head" about the work of the NKGB in Mexico **could** also mean someone's hidden interest in the Troll case.

In the leadership of the Spanish Communist Party, the struggle between the adherents of Ibarruri and her opponents, the supporters of the "new line", who were not guilty of the bitter defeats of the civil war, intensified. At the epicenter of this confrontation were experienced members of the CPI, Jesús Hernandez and Enrique Castro Delgado. A member of the "American Secretariat" of the CPI, Hernandez left the USSR for Mexico, where he was met by the authorities with the honors due to the former minister of the Spanish Republic. Poorly calculating his options, he tried to change the situation in the Mexican section of the CPI and seize the reins of power in his own hands. But Ibarruri's supporters held firm and he lost.

His friend Castro, who was then in Moscow, acted in a "parallel course", though more cautiously, and also did not succeed. On May 5, 1944, the leadership of the CPI held a meeting with a clearly defined task: to expel Hernandez from the party, and to remove Castro from the Central Committee. Arguments of various calibers were put into play, up to and including accusations of "dissidents" of moral degradation, a comfortable life during the war years, personal indiscretion and other sins. Despite the protests of Dolores, the Soviet authorities still allowed Castro to leave for Mexico. Such liberalism towards Hernandez and Castro was perceived by the Spanish emigration as obvious.

the fact of their belonging to the NKVD. Once in Mexico, both Castro and Hernandez, by inertia, tried to appeal to the USSR Embassy on all controversial issues, exposing the "corrupt gang" of Ibarruri. They tried to involve Meller in their "fight" as well. Why, she was expelled too! And now, in this explosive

situation, rumors about the strange mission of Caridad Mercader, her extravagant behavior, crazy spending, little hidden proximity to Soviet diplomats were circulating around the Spanish colony (cars with embassy numbers were noticed several times near her house). It became more and more obvious that Kira could become a bargaining chip in the factional struggle in the CPI. ... The meeting between Mercader and Martha Meller

took place at the latter's apartment. They know each other well, and Caridad didn't need a long preface. Kira immediately got down to business: how to contact the head of the "support group"? who is in it? What is the date of the operation? Caridad threatened: "If they don't connect me with an illegal leader, I myself will go to Ramon and find out everything from him personally." It was an ultimatum, and therefore, overnight, in

violation of all security rules, it was necessary to arrange a meeting between Caridad and Alexander Cooper, who, after arriving in Mexico City in the summer of 1944, was quietly working to prepare the "discharge of the patient from the hospital." It was he who was the new illegal commissioner of the NKGB instead of Juan and Harry. According to reports, Cooper was an

"important figure" in the NKGB, enjoyed considerable confidence there. He was born in Geneva, in a Spanish family with "Jewish roots", which then moved to Vigo, the port city of Spain. He received a medical education and was a good surgeon. He began to cooperate with the Soviet security agencies during the years of the Spanish Civil War. The escape of the Troll from prison, prepared by his group, was, according to Cooper, an alternative in the event that it was not possible to "negotiate" an amicable deal with the Mexican authorities, the likelihood of which was, of course, scanty. During a personal meeting, Cooper seemed to be able to

persuade Kira not to interfere, got her consent to an immediate departure for

Cuba. But a few **days** passed , and it seemed to Caridad that they were playing a dishonest game with her - ' She again visited Meller and poured out all her fury:

"There, in Moscow, I learned all the duality of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. For the sake of a high strategy, the Chinese and Greeks were betrayed, and Spain was completely exchanged for a handful of lentils, although the deceived Spaniards fought heroically on the German front, not sparing their lives. During the four years of living in Moscow, I was never received by Stalin. Apparently, this is called "socialist democracy". And here, in bourgeois Mexico, a month after my arrival, I had only to lift a finger, and I received an audience with the Minister of War Cardenas and was made an appointment with President Camacho. If it were not for serving the common communist idea, I would have broken with the NKVD long ago and gone to work in the Communist Party ... "

Succumbing to painful emotions, Kira tried to turn Cooper and Meller against the "Beria department". She told Alexander that his wife was forgotten by everyone in Moscow, she was starving, living in the most difficult conditions. Marte, without batting an eyelid, reported that her son Garcia did not die at the front, as they said in the Soviet embassy, but, probably ... was shot. Caridad's intolerance, sometimes turning into hostility, disorganized the work of those who tried to hasten Ramon's release. Often in her words resentment towards Eitingon showed through. Having once heard "lyrical ichthyia" from her daughter Meller about her life together with Tom, Caridad laughed:

"Don't hope for a new meeting with Naum. For him women's issues are irrelevant. Service is more important. He always lied to me too . He lived with me in Paris, Mexico City, Moscow - and nothing. In the Soviet Union, you definitely won't see him, but you will definitely be sent to some state farm so that you fantasize less." Through Magda, Caridad forwarded

a letter to Ramon: " My dear, I came to Mexico City by accident. But now no force will force me to leave here. While you are behind bars, I am not free either .

The lawyer Seniceros still had to arrange a meeting between Caridad and his son at the beginning of 1945. Basically, visitors

There were many trolls: sympathetic, inquisitive, countless journalists "identifiers" of the police ... But only for Caridad such a visit was contraindicated. Her visit confirmed to all "interested persons" that the main purpose of her visit was Jacques Mornard. After this meeting in prison, one could expect any action to rescue the prisoner. The Hunters were ready. Still, there was a sure chance to capture the "agents of Moscow" red-handed. This would also lead to a break in diplomatic relations.

There is unconfirmed evidence that Caridad personally petitioned the influential Lázaro Cardenas for forgiveness of her son, persuaded Lombardo Toledano to take the lead in conducting a propaganda campaign demanding Mornaru's amnesty. She also begged Lombardo to put in a good word for her son to the president, to ask for pardon. The trade union leader did not agree: he probably could not find a convincing argument, despite his flexible mind and skill in behind-the-scenes deals. The names of Toledano, Meller,

Caridad Mercader in the perception of the Mexican leadership were associated with the Soviet Union. Any initiatives of these persons would be interpreted unequivocally: the Soviet embassy puts forward its figures, remaining in the shadows.

The fussy actions of Caridad more and more put off the operation. The internal political situation in Mexico also changed not for the better. It became especially unfavorable after the death of the Soviet ambassador Konstantin Umansky. The impression was created that, as a result of the disaster at the Mexico City airport, the reactionary forces received the "go-ahead" for unpunished provocations against Soviet institutions and citizens. Any misfire in Operation Troll could lead to irreparable interstate consequences.

The new Soviet Ambassador Alexander Ivanovich Kapustin, unlike his predecessor, considered it unacceptable to conduct "offensive diplomacy" in Mexico - the southern "underbelly" of the United States. This meant, in his opinion, teasing the bull with a red rag. Kapustin behaved emphatically modestly, getting out of the embassy in exceptional cases, and, perhaps, by this he showed a deep understanding of the peculiarities of the moment and diplomatic wisdom. It gave the impression that he

prefers the functions of a caretaker to the duties of an ambassador: under him, the house on the "calzada Takubaya" underwent a noticeable modernization. Taking care of comfort, Kapustin seemed to say: "We are here for a long time." As N. S. Leonov noted in his book "Hard Times", the ambassador "spent eight difficult years of the Cold War in Mexico, not calling fire on the embassy and sitting out in all-round defense." The freedom of maneuver of Soviet diplomats and other employees was increasingly limited, the ranks of friends were rapidly thinning, and the number of visitors was declining.

Caridad, who believed that it was possible to rescue her son from captivity with a fleeting decisive operation, became more and more convinced of the complexity of the task. Kira began to be tormented by the thought that her presence in Mexico City had actually harmed Ramon. She recalled the harsh words spoken to her by her son in person. From the depressive state Caridad tried to get out of the excessive use of alcohol. It was during this period that she got into a car accident. Caridad was found unconscious on the pavement, with broken ribs. She had a significant amount of money and a cipher pad with her. The contents of the purse miraculously did not end up in the hands of the police.

In March 1945, Kasparov told Kira that the Center had requested a full report from her for the entire period after her departure from Moscow. Having subdued her pride, Caridad answered the request, but selectively, ignoring unfavorable topics for herself. The resident prepared his comments, supplementing the "gaps" of her message. From them it followed that Caridad still intended to "fight for her son."

I had to resort to the last, but strong means: to influence her through Ramon. Now it is impossible to find out what he wrote to her, but one can guess that under the influence of the stress he experienced (freedom was close - just reach out your hand) he was unrestrained and ruthless. Despair and hatred were evident in every word. Around the same time, Caridad learned that Soviet intelligence officers in Western Europe were taking steps to summon her son Jorge to the Soviet Union, who was in Hitler's camp during the war years.

Kira took this news as a clear sign of distrust of her: "they are trying to get one more hostage besides Luis," who, however, has become fully accustomed to Soviet reality. Outwardly, he was satisfied with his life and believed that brilliant scientific prospects were opening up before him. After these upheavals, Caridad seemed to have been replaced. No more agreements were needed.

Meanwhile, the situation in Mexico was deteriorating before our eyes. The Cold War was creeping up unnoticed. The experience gained by the Americans in neutralizing the Axis states on the continent was now useful for influencing Soviet institutions.

Kira with her characteristic energy *zasobiralis* in a way. When asked by the French consul about the purpose of her trip to France, she answered: "Children - Montserrat and Jorge - need my help. During the war they suffered greatly, especially their son, who spent four years in a German concentration camp." When asked about the source of income, she answered: "I have a fortune in Cuba." To renew her Cuban passport, Caridad secured an appointment with the ambassador and charmed him with her manners, secularity, knowledge of the behind-the-scenes aspects of life in Havana, and spoke in detail about family ties with wealthy people on the island.

In early October 1945, Kira exchanged farewell letters with her son, and on the 24th of the same month, in the port of New York, she boarded the steamer Santa Paula. In two weeks it will moor in Le Havre... The resident could breathe

easy. Caridad's improvisations completely exhausted him...
Meanwhile, Baez

continued his research. He guessed that the preparation of Mercader's "escapade" was supervised "ex officio" by Ivan Alexandrovich Kumaryan, the third Soviet resident in Mexico City in a short time, who replaced Kasparov, who was literally driven out of the country by a series of gross demonstrative provocations. (I. A. Kumaryan was born in 1909 in the village of Churus, Kar province (now Turkey). He participated in the civil war in Spain, first as the chief of staff of the aviation division as an In the state security bodies - interpreter, then in the republican army. since 1943.)

Kumaryan, however, gave no reason to suspect him. **He did not** exhaust the guys from the "outdoor" with many hours **of walks** around the city, he was "predictable", he met **only** with acquaintances of the police

people who are **in** contact with the Soviet Embassy, whose names were **well known** (they slipped in the press as “red accomplices **of the Kremlin**”). Everything is quiet, without chases and shootings. But **Baeza** suspected that he was in a still

water... **In** January 1948, Baeza decided to meet a **Russian** diplomat. Maybe in order to **add** another picturesque episode to your book. **The pretext** was found: the Soviet embassy was selling a defiantly scarlet Buick bought by Tarasov. The Mexican drove up to the building on Takubaya on **a service** van, clearly demonstrating that **he really** needed a new car. They did not agree on the price, **but** Baesa met Kumaryan: a contact, **groovy**, **with** the charisma of an “oriental” person (Armenian blood **flowed** in his veins).

Then the Mexican often visited Kumaryan to **unwind**, to relax his soul. Baeza often talked about interesting **things** . For example, about Agustin Darca and **Ramon** Mercader. About Caridad and her adventures in **Mexico City**. So, according to him, the Spaniard **lived for some time in the** Sarabia family and trusted her very much, although one **of her members** , Antonio, worked for the FBI. He was a tenacious agent, apolitical, unscrupulous, willing to do anything to get promoted. He did not like Americans and often complained that **he had to** work for ignorant gringos who spent days in bars, knowing that they were toiling for them.

Mexican detectives - these hired detective peons - and then send victorious reports to Washington. They paid especially well for information about **the “Russian presence”**. Sarabia did not go into details, but proudly said that he "made good money on the exposed Russians." Among others, he mentioned the name Caridad.

“Somehow **she became aware of the impending danger,**” Sarabia **complained, “and disappeared from Mexico City. Someone warned her, and she changed the**

scenery...” Kumaryan hoped for a political solution to the problem with Troll, primarily for the amnesty of President Aleman, and in this direction he conducted a cunning sounding. I wanted to make sure. But, apparently, the president was not going to quarrel with influential followers and admirers of Trotsky in the United States and around the world. Therefore, the most trivial variant was also worked out at the same time.

- bribing the prison administration. One of the pen-pals passed as Baker. True, after the escape from prison of two prisoners, his opportunities began to wane. It was expected that he was about to be removed from office. Mercader himself did

not sit idly by. He established friendly relations with the secretary-clerk of the prison. According to Ramon, it could be used to organize an escape. But he set a condition: to run away together and straight ... to the Soviet Union. The Soviet residency had previously studied this secretary and could not say with certainty what kind of person he was, what he really was. It happens. Complete impenetrability. Therefore, through Cooper, Mercader was strictly instructed not to enter into any negotiations with him. Subsequently, it turned out that this warning came in time ... Meanwhile, the situation around the Soviet embassy was

becoming more and more tense. The anti-Soviet campaign reached its climax. Virtually all of our diplomats' connections in the media have been accused of subversive activities. In September 1946, the Novedades newspaper called Hans Mayer, who

worked for a long time at the Mexican-Soviet Institute of Cultural Relations, "a capable spy for the GPU, who enjoys the full confidence of Beria." Leo Zuckerman, Oscar Danziger, Elena Gomez Vasquez, Eduard Weisblat, Margarita Nelken, Fedor Dragutin and others were mentioned as dangerous agents of the USSR operating in Mexico. In a series of articles clearly inspired by the Americans, a certain Karl Rifner labeled many political émigrés, especially Spaniards, as "agents of Moscow" who, they say, were thrown into Mexico en masse in order to destabilize it. Excelsior printed excerpts from day to day "from Trotsky's libel on Comrade Stalin" (the expression of an embassy review of the press).

Novedades published the revelations of the defector Viktor Kravchenko, and a little later, the anti-Soviet articles of the former press ^{from} attache of Cuba in the USSR Mirales (for which he was beaten by slandered Spanish emigrants). The Ombre Libre newspaper featured excerpts from the book "The Night Left Behind" by Jan Valtin, who "suffered from the Soviet and Hitlerite totalitarian

modes." The newspaper "Ul-timas noticias" distinguished itself with the article "The Institute of Public Opinion of Mexico - the center of communist espionage." The director of the institute, Laszlo Radvani, a Hungarian Jew, a Marxist, a talented economist, the husband of the German writer Anna Segers, was accused of all sins. It was reported that he had been spying for the GPU since the 1930s, and in Mexico City he continued this unseemly occupation, involving in this activity "his assistants" - the writer Ludwig Rennes and the famous Comintern cadre Vittorio Vidali. The police set up defiant

surveillance of the leaders of the Mexican Communist Party. The General Secretary of the ITUC reported with alarm to the Soviet embassy that the reaction was preparing public opinion for a police action to crush the "left" organizations. An attack was also expected on the headquarters of the Communist Party. Joining D. A. Siqueiros in May

1946 - a shocking act in an atmosphere of persecution and repression - was immediately marked by surveillance. Filery relentlessly followed the activists of the Slavic Club. The chairman of the Society of Friends of the USSR, which by that time was eking out a miserable existence, Jose Mansisidor, visiting the house on Tacubaya, bitterly stated that the Americans were trying to get Mexico to break off relations with the Soviet Union in order to neutralize even the hypothetical possibility of Soviet penetration into Central America. Propaganda pressure increased so much that the diplomats of the

"people's democracies" behaved like an ostrich, implicitly, but distancing themselves from the Soviet embassy. There was a smell of World War III in the air, and the spouses of the "People's Democratic" representatives were intensively stocking up on gold and currency. The Mexican press was silent about Something and the fact of the beating of Soviet diplomatic couriers.

During this period, Kasparov's apartment was shelled twice. The first time this happened was in November

1947: unknown people were hitting the windows of the second floor (fortunately, the resident's wife and children were on the first floor). Another shelling occurred in December: bullets pierced the ceiling of the bedroom. Kasparov and his wife were at the next reception, the children were left unattended and,

of course they were terrified. The family had to move to embassy building.

Kapustin was instructed by Molotov to make an oral presentation to the Mexican Foreign Ministry on these extraordinary incidents, demand an investigation, and add that, in the interests of Mexico and the Soviet Union, "the incidents will not be made public." One of the participants in the Watergate scandal, Howard Hunt,

told in his memoirs about how he worked in the CIA station in Mexico City in the early 50s. He and his colleagues had immeasurably greater capabilities than their Soviet opponents. Illegal penetrations into the premises of the missions of "people's democracies", illegal tapping, inducement to escape "in the name of freedom", fabrication of misinformation were routine business. CIA operatives were assisted by American entrepreneurs who had settled in the country, Mexican journalists and politicians who wanted to "earn extra money", fugitives from the communist parties. All fit for the job.

So, Hunt described how the former hero of the Spanish Civil War Valentin Gonzalez (partisan nickname Campesino) created under his dictation (or rather, they created for him) the revealing book Life and Death in the USSR. In a similar way, the book of the former leader of the Comintern, Eudocio Ravines, The Path of Yanan, was prepared. In the same years, by the way, E. Castro Delgado ("I lost faith in Moscow", 1950) and X. Hernandez ("People "made" in Moscow", 1952) published their memoirs. For the leadership of the CPI, their trajectory became a classic example of slipping into betrayal: these writings caused considerable harm to the unity of the party and were willingly used by Francoist propaganda to expose the "vices of the communists." Hunt spoke at some length about the strengthening of the CIA apparatus in Mexico, working side by side with the already dense

network of Hoover agents "who, **since** the beginning of the Second World War, by **presidential** decree (Franklin Delano Roosevelt), have turned Latin America into a protectorate of the FBI." The strengthening of American intelligence services in Mexico did not go unnoticed **by** the Soviet embassy. For example, in July 1950 alone, more than 250 intelligence and counterintelligence officers arrived in the country. Apparently it went

a continental- scale hunt for "atomic spies" of Soviet intelligence who had safely slipped out of Canada and the United States. All this, of course, did not contribute to the

solution of the **Troll case**. Here, the "most favored nation" regime was no longer foreseen. The protective barrier **became** more and more deaf. Life constantly threw appropriate pretexts to the Americans. So, in Guatemala, the progressive government of Hacobo Arbenz came to power, which was immediately enrolled by the CIA in the pro-Soviet. As a result, the sending of additional reinforcements to the American intelligence services, the flow of disinformation, the search for secret connections between the Soviet embassy and the "Red Guatemalans". **Rumors** again spread about the supply of Soviet weapons to the Central American region, the abandonment of Moscow instructors for guerrilla warfare, and even about the appearance of "mysterious Soviet submarines" that allegedly refueled in Puerto Barrios. The limit of ingenuity was the message that **the Russians** had set up a military base on Lake Peten. The UPI agency **did not** hesitate to spread this "misinformation" around the world ...

On February 10, 1948, Baeza unexpectedly looked into the Soviet embassy. Mexican's favorite hobby: venality of the authorities. Alvaro bitterly recalled that he encountered her everywhere, and most often in the police. In 1940, he happened to form a motorized **patrol**

service in Mexico City. Considerable funds were raised among bankers, industrialists and merchants, with which Baeza purchased about 30 cars in the USA. When he gathered for the second batch, high-ranking police officers tortured him with confidential requests: "It doesn't cost you anything to carve out an extra car ..." It never occurred to them that this was impossible **for** him. Hence the conflicts, slander, revenge.

"I am an idealist, I seek justice and I always lose. The other day I visited the house of Minister of War Lemon - this is a real palace! Montezuma himself never dreamed of such a thing! Former President Ávila Camacho acquired the richest oil field "Palma" near the productive field "Poso Rico". President Aleman built himself a yacht for 980 thousand

dollars and ordered a special plane, which will pull on the whole million. And near the Chapul-tepek park, construction is in full swing - there is his estate for several blocks! No, Mexico is ripe for a new revolution, we need to give a good shake to the overweight ex-revolutionaries! Baesa said. And leaving, as if by the way he threw: "I know that you have prepared an escape ... Mornara ... Don't do this. At least for now. The Gringos are in ambush."

The Mexican didn't even glance at Kumarian to check the effect. He clicked the metal gate of the embassy and sat down in the service wreck. "They really don't want scandals," Alvaro pointedly pointed upwards, "and even more they don't want to sing to someone else's tune. We don't want scandals prepared north of the Rio Grande." Of course, Baez did not mention this conversation in his book; apparently, it

was not of particular importance to him. ... Immersed in a measured prison life, Ramon Mercader patiently served his

term. Here is a curious episode, given in the "bestseller" of the 60s by Felix Vargas Chacon, who did not miss the charms of the "black castle", where this Venezuelan swindler met Ramon: "Jacques Mornard ... called himself a Belgian by nationality, but. .. was in fact a Spanish anarchist... I had a long talk with him, and he revealed

to me that it was not the murder of Trotsky that caused him the greatest pangs of conscience, but the involvement (in the case) of a girl named Sylvia Ageloff, whom he met in Paris in 1938. Seduced by him, the girl told him that her sister was the secretary of the man who created the Red Army and whom Stalin sent into exile. Mornar wept when he remembered that during the trial, Sylvia had yelled at him:

- Murderer! Geek! Coward! I won't rest until I find out that you committed suicide in prison!.. A dirty pawn of the

GPU!" Chacon's friend did not let him listen to the outpourings of Morn-ra, took the Venezuelan aside:

"Perhaps Mornar didn't even let you breathe, telling about his misfortunes. This is his usual occupation with all newcomers. At he has time for stories, because he served nine years, and all eleven are ahead.

But time passed, and the Troll, judging by his external reactions,
gradually got used to his position.

If you believe the numerous testimonies of that time, then Mercader did not experience much discomfort in prison. He lived in a single spacious cell with all amenities and even a TV. Twice a week his future wife visited him. Several times the police became aware that the prisoner was preparing an escape. But as soon as he found out about it himself, he categorically refused. After Stalin's death, there were no proposals to escape, which the prisoner noted with satisfaction and mentally praised himself for his caution. It is possible that the surviving performer seriously bothered someone and, under the pretext of escaping, they were going to simply remove him. Indeed, after the death of Stalin, a permanent period of fierce struggle for power began in the top party leadership of the USSR. Jacques Mornard was attributed by these people to

"undesirable witnesses".

The leading hierarchs of the CPSU did not want to remember the existence of the Troll in distant Mexico: "Stalin's deeds. You never know what this Spaniard, this hired killer, can say and do. Does he receive a cash pension? Gets... Complains about anything? No, he doesn't complain... Well, that's good. Let him sit. Knew what

walked..."

Ramon Mercader found himself at large only in May 1960 and was immediately transferred to the Soviet 1st Union. In 1973 he moved to Cuba. I rarely saw my mother. According to brother Luis, Ramon never forgave his mother: "Through her fault, I spent an extra sixteen years in prison." Caridad died in 1975 at her home in France, lying on a bed under a

large portrait of Stalin at the head. Ramon outlived her by only three years. He passed away in terrible agony - from bone cancer. Both received a pension from the KGB until their death. Tombstones on their graves were also installed at the expense of the KGB: hers - at the Pantin cemetery in Paris, and his - at Kuntsevsky in Moscow ...

It is probably impossible to get complete information about all the intricacies of preparing the shoots of Ramon Mercader now. But there is evidence to paint a fairly clear picture.

this period in the life of the Troll. Very significant information is provided in the memoirs left by him, Louis Mercader, Ramon's younger brother, told something about this in the book of memoirs of Alvaro Baez - a police agent who tried to "privately" unravel the mystery of the prisoner Lecumberri, the stories of Yuri Antonovich Markov, who oversaw in the 40s, the Mexican direction in the First Directorate of the NKGB-MGB.

Chapter 13

SOVIET FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

On July 10, 1934, by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs - the NKVD of the USSR was formed, within which the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) was created. The main functions of the OGPU were transferred to this department. The foreign department became the 5th department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR. The government defined its tasks as follows: revealing conspiracies directed against the USSR and the activities of foreign states, their intelligence agencies and general staffs, as well as anti-Soviet political organizations;

disclosure of sabotage, terrorist and espionage activities on the territory of the USSR by foreign intelligence agencies, white émigré centers and other organizations;

management of the activities of overseas residencies; control over the work of the visa bureau, the entry of foreigners abroad, management of work on the registration and registration of foreigners

in the USSR. Whatever the shortcomings or omissions **of the document**, it was a state normative act **that gave** the right to the 5th department of **the GUGB**, that is, foreign **intelligence**, to conduct undercover work in foreign countries **in order** to obtain information on security issues of the Soviet state. In

1938, the country's leadership again returned to the issue of improving intelligence activities abroad.

The work of the 5th department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR was subjected to a thorough and comprehensive analysis, proposals for its improvement were considered in such a way, the adopted document said, "so that the department could launch extensive intelligence work abroad through political, scientific and technical intelligence, identify intrigues foreign intelligence services and white émigré centers on the territory of the Soviet Union. Thus, the main directions of activity of foreign intelligence were preserved: political, scientific and technical and foreign

counterintelligence. The staff of the department was approved in the amount of 210 people, 13 divisions were created in its structure, 7 of which were engaged in the management of foreign residency tours on a geographical basis. The rest of the units performed various functions necessary for conducting intelligence work. In particular, they supervised scientific and technical intelligence, work on Russian emigration, the "development" of Trotskyist and "right" organizations, operational records, etc. The 5th department, although small in number, thus acquired on the eve of the war, a fairly developed, well-thought-out structure aimed at working on a large scale. Well, how was foreign intelligence funded? The

archive of the SVR has preserved the financial statistics of the OGPU and foreign intelligence for 1930. INO then received 300 thousand rubles for its maintenance and foreign operations. On the eve of the Great

Patriotic War, the budget of Soviet foreign intelligence for the first time reached the figure of 1 million rubles.

For comparison: the expenditure part of the state budget of the USSR in 1940 amounted to 17.4 billion rubles, including defense - 5.8 billion, public administration - 0.7 billion.

The combination of work from "legal" and illegal positions brought the desired results. In the prewar years, Soviet foreign intelligence managed to penetrate many important objects of the main capitalist countries. So, in 1933-1937, the "legal" residency in Germany, headed by B. A. Berman, and then B. M. Gordon, and illegal residencies under the leadership of V. M. Zarubin and F. K. Parparov acquired

valuable agents who had access to secret documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through an agent recruited by Parparov under the cover of working with the intelligence of a third country ("foreign flag"), the residency systematically received information about the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German embassies abroad and foreign embassies in Berlin.

The agent network of foreign intelligence included persons associated with influential circles and the leadership of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (NSDAP). Thanks to this, the Soviet leadership had information about the activities of the Nazi party apparatus. Systematically obtained information about the intelligence service of the Nazi Party. The work of the police against the Communist Party of Germany and foreign communists was regularly monitored, which made it possible to identify a number of provocateurs in their ranks. The Berlin residencies also had sources in the counterintelligence agencies of Nazi Germany. In 1933 an illegal residency

was established in England. It included experienced illegal intelligence agents A. M. Orlov, T. S. Mally, I. Reif. It was they who acquired and prepared a group of promising sources that later became part of the gold fund of foreign intelligence under the name "Cambridge" or "Big Five". (It included Kim Philby, Donald McLean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross.) A prominent Soviet illegal spy A. G. Deutsch played a special role in the creation of the group. Another illegal spy, D. A. Bystroletov, managed to recruit an employee of the cipher service of the British Foreign Office. Good agent positions in England and France in the pre-war period made it

possible for foreign intelligence to obtain valuable documentary information about the policy pursued by the British ruling circles of "appeasement" of Nazi Germany and encouragement of its aggressive aspirations to the East.

In Italy, intelligence managed to infiltrate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intelligence service, some diplomatic missions.

From the beginning of the civil war in Spain, following the instructions of the country's leadership, foreign intelligence assisted the government of Republican Spain in the fight against the rebels and the German-Italian interventionists. Revealing secret plans

Germany and Italy to prepare and commit aggression against the legitimate Spanish government, the transfer of volunteers and weapons from other countries to Spain, and, finally, the transfer to the USSR after the fall of the republic of a large group of participants in the civil war who were in mortal danger - this is not a complete list of what foreign intelligence had to do during the heroic and tragic events in Spain.

Significant success was achieved by Soviet intelligence in the early 1930s in a number of other countries as well. In the United States, an illegal residency under the leadership of I. A. Akhmerov and B. Ya. Bazarov recruited several valuable agents who had direct access to State Department employees and received information from them on a wide range of issues. A source with connections in President Roosevelt's entourage was acquired, who transmitted unique information about the position of the country's ruling circles during the period of military conflict in Europe maturing.

Much attention was paid to the organization of intelligence work in the Baltics. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia served as a springboard for the intelligence and subversive activities of Germany, other Western states and the largest anti-Soviet emigre organizations against the USSR. It was carried out not only with the knowledge, but also with the active support of the governments of the Baltic countries. The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to intelligence information in the Baltic states is evidenced by the fact that in May 1940, foreign intelligence resident I.A. Chitschayev, operatives E.I. Kravtsov and V.T. Yakovlev, and from Kaunas - resident S. I. Ermakov for a personal report to Stalin.

Our southern neighbors - Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey - in the pre-war years occupied a significant place in the activities of Soviet intelligence. The diplomatic departments of the Soviet Union, with the active assistance of intelligence, managed to establish friendly relations with the countries of the Middle East region, provided them with all possible economic and technical assistance. Foreign intelligence did not work against these countries, since they did not pose a direct threat to the USSR, it used their territory to work against potential adversaries, primarily the Axis countries: Germany, Italy and Japan. Diplomats and agents of the fascist

Germany, for example, actively worked in Iran and Turkey, trying to draw these countries into the orbit of their designs against the Soviet Union. Soviet foreign intelligence, revealing these plans, carried out measures to disrupt or neutralize them. As is known, as a result of Nazi Germany, it was not possible to use these countries in the fight against the anti-Hitler coalition in the way it would have done.

wanted.

Much work was carried out in those years in the Far East. Japan did not hide plans to seize territories in Primorye and Siberia, continued to openly support anti-Soviet, including the White Guard, forces in China, widely used them not only for military preparations for an attack on the Soviet state, but also in espionage, sabotage and terrorist actions. Thanks to a series of operational measures, the activities of many of the most dangerous White émigré organizations in the Far East region were neutralized and their leaders compromised. Some of them managed to be taken to the USSR, where they stood trial.

Foreign intelligence has achieved considerable success in its work on Japan in other countries, in particular in China and Korea. At the beginning of 1938, reliable intelligence information was received that the Japanese had set up a secret laboratory in Harbin to develop bacteriological weapons. About 200 microbiologists from Kyoto University, together with the military, **conducted** experiments on the cultivation and **spread** of plague, typhoid, and cholera bacteria. This information, as especially important, was reported to Stalin. As a

result, individual people's commissariats, scientific **and** medical institutions were instructed to develop a system of measures in case of a massive occurrence of dangerous diseases both in the army and among the population of the Soviet Far East. One of the important tasks of foreign intelligence in the prewar years was work on China.

Proceeding from the principles of its policy, the Soviet Union supported those forces in China that fought for the country's independence and opposed the dismemberment of its territory and the creation of puppet states. The Kuomintang was provided with various assistance, including military assistance, weapons and ammunition were supplied, military units of the Kuomintang army were sent

military advisers. At the same time, the Soviet side constantly emphasized that it was providing assistance to repel the Japanese aggressors, and not to use it in the internal struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Part of this aid went through intelligence channels. She coordinated her work against the Japanese with Kuomintang intelligence. In 1938, for this purpose, the Joint Bureau was created on an equal footing. At first, the bureau was quite successful, but later the Kuomintang intelligence officers began to use it to obtain unilateral benefits, and gradually it ceased to exist.

Great assistance was rendered to the Chinese in the preparation of their reconnaissance and sabotage detachments, which were thrown into the occupied territories to fight the Japanese army. Intelligence work in China was carried out through "legal" residencies, of which there were about twenty. They were located, in particular, in Harbin, Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Tianjin, Nanjing, Hankou, in the regional centers of Xinjiang and other cities. In Harbin and Shanghai, in addition, there were illegal residencies. The Harbin residency worked most successfully. Japanese-occupied Manchuria was the center of Japanese military activity in the region. It scattered their networks and intelligence services of various states. The Harbin station (along with the Seoul station) managed to obtain in 1927 the well-known "Tanaka memorandum", obtain information about the preparation of the Japanese for an attack on the Mongolian People's Republic shortly before the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River, promptly inform the Center about the concentration of units of the Kwantung Army near the borders of the Soviet Union army before the battles on Lake Khasan, to inform about the Japanese preparations for the capture of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. Very useful work for the country was carried out by foreign

intelligence in the 1930s in the economic, scientific and technical areas. In the USA, England, Germany and other countries, materials were obtained that played a significant role in the technical progress of domestic industry, including the development of military industries. Documentary information on aircraft and engine building, radio communications, military optics, technology for the production of synthetic

gasoline, anti-chemical protection, materials about new types of warships, submarines, artillery systems - this is not a complete list of information obtained by intelligence in the field of military equipment. They rendered substantial assistance in strengthening the defense capability of the state and in the further development of science and technology in the USSR.

Successful work of the Soviet foreign intelligence in general! in the pre-war years, the repressions that fell upon her were seriously undermined. By 1938, almost all illegal residencies were liquidated, contacts with the most valuable sources of information were lost. Subsequently, significant efforts were required to restore them. However, some sources were lost forever. Sometimes only one or two employees remained in the "legal" residencies, as a rule, young and inexperienced. The arrests created an atmosphere of confusion, distrust and suspicion in the collectives. In a report sent to the leadership of the NKGB on the work of foreign

intelligence from 1939 to 1941, its then head, P. M. Fitin, wrote: . Most of them were then arrested, and the rest were subject to verification.

There was no question of any intelligence work behind the cordon in this situation. The task was to create, along with the creation of the apparatus of the department itself, the apparatus of residencies behind the cordon.

The losses of the composition were so great that in 1938 for 127 consecutive days from foreign intelligence the country's leadership did not receive any information at all. It happened that there was no one to sign even messages addressed to Stalin, and they were sent signed by ordinary employees of the intelligence apparatus. 92 people were arrested and 87 employees were fired. 67 people were withdrawn from the residencies. As a result of repressions, the commission of the Central Committee. in January 1939, she stated that the NKVD had practically not a single resident and not a single verified agent abroad. The work of the INO has practically failed and, in essence, it needs to be organized anew.

As a result of the measures taken, by the beginning of 1941, foreign intelligence had 40 residencies abroad, in which 250 operatives operated, in total, the foreign intelligence agent network numbered more than three thousand people. The vast majority of them (70 percent) were newly recruited employees.

In order to restore the personnel of intelligence, people with experience in party and organizational work, commanders who had proven themselves in the army, and students who graduated from universities, were still sent to it. However, without the organization of their special training, this did not solve the problem. Persons who did not know foreign languages, were poorly versed in foreign policy issues, and did not have operational skills were often sent to residencies. There was a moment in the Tokyo residency on the eve of the war when not one of the employees of the "legal" residency knew either Japanese or any other foreign language. A similar situation arose in a number of other residencies.

The repressions did not bypass the central apparatus of foreign intelligence. At the end of the 1930s, V. G. Dekanozov headed the 5th department of the GUGB for only a few months. He did not know intelligence. This soon became clear to everyone, including the leadership of the country. Dekanozov was urgently sent as a plenipotentiary to Berlin. At the end of 1939, the department was headed by P. M. Fitin, he was then only 31 years old. A capable, energetic, ardently devoted person, he quickly mastered the basics of reconnaissance skills and showed himself to be a talented organizer. As head of intelligence, he worked until 1946. On the shoulders of Pavel Mikhailovich fell the burden of healing the wounds inflicted by the repressions, restoring the combat effectiveness of intelligence on the eve of the war.

In the same report by P. M. Fitin, it was indicated that in the middle of 1940 695 people worked in its central office. By 1941, thanks to the selfless work of employees, she managed to restore a workable intelligence apparatus in Germany, Italy, England, France, the USA, and China. The largest residencies were in the USA - 18 people, Finland - 17 people, Germany - 13 people. In total, by this time, foreign intelligence had 40 residencies. 242 intelligence officers worked in them, who had a total of about 600 different sources in touch.

information. Actively using them, intelligence regularly received on the eve of the war important information about the foreign and domestic policy of the bloc of fascist states and the leading Western powers.

After the formation of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR on July 10, 1934, the Foreign Department (I NO) moved from the abolished OGPU to the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD. The main tasks of the INO, as before, remained: legal and illegal overseas intelligence; the fight against anti-Soviet emigrant terrorist organizations in the country and abroad; **revealing the interventionist plans of the bourgeois**

states;

revealing the espionage activities of foreign special services and emigrant centers and other anti-Soviet organizations on the territory of the USSR (together with other departments of the NKVD GUGB);

obtaining undercover new technologies for Soviet industry (scientific and technical intelligence);

counterintelligence support of Soviet colonies and foreign births.

Since 1930, the general

staff of the central apparatus of the INO was determined to be 121 people. According to the main directions of intelligence activity, the department included eight departments: **1st - illegal intelligence; 2nd - questions**

of exit and entry into the USSR;

3rd - intelligence in the USA and the main

countries of Europe; 4th - intelligence in Finland and the

Baltic countries; 5th - work on white emigration; 6th -

intelligence in the countries of the

East; 7th - economic intelligence; 8th

- NTR (scientific and technical

intelligence). Artur Khristianovich Artuzov, a

veteran **of the VChK-** GPU bodies , who **previously** led the foreign intelligence of the OGPU , **headed** the Foreign Department of the GUGB. For closer **coordination** of intelligence operations abroad, **A. Kh. Artuzov** was appointed in May 1934 concurrently **as** Deputy Chief of the **Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (RKKA)**. N. I. Eitingon became the head of **illegal intelligence** (1st department).

In connection with the change in the foreign policy **situation** , the priorities of foreign intelligence have also changed: the white émigré movement has ceased to pose **a primary** threat to the USSR, the most important areas of intelligence work have become the creation of a reliable **penetration agent** at vital objects of bourgeois **countries**, capable of extracting information of a political, economic, scientific and technical nature; **exposure** of espionage and subversive activities and plans **against** the USSR on the part of foreign secret services **and emigre** organizations; control over the stay **of foreigners in the country**; strengthening **the provision of** counterintelligence missions abroad. **The structure of the central office was also** changed - the INO **departments and** two included two Soviet independent departments:

The 1st **department, which included nine geographical sectors, led overseas reconnaissance**; The 2nd **department was in charge of foreign counterintelligence and consisted of six sectors that were engaged in the fight against sabotage, terror, espionage by foreign special services and white émigré centers on the territory of the**

USSR. After the final transfer of corps commissar A. Kh. Artuzov to military intelligence in May 1935, Abram Aronovich Slutsky, commissar of the State Security Service of the

2nd rank, replaced him as head of the

INO. On December 25, 1936, the departments of the GUGB were numbered. INO became the 7th department of

the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR. On February 17, 1938, A. A. Slutsky was found dead in the office of the Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD M. P. Frinovsky, according to the official version, death was the result of acute heart failure, however, according to the version of most historians, the head of foreign intelligence was poisoned. After him, the duties of the head of the department were performed by Major of the State Security Service

Sergei Mikhailovich Shpigelglas, and then by Senior Major of the State Security Service Zai

On June 9, 1938, in connection with the disbandment of the GUGB, the foreign intelligence service entered the newly created First Directorate (state security) of the NKVD of the USSR as the 5th department.

Republican Spain was greatly assisted by the intelligence of the state security agencies. Through its channels, the delivery of weapons, ammunition, military equipment to the Republicans, the transfer of volunteers, the export of women, children and the wounded from Spain was arranged. Reconnaissance and sabotage operations were carried out in the

rear of the Francoist troops. In the 1930s, the work of our intelligence officer in Europe, Dmitry Bystroletov, deserved high praise. He managed to get the ciphers of England, France and Czechoslovakia, which made it possible to read the encrypted correspondence of these countries and receive reliable information on many issues of European politics.

With the advent of fascism to power in Germany and the formation of the anti-Soviet "axis" Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, the attention of Soviet intelligence was directed to revealing plans for preparing a war against the USSR, obtaining information about the weapons of a potential enemy. To solve these problems, intelligence had considerable opportunities. We, as noted above, had reliable sources of information in the Nazi Party, police agencies, the military-political and economic circles of Germany, surrounded by the Italian dictator Mussolini, and in the informed circles of Japan.

As a result of the "purges" in the 30s, a crushing blow was dealt to the Soviet intelligence service: out of 450 employees (including the foreign apparatus), 275 people were repressed, that is, more than half of the personnel. The heads of the INO M. A. Trilisser, A. Kh. Artuzov, S. M. Shpigelglas

and 3. I. Passov were shot, D. A. Slutsky was posthumously declared an "enemy of the people", the heads of operational units were liquidated or sent to camps. Recalled to the USSR and repressed: residents in New York - **P.** D. Gutzeit (Gusev), in Berlin - B. M. Gordon, in **London** - A. S. Chapsky, G. B. Grappen and T. S. Mally, in Paris - S. M. Glinsky (Smirnov) and G. N. Kosenko (Kislov), **in** Rome - M. M. Axelrod, the chief resident **for** Asian countries I. T. Ivanov Perekrest, outstanding illegal intelligence officers B. Ya. Bazarov, D. A. Bystroletov, G. S. Syroezhkin and others. The "Yasha Group" was completely liquidated, its leaders Ya. I. were repressed.

Serebryansky, A. I. Syrkin, P. N. Serebryanskaya, S. M. Perevoznikov, A. N. Turyzhnikov, Yu. I. Volkov. Most of the surviving intelligence **officers** came under investigation, many were dismissed from the bodies or demoted. TO

In 1939, as a result of "purges", the work of some of the leading **residencies**, which lost all their employees, had to be **completely** curtailed.

Due to the acute shortage of intelligence personnel in 1936, a special training center was created for their **accelerated** training - the School for Special Purposes (SHON) of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR. The head of the school and **his** deputy were originally Gorsky and M. **M.** Akselrod, who were arrested in October 1938, **after** which the school was headed by V. Kh. Sharmazanashvili and N. F. Krupennikov. Experienced intelligence **masters** S. M. Shpigelglas, M. M. Axelrod, V. S. Grazhul, P. M. Zhuravlev, E. P. Mitskevich,

V. I. Pudin, V. M. Zarubin. **My** father also taught at this school. By 1941, the school had trained several dozen scouts. Among its first graduates **were** the future head of the Soviet foreign intelligence **P. M.** Fitin, future residents and intelligence officers V. G. **Pavlov**, E. T. Sinitsin, A. S. Feklisov, A. A. Yatskov, N. **M.**

Gorshkov, V. M. Ivanov and others.

The name of this unique **educational** institution has changed many times. At first it was the School for Special Purposes (SHON), then the Intelligence School (RSh), then the Higher Intelligence School (HRSh, **it** also had an encrypted name - School No. 101), since November 1968 - the Red Banner Institute (KI), hereinafter named Yu. V. Andropov, since October 1994 - Academy of Foreign Intelligence of the Russian Federation. In the first two years, the enrollment in the SHON was 30 people. Almost the entire first set was repressed during the great "purge". Since 1939, SHON has already graduated more than 70 people. Its budget was 1.5 million rubles. On

September 13, 1938,

the 5th department became part of the recreated GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.

In 1938, a decision was made to strengthen intelligence. The structure of the 5th department was rebuilt, it included the following units:

a) Management (head and two deputies). b) The secretariat in charge of the secret office work (30 people).

c) Functional divisions (economic, personnel, financial). d) Operational

departments: 1st - Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary; 2nd - Japan, China; 3rd - Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria; 4th - Great Britain, Switzerland, France, Spain, the Benelux countries; 5th -

Greece, Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan; 6th - Finland, Scandinavian and Baltic countries; 7th - USA, Canada; 8th -

opposition: Trotskyists, "rightists", etc.; 9th

- emigration; 10th

- NTR; 11th

- operational and technical support; 12th - visas and registration of

foreigners. In total, 210 people worked in the central office of the 5th department at that time. On October 5, 1938, the functions and staff of the abolished Special Bureau under the Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR, which at that time was the first information and analytical unit in the NKVD system, were transferred to the 5th department of the GUGB. Among other things, the functions of the Special Bureau included the preparation of reference materials on the forms and methods of work of foreign intelligence services, the compilation of characteristics for leaders, statesmen and public figures of foreign countries. After the appointment of L.P. Beria as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in November-December 1938, my father, Senior Major Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, performed the duties of head of the 5th department. Then, as mentioned above, the closest associate of L.P. Beria for work in Georgia and his deputy for the NKVD of the USSR Vladimir Grigoryevich Dekanozov, who combined this position with the post of head of the 3rd department of the GUGB (counterintelligence), headed foreign intelligence. He was replaced by a young journalist P. M. Fitin, who c

a graduate of the SEON, who fruitfully led foreign intelligence for the next seven years until 1946.

In 1939-1940, the structure of the 5th department of the GUGB included seventeen operational and functional departments: three European, American, Far Eastern, Middle Eastern, information-analytical, operational-technical, personnel, financial, economic, communications and others. In the prewar period, thanks to

the influx and careful selection of young personnel, and other emergency measures to strengthen intelligence, the leadership of the NKVD managed to recreate an effective and reliable intelligence apparatus. As part of the

People's Commissariat of State Security, created on February 3, 1941, the tasks of directing foreign intelligence were assigned to the Intelligence, and from March 1943 to the First Directorate. About 120 people worked in the central office, including technical staff. There were 45 legal and 14 illegal reconnaissance vehicles operating abroad. In countries such as Germany, Great Britain, France, in addition to the legal one, there were from two to four illegal residencies. In the UNKGB of the border regions (Khabarovsk Territory, Arkhangelsk,

Brest, Leningrad, Lvov and Chita regions), local foreign intelligence units were formed - the 1st (intelligence) departments. In April 1941, it was decided to switch intelligence apparatus abroad to a linear principle of work: certain areas of activity (lines) were assigned to individual employees of the residencies: political, economic or scientific and technical intelligence, external counterintelligence. In the pre-war years, intelligence regularly obtained data on the military-political plans of Germany. A few months before the start of the war, our sources in Berlin reported:

September 20, 1940. At the beginning of next year, Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union. A preliminary step towards this will be the military occupation of Romania.

February 25, 1941. In the highest governmental and military organizations of Germany, the question of a military operation against the USSR is being worked out in strict secrecy.

March 24, 1941. The German General Staff is intensively preparing for an attack on the USSR. A plan is being drawn up to bombard important targets. A plan was developed for the bombing of Leningrad and Kyiv. The aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of cities and industrial facilities of the USSR. April 2, 1941. The headquarters of the German army fully prepared a plan for an attack on the USSR. Army groups formed. April 12, 1941. We inform you with full responsibility that in all official German instances the issue of a military invasion of the USSR is considered resolved. June 16, 1941. All

German military preparations for an attack on the USSR are completely completed, a strike can be expected at any time.

Information

about Germany's preparations for a surprise attack on the USSR also came from our agent, the former commander of the Nazi assault detachments in Berlin, Captain Stenness, who was expelled to China for disagreements with the fascist elite. As you know, intelligence information was not taken into account, and on June 22, 1941, Germany managed to suddenly attack our country. Why this information was not listened to has already been stated in our press more than once. Here are the disinformation measures of Germany, and the intelligence data of the military districts that contradicted this information, and of course Stalin's confidence in his own foresight. However, at the same time, it is obvious that one of the reasons for the neglect of these intelligence reports was that by the end of the 1930s intelligence itself had been compromised by unfounded arrests, accusations of its employees of treason and espionage.

During his tenure as acting head of the Foreign Department of the NKVD, my father was able to learn more about the structure and organization of intelligence operations abroad. Within the framework of the NKVD, there were two divisions that dealt with this. This is the Foreign Department, which was led first by Trilisser, then by Artuzov, Slutsky and Passov. The task of the department was to collect intelligence for the Center, obtained as legally (through our employees who had diplomatic cover or worked in trade

representative offices abroad), and through illegal channels. Of particular importance was information about the activities of governments and private corporations that secretly financed the subversive activities of Russian emigrants and White Guard officers in European countries and in China, directed against the Soviet Union. The foreign department was divided into departments on a geographical basis, and also included departments that were engaged in the collection of scientific, technical and economic intelligence. These departments summarized the materials received from our residencies abroad. At the same time, the priority of illegal channels was quite natural, since there were not so many Soviet diplomatic and trade missions abroad at that time. That is why illegal channels for obtaining the intelligence of interest were so important. At the same time, there was another

intelligence service - the Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, directly subordinate to him and deeply conspiratorial. Its task was to create a reserve network of illegal immigrants to conduct sabotage operations behind enemy lines in Western Europe, the Middle East, China and the United States in case of war. Given the nature of the work, the Special Group did not have its own employees in diplomatic and trade missions abroad. Its apparatus consisted of twenty operatives who were responsible for coordinating the activities of overseas agents. All other employees worked abroad as illegal immigrants. At the end of the 1930s, the number of such illegal immigrants was about sixty people. The leadership of the NKVD could, at its choice, use the forces and means of the Foreign Department and the Special Group to carry out especially important operations, including sabotage and liquidation of the opponents of the USSR abroad. After the liquidation of Trotsky, part of the agents recruited by Eitingon and other

persons attached to his network operating in the United States and Mexico joined the illegals not involved in the operation against Trotsky. This extended network of agents later played an important role in reaching the circles of scientists working on the American atomic bomb. Soviet illegal immigrants with false documents, who did not hold any official positions, settled in the United States in the late 1920s and

early 30s. Their main task was to enter a job where you can have access to scientific and technical information and military-strategic transportation in the event of a war with Japan.

It was during these years that Eitingon and Serebryansky began active work in the United States to recruit Chinese and Japanese emigrants who could be useful in military and sabotage operations against Japan. By this time, the Japanese had managed to capture the central and northern regions of China and Manchuria, and the USSR was afraid of the upcoming war with Japan. At the same time, Eitingon introduced two agents for long-term settlement - Polish Jews, whom he managed to bring to the United States from France. Eitingon also had to assess the potential capabilities of the American Communists in the interests of our intelligence. According to his very sensible proposal, it was not necessary to recruit agents from members of the Communist Party, but it made sense to focus on those who, not being in its ranks, expressed sympathy for communist ideas. Eitingon

acted in parallel with Akhmerov, who, despite Eitingon's strong objections, nevertheless married the niece of Earl Browder, the founder of the American Communist Party. Operations in the United States and the creation of a network of illegal immigrants there were not among the Kremlin's most important goals, since at that time obtaining intelligence data from the New World did not influence Moscow's decisions. Eitingon, however, assigned several of his agents to monitor American policy toward China. **He, in** particular, managed to find journalists from the magazine

"Ameresh", who later formed a lobby that **influenced** the American line of diplomacy in **One of** the agents recruited by Eitingon was **the very** famous Japanese painter Miyagi,

who later **joined** the group of Richard Sorge **in** Japan. Eitingon, **a good** friend of my father Ivan Vinarov (an intelligence adviser under Georgy Dimitrov in the 1940s) **made** contact with Sorge in Shanghai in the late 1920s. Sorge's **information** was regarded as quite valuable throughout **the** 1930s, with the proviso **that both the Germans and** the Japanese consider him a double agent.

The Soviet agent Drug, the Consul General of Germany in Shanghai (he will be discussed in more detail below), often met with Sorge in 1939-1941. He noted his broad awareness of the situation in the Far East, unaware of Sorge's work for the Red Army Intelligence Directorate, and emphasized Sorge's strong, solid ties with German military intelligence. In 1932, Eitingon left California

and returned to the Soviet Union via Shanghai. He was appointed deputy Serebryansky, then Eitingon moved to a leadership position in the Foreign Department of the OGPU. During the period of aggravation of the international situation

on the eve of America's entry into the war, intelligence work along the lines of the NKVD on the East Coast of the United States was headed by Kheifets. Previously, he worked in the Comintern. His father was one of the organizers of the American Communist Party. Heifetz personally knew many prominent American communists. Given the experience of the Comintern, he was sent in the early 30s to work in the intelligence of the NKVD. He organized illegal groups in Germany and Italy in the mid-1930s, acting as an Indian student studying in Europe. Heifetz was actually a Jew, but because of his swarthy skin, despite his blue eyes, he looked like a real immigrant from Asia. In the United States, in "leftist" circles, he was known as Mr. Brown. While previously in Italy, Heifetz met the young Bruno Pontecorvo, then a student,

And A. Sudoplatov - 1 who studied in Rome. Heifetz recommended that Pontecorvo contact Frédéric Joliot-Curie, an eminent French physicist close to the leadership of the French Communist Party. In the future, it was Pontecorvo who became the channel through which we received American atomic secrets from Enrico Fermi.

289 Kheifetz was lucky: in the 30s he was not repressed. He was recalled to Moscow, and although in November 1938 Yezhov ordered his arrest, it was not carried out. Soon Heifetz was sent to the United States, to the West Coast, to intensify intelligence work. He was given the task of establishing strong ties with the agents of "deep settlement", created in his time by Eitingon. original plan

was to create a network of illegal immigrants in American ports, following the example of Scandinavia, to destroy ships with strategic raw materials and fuel for Japan. Unaware of Japanese intentions to attack Southeast Asia or Pearl Harbor, the Soviet military leadership assumed that they would first launch military operations against the USSR.

Heifetz's assistant at the San Francisco consulate, Lyagin, an engineer and a graduate of the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, was given the special task of obtaining data on technological innovations at West Coast enterprises. The main task assigned to him is the collection of materials on the American naval shipbuilding programs. So, in one of his reports, it was said about the great interest that the Americans showed in the program for the construction of aircraft carriers. Lyagin also managed to recruit an agent in San Francisco, who gave Soviet intelligence a description of the devices being developed to protect ships from magnetic mines. In order not to arouse suspicion, Lyagin refrained from any contact with American pro-communist circles. However, he did not work long in San Francisco. He was recalled to Moscow and promoted to the post of deputy head of the NKVD overseas intelligence. He was only thirty-two years old. During the German occupation, he was sent as an illegal resident to the German naval base at Nikolayev on the Black Sea. He managed to carry out a number of sabotage on the base. The Gestapo eventually captured him and the group's radio operator. Lyagin refused **to escape** from prison, as he could not leave the wounded radio operator arrested with him. They were shot. **In 1945** he was posthumously awarded **the title** of Hero of the Soviet Union. Heifetz, who remained in San Francisco, managed, having received an orientation from Eitingon,

to reach the previously introduced two "deep subsidence" agents. Both of them led the ordinary, inconspicuous life of ordinary Americans: one was a dentist, the other was a retail business owner. Both of them were, as I said, Jewish emigrants from Poland. A stomatologist known personally to Serebryansky, at one time received money from our country in order to graduate from a medical college in France and become a certified specialist. Both of these people were implanted